Orleans Parish Courts “Subject to Change by Law”: La. Const. art. V, § 32 Displaces art. V, § 15(D)’s Supermajority for Judgeship Reductions

1. Introduction

In John T. Fuller v. State of Louisiana; Jeff Landry in His Official Capacity as Governor; Elizabeth B. Murrill, in Her Official Capacity as Attorney General; Nancy Landry, in Her Official Capacity as Secretary of State; And Chelsey Richard Napoleon, in Her Official Capacity as Clerk of Court for the Parish of Orleans, the Supreme Court of Louisiana resolved, on expedited supervisory review, whether Act 748 of the 2026 Regular Session—which prospectively abolishes three sections (A, E, and J) of the Orleans Parish Criminal District Court at the end of incumbents’ terms—was constitutionally enacted.

The plaintiff, Judge John Fuller, elected to Section J in May 2026, argued that because Act 748 “change[d] the number of judges in [a] judicial district,” it required a two-thirds vote in each legislative chamber under La. Const. Art. V, § 15(D). The State responded that Orleans Parish courts are governed by the special constitutional provision La. Const. Art. V, § 32, which makes enumerated Orleans Parish courts “subject to change by law” “notwithstanding any other contrary provision of this constitution,” permitting change by ordinary legislation.

The trial court granted a preliminary injunction, declared Act 748 “null and void,” and ordered election-related preservation measures. With election qualifying imminent, the Supreme Court took the case directly to provide finality.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Court (per curiam) held that Act 748 was validly enacted: La. Const. Art. V, § 32 controls Orleans Parish courts, and its “notwithstanding” clause displaces any conflicting supermajority mechanism in La. Const. Art. V, § 15(D) as applied to changes to the Orleans Parish civil and criminal district courts, including reductions in the number of judgeships that constitute those courts.

The Court also rejected alternative theories (right to vote, equal protection, and local/special law), reiterating that laws concerning courts and judicial officers are matters of statewide concern and not local laws even if geographically limited. Finally, the Court found procedural error: the trial court improperly decided constitutionality during a preliminary injunction (a summary proceeding), contrary to La. C.C.P. art. 855.1 and related jurisprudence.

The Court lifted the stay, lifted the injunction, reversed and rendered, and dismissed Judge Fuller’s claims.

3. Analysis

3.1. Precedents Cited

Supervisory authority, standard of review, and presumption of constitutionality

  • John T. Fuller v. State of Louisiana, et al., 26-0927 (La. 7/17/26), --- So. 3d --- (2026 WL 2105672): the Court’s earlier order assuming supervisory jurisdiction and staying proceedings set the procedural posture for expedited resolution tied to election timelines.
  • Marionneaux v. Hines, 05-1191, p. 4 (La. 5/12/05), 902 So. 2d 373, 376: quoted for the breadth of the Court’s “plenary, unfettered” supervisory authority, supporting intervention despite incomplete lower-court posture.
  • Fisher v. Harter, 24-0359, p. 5 (La. 10/25/24), 395 So. 3d 806, 811: supplied (i) de novo review for constitutional rulings and (ii) the presumption of constitutionality/burden on the challenger.

Text-first constitutional interpretation and the “notwithstanding” clause

  • Radiofone, Inc. v. City of New Orleans, 630 So. 2d 694, 698 (La. 1994): invoked for the interpretive rule that clear constitutional text is applied as written absent absurd consequences, anchoring the Court’s textual approach to Article V, § 32.
  • Cisneros v. Alpine Ridge Group, 508 U.S. 10, 18 (1993): used to support the proposition that a “notwithstanding” clause signals override priority, reinforcing § 32’s supremacy over conflicting constitutional mechanics.

Orleans Parish exceptionalism and legislative plenary authority under Article V, § 32

  • Davenport v. Hardy, 349 So.2d 858 (La. 1977): central to the majority’s conclusion that § 32 places enumerated Orleans Parish courts/offices under legislative power “subject to change by law,” with “no limitations or restrictions” beyond the constitutional text itself.
  • Crockett v. State, 26-0594, pp.3-5 (La. 6/1/26), --- So. 3d --- (2026 WL 1599484): treated as recent confirmation that changes under § 32 proceed by ordinary majority vote “notwithstanding” other provisions, and that Orleans Parish’s historically “anomalous structure” was preserved but not insulated from legislative revision.
  • State v. Francois, 445 So. 2d 416, 418 (La. 1983): quoted for the Legislature’s “plenary power” to “completely abolish, partially erase or otherwise change” Orleans Parish courts under § 32, supporting the majority’s refusal to separate “court” change from “judge” change.

Limits on using convention history to vary clear text

  • Succession of Lauga, 624 So. 2d 1156, 1165 (La. 1993): cited to reject reliance on constitutional convention debates to vary unambiguous constitutional text, a direct response to plaintiff and dissent reliance on convention materials.

Local/special law doctrine as applied to court-related statutes

  • Crockett, 26-0594, p. 4 n.1, --- So.3d at ---: relied upon for the proposition that laws about courts/judicial officers are statewide matters and not “local laws,” even if geographically confined.
  • Polk v. Edwards, 626 So. 2d 1128, 1133-35 (La. 1993): used to articulate the controlling test: a statute is not local/special merely because it operates in a single locality if it concerns a subject of general public interest.
  • State v. Dalon, 35 La. Ann. 1141, 1143-44 (La. 1883): foundational authority rejecting the claim that a law creating/structuring a parish court is a “local law”; the majority quotes its emphatic language to underscore doctrinal stability.
  • State ex rel. Grosch v. New Orleans, 211 La. 241, 29 So.2d 778 (La. 1947): cited via Polk as part of the long line of authority supporting the general-law characterization of court statutes.

