Parenting a Different Child Is Not Determinative of Best Interests; Stagnation Supports Termination When Noncompliance Is Within the Parent’s Control

1. Introduction

Case: In re M.D. and M.D., Juveniles (O.L., Mother* and A.D, Father*)
Court: Supreme Court of Vermont (Entry Order, April Term 2026)
Appeal from: Superior Court, Franklin Unit; Family Division
Children: Mi.D. (b. Dec. 2016) and Ma.D. (b. Dec. 2017)

The State initiated a CHINS proceeding after allegations that father used physical discipline resulting in bruising and refused to engage in Department for Children and Families (DCF) safety planning. The record reflected prior DCF involvement and domestic violence history. After disposition with a reunification goal, the State later petitioned to terminate both parents’ rights. The family court terminated, finding (1) a post-disposition “change of circumstances” due to stagnation and (2) termination served the children’s best interests.

On appeal, father challenged the best-interests determination, emphasizing stable housing and that he was successfully parenting a new child. mother challenged the threshold “change of circumstances,” arguing her pace of contact was shaped by the children’s needs and thus beyond her control.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Vermont Supreme Court affirmed. It held that the family court’s findings supported termination as to both parents.

  • Father: The court reasonably concluded termination was in the children’s best interests where father had no contact for two years, did not engage in reunification steps, and retreated from accepting responsibility—regardless of his ability to parent a different child.
  • Mother: The court reasonably found a change of circumstances due to stagnation where mother made only minimal progress on critical case-plan requirements (including failing to maintain provider releases and failing to attend medical/dental appointments), and where the obstacles were not shown to be beyond her control.

3. Analysis

3.1. Precedents Cited

In re K.F., 2004 VT 40, ¶ 8, 176 Vt. 636 (mem.)

The Court relied on In re K.F. for the two-step framework applicable when termination is sought after an initial disposition: (1) the court must find a change of circumstances under 33 V.S.A. § 5113(b), and (2) it must find termination is in the child’s best interests. This decision provided the doctrinal “roadmap” for evaluating mother’s threshold argument and father’s best-interests challenge.

In re J.B., 167 Vt. 637, 639 (1998) (mem.)

In re J.B. supplied both the appellate standard (findings upheld unless clearly erroneous; conclusions upheld if supported by findings) and the key best-interests emphasis: the most important factor is whether the parent can resume parenting duties within a reasonable time. The Court used that factor to affirm the determination that father—having had no contact for two years and no meaningful case-plan engagement—could not resume parenting in a reasonable period.

In re D.C., 2012 VT 108, ¶ 22, 193 Vt. 101

In re D.C. directly addressed father’s primary appellate theme (that he was successfully parenting a new child). Quoting In re D.C., the Court reiterated that the best-interests criteria do not measure whether a parent is “good” in the abstract or generally fit to parent any child; the question is whether the parent is fit (or will be fit soon) to parent the particular child at issue.

This principle drove the Court’s rejection of father’s reliance on his parenting of another child as “not determinative,” because it did not answer the case-specific questions raised by his lack of contact, lack of responsibility-taking, and lack of reunification progress with Mi.D. and Ma.D.

In re D.S., 2016 VT 130, ¶ 7, 204 Vt. 44

Mother invoked In re D.S. for the proposition that stagnation cannot support termination if it is attributable to factors beyond the parent’s control. The Court distinguished that concept on the facts: mother’s stagnation finding rested materially on failures the family court deemed within her control, particularly the failure to maintain releases allowing DCF to communicate with providers and monitor progress—an issue central to decisions about advancing contact.

In re A.F., 160 Vt. 175, 178 (1993)

The Court cited In re A.F. to emphasize appellate restraint: credibility and evidentiary weight are for the family court. This precedent supported the Court’s refusal to “reweigh the statutory factors” in response to mother’s request to credit her narrative of gradual progress and external constraints.

