Particularized “Necessity” for Title III Wiretaps: Detailed Limits of Traditional Techniques and Surveillance-Evasion Facts Suffice

I. Introduction

In United States v. Medina (10th Cir. June 11, 2026) (unpublished “Order and Judgment”), the Tenth Circuit affirmed the denial of a motion to suppress evidence derived from Title III wiretaps used in a Denver drug-trafficking organization (“DTO”) investigation. The Government obtained wiretap orders for multiple “Target Telephones” after employing numerous traditional investigative methods (confidential informants, controlled buys, surveillance, pen registers, and more) but still lacking visibility into the DTO’s full structure, suppliers, customers, stash locations, and proceeds.

The appellant, Leonardo Medina, was convicted on six drug-related counts after wiretap interceptions (principally from TT1, the alleged DTO leader’s phone, and TT5, one of Medina’s phones) tied him to DTO activity. On appeal, Medina argued the wiretap applications failed Title III’s “necessity” requirement because traditional techniques were already effective and the affidavits offered boilerplate reasons for not doing more.

The central issue was whether the district court abused its discretion in finding the Government made the required “full and complete statement” that other investigative procedures had been tried and failed, or were unlikely to succeed or too dangerous, as required by 18 U.S.C. § 2518(1)(c) and § 2518(3)(c).

II. Summary of the Opinion

The Tenth Circuit held that the wiretap affidavits—particularly DHS Agent Joshua Lievers’s affidavit supporting TT1, and the TT5 affidavit incorporating TT1 and adding further detail—satisfied Title III’s necessity requirement. The court emphasized:

  • Traditional techniques produced evidence but did not achieve the investigation’s stated objectives (mapping the DTO’s scope, roles, suppliers/customers, stash sites, and money flow).
  • The affidavits provided specific, target-linked explanations of both the value and the limitations of each investigative method.
  • Attempts at mobile surveillance were thwarted by surveillance-evasion behavior (including “burn runs”), making continued surveillance unlikely to succeed without compromising the investigation.
  • The affidavits were distinguishable from the conclusory necessity showing rejected in United States v. Castillo-Garcia.

Applying abuse-of-discretion review, and noting that once authorized a wiretap is “presumed proper” with the defendant bearing the burden to show invalidity, the court affirmed.

III. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

The opinion fits within an established Tenth Circuit line defining what constitutes a sufficient necessity showing under Title III, and how appellate courts review such determinations.

1. Standard of review, presumption of validity, and burden allocation

  • United States v. Ramirez-Encarnacion, 291 F.3d 1219, 1222 (10th Cir. 2002): provides the abuse-of-discretion standard for reviewing necessity determinations. In Medina, this deferential standard framed the appellate analysis.
  • United States v. Portillo-Uranga, 28 F.4th 168, 174 (10th Cir. 2022): the court quoted its rule that after authorization, a wiretap is “presumed proper” and the defendant bears the burden to show invalidity. Medina applied this presumption as a practical backdrop: the question was not whether more could be done, but whether the affidavits adequately justified the wiretap given the investigation’s needs.

2. Title III framework and the necessity requirement

  • United States v. Castillo-Garcia, 117 F.3d 1179, 1184-85 (10th Cir. 1997), overruled on other grounds by Ramirez-Encarnacion, 291 F.3d 1219: Medina relied heavily on Castillo-Garcia for the proposition that generalities and boilerplate are insufficient and that necessity statements must be particularized to the wiretap targets. The Medina panel agreed with those principles but distinguished the affidavits at issue as specifically tied to the targets and the investigation’s objectives.
  • United States v. Iiland, 254 F.3d 1264, 1267 (10th Cir. 2001): cited for the suppression remedy—if the application was granted without meeting necessity, evidence “must be suppressed”—reinforcing the stakes and the statutory seriousness of the showing.
  • United States v. Green, 175 F.3d 822, 828 (10th Cir. 1999): appears via Iiland for the same suppression principle and underscores that necessity is not a technicality but a statutory condition of admissibility.

