Parallel Conduct Is Not Enough to Plead a Federal Civil-Rights Conspiracy; State-Law Claims Must Be Dismissed Without Prejudice When Supplemental Jurisdiction Is Declined

1. Introduction

In Carolyn Smith v. City of Philadelphia (3d Cir. Sept. 17, 2026) (non-precedential), pro se appellants Dr. Tamiera Harris Griffin (a maternal cousin and prospective adoptive parent) and Carolyn Smith (the child’s maternal grandmother and permanent legal custodian) sued the City of Philadelphia and numerous individuals connected to Philadelphia’s child-welfare and Family Court systems, along with Harris Griffin’s former court-appointed counsel.

The lawsuit arose out of state adoption/custody proceedings concerning the minor child, T.A.H. After the Juvenile Branch dismissed an adoption petition without prejudice and transferred it to the Domestic Relations Branch (because the PLC order originated there), appellants filed a federal action asserting claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, conspiracy claims under §§ 1985 and 1986, and state-law claims, and sought injunctive relief that would effectively intervene in the state-court process.

The central issues on appeal were whether the complaint plausibly pleaded (i) a civil-rights conspiracy and (ii) due process / access-to-courts violations arising from alleged exclusion from hearings, e-filing restrictions, and alleged withholding or alteration of court documents—and, separately, whether state-law claims were properly dismissed with prejudice after federal claims failed.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Third Circuit affirmed the dismissal of all federal claims under Rule 12(b)(6), holding that appellants alleged at most “parallel conduct” and conclusory suspicions rather than facts permitting a reasonable inference of an agreement to violate constitutional rights. The court also rejected due process and access-to-courts theories because the record contradicted key “excluded from hearings” allegations and because appellants failed to plead an “actual injury” from alleged filing limitations or alleged withholding of documents.

The panel agreed that amendment would be futile on the pleadings presented. It modified the judgment, however, to reflect that the dismissal of the state-law claims must be without prejudice.

3. Analysis

3.1. Precedents Cited

  • T. M. v. Univ. of Md.  Med. Sys. Corp., 146 S. Ct. 1739 (2026) — Cited for the contours of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Although appellants did not challenge the district court’s Rooker-Feldman ruling as to claims seeking review/rejection of state-court orders, the panel used this case as the framing authority: federal district courts cannot function as appellate tribunals over state judgments.
  • Great W.  Mining & Min. Co. v. Fox Rothschild LLP, 615 F.3d 159 (3d Cir. 2010) — The opinion’s principal pleading benchmark. It supplied (i) the rule that independent constitutional injuries can fall outside Rooker-Feldman, and (ii) the requirement that conspiracy claims include facts from which a conspiratorial agreement can be inferred; mere “parallel conduct” does not suffice.
  • Jutrowski v. Twp. of Riverdale, 904 F.3d 280 (3d Cir. 2018) — Reinforced that plaintiffs must plead facts showing defendants “reached an understanding” to violate rights; agreement cannot be assumed from participation in the same events.
  • Abbott v. Latshaw, 164 F.3d 141 (3d Cir. 1998) — Used to underscore that “conclusory allegations of concerted action” without concrete facts reflecting “joint action” fail to state a conspiracy claim.
  • Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) — Supplied the “plausibility” requirement: enough facts must be pleaded to make entitlement to relief plausible, not speculative.
  • Parker v. N.J. Motor Vehicle Comm'n, 158 F.4th 470 (3d Cir. 2025) — Provided the elements of a Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process claim (deprivation + state actor + lack of due process).
  • Monroe v. Beard, 536 F.3d 198 (3d Cir. 2008) — Controlled the access-to-courts analysis: a plaintiff must plead an “actual injury” (loss of an opportunity to pursue a nonfrivolous claim).
  • In re  Fine Paper Antitrust Litig., 685 F.2d 810 (3d Cir. 1982) — Cited for district-court discretion over docket control, relevant to the e-filing complaint.
  • Alpizar-Fallas v. Favero, 908 F.3d 910 (3d Cir. 2018) — Invoked to show that allegations of fraud must satisfy particularity requirements (the “precise misconduct” must be stated).
  • Reilly  v. City of Harrisburg, 858 F.3d 173 (3d Cir. 2017) — Used to reject injunctive relief where there is no “reasonable probability of eventual success” on the merits.
  • Grayson v.  Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103 (3d Cir. 2002) — Supported denying leave to amend where amendment would be futile.
  • 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) and In re U.S. Healthcare, Inc., 193 F.3d 151 (1999) — Grounded the principle that district courts may decline supplemental jurisdiction once all federal claims are dismissed.
  • N.J. Physicians, Inc. v.  President of U.S., 653 F.3d 234 (3d Cir. 2011) — The key authority for the panel’s modification: dismissals for lack of subject matter jurisdiction are “by definition without prejudice,” requiring the state-law claims to be dismissed without prejudice.
  • Additional procedural authorities shaped the standard of review and pleading framework: Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, Warren  Gen. Hosp. v. Amgen Inc., Davis v. Wells Fargo, Murray v. Bledsoe, and waiver/forfeiture principles from In re Wettach and Barna v. Bd. of Sch. Dirs. of Panther Valley Sch. Dist..