3.2. Legal Reasoning

(a) Threshold requirement: “Change of circumstances” through stagnation (33 V.S.A. § 5113(b))

The family court found a post-disposition change of circumstances based on stagnation—i.e., insufficient progress toward the conditions necessary for reunification. The Supreme Court affirmed because the case plan required concrete steps (school involvement, parent education, counseling/anger-management work, collaboration with children’s providers, and releases), and mother’s overall progress was found minimal over the case’s two-year span.

A pivotal factual/legal link was the role of provider releases. The case plan treated releases as necessary for DCF to verify diagnoses, assess progress, and make informed decisions about contact increases. Mother’s failure to maintain releases meant DCF could not confirm progress or safely adjust visitation. The Court treated this as a parent-controlled barrier, aligning the stagnation finding with (and not barred by) the principle stated in In re D.S..

(b) Best interests (33 V.S.A. § 5114) and “reasonable time”

Applying the statutory best-interests criteria, the family court emphasized the “most important factor” from In re J.B.—whether the parent can resume parenting within a reasonable time.

  • Father: The Court highlighted the family court’s findings that father had no contact with the children for two years, did not attend school/medical appointments, and failed to follow the case plan. His later claim of successful parenting of another child did not address whether he could safely and timely resume parenting these children, especially given his failure to accept responsibility for the harm and removal circumstances.
  • Mother: The Court agreed it was unlikely mother could resume parenting within a reasonable time given minimal progress over two years, lack of in-person visitation advancement, lack of medical/dental involvement, and lack of the information-sharing infrastructure (releases) needed to evaluate readiness for expanded contact.

The Court also relied on facts supporting stability and attachment in the children’s current placements: minimal contact with mother, none with father, and positive adjustment to foster families and communities.

3.3. Impact

This Entry Order is issued by a three-justice panel and is explicitly labeled as nonprecedential. Even so, it has practical significance in at least three ways:

  1. Case-specific fitness over generalized parenting ability: The Court’s application of In re D.C. underscores that evidence a parent is successfully raising another child may carry limited weight when the parent has been absent from the subject children’s lives and has not engaged in reunification tasks tied to those children’s specific needs.
  2. “Stagnation” grounded in controllable noncompliance: The decision illustrates how stagnation can be found where a parent’s own omissions (e.g., failing to maintain releases, missing health appointments, not completing core plan steps) impede DCF’s ability to assess safety and to progress visitation—distinguishing situations where progress is thwarted by external constraints.
  3. Time as a child-centered metric: The Court’s approval of the “reasonable time” analysis reinforces the child-centered nature of termination decisions: prolonged absence and lack of engagement can outweigh claimed capacity or past parenting history.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • CHINS (Child in Need of Care or Supervision): A court finding that a child requires state intervention for safety/welfare reasons.
  • Disposition order / case plan: The court-ordered roadmap after a CHINS finding setting goals (often reunification) and specific steps parents must complete to regain custody.
  • Termination of parental rights (TPR): A proceeding that permanently ends the legal parent-child relationship.
  • Change of circumstances (33 V.S.A. § 5113(b)): When TPR is sought after disposition, the State must first show circumstances have materially changed since disposition—often shown by “stagnation.”
  • Stagnation: Not simply slow progress; it is a lack of meaningful improvement toward reunification such that the issues requiring state involvement remain unresolved.
  • Best interests (33 V.S.A. § 5114): Statutory factors the court must consider, with heavy emphasis on whether the parent can resume parenting within a reasonable time.
  • Clear and convincing evidence: A heightened proof standard requiring the court to be firmly persuaded of the facts supporting termination.
  • Releases: Signed authorizations permitting DCF to communicate with treatment providers; without them, DCF may be unable to verify progress or safely recommend expanded contact.

5. Conclusion

The Vermont Supreme Court affirmed termination of both parents’ rights where the family court found stagnation and concluded termination served the children’s best interests. The decision reinforces two central themes: (1) best-interests analysis is child- and case-specific—parenting a different child does not resolve fitness to parent the children at issue—and (2) stagnation may be established when lack of progress stems from controllable noncompliance with essential case-plan steps, including information-sharing measures necessary to evaluate safe reunification. In doing so, the Court applied and harmonized its prior guidance in In re K.F., In re J.B., In re D.C., In re D.S., and In re A.F..