3. What must be shown: tried-and-failed or unlikely-to-succeed, with particularity

  • United States v. Foy, 641 F.3d 455, 464 (10th Cir. 2011): supplied both (i) the statutory quote requiring a “full and complete statement” and (ii) the list of “traditional investigative methods” (surveillance, interviews/grand jury, search warrants, informants/undercover, pen registers, trap and trace). Medina used Foy’s framework to evaluate each technique described in the affidavits.
  • United States v. Cline, 349 F.3d 1276, 1280-81 (10th Cir. 2003): emphasized that if traditional techniques were not used, the Government must explain why “with particularity,” and that conclusory assertions are inadequate. Medina treated Cline as the governing standard for assessing whether the affidavits’ explanations were sufficiently concrete and individualized.
  • United States v. Barajas, 710 F.3d 1102, 1107 (10th Cir. 2013): reinforced the “common-sense” approach and that the Government need not exhaust all conceivable techniques. Medina invoked Barajas to validate a practical, goal-oriented assessment: whether the techniques used (and those not used) plausibly could achieve the stated investigative goals.

4. Surveillance limitations, compartmentalization, and surveillance consciousness

  • United States v. Verdin-Garcia, 516 F.3d 884, 890-92 (10th Cir. 2008): supported acceptance of detailed assertions that visual surveillance often cannot prove relationships, organizational structure, sources of supply, or purpose of meetings; also supported explanations for why search warrants and interviews could jeopardize an investigation. Medina used Verdin-Garcia to credit the affidavits’ descriptions of why surveillance and other methods were insufficient for higher-level DTO objectives.
  • United States v. Zapata, 546 F.3d 1179, 1185-87 (10th Cir. 2008): upheld necessity where targets were “extremely surveillance conscious.” Medina applied Zapata directly to the affidavits’ descriptions of evasive driving and “burn runs,” treating them as specific facts—not generic tropes—showing mobile surveillance was unlikely to succeed.
  • United States v. Portillo-Uranga, 28 F.4th at 175-76: used to validate the concept that traditional techniques may yield “some intelligence” but still fail to disclose key DTO details, and that informants’ limited access can make them inadequate for organizational mapping. Medina leaned on this reasoning to rebut the argument that successful controlled buys and seizures necessarily negate necessity.

5. Addressing (possible) waiver by deciding on the merits

  • United States v. Wells, 873 F.3d 1241, 1250 (10th Cir. 2017) and United States v. Black, 773 F.3d 1113, 1115 n.2 (10th Cir. 2014): cited for the court’s discretion to bypass a waiver dispute and resolve an argument on the merits when the merits are dispositive. Medina used these cases to justify reaching Medina’s surveillance-adequacy arguments even if they were not preserved below.

B. Legal Reasoning

The opinion’s reasoning is best understood as a structured application of Title III’s necessity requirement to a DTO investigation with articulated “enterprise-mapping” goals.

1. Necessity is measured against investigative goals, not against whether police found evidence

Agent Lievers’s TT1 affidavit framed goals including identifying the DTO’s “full scope,” key personnel, suppliers and customers, stash locations, and the disposition of proceeds, plus obtaining admissible proof beyond a reasonable doubt. The court treated these as legitimate objectives for which partial success (e.g., controlled buys or seizures) does not automatically suffice. Echoing Portillo-Uranga, the court emphasized that learning “some intelligence” does not negate necessity where key structural details remain unknown.

2. The affidavits’ method-by-method explanation was “full and complete”

The panel credited that the affidavits did not merely list techniques; they described what each produced and why each hit a ceiling:

  • Confidential informants: limited access to higher-level targets and inability to capture recorded conversations; in TT5, informants lacked information about Medina specifically.
  • Controlled purchases: generated physical evidence (including large seizures) but did not reveal leadership roles, full membership, stash locations, or laundering/proceeds; the affidavits explained compartmentalization (buyers are not told operational details).
  • Physical surveillance: could confirm meetings but often could not prove purpose, roles, or structure; continued surveillance risked limited evidentiary payoff.
  • Pen registers and trap and trace: yielded call patterns but not identities of all communicants or the content/purpose of communications, and could not differentiate legitimate from criminal calls.

On these facts, the court concluded the Government satisfied 18 U.S.C. § 2518(1)(c) and § 2518(3)(c) as construed in Foy, Cline, and Barajas.

3. “Not used” does not mean “not justified”: the court rejected an exhaustion theory

Medina argued the Government should have done more surveillance—particularly more “mobile surveillance”—and faulted the Government for not pursuing other traditional methods in a way he considered adequate. The panel responded with the recurring Tenth Circuit principle (stated in Portillo-Uranga and Foy) that Title III does not require exhaustion of “all other conceivable investigative procedures.”

