Outdated Grievance Forms and “Non-Eergency” Determinations Do Not Excuse PLRA Exhaustion in Illinois

1. Introduction

In Michael Reck v. Shana Clarkson (7th Cir. Jan. 23, 2026) (nonprecedential), Illinois prisoner Michael Reck sued prison medical staff—Dr. Zorian Trusewych and nurse practitioner Shana Clarkson— and two unidentified correctional officers under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference to serious medical needs after he allegedly went without blood-pressure medication for over a month and suffered a stroke.

The central issue on appeal was procedural rather than medical: whether Reck had to, and did, exhaust available administrative remedies under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a)) before filing suit, given that prison staff returned multiple emergency grievances for use of an outdated grievance form and later rejected his appeal to the Administrative Review Board for missing required attachments.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment for Trusewych and Clarkson on exhaustion grounds. The court held that administrative remedies were available to Reck and that he failed to comply with required steps—most notably, he did not submit a standard (non-emergency) grievance after the chief administrative officer deemed his emergency grievance a non-emergency and instructed him to use the standard process. The court also declined to consider an “inconsistent enforcement” argument because Reck raised it for the first time on appeal. Because exhaustion was dispositive, the panel did not reach Reck’s challenge regarding dismissal of claims against the unidentified correctional officers.

3. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

  • Ross v. Blake, 578 U.S. 632 (2016)
    Ross is the Supreme Court’s leading “availability” decision under the PLRA. The Seventh Circuit used Ross to frame Reck’s main argument: that remedies were “effectively unavailable” because prison staff required use of the “current” grievance form and repeatedly returned his submissions. The panel invoked Ross’s discussion of “availability” and its recognition that administrative remedies can be unavailable when officials thwart inmates through “game-playing” or misrepresentations, but found no record basis (in the district court) to apply that exception here.
  • Wallace v. Baldwin, 55 F.4th 535 (7th Cir. 2022)
    Cited for the proposition that frustration with the grievance process does not eliminate the PLRA’s exhaustion requirement when remedies remain available. The panel used Wallace to characterize Reck’s federal filing as premature rather than excused.
  • King v. McCarty, 781 F.3d 889 (7th Cir. 2015)
    Quoted for the principle that prisoners must exhaust procedures they have been told about, but not ones they have not been told about. The court used King to support the conclusion that officials repeatedly informed Reck how to comply (use the current form; follow the standard process after a non-emergency determination), undermining any “hidden procedure” theory.
  • Cannon v. Washington, 418 F.3d 714 (7th Cir. 2005)
    Cited to reject the idea that an inmate’s failure to follow reasonable instructions converts an otherwise functioning grievance system into an “unavailable” one.
  • Cooper v. Retrieval-Masters Creditors Bureau, Inc., 42 F.4th 675 (7th Cir. 2022)
    Used for appellate waiver: arguments raised for the first time on appeal are forfeited/waived. This doctrine prevented Reck from relying on new evidence (other grievances allegedly processed on outdated forms) to prove inconsistent enforcement and “game-playing.”
  • Chambers v. Sood, 956 F.3d 979 (7th Cir. 2020)
    Cited for the strict rule that to exhaust under the PLRA, a prisoner must follow each step required by the state’s grievance system, not an inmate-created substitute.
  • Williams v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., 957 F.3d 828 (7th Cir. 2020)
    Applied to Illinois’s emergency grievance framework: when an emergency grievance is deemed a non-emergency by the chief administrative officer, the inmate must resubmit through the standard grievance process.
  • Dole v. Chandler, 438 F.3d 804 (7th Cir. 2006)
    Cited for “strict compliance” with exhaustion rules. The panel used Dole to reject Reck’s argument that his letter to his counselor could substitute for a grievance filed on the required grievance form.

