Date: Jul 4, 2026

Partial Mootness in Successive Revocations: Appeals Survive Only for Unpronounced Conditions that Later Trigger Revocation

I. Introduction

United States v. Kendall (5th Cir. July 2, 2026) addresses a recurring supervised-release problem: a defendant appeals conditions imposed in a first revocation judgment, but while the appeal is pending the district court revokes supervision again and enters a second (unappealed) revocation judgment that supersedes the first.

The central issues were: (1) mootness—whether the second revocation judgment extinguished the live controversy over the first; and (2) oral pronouncement—whether certain non-mandatory conditions appearing in the written first revocation judgment were invalid because they were not properly pronounced at sentencing, as required by United States v. Diggles.

The parties were the United States (Appellee) and William Scott Kendall (Appellant), whose supervision was revoked twice. Kendall’s appeal targeted only the conditions in the first revocation judgment; he did not appeal the second revocation judgment.

II. Summary of the Opinion

The Fifth Circuit held the appeal was moot in large part because the first revocation judgment had been superseded. However, the case remained live as to the specific conditions from the first revocation judgment that (a) Kendall challenged and (b) later served as the bases for the second revocation.

On the merits of those surviving issues, the court held two conditions were not properly pronounced: (1) the home detention component embedded under “location monitoring,” and (2) Standard Condition 13 (requiring Kendall to follow probation officer instructions). Because the district court adopted an appendix to a sentencing worksheet without record proof Kendall had reviewed it or an opportunity to object, those conditions conflicted with the oral pronouncement and had to be removed.

Disposition: the Fifth Circuit VACATED in part and REMANDED to amend the written judgment to remove the two unpronounced conditions, and DISMISSED the remainder of Kendall’s challenges as moot.

III. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

1. Mootness framework and exceptions

Center for Individual Freedom v. Carmouche — Mootness is jurisdictional; the court must address it first.
Calderon v. Moore (quoting Mills v. Green) — Federal courts cannot decide “moot questions or abstract propositions.” A case is moot when no “effectual relief whatever” can be granted.
United States v. Vega (960 F.3d) (quoting Knox v. Serv. Emps. Int'l Union, Loc. 1000) — A case remains live if parties retain any concrete interest, “however small.”
Spencer v. Kemna — Sets the “capable of repetition yet evading review” test and distinguishes between presumed collateral consequences of convictions and the need to prove collateral consequences when challenging other criminal adjudications.
Lewis v. Cont'l Bank Corp. and City of Los Angeles v. Lyons — Contribute to the “exceptional situations” limitation for the capable-of-repetition doctrine.
United States v. Sanchez-Gomez — Courts reject jurisdiction based on speculation that a defendant will again violate valid laws.
St. Pierre v. United States — Defines collateral consequences as “further penalties or disabilities.”
Sibron v. New York — Collateral consequences are presumed for challenges to criminal convictions.
United States v. Juvenile Male — When collateral consequences are not presumed, a defendant must show a concrete injury that is traceable and likely redressable by a favorable decision (not merely a “useful precedent”).

2. Mootness in successive revocations and redressability

United States v. Wynn (8th Cir.) — A challenge to a condition may not be moot if revocation was based on violation of an invalid condition. The Fifth Circuit found the reasoning “sound” but distinguished it because Wynn involved appeals from both the original judgment and revocation.
United States v. Mallard — Nonprecedential Fifth Circuit support for keeping an appeal live when a challenged condition later becomes the basis for revocation; the later revocation is a collateral consequence of the earlier condition.
Manrique v. United States — To obtain appellate review, a party must file a notice of appeal from the judgment/order at issue; here, Kendall did not appeal the second revocation judgment.
Johnson v. Pettiford and Herndon v. Upton — Challenges may remain live if the sentencing court retains authority (e.g., to modify supervised release under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(2)).
United States v. Baldemoro — Recently applied the Johnson/Herndon rationale in a successive-revocation context: prevailing on the earlier appeal could support later modification/termination arguments due to “excess prison time.”
United Pub. Workers v. Mitchell — Reinforces the bar on advisory opinions; the Kendall court uses it to explain why its ruling is not merely abstract.

3. Oral pronouncement and supervised-release conditions

United States v. Diggles (en banc) — Due process requires notice and an opportunity to object; non-mandatory supervised-release conditions must be orally pronounced, which can be satisfied by in-court adoption of a written list that the defendant had the chance to review with counsel.
United States v. Grogan — Standard of review turns on whether the defendant had an opportunity to object; absent that opportunity, review is for abuse of discretion.
United States v. Vega (332 F.3d) — Recognizes the constitutional right to be present at sentencing (supporting the pronouncement doctrine).
United States v. Prado — Oral pronouncement controls over conflicting written judgment.
United States v. Bigelow — A conflict exists if the written judgment is more burdensome than what was orally pronounced.
United States v. Omigie — Where a condition is in a separate recommendation (not the PSR) and the record does not show it was disclosed, the condition must be excised.
United States v. Martinez — Supports the requirement that the defendant have a genuine opportunity to object or at least seek clarification.
United States v. Fields — Reinforces that adopting conditions without adequate notice/opportunity to object is improper.
United States v. Polydore (Richman, J., concurring) — Highlights the restrictive nature of home confinement and Congress’s caution that it should function as an alternative to incarceration.