3.2. Legal Reasoning

  1. Rule 12(b)(6) plausibility as the gatekeeper. Applying Twombly and Third Circuit pleading cases, the court treated well-pleaded factual allegations as true but rejected speculative conclusions and contradictions by exhibits incorporated into the complaint record (e.g., hearing transcripts undermining “excluded from hearings” assertions).
  2. Civil-rights conspiracy requires facts showing agreement. The court catalogued appellants’ conspiracy “proof” (a child advocate’s alleged statements and withdrawal, alleged unnoticed guardian participation, shared legal positions about the PLC order, continued participation despite cease and desist letters, and “suppression” of a 2015 form). It held these allegations failed to permit an inference that defendants “reached an understanding” to violate rights, describing the allegations as, at most, parallel conduct and conclusory belief—insufficient under Great W.  Mining & Min. Co. v. Fox Rothschild LLP and Jutrowski.
  3. Due process and access-to-courts claims failed for lack of concrete deprivation and injury. The “excluded from hearings” theory was undercut by the complaint’s own attachments showing attendance. The e-filing theory failed because appellants did not plead that denial of state-court e-filing (or the district court’s pro se filing protocols) actually prevented pursuit of a nonfrivolous claim, as required by Monroe. Assertions about modified/withheld orders and a withheld 2015 document were not explained with facts connecting them to a deprivation “without due process,” as required by Parker, and remained speculative under Twombly.
  4. Injunctive relief necessarily fell with the merits. Without a plausible federal claim, appellants could not show a reasonable probability of success under Reilly  v. City of Harrisburg, defeating injunctive relief aimed at intervening in the state proceedings.
  5. Futility justified denial of leave to amend. The panel emphasized appellants’ lack of clarity and the speculative nature of their allegations across filings, and affirmed the denial of leave to amend as futile under Grayson.
  6. State-law claims: dismissal must be without prejudice. Even though appellants did not challenge the supplemental-jurisdiction ruling, the Third Circuit corrected the form of dismissal. Relying on N.J. Physicians, it modified the judgment so the state-law claims are dismissed without prejudice, preserving appellants’ ability to pursue them in an appropriate forum.

3.3. Impact

  • Federal pleading discipline in family-court-adjacent disputes. The decision illustrates how federal civil-rights claims attacking conduct surrounding custody/adoption proceedings will be screened rigorously for plausible facts showing agreement (conspiracy) or concrete deprivation and injury (due process/access).
  • Document attachments can defeat allegations at the motion-to-dismiss stage. By relying on hearing transcripts attached to the complaint, the opinion highlights the practical risk that exhibits incorporated into pleadings may undermine claims before discovery.
  • Procedural clarity on state-law claim disposition. The modification reinforces an important remedial point: when federal claims are gone and a federal court declines to keep state claims, the state claims ordinarily exit federal court without prejudice, limiting unintended preclusive effects.
  • Non-precedential but instructive. While designated “NOT PRECEDENTIAL,” the opinion is a useful synthesis of Third Circuit standards for conspiracy and access-to-courts pleading, and for the correct form of dismissal of pendent state claims.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Rooker-Feldman doctrine: Federal trial courts generally cannot review and overturn state-court judgments; that role belongs to state appellate courts and, in limited circumstances, the U.S. Supreme Court. Claims alleging a new, independent constitutional wrong may proceed, but claims seeking federal “appeal” of a state decision cannot.
  • “Plausibility” pleading (Rule 12(b)(6)): A complaint must include enough concrete facts to make the claim believable—not just possible. Courts disregard conclusory assertions like “they conspired” without factual detail showing how, when, and with what shared plan.
  • Civil-rights conspiracy: It is not enough that multiple officials took similar positions or participated in the same proceeding. The plaintiff must plead facts supporting an inference of an actual agreement to violate rights.
  • Access to courts / “actual injury”: A plaintiff must show the challenged obstruction caused a real loss—like the inability to bring (or the dismissal of) a nonfrivolous claim—not merely inconvenience.
  • Dismissal “without prejudice”: This means the claim is not finally decided on the merits, and the plaintiff may be able to refile it in a proper court (subject to limitations such as statutes of limitation).

5. Conclusion

The Third Circuit’s decision affirms that broad accusations of unfairness in state adoption/custody litigation do not become federal civil-rights claims without well-pleaded facts showing (i) an actual conspiratorial agreement or (ii) a concrete due process/access injury. Just as importantly, the panel corrected the judgment’s form to ensure that once federal claims are dismissed and supplemental jurisdiction is not exercised, pendent state-law claims are dismissed without prejudice, preserving the litigants’ ability to pursue those claims in an appropriate forum.