Parole Revocation Appeals in Colorado: Administrative Exhaustion Is a Jurisdictional Prerequisite to Crim. P. 35(c) Review

1. Introduction

In People v. Abdul-Rahman, 2026 CO 33 (May 26, 2026), the Colorado Supreme Court addressed whether a parolee may seek judicial review of a parole revocation through a postconviction motion under Crim. P. 35(c) without first using the administrative appeal mechanism provided by statute within the Colorado State Board of Parole (“Board”).

The Respondent, Shams Abdul-Rahman, was on parole after a sex assault conviction and indeterminate sentence under the Colorado Sex Offender Lifetime Supervision Act (§§ 18-1.3-1001 to -1012). The Board revoked his parole after a hearing. Instead of appealing internally to the Board’s appellate body, Abdul-Rahman filed a Crim. P. 35(c)(2)(VII) petition in district court alleging unlawful parole revocation. The district court denied relief on the merits. The court of appeals affirmed, holding exhaustion was not required.

The Supreme Court granted certiorari on a single issue: whether administrative exhaustion is required before a revoked parolee may seek judicial review of parole revocation under Crim. P. 35(c).

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Court held that a parolee challenging the Board’s initial parole revocation decision must exhaust administrative remedies by appealing first to the Board’s appellate body before seeking judicial review via § 18-1-410(1)(h) and Crim. P. 35(c). Because Abdul-Rahman did not take the administrative appeal, the postconviction court lacked jurisdiction to decide his petition.

The Supreme Court therefore vacated the court of appeals’ judgment and remanded with directions to have the district court dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.

3. Analysis

3.1. Precedents Cited

The majority situates its holding within Colorado’s longstanding exhaustion doctrine and related interpretive rules:

  • Thomas v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., 255 P.3d 1073 (Colo. 2011): Cited for the core definition of exhaustion and for the principle that, where applicable, exhaustion operates as a jurisdictional prerequisite, and for recognized exceptions (ill-suited remedies, pure questions of law, and futility).
  • Horrell v. Dep't of Admin., 861 P.2d 1194 (Colo. 1993): Used to explain that until remedies are exhausted, the matter remains within the agency’s authority, rooted in separation-of-powers concerns; also cited for exceptions.
  • Crow v. Penrose-St. Francis Healthcare Sys., 169 P.3d 158 (Colo. 2007), and State Pers. Bd. v. Dist. Ct., 637 P.2d 333 (Colo. 1981): Cited for the separation-of-powers rationale—courts should not interfere with functions the legislature delegated to the executive branch.
  • State v. Golden's Concrete Co., 962 P.2d 919 (Colo. 1998): Cited for policy rationales: agency expertise, error correction, record development, and judicial efficiency.
  • Gramiger v. Crowley, 660 P.2d 1279 (Colo. 1983); Heron v. City of Denv., 283 P.2d 647 (Colo. 1955); People v. Dist. Ct., 287 P. 849 (Colo. 1930): Cited as part of the Court’s historical line recognizing exhaustion as a prerequisite to judicial review in applicable statutory schemes.
  • City & Cnty. of Denv. v. United Air Lines, Inc., 8 P.3d 1206 (Colo. 2000): Cited on exhaustion’s role in conserving judicial resources and the “complete, adequate, and speedy” standard; also for the futility exception (“clear beyond a reasonable doubt”).
  • Herr v. People, 198 P.3d 108 (Colo. 2008), and People v. S.X.G., 2012 CO 5, 269 P.3d 735: Invoked on preservation and the appellate court’s obligation to assure itself of jurisdiction even if not raised below.
  • Mostellar v. City of Colo. Springs, 2026 CO 22, 587 P.3d 168; McCoy v. People, 2019 CO 44, 442 P.3d 379: Cited for de novo statutory construction, reading the scheme as a whole, harmonizing provisions, and avoiding surplusage/absurdity.
  • Walton v. People, 2019 CO 95, 451 P.3d 1212: Cited for “shall” being mandatory.
  • Turbyne v. People, 151 P.3d 563 (Colo. 2007): Cited for the rule against adding/subtracting words from statutes.
  • A.S. v. People, 2013 CO 63, 312 P.3d 168: Cited for “may” generally indicating discretion.
  • People v. Steen, 2014 CO 9, 318 P.3d 487, quoting City of Florence v. Pepper, 145 P.3d 654 (Colo. 2006): Used for harmonizing potentially conflicting statutes.
  • People v. Cooper, 27 P.3d 348 (Colo. 2001), and § 2-4-201(1)(b): Cited for the presumption that the General Assembly intends the entire statute to be effective (no nullities).
  • McCallum v. Colo. State Bd. of Parole, 23 P.3d 1226 (Colo. App. 2000): Cited by analogy for the proposition that the parole statute, read with the APA, can establish an “exclusive procedure” and render APA procedures inapplicable.
  • Hunsaker v. People, 2021 CO 83, 500 P.3d 1110: Cited to link Crim. P. 35(c) to § 18-1-410 postconviction relief and confirm they track one another.

