Passenger Presence Is Not “Possession” Under NRS 205.273 Absent Proof of Dominion or Control

1. Introduction

This juvenile delinquency appeal required the Supreme Court of Nevada to decide what it means to have “possession” of a stolen vehicle under NRS 205.273(1)(b) when the accused is a non-driving passenger. Appellant A.W., age 17, was seen sitting in the back passenger seat of a car that had been stolen roughly 13–14 hours earlier. A 13-year-old was identified as the driver. The record contained no evidence that A.W. was ever in the vehicle while it was moving. When the youths exited and walked away, A.W. wore a black ski mask (balaclava) despite it being June.

After a contested hearing, the juvenile court adjudicated A.W. delinquent for “possession of a stolen vehicle.” On appeal, A.W. challenged the sufficiency of the evidence—specifically, whether the State proved beyond a reasonable doubt that he “possess[ed]” the vehicle (as distinct from merely being present in it), and whether he knew or had reason to believe it was stolen.

2. Summary of the Opinion

Applying the sufficiency standard from In re T.R., the court viewed the evidence in the State’s favor but concluded that the State proved only A.W.’s presence in a parked stolen vehicle and suspicious post-exit circumstances (mask, continued association with the group). Those facts, without evidence of dominion or control, did not establish “possession” under NRS 205.273(1)(b). Because the statute requires both possession and knowledge, the adjudication could not stand notwithstanding sufficient proof of the knowledge prong.

The court also rejected the dissent’s threshold argument that A.W.’s failure to include certain video/bodycam exhibits on appeal should trigger a presumption supporting the juvenile court’s decision, reasoning that the omitted materials were not “necessary” to resolve the appellate issue.

3. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

1) Sufficiency review and burden of proof in juvenile cases

• In re T.R., 119 Nev. 646, 649, 80 P.3d 1276, 1278 (2003): Provided the governing sufficiency standard—whether, viewing evidence in the State’s favor, a rational factfinder could find the elements beyond a reasonable doubt. The majority applied this framework to separate “possession” from “knowledge.”
• NRS 62D.040(4), NRS 175.211(1): Reinforced that juvenile delinquency must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt and that reasonable doubt is not “mere possible doubt.” These statutes supplied the seriousness of the State’s evidentiary burden for each element.

2) The meaning of “possession” as dominion or control

• Glispey u. Sheriff, 89 Nev. 221, 224, 510 P.2d 623, 624 (1973): Although a controlled-substance case, it supplied a cross-context definition: the “quintessence” of possession is the ability to exercise “dominion or control.” The majority imported this concept to stolen-vehicle possession.
• Palmer u. State, 112 Nev. 763, 769, 920 P.2d 112, 115 (1996): The court’s most direct Nevada analogue for stolen-vehicle possession. There, dismantling and removing parts from the stolen jeep demonstrated control sufficient for possession even absent proof of keys or driving. The majority used Palmer as the comparator: A.W. had no similar hands-on control.

3) “Mere presence” doctrine

• Palmer u. State (quoting Baker u. Sheriff, 93 Nev. 11, 13, 558 P.3d 629, 629 (1977)): “Mere presence cannot support an inference that one is party to an offense,” though presence plus additional circumstances can. This principle framed the majority’s analysis: the State’s “other circumstances” did not rise to dominion/control.

4) Circumstantial “plus factors” recognized in Nevada and other jurisdictions

• Chism v. State, 114 Nev. 229, 232-33, 954 P.2d 1183, 1185 (1998): Cited as an example where the stolen vehicle’s use in other crimes can supply the additional circumstances.
• People v. Tucker, 542 N.E.2d 804, 812 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989): Lookout/assistance to the driver as evidence supporting possession.
• People v. Land, 35 Cal. Rptr. 2d 544, 549 (Ct. App. 1994): Proximity of residence to the stolen vehicle’s location as a potentially relevant factor.
• Riddle v. State, 791 S.W.2d 708, 709 (Ark. 1990): Passenger’s attempts not to get caught as an evidentiary circumstance.

The majority cited these decisions not to adopt their specific tests, but to illustrate the kinds of “presence plus” facts that can demonstrate dominion/control. It then held the record in A.W.’s case lacked comparable evidence.

