Complaint Naming Only Deceased Defendants Is Void Ab Initio and Cannot Be Cured by Amendment or Substitution (Even in Post-Foreclosure Ejectment)

Introduction

In Parker v. The Bank of New York Mellon (Ala. May 15, 2026), the Supreme Court of Alabama addressed a threshold jurisdictional defect in a post-foreclosure ejectment action. The plaintiffs/appellants—William Parker, Jr., Ramona D. Hall, and the Estate of Roberta W. Parker—appealed a circuit-court order granting summary judgment to The Bank of New York Mellon (as trustee) (“BONY”) and Select Portfolio Servicing, Inc. (“SPS”).

The critical issue was not the merits of foreclosure, ejectment, or the defendants’ counterclaims, but whether the circuit court ever acquired subject-matter jurisdiction where BONY’s original complaint named only deceased individuals as defendants. The Court held it did not, rendering all subsequent proceedings void.

Summary of the Opinion

The Court reversed and remanded with instructions to vacate the circuit court’s order and dismiss the action without prejudice. Because BONY filed the original ejectment complaint solely against William Parker, Sr. and Roberta W. Parker—both already deceased—the case was void ab initio and did not invoke the circuit court’s subject-matter jurisdiction. As a result, the court lacked power to allow amendments, substitutions (including substituting the Estate), or to enter summary judgment. The Court also noted a potential finality issue (unaddressed mesne profits) but held jurisdiction had to be examined first.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

1) Duty to examine subject-matter jurisdiction ex mero motu

  • Murray v. Porter, 389 So. 3d 349 (Ala. 2023): Reinforced that subject-matter jurisdiction cannot be waived and must be considered by an appellate court on its own motion.
  • McElroy v. McElroy, 254 So. 3d 872 (Ala. 2017): Quoted in Murray for the same principle; used here to justify raising jurisdiction despite the parties’ focus on merits.

2) Suing a deceased person: no capacity to be sued; no jurisdiction

  • A.E. v. M.C., 100 So. 3d 587 (Ala. Civ. App. 2012): Central authority adopted and applied. It held an action naming a deceased person as the sole defendant is “void at its inception,” fails to invoke subject-matter jurisdiction, and must be dismissed.
    The opinion in Parker quotes A.E.’s reliance on general principles that a deceased person is a “nonexistent entity” and cannot be sued.
  • The out-of-state cases quoted within A.E. were included to illustrate the widely accepted doctrine:
    • Thompson v. Peck, 320 Pa. 27, 181 A. 597 (1935) (legal action implies legally existing parties).
    • Bateman v. Wood, 297 Mass. 483, 9 N.E.2d 375 (1937) (an action against a dead person is “against nobody”).
    • Volkmar v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co., 104 Ill. App. 3d 149, 432 N.E.2d 1149 (1982) (proceedings filed against someone already deceased are a nullity, void ab initio).
    • Richie v. Laususe, 892 S.W.2d 746 (Mo. Ct. App. 1994) (accord with nullity principle).
    • Noble v. Corkin, 45 Conn. Supp. 330, 717 A.2d 301 (1998) (a writ naming a dead defendant makes the complaint a nullity).

3) “Void ab initio” means amendments and substitutions cannot cure

  • Maclin v. Congo, 106 So. 3d 405 (Ala. Civ. App. 2012): The controlling Alabama application of A.E. to civil litigation mechanics. It held that when the original complaint is filed against a deceased defendant, the action is void ab initio; the trial court has no jurisdiction to entertain amendments or further pleadings and must dismiss.
  • Ex parte Owens, 65 So. 3d 953 (Ala. Civ. App. 2010): Cited in Maclin for the proposition that the trial court is required to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, not proceed with amendment practice.
  • Moore v. John Hancock Life Ins. Co., 876 So. 2d 443 (Ala. 2003): Quoted in Maclin for the proposition that absence of subject-matter jurisdiction renders any judgment void.

4) Analogous “void complaint” doctrine: absolute immunity

  • Ex parte Board of Trs. of Univ. of Alabama, 411 So. 3d 1228 (Ala. 2024): Not a deceased-party case, but a structural analogue. A complaint naming only an absolutely immune state institution was void ab initio; the trial court lacked jurisdiction to permit amendments or substitutions. Parker uses it to reinforce that certain foundational defects prevent jurisdiction from ever attaching, regardless of later procedural attempts.