The dissent’s waiver/jurisdiction critique relied on:

  • Moses v. Diocese of Colo., 863 P.2d 310 (Colo. 1993), and Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc. v. Adams, 718 P.2d 508 (Colo. 1986): For the general waiver rule and the exception for subject matter jurisdiction.
  • Masterpiece Cakeshop, Inc. v. Scardina, 2024 CO 67, 556 P.3d 1238 (Gabriel, J., dissenting): To argue that exhaustion is often labeled “jurisdictional” imprecisely and should not be treated as subject matter jurisdiction.
  • People v. Sprinkle, 2021 CO 60, 489 P.3d 1242, and St. George v. Off. of State Pub. Def., 2026 COA 28: To distinguish nonwaivable subject matter jurisdiction from waivable “jurisdictional” issues.

3.2. Legal Reasoning

(a) The statutory architecture: “exclusive power” plus a prescribed appeal route

The majority’s reasoning begins with the legislature’s allocation of authority over parole revocation to the executive branch, specifically the Board: § 17-2-201(7) gives the Board “exclusive power to conduct all proceedings involving an application for revocation of parole.” The Court reads “all proceedings involving” revocation to include not only the hearing and disposition but also the administrative appeal process.

The lynchpin is § 17-2-201(9)(c), which spells out what happens “[i]f the parolee decides to appeal”: the appeal shall be filed within 30 days; two Board members (excluding the hearing decisionmaker) shall review the record and issue a written decision on a short statutory timeline. For the majority, this is a complete, mandatory administrative appeal pathway once the parolee elects to contest the revocation, and the statute does not suggest judicial review can replace it at the front end.

(b) The meaning of “may appeal”

Abdul-Rahman (and the court of appeals majority) relied on § 17-2-103(2)(b), which states a parolee “may appeal” to two Board members. The Supreme Court rejects the inference that “may” creates an option between administrative review and immediate judicial review. Instead, “may appeal” means the parolee may choose whether to appeal at all; if the parolee chooses to appeal, the appeal is to the Board’s appellate body as the statute specifies.

A key structural argument is parity with the State’s appeal language. Under § 17-2-201(9)(d), the district attorney or attorney general “may appeal” the revocation decision to two Board members. The Court reasons that “may appeal” cannot logically mean the State may choose direct judicial review, because the only judicial review referenced is through § 18-1-410(1)(h)/Crim. P. 35(c), which is available to “every person convicted of a crime,” not the prosecution. Therefore, “may appeal” must mean the choice to appeal or not, not the choice of forum.

(c) The role of § 17-2-201(4)(b): judicial review exists, but after administrative completion

Abdul-Rahman argued that § 17-2-201(4)(b) authorizes immediate judicial review because it states: “Judicial review of any revocation of parole shall be held pursuant to section 18-1-410(1)(h).” The majority reads this not as a timing rule allowing immediate court review, but as a channeling rule specifying the proper vehicle for court review (postconviction review under § 18-1-410(1)(h)).

The Court emphasizes harmonization: construing § 17-2-201(4)(b) to allow immediate judicial review would collide with the detailed, time-bound administrative appeal process set out in §§ 17-2-103(2)(b) and 17-2-201(9)(c).

