Parole Revocation: Administrative Appeal to the Parole Board Is a Jurisdictional Prerequisite to Crim. P. 35(c) Review

Case: People v. Abdul-Rahman, 2026 CO 33, 24SC774 (Colo. May 26, 2026) (MÁRQUEZ, C.J.)
Court: Colorado Supreme Court (en banc)  |  Disposition: COA vacated; remanded with instructions to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction

1. Introduction

This case arises from a parole revocation. Respondent Shams Abdul-Rahman—serving an indeterminate sentence under the Colorado Sex Offender Lifetime Supervision Act—was paroled, then charged with violating parole conditions. After a revocation hearing, the Colorado State Board of Parole (“Board”) revoked parole.

Rather than pursuing the Board’s internal appellate review, Abdul-Rahman filed a postconviction motion in district court under Crim. P. 35(c)(2)(VII), alleging an unlawful revocation. The district court denied the motion on the merits. On appeal, the People argued (for the first time) that the courts lacked jurisdiction because Abdul-Rahman failed to exhaust the statutory administrative appeal.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Court vacated the court of appeals’ judgment and remanded with instructions to return the matter to the postconviction court for dismissal for lack of jurisdiction.

3. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

The Court’s reasoning is anchored in Colorado’s long-standing administrative exhaustion doctrine and in interpretive canons requiring courts to harmonize statutes and respect separation of powers.

1) Jurisdiction and ability to raise defects

• Herr v. People: Recognized the general appellate rule that issues not raised below are typically forfeited; the Court noted this baseline while treating jurisdiction as different.
• People v. S.X.G.: Supplied the doctrinal mechanism for reaching the issue despite the People’s late timing—courts may consider jurisdictional defects sua sponte.

2) Exhaustion as a separation-of-powers and jurisdictional principle

• Thomas v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp.: Used for the core definition of exhaustion and the proposition that, where a statutory scheme makes exhaustion applicable, exhaustion is a “jurisdictional prerequisite” to judicial review; also cited for recognized exceptions (ill-suited remedies, pure questions of law, futility).
• Horrell v. Dep't of Admin.: Cited for the separation-of-powers rationale (matters remain within administrative jurisdiction until remedies are exhausted) and for exceptions to exhaustion.
• Crow v. Penrose-St. Francis Healthcare Sys. and State Pers. Bd. v. Dist. Ct.: Cited for the separation-of-powers premise—judicial interference is constrained where the General Assembly delegated the function to the executive branch.
• State v. Golden's Concrete Co. and Gramiger v. Crowley: Cited for the proposition that Colorado has long treated exhaustion as jurisdictional in appropriate statutory contexts; Golden's Concrete Co. also supports policy goals (agency expertise, error correction, record development).
• Heron v. City of Denv. and People v. Dist. Ct.: Older authorities reinforcing the longevity and jurisdictional framing of exhaustion in Colorado law.
• City &Cnty. of Denv. v. United Air Lines, Inc.: Cited for efficiency rationales and the high bar for futility (“clear beyond a reasonable doubt”).

3) Statutory interpretation methodology

• Mostellar v. City of Colo. Springs: Provided de novo review for statutory construction and the plain-language-first approach.
• McCoy v. People: Reinforced whole-statute harmonization and the canon against surplusage/absurd results.
• Walton v. People: Supported the mandatory force of “shall” absent clear contrary indication.
• Turbyne v. People: Used to reject adding words or options not expressed in the statute (no reading in an alternative “immediate judicial review” path).
• A.S. v. People: Used for the ordinary meaning of “may” as discretion/permission—important to rejecting the court of appeals’ reading that “may” created a choice between administrative and judicial routes.
• People v. Steen and City of Florence v. Pepper: Used for harmonizing potentially conflicting statutes rather than reading one to nullify the other.
• People v. Cooper and § 2-4-201(1)(b): Cited for the presumption that the General Assembly intended the entire statutory scheme to be effective (i.e., the Board’s appellate body is not a nullity).

4) APA interplay and specialized parole procedures

• McCallum v. Colo. State Bd. of Parole: Supported the view that parole statutes can create “clear, unambiguous, and exclusive” procedures displacing APA processes in this context.
• The Court also cited historical exhaustion authorities—First Nat'l Bank of Greeley v. Patterson, Bordner v. Bd. of Comm'rs, and Hannum v. Hillyard—to show that exhaustion doctrine predates the APA, undermining the argument that exemption from § 24-4-105 implies no exhaustion obligation.

5) Dissent’s waiver and “DIG” framework

• Moses v. Diocese of Colo. and Paine, Webber, Jackson &Curtis, Inc. v. Adams: Cited by the dissent for the rule that issues not raised in the trial court are waived, subject to an exception for subject matter jurisdiction.
• Masterpiece Cakeshop, Inc. v. Scardina: Cited by the dissent to argue the Court has been imprecise in labeling exhaustion as “subject matter jurisdiction.”
• People v. Sprinkle and St. George v. Off. of State Pub. Def.: Used by the dissent to stress that “subject matter jurisdiction” is uniquely non-waivable, while other jurisdiction-like concepts can be waived.

B. Legal Reasoning

The Court’s holding turns on a textual, structural reading of the parole revocation statutes—especially § 17-2-103 and § 17-2-201—and on fitting those statutes into the established exhaustion framework.