5) Appellate record completeness and presumptions

• Greene v. State, 96 Nev. 555, 558, 612 P.2d 686, 688 (1980): Cited (by the dissent and acknowledged by the majority) for the appellant’s burden to provide a proper record.
• Riggins v. State, 107 Nev. 178, 182, 808 P.2d 535, 538 (1991), rev'd on other grounds by Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127 (1992): Cited for the proposition that omitted materials are presumed to support the lower court’s decision; the majority distinguished its application here.
• Cuzze v. University & Community College System of Nevada, 123 Nev. 598, 603, 172 P.3d 131, 135 (2007): The majority relied on this to emphasize that an appendix must include portions “necessary” to decide the issues raised. The court treated “necessity” as a gatekeeper for when omission triggers a presumption against the appellant.
• Acosta v. State, 141 Nev., Adv. Op. 40, 573 P.3d 1258, 1270 n.3 (2025): Cited in the dissent alongside Riggins to reinforce the presumption arising from omissions.

The majority’s key move was to define the “proper appellate record” in a way that depends on what is necessary to decide the issues. Because the court concluded the omitted video/bodycam evidence was not necessary to its dominion/control analysis on the existing record—and because nothing suggested A.W. “took exception” to the video—the court declined to apply the presumption in favor of the juvenile court that the dissent urged.

6) The knowledge element for stolen-property/vehicle possession

• Montes v. State, 95 Nev. 891, 893, 603 P.2d 1069, 1071 (1979): Cited for the statutory requirement that the State prove the defendant “knew or had reason to believe” the vehicle was stolen.
• Gray v. State, 100 Nev. 556, 558, 688 P.2d 313, 314 (1984): Supported the proposition that actual knowledge is unnecessary when circumstances would lead a reasonable person to know the property is stolen.
• Wayne R. LaFave, Substantive Criminal Law § 20.2(d) (3d ed. 2018): Used to frame the “reasonable person” standard as objective.

7) Dissent’s additional persuasive authorities

• State v. McCoy, 561 A.2d 582 (N.J. 1989): Used to argue passengers can possess stolen vehicles where evidence shows intention/capacity to control.
• State v. Gary, 2008 WL 926592 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2008): Cited for joint/constructive possession by driver and passengers.
• New Jersey v. Alexander, 522 A.2d 464 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. 1987): Time-from-theft as a factor supporting inference of possession.
• Commonwealth v. Namey, 852 N.E.2d 116 (Mass. App. Ct. 2006): Disguise as evidence of more-than-mere-passenger involvement.
• Edwards v. State, 90 Nev. 255, 258-59, 524 P.2d 328, 331 (1974): Emphasized appellate deference to factfinders in sufficiency review.

B. Legal Reasoning

1) Element-by-element analysis under NRS 205.273(1)(b)

The majority treated NRS 205.273(1)(b) as requiring two independent showings: (i) possession of the vehicle and (ii) knowledge/reason to believe it was stolen. The decision is structured around the idea that proof of one element cannot substitute for proof of the other. Even strong evidence of guilty knowledge does not, by itself, establish dominion or control.

2) “Possession” requires dominion/control, not occupancy

Using Black’s Law Dictionary’s definition and Glispey u. Sheriff, the court anchored “possession” in the power to exercise dominion or control. It then applied the “mere presence” principle (from Palmer u. State quoting Baker u. Sheriff) to conclude that sitting in the back seat of a parked stolen car is, without more, insufficient to prove dominion/control. The State’s “more”—A.W.’s ski mask, his continued association with the group after exiting, and his willing presence—was deemed probative of suspicious behavior but not of control over the vehicle itself.

The court distinguished Palmer u. State because the defendant there was actively dismantling the vehicle—conduct that directly demonstrated present control over the object. By contrast, the record did not show A.W. drove, had keys, directed the driver, moved items, tampered with the ignition, or otherwise exercised authority over the vehicle.