(d) APA exemption does not eliminate non-APA exhaustion

Because parole revocation hearings are “exempt” from § 24-4-105 (APA hearing requirements), Abdul-Rahman argued the general APA exhaustion requirement falls away too. The Court responds in two steps:

  1. The exemption is about hearing procedures, which are instead supplied by § 17-2-103 and tailored to parole-revocation realities.
  2. Exhaustion in Colorado is a broader, older doctrine than the APA’s codified exhaustion clause; thus, the APA exemption does not imply the legislature intended to allow “leapfrogging” the Board’s own appellate body.

(e) Exhaustion as jurisdictional and its policy function in parole revocations

The Court reaffirms the conventional Colorado formulation: where the statutory scheme makes exhaustion applicable, failure to exhaust deprives courts of jurisdiction. It then reinforces that result with policy considerations:

  • Expertise and discretion: The Board is staffed with “multidisciplinary” expertise (§ 17-2-201(1)(a), (e)), and parole revocation decisions are fact-intensive and discretionary (revocation/continue/modify).
  • Error correction and process: The appellate body can review for specified grounds (including “abuse of discretion,” “arbitrary and capricious,” “newly discovered evidence,” “error or change in law”) under 8 Colo. Code Regs. 1511-1:14.00(E) (2013), and can order a new revocation hearing.
  • Speed and record for court review: The Board appeal has short deadlines and requires a written decision, potentially giving parolees quicker relief and providing a better-developed record for any later § 18-1-410/Rule 35 review.

(f) Application and remedy

Abdul-Rahman undisputedly did not pursue the administrative appeal and did not invoke any exhaustion exception. Consequently, the district court lacked jurisdiction, so the merits denial could not stand; dismissal for lack of jurisdiction was required.

3.3. Impact

The decision’s practical and doctrinal effects are substantial:

  • Mandatory sequencing: Parolees challenging revocation must first file the Board appeal (within the statutory window) before turning to § 18-1-410(1)(h) and Crim. P. 35(c)(2)(VII).
  • Jurisdictional consequence: District courts must dismiss Rule 35(c) parole-revocation challenges filed without exhaustion, regardless of whether the prosecution raises the issue initially (because courts must assure jurisdiction).
  • Litigation strategy shift: Defense counsel must preserve the Board appeal promptly; prosecutors and courts will scrutinize exhaustion at the outset. The decision also increases the importance of the Board’s written appellate decisions and the administrative record.
  • Separation-of-powers reinforcement: The Court’s reasoning strengthens deference to legislatively created executive processes in the parole context, limiting judicial intervention until executive proceedings are complete.

The dissent signals a potential future fault line: whether exhaustion truly implicates subject matter jurisdiction (nonwaivable) or is a different kind of mandatory claims-processing rule (potentially waivable). Although the majority treats it as jurisdictional here, Justice Gabriel’s dissent—drawing on Masterpiece Cakeshop, Inc. v. Scardina—invites continued debate in later cases about labeling and waiver.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Administrative exhaustion: Before asking a court to fix an agency decision, you must use the agency’s own review steps first—unless a recognized exception applies (e.g., futility).
  • Jurisdiction (in this context): The majority treats exhaustion as a gateway condition to the court’s power to hear the case; if unmet, the court must dismiss rather than decide who is right.
  • “May” vs. “shall”: “May” typically grants a choice (do it or not). “Shall” typically imposes a requirement. The Court reads “may appeal” as “you are permitted to appeal,” not “you may pick a different forum.”
  • APA exemption: Being exempt from the APA’s hearing procedures does not mean there is no administrative process; it means a different, specific statutory process applies (here, the parole statutes).
  • Postconviction relief for unlawful parole revocation: Colorado channels judicial review of parole revocation into § 18-1-410(1)(h) and Crim. P. 35(c)(2)(VII), rather than ordinary civil administrative review.

5. Conclusion

People v. Abdul-Rahman establishes a clear rule: a parolee challenging an initial parole revocation must first pursue the Board’s administrative appeal process; only after exhausting that remedy may the parolee seek judicial review through § 18-1-410(1)(h) and Crim. P. 35(c). Failure to exhaust requires dismissal for lack of jurisdiction.

The opinion fortifies legislative design in parole administration, aligns parole revocation review with Colorado’s broader exhaustion doctrine, and materially reshapes the procedural path for parole-revocation litigation—while the dissent highlights unresolved tensions about waiver and the precise meaning of “jurisdiction” in exhaustion cases.