Out-of-State Motorists Have Standing to Enjoin a State Police Pattern of Unconstitutional Stops, but Relief Must Be Narrow and Cannot Restrict the “Kansas Two-Step” Contrary to Circuit Precedent

Introduction

Shaw v. Smith (10th Cir. Jan. 29, 2026) arises from multiple traffic stops by the Kansas Highway Patrol (KHP) of out-of-state motorists traveling on major Kansas highways—especially routes associated with interstate travel to and from Colorado—followed by prolonged detentions, canine sniffs, and searches that yielded no contraband.

The plaintiffs (Blaine Franklin Shaw; Samuel James Shaw; Joshua Bosire; Mark Erich; Shawna Maloney) sued the KHP Superintendent in his official capacity under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 seeking prospective relief, alleging systemic Fourth Amendment violations (unreasonable seizures and searches) and infringement of the right to interstate travel. The central appellate issues were:

  • Standing: Whether plaintiffs previously subjected to unconstitutional detentions could seek prospective declaratory and injunctive relief.
  • Scope of equitable relief: Whether the district court’s extensive injunction improperly intruded into state administration and conflicted with Tenth Circuit Fourth Amendment precedent, particularly regarding the “Kansas Two-Step.”

Summary of the Opinion

The Tenth Circuit held that plaintiffs do have standing to pursue prospective injunctive relief because they showed a substantial risk of future encounters with KHP and proved an officially authorized pattern and practice of unconstitutional enforcement (including training and culture) targeting out-of-state drivers.

On remedy, the court affirmed in part and reversed in part the permanent injunction:

  • State-of-origin “drug source/destination” reasoning: The panel ruled the district court’s relief was too intrusive; the injunction may go no further (on this record) than ordering corrective training on the irrelevance of state residency/state of travel as reasonable-suspicion factors.
  • “Kansas Two-Step” restrictions: The panel set aside as an abuse of discretion the injunction provisions regulating the Two-Step because Tenth Circuit precedent repeatedly recognizes that post-stop re-engagement can be consensual under circumstances the district court sought to curtail, and because “obey-the-law” injunctions violate Rule 65(d)’s specificity requirements.

The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the appellate limitations.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

1) Standing and prospective relief

  • City of Los Angeles v. Lyons: The Superintendent invoked Lyons to argue that past injury from an unlawful stop is not enough for an injunction absent likelihood of repetition. The panel distinguished Lyons by emphasizing (i) traffic stops are routine and often unavoidable even for law-abiding motorists; (ii) plaintiffs are within a class disproportionately targeted (out-of-state drivers); and (iii) the district court found KHP training and practices authorized unconstitutional conduct—matching Lyons’ requirement that officers be “ordered or authorized” to act unlawfully.
  • Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus and Clapper v. Amnesty Int'l USA: The opinion adopts the “certainly impending”/“substantial risk” framework and treats imminence as probabilistic, not “literally certain.” The court frames plaintiffs’ future injury as sufficiently likely given KHP’s high-volume stop practices and statistical evidence of out-of-state targeting.
  • O'Shea v. Littleton: Used both for the assumption that plaintiffs will try to obey the law and for caution against speculative future enforcement injury. The panel accepts the “obey the law” assumption but notes it does not eliminate the risk of being stopped.
  • TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins: These cases supply the modern standing triad (injury, causation, redressability) and the “concrete and particularized” injury requirement, which the court finds satisfied because plaintiffs face personal risk of renewed unconstitutional detention and attendant fear/humiliation.
  • Melendres v. Arpaio and Deshawn E. by Charlotte E. v. Safir: Cited to support standing where plaintiffs challenge an “officially sanctioned” pattern of unconstitutional police conduct directed at a discrete group.

2) Federalism limits on injunctions against state agencies

  • Rizzo v. Goode: The court treats Rizzo as a federalism warning, not a categorical bar. It distinguishes “rogue officer” scenarios from the district court’s finding here of training-driven, pervasive unconstitutional practice. Even so, Rizzo informs the remedy analysis by reinforcing narrow tailoring and sensitivity to state administration.
  • Steffel v. Thompson: Quoted for the principle that declaratory relief can be an alternative to the “strong medicine” of an injunction—used to justify restraint when crafting federal equitable orders against state entities.
  • Eaglemed LLC v. Cox: Provides the controlling narrow-tailoring rule: injunctive relief against a state agency must be “no broader than necessary,” reflecting “comity and federalism.”
  • Knox v. Salinas, Ruiz v. Estelle, Toussaint v. McCarthy, Marie v. Mosier: These cases illustrate remedial restraint—courts may escalate to more detailed supervision only after a stronger showing that narrower measures (including updated regulations/training) are inadequate or noncompliance persists.

3) Fourth Amendment standards governing stops, extensions, and consent

  • Vasquez v. Lewis: The foundational Fourth Amendment precedent in the opinion. The court reiterates that using state residency or “drug corridor/drug source state” logic is “impermissible” and “so broad as to be indicative of almost nothing.” The district court found KHP training and trooper testimony conflicted with Vasquez. The appellate panel preserves the constitutional holding but limits the remedy to mandatory training (for now).
  • United States v. Wallace: Supplies the basic rule that a completed traffic stop may be extended only with reasonable suspicion or voluntary consent.
  • Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, United States v. Manjarrez: Provide the totality-of-circumstances voluntariness standard and the “free to leave or disregard” test for consensual encounters.
  • Florida v. Bostick: The core “free to decline or terminate the encounter” test used by the majority (Hartz) to evaluate whether Two-Step interactions are seizures.
  • United States v. Tafuna and United States v. Mercado-Gracia: Provide the multi-factor test for consensual encounters versus seizures.
  • United States v. West, United States v. Bradford, United States v. Ledesma, United States v. Hunter, United States v. Guerrero: These are the decisive “Two-Step” precedents. The majority treats them as establishing that saying “have a safe trip,” returning documents, and quickly re-engaging can still be consensual; officers need not say “you are free to go,” and proximity to the vehicle can be consistent with consent (e.g., interstate safety). Because these cases upheld Two-Step encounters on similar features, the panel held the district court’s Two-Step restrictions conflicted with circuit law.