1. The Board’s “exclusive power” means the matter remains in the executive branch until Board proceedings conclude.
   The Court began with § 17-2-201(7), which states the Board has “exclusive power to conduct all proceedings involving an application for revocation of parole.” The Court read “all proceedings involving” revocation to include not just the revocation hearing and disposition, but also the internal appeal process.

2. The internal appeal process is mandatory if the parolee chooses to appeal; the statutory scheme does not create an alternative track of immediate judicial review.
   The Court treated § 17-2-201(9)(c) as prescribing a complete administrative appeal pathway: if the parolee decides to appeal, the appeal “shall” be filed within 30 days and reviewed by two Board members who did not conduct the revocation proceeding. The statute’s specificity and use of “shall” supported that the legislature contemplated the Board appeal as the required step before courts may review.

3. “May appeal” grants permission to appeal (or not), not permission to bypass the Board.
   Responding to the court of appeals’ reliance on “may” in § 17-2-103(2)(b), the Court held “may appeal” means a parolee is permitted to appeal (and may also choose not to), but it does not imply a choice between administrative appeal and immediate judicial review. The Court bolstered this by pointing to parallel language allowing the State to “may appeal” under § 17-2-201(9)(d)—which cannot sensibly mean the State may seek judicial review via Crim. P. 35(c), because that remedy is reserved to “every person convicted of a crime.”

4. “Judicial review of any revocation of parole” identifies the judicial vehicle and limits the type of relief; it does not eliminate the administrative prerequisite.
   The Court read § 17-2-201(4)(b) (“Judicial review of any revocation of parole shall be held pursuant to section 18-1-410(1)(h)”) as directing the mechanism for judicial review (postconviction review under § 18-1-410(1)(h) and Crim. P. 35(c)(2)(VII)), not as authorizing immediate judicial review that would conflict with the Board-appeal procedures.

5. Exemption from the APA’s hearing requirements does not repeal exhaustion; it redirects process to the specialized parole statutes.
   Although § 17-2-201(4)(b) exempts revocation hearings from § 24-4-105, the Court held that exemption merely means revocation hearings follow § 17-2-103 procedures tailored to parole, not that exhaustion disappears. The Court emphasized that exhaustion doctrine predates the APA and that the parole statutes themselves include an appeal process.

6. Policy rationales confirm, rather than override, the statutory meaning.
   The Court explained that requiring a Board appeal respects the Board’s expertise and discretion, promotes internal error correction (including the Board’s regulatory grounds for appeal in 8 Colo. Code Regs. 1511-1:14.00(E) (2013)), conserves judicial resources, and provides a written decision on an expedited schedule (§ 17-2-201(9)(c)) that can aid later judicial review if necessary.

Having concluded exhaustion is required, the Court applied the rule straightforwardly: Abdul-Rahman did not file the administrative appeal, did not invoke any exception (ill-suited remedy, pure law, futility), and thus the district court lacked jurisdiction to decide the Crim. P. 35(c) petition on the merits.

C. Impact

• New procedural prerequisite in practice: Parolees challenging revocation as “unlawful” under § 18-1-410(1)(h)/Crim. P. 35(c)(2)(VII) must first pursue the Board appeal to two Board members under § 17-2-201(9)(c) (and the related provisions in § 17-2-103(2)(b) and § 17-2-201(9)(c)-(d)).
• Jurisdictional framing increases consequences: Because failure to exhaust deprives courts of jurisdiction (per the majority), district courts must dismiss—not deny—unexhausted parole-revocation postconviction claims, regardless of their merits.
• Litigation sequencing and timelines: The decision elevates the 30-day Board-appeal deadline and encourages rapid administrative record development. Counsel must treat the Board appeal as the gateway to later judicial review.
• Reduced “leapfrogging” to courts: The ruling removes incentives to bypass the Board’s appellate body, reinforcing agency primacy in parole revocation proceedings.
• Potential future litigation: The dissent’s critique (waiver and the meaning of “subject matter jurisdiction”) may reappear in later cases challenging whether exhaustion is truly non-waivable jurisdictional doctrine or instead a mandatory claims-processing rule.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

• Administrative exhaustion: Before asking a court to intervene, a person must use the review steps the legislature created inside the agency (here, an appeal to the Board’s appellate body). Courts step in only after the agency finishes its process.
• Jurisdiction (as used by the majority here): If exhaustion is a “jurisdictional prerequisite,” then a court has no legal power to decide the dispute until exhaustion occurs; the correct remedy is dismissal, even if the court thinks the claim would fail (or succeed) on the merits.
• “May” vs. “shall”: “May” generally signals permission or discretion (you can do it, but you do not have to). “Shall” generally signals a mandatory step. The Court held “may appeal” means you are allowed to appeal (or not), but if you want review, the statute specifies where you must appeal first (the Board).
• APA exemption: Exempting a hearing from the APA’s generic procedures does not necessarily eliminate all administrative requirements; it often means a specialized statute supplies different procedures (as the Court found here with § 17-2-103 and § 17-2-201(9)(c)).

5. Conclusion

People v. Abdul-Rahman establishes a clear rule for Colorado parole revocation challenges: a parolee must first pursue the statutory administrative appeal to the Parole Board’s appellate body before seeking judicial review through § 18-1-410(1)(h) and Crim. P. 35(c)(2)(VII). The Supreme Court treated this exhaustion requirement as jurisdictional, requiring dismissal of unexhausted petitions. The decision strengthens the Board’s statutory primacy over revocation proceedings, channels disputes into an expedited administrative review process, and reshapes postconviction practice by making exhaustion the necessary first step rather than an optional detour.