Insanity Jury Instructions Require “Slight Evidence” of Legal Insanity, Not Mere Mental Illness or an “Abnormal” Killing

1. Introduction

In Painter v. State (Ga. Apr. 21, 2026), Gregory Painter appealed his Fulton County convictions for malice murder and related offenses arising from the April 16, 2020 shooting death of his father, James Painter. Painter raised a single issue: whether the trial court erred by refusing to instruct the jury on insanity—both the “right and wrong” mental capacity defense under OCGA § 16-3-2 and the delusional compulsion defense under OCGA § 16-3-3.

The Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed, holding that the record contained not even slight evidence that Painter was legally insane at the time of the shooting, and thus the requested insanity charges were not authorized by the evidence.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Court reiterated that a requested instruction must be “legal, apt, and precisely adjusted to some principle involved in the case and be authorized by the evidence,” and that trial courts may give a requested instruction if slight evidence supports it. Applying de novo review to whether slight evidence existed, the Court concluded:

  • Evidence that Painter had mental health issues, behaved erratically, or left strange notes did not constitute evidence that he could not distinguish right from wrong at the time of the killing under OCGA § 16-3-2.
  • The handwritten note about the father “t[aking] pliers” to a child’s head did not supply evidence of delusional compulsion connected to the killing, and in any event would not have justified the homicide even if true, as required by OCGA § 16-3-3.
  • Brown v. State, 228 Ga. 215 (1971) did not support giving a delusional compulsion charge based solely on the “senselessness” or “abnormality” of the act; Brown involved expert testimony and a delusion that—if believed—could have legally justified the killing.

3. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

1) The “slight evidence” standard and charge entitlement

  • Hudson v. State, 308 Ga. 443, 445 (2020): Provided the core rule for requested jury charges (“legal, apt…authorized by the evidence”) and supported de novo review of whether slight evidence exists. The Court also relied on Hudson substantively for the point that testimony a defendant was “acting crazy” is not evidence of legal insanity.
  • Reese v. State, 289 Ga. 446, 449 n.3 (2011), overruled on other grounds by State v. Lane, 308 Ga. 10, 23 (2020): Reaffirmed that a charge on a defendant’s sole defense is mandatory only if there is some evidence to support it; the Court used this to frame the inquiry while noting Reese’s partial overruling did not undermine this charge principle.

2) Presumption of sanity; elements of Georgia’s insanity defenses

  • Jackson v. State, 301 Ga. 878, 881 (2017): Anchored the presumption of sanity and the defendant’s burden to prove insanity by a preponderance of the evidence, and supplied the Court’s formulation that the defendant must show lack of capacity to distinguish right from wrong “at the time” of the crimes.
  • Brookins v. State, 315 Ga. 86, 98-99 (2022): Emphasized the distinction between the mental capacity defense (OCGA § 16-3-2) and the delusional compulsion defense (OCGA § 16-3-3), supporting the Court’s separate analysis of each requested instruction.
  • Hood v. State, 311 Ga. 855, 868 (2021): Supplied the limiting rule that delusional compulsion is available only where the defendant would have acted “lawful and right” if the imagined facts were true—i.e., the delusion must map onto a legally justifying scenario.
  • Webb v. State, 270 Ga. 556, 557 (1999): Provided the three-part framework for delusional compulsion: (1) acted under delusion; (2) act connected to the delusion; (3) delusion related to a fact that, if true, would have justified the act.

3) Mental illness and abnormal behavior are not “legal insanity”

  • Lawrence v. State, 265 Ga. 310, 312 (1995): Cited for the principle that legal insanity is not established merely by a diagnosis of mental illness (e.g., psychosis).
  • State v. Abernathy, 289 Ga. 603, 607-08 (2011): Reinforced that mental abnormality, unless it amounts to insanity, is not a defense to crime.
  • Durrence v. State, 287 Ga. 213, 216 (2010): Highlighted the statutory and doctrinal distinction between being insane at the time of the crime and being mentally ill, requiring different proof.
  • Phillips v. State, 255 Ga. 539, 542 (1986): Supported rejection of insanity instructions where evidence showed odd demeanor (“mad,” “wild,” “unnormal” look) but not the legal test for insanity.
  • Hudson v. State, 308 Ga. 443, 447 (2020): Specifically applied the same idea to lay descriptions of “acting crazy.”

4) Limits on justification via delusion; rejection of “revenge” framing

  • Pearson v. State, 277 Ga. 813, 814 (2004): Used to show that even if the “pliers” belief were true, it would not justify the killing; the law does not allow homicide as “deliberate revenge” for past wrongs.