4) “Universal injunctions,” stipulations, and scope

  • Trump v. CASA, Inc.: The court notes the Supreme Court’s rejection of “universal injunctions,” but finds it not controlling because (i) the relief is confined to a state agency within Kansas, (ii) “complete relief” may be indivisible and incidentally benefit third parties, and (iii) KHP stipulated the equitable relief would benefit the putative class, limiting its ability to contest breadth on appeal.
  • Richison v. Ernest Grp., Inc.: Cited to support waiver/forfeiture principles related to the stipulation about classwide benefit.

5) Rule 65(d) specificity (“obey the law” problem)

  • Schmidt v. Lessard: Supports the requirement that injunctions be specific enough to guide conduct and enable review.
  • Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, Denver, Colo.: Reaffirms that “obey the law” injunctions are too vague and must be stricken.

Legal Reasoning

1) Standing: reconciling Lyons with systemic traffic-stop practices

The opinion’s central standing move is to convert what would be “speculative future harm” in a one-off police encounter into “substantial risk” where (a) traffic stops are common and sometimes unavoidable; (b) plaintiffs plausibly will travel through Kansas again; and (c) the defendant agency’s training, culture, and data demonstrate a repeatable and officially tolerated pattern.

Critically, the court treats the district court’s findings—statistical evidence of disproportionate stops and canine sniffs, and uniform trooper testimony that state origin is used—as satisfying Lyons’ “ordered or authorized” condition without needing a formal written policy.

2) Remedy: constitutional violation does not justify maximal supervision

Having found standing and constitutional violations, the court narrows the remedy through a federalism-inflected proportionality principle: even if unconstitutional practices are proven, a federal court must choose the least intrusive effective remedy against a state agency. The majority (Hartz) emphasizes that the record did not show officers would persist in the “drug source/destination” logic after targeted training; therefore, detailed monitoring requirements were premature for that component.

3) Two-Step: circuit precedent as a ceiling on injunctive regulation

The Two-Step portion rests on a strong institutional claim: whether a post-stop encounter is consensual is an “ultimate” Fourth Amendment determination that appellate courts review de novo (citing United States v. Little and analogizing to Ornelas v. United States). The majority rejects the district court’s premise that brief disengagement, ambiguous farewell language, or close proximity typically negates consent, because that premise is inconsistent with Tenth Circuit holdings.

The court also warns that an injunction cannot merely command “use the Two-Step lawfully”; Rule 65(d) requires operational specificity, yet specificity cannot contradict circuit precedent by effectively imposing extra-statutory, extra-constitutional consent requirements.

Impact

  • Expanded practical pathway to standing in pattern-and-practice traffic-stop litigation: The decision strengthens standing arguments for motorists (especially those in a demonstrably targeted group) to seek prospective relief when they can show (i) likely future travel exposure and (ii) an officially authorized pattern, including training, even without a written policy.
  • Remedial restraint as a governing rule for institutional reform injunctions against police: Even with systemic constitutional violations, the court signals that initial relief should often begin with narrower tools (notably, training) absent proof that narrower measures will fail.
  • Doctrinal stabilization of the “Two-Step” in the Tenth Circuit: By reversing the Two-Step injunction explicitly because existing precedent permits many Two-Step variants, the decision effectively insulates that tactic from broad prophylactic regulation via civil injunction—at least unless future en banc or Supreme Court developments alter the circuit’s consent/seizure jurisprudence.
  • Post-Trump v. CASA injunction framing: The opinion models how lower courts may preserve institution-targeted injunctions (not “universal injunctions”) while emphasizing “complete relief,” indivisibility, and procedural posture (including stipulations affecting scope).

Complex Concepts Simplified

Standing (for an injunction)
To get a forward-looking court order, plaintiffs must show not only past harm but a meaningful likelihood of being harmed again. Here, repeated travel exposure plus an agency-wide pattern made future harm “substantially” likely.
Reasonable suspicion
A specific, articulable basis to suspect crime before extending a stop. The court reiterates that “out-of-state plates,” “drug corridor,” and “drug source/destination state” are too broad and innocuous—especially after Vasquez v. Lewis.
Consensual encounter vs. seizure
After a traffic stop ends (documents returned), an officer may ask additional questions only if a reasonable person would feel free to decline and leave. Many Tenth Circuit cases treat common “farewell” language and quick follow-up questions as consistent with consent.
Federalism/comity limits
Even when a federal court finds state officials violated federal rights, it should not take over state administration unnecessarily. The remedy should be as narrow as possible while still fixing the constitutional violation.
Rule 65(d) specificity
An injunction must tell the defendant exactly what is required or forbidden. Courts cannot issue vague commands like “obey the law.”

Conclusion

Shaw v. Smith delivers two major lessons. First, motorists previously subjected to unconstitutional traffic-stop extensions can obtain standing for prospective relief when they demonstrate a substantial risk of repeat encounters and an officially authorized pattern of misconduct. Second, even where systemic constitutional violations are proven, federal courts must craft remedies that are minimally intrusive—here, limiting the “state-of-origin” component largely to corrective training—and cannot impose injunction rules that contradict controlling circuit precedent on consensual post-stop questioning, resulting in vacatur of the Two-Step portion of the injunction and a remand for further tailoring.