B. Legal Reasoning

1. The court’s “partial mootness” holding

The Fifth Circuit started from the premise that the first revocation judgment was superseded by an unappealed second revocation judgment. That normally eliminates “effectual relief” as to the expired judgment. But the court identified a narrow category of claims where relief remains possible: when the validity of the second revocation turns on the validity of a condition imposed in the first.

The court rejected Kendall’s “capable of repetition yet evading review” argument under Spencer v. Kemna, emphasizing: (i) Kendall did not show the first revocation sentence inherently evaded review; and (ii) recurrence depends on future misconduct, which United States v. Sanchez-Gomez treats as too speculative to satisfy Article III.

It then accepted a limited “collateral consequences” theory: if a challenged condition from the first judgment served as the basis for the second revocation, a favorable appellate ruling could be used to attack the legality of the current custody/supervision (the court suggested a pathway via 28 U.S.C. § 2255). That makes the injury redressable under United States v. Juvenile Male, because the decision would be a “conclusive determination” about whether Kendall violated a legally enforceable obligation—something more than merely producing “useful precedent.”

Critically, the court limited its live jurisdiction to the conditions that actually mattered to the second revocation: the “home detention” element of “location monitoring” and Standard Condition 13 (obeying probation officer instructions). All other condition challenges were dismissed as moot.

2. The pronouncement error and why “adoption” failed

Applying Diggles and Omigie, the court held the district court abused its discretion because Kendall lacked notice and a real opportunity to object. Although Diggles permits adoption of written conditions, it requires the court to ensure the defendant had an opportunity to review the adopted document with counsel—much like confirmation of PSR review under Rule 32.

Here, the judge referenced “the Appendix” to a “Judge’s Sentencing Options Worksheet,” but the record did not show the worksheet (or appendix) was provided to Kendall or his lawyer, nor did the court confirm review. The Fifth Circuit also rejected the Government’s argument that counsel’s silence showed knowledge; on this record, silence more naturally reflected that counsel understood the judge to be adopting only what had just been orally listed.

3. Why “location monitoring” did not implicitly include home detention

The Fifth Circuit treated home detention as qualitatively more restrictive than ordinary monitoring, invoking Congress’s caution that home confinement should be imposed “only as an alternative to incarceration” (18 U.S.C. § 3563(b)(19)). Because home detention is not a “natural follow-on” to location monitoring, an oral statement imposing “location monitoring” did not provide adequate notice that home detention would also be required. In other words, the pronouncement requirement cannot be satisfied by bundling a materially more burdensome restraint into a broader label.

C. Impact

Narrow survival of appellate jurisdiction in successive revocations: Kendall provides a Fifth Circuit roadmap for “partial mootness” in revocation-condition appeals: claims are moot once superseded except for those conditions that later became the basis for revocation and thus remain redressable as collateral consequences.
Record-building burden on district courts and government: If conditions are imposed via adoption of a worksheet/appendix (or any non-PSR document), Kendall underscores that the record should show disclosure and review; otherwise, conditions risk being stricken on appeal.
Home detention singled out as requiring clarity: The decision strengthens the message that home detention is not merely a technical parameter of monitoring but a major liberty restriction requiring explicit pronouncement or properly disclosed adoption.
Practical downstream consequences: Although Kendall did not appeal the second revocation judgment, the court’s redressability analysis signals that successful challenges to predicate conditions can become leverage for later post-conviction or modification litigation—especially where revocation custody or conditions flowed from an invalidly imposed requirement.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

Mootness: A federal court can decide only live disputes. If events make it impossible for the court to grant effective relief, the case is moot and must be dismissed.
Collateral consequences: Even if the original judgment has expired, a case may remain live if that judgment continues to cause concrete legal harm that a court decision can likely fix. In Kendall, the “harm” was that conditions from the first revocation were later used to revoke Kendall again.
Redressability: The requested judicial decision must likely remedy the harm, not merely create favorable reasoning for some future case. Kendall found redressability because invalidating the predicate conditions would undermine the legal basis for the later revocation and sentence.
Oral pronouncement vs. written judgment: Non-mandatory supervised-release conditions must be imposed in a way that gives the defendant notice and a chance to object at sentencing. If the written judgment adds burdens not clearly imposed orally (or properly adopted from a reviewed document), the written additions are invalid.
Adoption by reference: A judge can impose conditions by saying, in court, that a written list is adopted—but only if the defendant had a chance to review that list with counsel. Merely referencing an undisclosed appendix is not enough.

V. Conclusion

United States v. Kendall establishes a practical Fifth Circuit rule for successive supervised-release revocations: an appeal from a superseded revocation judgment is moot except as to those challenged conditions that later served as the basis for a subsequent revocation, because those conditions create redressable collateral consequences.

On the merits, Kendall reinforces Diggles’ core due-process demand: non-mandatory conditions must be pronounced (or adopted) in a way that ensures real notice and an opportunity to object. Where a court relies on an undisclosed worksheet appendix—and where “location monitoring” silently carries an unmentioned “home detention” restriction—the Fifth Circuit will require the offending conditions to be removed from the written judgment.