5) The Court’s clarification of Brown v. State

  • Brown v. State, 228 Ga. 215, 217 (1971): Painter invoked Brown for the phrase that the act itself may be “so utterly senseless and abnormal as to furnish satisfactory proof of a diseased mind.” The Court distinguished Brown, explaining that it turned on expert testimony authorizing a finding of delusional insanity and on a delusion that (per the majority in Brown) could have legally justified the killing. The Court further stated, “We express no opinion as to whether Brown was correctly decided,” citing the dissent’s concern about imminence limits.

B. Legal Reasoning

  1. Charge entitlement is evidence-driven, not label-driven. The Court treated Painter’s pretrial “notice” of insanity and evidence of mental health history as insufficient by themselves; the decisive question was whether the trial record contained slight evidence meeting the statutory elements of OCGA § 16-3-2 or OCGA § 16-3-3.
  2. Mental capacity (“right and wrong”) required evidence of incapacity at the time of the act. Painter’s cited facts (family testimony about mental illness, mother’s 911 statement that he “just went crazy,” unusual handwritten notes) were treated as evidence of mental illness or abnormality, not proof that he could not distinguish right from wrong when he fired seven shots. The Court additionally viewed Painter’s post-shooting conduct—collecting shell casings and concealing the gun—as inconsistent with an inability to appreciate wrongfulness.
  3. Delusional compulsion required a connected delusion plus a legally justifying “if true” scenario. The Court found no evidence that Painter was acting under a delusion at the time of the shooting, that the shooting was connected to any such delusion, or that the asserted “pliers” belief (even if true) would have legally justified killing his father (invoking Pearson).
  4. The “senseless and abnormal” phrase is not a shortcut to an insanity charge. The Court rejected the reading of Brown that would allow delusional compulsion instructions based merely on the nature of the homicide. Instead, Brown was treated as a case where evidentiary support—particularly expert testimony and a qualifying delusion—made the instruction appropriate.

C. Impact

Painter v. State is likely to be cited for a practical but significant charge-law clarification: Georgia trial courts need not instruct on insanity—even where mental illness evidence exists and the defense is the defendant’s “sole defense”—unless the defendant produces slight evidence satisfying the statutory elements of OCGA § 16-3-2 or OCGA § 16-3-3.

Key implications include:

  • Defense strategy: Defendants seeking insanity instructions must connect mental health evidence to the time-of-act statutory tests (right/wrong incapacity or delusion that would legally justify the act if true). General history, odd writings, or lay impressions of “crazy” behavior will often be inadequate.
  • Role of expert evidence: While the Court did not announce a categorical expert-testimony requirement, its distinction of Brown underscores how expert evidence can supply the necessary “slight evidence,” especially for delusional compulsion.
  • Constraining expansive readings of Brown: Litigants may rely less successfully on the “senseless and abnormal” phrasing as a stand-alone basis for delusional compulsion charges.
  • Behavior implying consciousness of guilt: Post-act concealment behavior can be used to argue against the right/wrong incapacity theory in charge disputes, not only at the merits stage.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • “Legal insanity” vs. “mental illness”: A person may have a mental illness yet still be legally responsible. Georgia’s insanity defenses require specific showings defined by statute, not just proof of diagnosis or unusual behavior.
  • OCGA § 16-3-2 (Right/Wrong test): The question is whether, at the moment of the criminal act, the defendant lacked the mental capacity to distinguish right from wrong regarding that act.
  • OCGA § 16-3-3 (Delusional compulsion): The defendant must have committed the act because of a delusion that overpowered his will, and the delusion must be of a kind that—if the imagined facts were true—would make the act legally justified.
  • “Slight evidence” for a jury instruction: This is a low threshold, but it still requires some evidence of each element of the defense. If the evidence only shows “something was wrong” mentally, the threshold is not met.
  • De novo review: The Supreme Court independently evaluates whether the evidence was sufficient to authorize the requested charge, rather than deferring to the trial court.

5. Conclusion

Painter v. State reaffirms Georgia’s insistence that insanity jury instructions are warranted only when the record contains at least slight evidence of statutory insanity—either inability to distinguish right from wrong under OCGA § 16-3-2 or a qualifying, act-connected, legally justifying delusion under OCGA § 16-3-3. The decision also cabins attempts to use the “utterly senseless and abnormal” language associated with Brown v. State, 228 Ga. 215 (1971) as a substitute for evidence of a specific, justifying delusion. In practice, the opinion strengthens trial courts’ ability to refuse insanity charges where the proof shows mental illness or aberrant behavior but does not satisfy the legal tests for criminal non-responsibility.