B. Legal Reasoning

  1. Availability of the remedy despite returned forms.
    Illinois regulations require prisoners to submit grievances “on a grievance form that shall be made available in all living units.” ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 20 § 504.810(a). The court accepted the magistrate judge’s finding that the record did not support an inference that the current form was unavailable to Reck—indeed, he eventually used the correct form. From that, the panel reasoned that the requirement to use the current form was not so “technical” that it rendered the process unavailable under Ross.
  2. Reasonableness of requiring the “current” form.
    Even though neither Illinois regulations nor prison rules expressly address “outdated” forms, the panel treated the instruction to use the current version as a reasonable administrative requirement, especially because Reck admitted he obtained the outdated forms at a different facility. The court emphasized that officials promptly told Reck what to do to comply.
  3. Appellate waiver prevented a “game-playing/inconsistency” theory.
    Reck’s strongest potential Ross theory was that inconsistent enforcement could amount to thwarting “effective invocation” of the grievance system. But because he did not raise it or present the supporting materials in the district court, Cooper barred consideration on appeal.
  4. Failure to take required next step after “non-emergency” determination.
    The chief administrative officer stated that no emergency was substantiated and instructed Reck to proceed through the standard grievance process. Under Williams and ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 20 § 504.840(c), Reck had to resubmit as a standard grievance. His decision to write a letter and appeal to the Administrative Review Board—without following required steps and attachments—did not satisfy the PLRA’s demand for completion of the prescribed process.
  5. Letter-writing is not “strict compliance” when a form is required.
    The court acknowledged Reck’s frustration, but held that Illinois requires grievances be on the designated form and that Dole’s “strict compliance” principle foreclosed treating a counselor letter as the equivalent of a proper grievance.

C. Impact

Although designated a nonprecedential disposition, the order reinforces several practical points likely to shape litigation and prison practice in Illinois and within the Seventh Circuit:

  • Form compliance can matter without becoming “unavailable” under Ross, especially where the inmate is repeatedly told how to comply and the compliant form is accessible.
  • Emergency grievance denial triggers a mandatory pivot to the standard grievance track in Illinois; failing to make that pivot is a common exhaustion failure point.
  • Build the “unavailability” record in the district court. Claims of inconsistency, misdirection, or “game-playing” must be timely raised and supported below, or they risk waiver on appeal.
  • Procedural exhaustion can eclipse merits. Even serious allegations (a stroke after missed medication) may never be reached if the inmate does not complete required administrative steps.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • PLRA “exhaustion” (42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a)): Before suing about prison conditions in federal court, an inmate must use the prison’s grievance system properly and completely—following the rules the state sets.
  • “Available” remedies (from Ross v. Blake): An inmate does not have to exhaust a process that is truly not usable in practice (for example, if officials block access or mislead the inmate). But a process is still “available” if the inmate can use it and is told how to do so.
  • Emergency vs. standard grievance (Illinois): An emergency grievance can be submitted for urgent issues, but if the chief administrative officer decides it is not an emergency, the inmate must restart/continue using the normal multi-step grievance process.
  • Summary judgment: A case can be decided without trial if the material facts are not genuinely disputed and the law requires judgment for one side—here, because exhaustion failed as a matter of law.
  • Waiver on appeal: If you do not raise an argument (and supporting evidence) in the trial court, an appellate court generally will not consider it later.
  • Eighth Amendment “deliberate indifference”: A constitutional claim requiring more than negligence; it typically demands that officials knew of and disregarded a substantial risk of serious harm. In this appeal, the court did not reach that merits question because exhaustion was dispositive.

5. Conclusion

The Seventh Circuit affirmed dismissal because Reck did not complete Illinois’s prescribed grievance steps before filing suit. The decision underscores that (1) returning grievances for use of an outdated form does not by itself make the system “unavailable” when the correct form is accessible and instructions are provided; (2) once an Illinois emergency grievance is deemed a non-emergency, the inmate must proceed through the standard grievance process; and (3) strict compliance, not substantial compliance by letters or partial appeals, is the baseline for PLRA exhaustion.