5) Remedy: dismissal is mandatory; void judgments do not support appeals

  • Gulf Beach Hotel, Inc. v. State ex rel. Whetstone, 935 So. 2d 1177 (Ala. 2006), quoting State v. Property at 2018 Rainbow Drive, 740 So. 2d 1025 (Ala. 1999): Cited for the rule that when jurisdiction is absent, the court has “no alternative but to dismiss.”
  • Dalton Drug Co. v. OptumRx, Inc., 424 So. 3d 1254 (Ala. 2025): Cited for the proposition that a void judgment will not support an appeal, and to justify reversal with instructions to vacate and dismiss.

Legal Reasoning

  1. Jurisdiction first, merits never reached. The Court flagged a potential final-judgment defect (mesne profits not adjudicated) but properly treated subject-matter jurisdiction as antecedent to finality and merits.
  2. Capacity-to-be-sued problem becomes a subject-matter jurisdiction problem under Alabama precedent. Applying A.E. v. M.C. and Maclin v. Congo, the Court held that naming only deceased persons as defendants means the complaint does not commence a justiciable case in the circuit court at all.
  3. “Void ab initio” blocks procedural cures. Because the action was void from filing, the circuit court lacked power to:
    • allow an amended complaint adding Parker and Hall;
    • substitute the Estate for Roberta;
    • order deposits into court;
    • enter summary judgment on ejectment, redemption forfeiture, or counterclaims.
  4. Dismissal must be without prejudice. The Court’s instruction to dismiss “without prejudice” follows from the absence of adjudicatory authority: the merits were never validly determined; the plaintiff may file a new action against a proper, existing defendant.
  5. The footnote underscores preventability. The Court observed that an estate for Roberta had already been opened and Parker had been appointed personal representative; SPS had already confirmed Parker as a successor in interest and corresponded with him. The Court emphasized that had BONY sued the proper party initially (e.g., the Estate/personal representative), the jurisdictional issue likely would not exist.

Impact

  • Strict pleading discipline in ejectment/foreclosure aftermath. Foreclosure purchasers and servicers must ensure that the named defendants are legally existing entities at filing—particularly where the record owner/borrower is deceased.
  • No “relation back” rescue when jurisdiction never attached. Although the opinion does not explicitly discuss Rule 15 relation back, its holding effectively forecloses reliance on amendment/substitution to cure an action that was a nullity from inception.
  • Procedural waste and risk allocation. Orders for possession, redemption forfeiture, payment deposits, and counterclaim dispositions can be wiped out if the original pleading named only deceased defendants—creating significant strategic and economic consequences for plaintiffs who do not identify the estate/personal representative or other proper occupant defendants at the outset.
  • Broader application beyond ejectment. By aligning with the absolute-immunity “void complaint” logic from Ex parte Board of Trs. of Univ. of Alabama, the Court reinforces a category of foundational defects that preclude jurisdiction and cannot be fixed by later procedural steps.

Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Subject-matter jurisdiction: The court’s legal power to hear a type of case. If absent, everything the court does is invalid.
  • Void ab initio: Treated as invalid from the very beginning—as if it never existed.
  • Capacity to be sued: The defendant must be a legally recognized “person” or entity. A deceased person is not.
  • Substitution vs. amendment: Normally, parties can be substituted (e.g., a personal representative) or pleadings amended. But if the original case never invoked jurisdiction, there is nothing legally pending to amend or substitute into.
  • Dismissal without prejudice: The case is dismissed without a decision on the merits, leaving open the ability to refile properly.
  • Mesne profits: Money damages for the value of use/occupation of land while someone allegedly possesses it unlawfully (similar to rental value).

Conclusion

Parker crystallizes an unforgiving procedural rule in Alabama: an action filed against only deceased defendants is a nullity that never invokes subject-matter jurisdiction. Consequently, no amendment, substitution, or subsequent litigation activity can cure the defect; the trial court must dismiss without prejudice, and any orders entered are void. In practical terms, the opinion serves as a cautionary precedent for foreclosure purchasers and litigants in property-possession disputes to identify and sue legally existing parties—often the estate’s personal representative or other proper defendants—at the moment of filing.