Importantly, the court treated the affidavits’ discussion of surveillance evasion as fact-specific: evasive driving, situational awareness, high-speed departures, looking around before driving, and repeated “burn runs.” Those details turned the explanation into the kind of particularized showing accepted in Zapata, rather than a generalized claim that “surveillance is hard.”

4. Distinguishing conclusory affidavits under United States v. Castillo-Garcia

Medina’s principal doctrinal attack was that the necessity narrative was generic, invoking United States v. Castillo-Garcia. The court distinguished Castillo-Garcia because that affidavit used broad, non-targeted assertions (“a variety of normal and routine investigative techniques have been attempted”) and lacked language “in any way particularized” to the target. By contrast, the Medina affidavits were tied to the named interceptees and to specific investigative events (including particular attempts to surveil Medina and the consequences of his evasive maneuvers).

5. Incorporation and layering: TT5’s reliance on TT1 (and more) was acceptable

The panel noted Medina conceded at oral argument that if TT1 satisfied necessity, TT5—incorporating TT1 and adding detail—was likely sufficient. The opinion thus implicitly approves “layered” applications in complex investigations: later wiretap affidavits may incorporate earlier affidavits and update them with additional facts, so long as the combined showing remains “full and complete” and particularized.

C. Impact

Although the decision is explicitly “not binding precedent” (except under law-of-the-case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel), it has persuasive significance in at least four recurring Title III contexts in the Tenth Circuit:

  1. Enterprise-mapping justifies wiretaps where conventional methods yield only transactional proof. The opinion reinforces that controlled buys, seizures, and surveillance can still leave “necessity” satisfied when the Government credibly seeks higher-order DTO facts (roles, suppliers, customers, stash locations, proceeds).
  2. Surveillance-evasion facts strengthen necessity showings. Concrete descriptions of “burn runs,” high-speed departures, and situational awareness operate as particularized reasons why mobile surveillance is unlikely to succeed, aligning with Zapata.
  3. Particularity remains the line between sufficiency and suppression. Medina underscores that Castillo-Garcia remains a live caution: generalized statements are vulnerable, but detailed, target-specific narratives can satisfy Title III even when many techniques have been used with some success.
  4. Affidavit drafting practice: method-by-method accounting and explicit limitations. The decision rewards affidavits that (i) list techniques, (ii) specify what they produced, and (iii) explain why they cannot reach the investigation’s articulated goals—rather than reciting stock phrases.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Title III wiretap: A court-authorized interception of wire communications (e.g., phone calls/texts). Without such authorization, interception is generally prohibited by federal statute.
  • “Necessity” requirement: The Government must explain to the judge why ordinary investigative tools (informants, surveillance, warrants, interviews, pen registers) have failed or are unlikely to succeed (or are too dangerous). The point is to keep wiretaps from becoming a first-choice tool.
  • “Full and complete statement” (18 U.S.C. § 2518(1)(c)): The affidavit must be detailed—what was tried, what happened, and why the remaining gaps matter.
  • Particularity: The explanation must be tied to the specific targets and facts of the investigation, not generic statements that could be pasted into any case.
  • Pen register / trap and trace: Tools that capture dialing/routing information (numbers contacted, time, duration), but not the content of communications.
  • “Burn run”: Driving maneuvers intended to detect or shake surveillance; here, used as evidence that mobile surveillance was unlikely to succeed without exposing the investigation.
  • Abuse of discretion: A deferential appellate standard; the appellate court does not decide necessity from scratch but asks whether the district court made a reasonable decision based on the record.

V. Conclusion

United States v. Medina persuasively reaffirms a practical rule for Title III in DTO investigations: a wiretap is “necessary” when the Government’s affidavits, in a method-by-method and target-specific way, show that traditional techniques—though productive—cannot reasonably achieve defined enterprise-level objectives, and when concrete facts (like surveillance-evasion and “burn runs”) explain why expanding conventional surveillance is unlikely to succeed. The decision also highlights the continued importance of United States v. Castillo-Garcia: necessity fails when affidavits are generic, but succeeds when the Government explains investigative limits with particularity tied to the targets and facts.