3) Knowledge was sufficiently proved (but could not save the adjudication)

On the knowledge prong, the court applied Montes v. State and Gray v. State and asked whether a reasonable 17-year-old passenger would have reason to believe the car was stolen. It held that:

• The damaged ignition was visible from outside, permitting an inference it was visible from A.W.’s backseat position.
• A factfinder could infer a 17-year-old would recognize the driver’s approximate age and understand a 13-year-old likely did not own the vehicle.
• Wearing a ski mask in June, when others were not masked, supported an inference of consciousness of wrongdoing and intent to evade detection.

Nonetheless, because possession and knowledge are both required, the failure on possession compelled reversal.

4) The appellate-record dispute: when omissions trigger a presumption

The dissent argued the missing videotape and bodycam footage should defeat A.W.’s sufficiency challenge under Greene v. State and Riggins v. State. The majority responded by reframing the question: what constitutes a “proper appellate record” depends on what is “necessary” to decide the issue presented, as emphasized in Cuzze v. University & Community College System of Nevada. Because the majority deemed the missing exhibits unnecessary to its conclusion, it declined to apply the presumption that omitted materials support the lower court’s ruling.

C. Impact

1) Prosecutorial proof burden for non-driver passengers

The decision tightens the practical evidentiary threshold for charging or sustaining adjudications/convictions of “possession of a stolen vehicle” against non-driving occupants. After In re A.W., Nevada prosecutors should anticipate needing “dominion or control” facts such as:

• Evidence the passenger exercised control over the car (e.g., directing movement, handling keys, operating features, helping steal/strip/tamper).
• Evidence the passenger exercised control over the driver (e.g., instructions, coordination, lookout behavior, shared plan evidenced by conduct).
• Evidence tying the passenger to the theft or to post-theft use in other crimes (as suggested by Chism v. State and other “presence plus” examples).

Suspicious clothing and group association may help prove knowledge or consciousness of wrongdoing, but the majority treated them as weak proxies for dominion/control absent a clearer vehicle-centric act of possession.

2) Doctrinal clarification: separating “knowledge” from “possession”

The opinion reinforces element-by-element discipline in sufficiency review. It rejects a slide from “he knew it was stolen” to “therefore he possessed it,” potentially influencing how Nevada courts analyze analogous possession-based offenses where knowledge and control are distinct inquiries.

3) Appellate practice: narrowing when missing exhibits doom a sufficiency claim

The majority’s treatment of Riggins v. State and Cuzze v. University & Community College System of Nevada suggests that omission of exhibits will not automatically trigger a presumption against the appellant; the presumption depends on whether the missing material is “necessary” to decide the issue. Future litigants can be expected to dispute “necessity” more directly when records are incomplete—especially in evidentiary-sufficiency appeals where video evidence is common.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

• Actual vs. constructive possession: Actual possession means physically holding or directly controlling something. Constructive possession means having the power and intent to control it, even if not physically holding it. The court emphasized that either way, the key is dominion or control.
• Dominion and control: Practical authority over an object—being able to use it, direct its use, exclude others, or otherwise exercise control. Here, sitting in a back seat of a parked car, without evidence of directing the driver or manipulating the vehicle, did not show dominion/control.
• Mere presence doctrine: Being at the scene of wrongdoing (or near contraband/property) does not, without additional evidence, prove participation or possession.
• Objective “reason to believe” standard: The knowledge element can be met even without proof of actual knowledge if the surrounding facts would cause a reasonable person in the defendant’s position to believe the property was stolen.
• Sufficiency of the evidence: On appeal, the question is not whether judges are personally convinced; it is whether any rational factfinder could find the elements proved beyond a reasonable doubt when viewing the evidence favorably to the State.

5. Conclusion

In re A.W. sets a clear boundary for Nevada’s stolen-vehicle-possession statute: occupying a stolen car as a passenger—without evidence of dominion or control—is not “possession” under NRS 205.273(1)(b), even where the passenger’s behavior strongly supports that he knew the car was stolen. The opinion’s significance lies in its insistence on element-by-element proof and its practical message that suspicious circumstances (such as a ski mask and continued association with companions) may establish knowledge but cannot replace evidence showing control over the vehicle. The decision also adds an appellate-practice gloss, suggesting that record omissions do not automatically trigger presumptions against an appellant unless the omitted materials are “necessary” to resolve the issue on appeal.