Procedural impropriety of deciding constitutionality in preliminary injunction proceedings

  • Herman, Herman, Katz & Cotlar, L.L.C. v. State ex rel. Blanco, 08-1337 (La. 9/19/08), 990 So. 2d 737, 738: controlling precedent that a declaration of unconstitutionality at a preliminary injunction hearing exceeds the limited scope of the proceeding absent party agreement to try the merits.
  • Calhoun v. Landry, 25-00316, p. 5 (La. 3/18/25), 403 So. 3d 521, 529 (Cole, J., concurring): cited to reinforce the principle distinguishing summary injunction practice from merits adjudication.

Authorities emphasized in dissents (and their role in framing the dispute)

  • State ex rel. Garland v. Guillory, 166 So. 94, 102 (La. 1935): used by the Chief Justice’s dissent to show historical continuity of supermajority requirements for changing judgeships under prior constitutions.
  • Caddo-Shreveport Sales & Use Tax Comm'n v. Office of Motor Vehicles, 97-2233, p. 11 (La. 4/14/98), 710 So.2d 776, 782: cited in dissent for in pari materia interpretation of constitutional provisions—central to the dissenters’ harmonization theory (§ 32 about structure; § 15(D) about number of judges).
  • Champagne v. Ward, 03-3211 (La. 1/19/05), 893 So.2d 773, 780 and Lowther v. Town of Bastrop, 20-01231, p. 4 (La. 5/13/21), 320 So.3d 369, 373: referenced in dissents to argue the “more specific” provision (§ 15(D)) should control over the general language of § 32.
  • Bd. of Comm'rs of Orleans Levee Dist. v. Dep't of Nat. Res., 496 So. 2d 281, 286 (La. 1986): cited in dissent to stress that even “plenary” power is limited by constitutional constraints—supporting the dissent view that § 32 does not displace § 15(D).

3.2. Legal Reasoning

(a) The controlling constitutional conflict and the majority’s override analysis

The majority frames a direct conflict between two Article V provisions: § 15(D) (two-thirds vote to change the number of judges in “any judicial district”) and § 32 (Orleans Parish courts “continued, subject to change by law,” “notwithstanding any other contrary provision”). The Court resolves that conflict by treating § 32’s “notwithstanding” clause as an explicit priority rule: when § 32 applies, it authorizes change “by law” via ordinary majority vote, and any competing supermajority mechanism yields.

(b) “Court” change necessarily includes “judgeship” change

A key move in the reasoning is rejecting plaintiff’s attempt to split “courts” (structure/existence) from “judges” (number of seats). The Court holds the legislative authority over the “civil and criminal district courts” cannot be severed from authority over the judges who constitute those courts. It finds plaintiff’s reading would create an “incongruous result”: the Legislature could abolish the entire court by ordinary law, yet could not reduce it by three judgeships without a two-thirds vote.

(c) Convention history: not permitted to vary clear text; and, in any event, votes matter

The Court declines to allow convention debates to override unambiguous text, relying on Succession of Lauga. It also notes a concrete historical datapoint: delegates deleted a draft supermajority requirement for § 32, which the Court reads as confirming that ordinary legislation was intended to be sufficient under § 32.

(d) Alternative constitutional theories rejected

The Court treats the local/special law claim as foreclosed by longstanding doctrine: court-related statutes are matters of statewide concern even if geographically limited (Polk v. Edwards; State v. Dalon). The opinion warns that embracing the opposite view would destabilize “many hundreds” of court-operational statutes customized by district.

(e) Procedure: no constitutional merits adjudication in a preliminary injunction hearing

Even though the Court reaches the constitutional merits under its supervisory authority, it criticizes the trial court’s approach: deciding unconstitutionality during a preliminary injunction hearing (a summary proceeding) violates La. C.C.P. art. 855.1 and the limitation stated in Herman, Herman, Katz & Cotlar, L.L.C. v. State ex rel. Blanco. With Act 748 held constitutional, plaintiff could not show likelihood of success, so the injunction necessarily falls.

3.3. Impact

  • Doctrinal rule for Orleans Parish reforms: The decision solidifies a strong, text-driven rule that Article V, § 32 permits ordinary-majority legislation to restructure enumerated Orleans Parish courts—including changes that effectively reduce judgeships—despite the statewide supermajority rule in § 15(D).
  • Legislative leverage and judicial independence debate: The dissents (Weimer, C.J.; Griffin, J.; Guidry, J.) emphasize separation-of-powers and anti-politicization rationales for supermajority protections. The majority, however, treats the constitutional text as having already made that policy choice for Orleans Parish. Practically, future disputes will likely focus on whether a reform is properly characterized as a “change” to a § 32-enumerated “court” (covered) versus something else (potentially not covered).
  • Election-timeline adjudication: The case exemplifies the Court’s willingness to use plenary supervisory authority to provide pre-qualifying-period finality, potentially shaping how future election-adjacent constitutional challenges are routed and decided.
  • Local-law challenges to court statutes weakened: By forcefully reaffirming Polk v. Edwards and State v. Dalon, the opinion makes it harder to attack court-administration statutes as “local” merely because they apply to one parish or district.
  • Trial-court procedure signal: The Court’s procedural discussion reinforces that constitutional invalidation should not occur in preliminary injunction posture absent agreement to try merits—likely affecting how litigants plead and sequence relief in future constitutional litigation.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • “Notwithstanding” clause: A drafting device meaning “despite anything else that conflicts.” Here, § 32’s “notwithstanding any other contrary provision” is treated as an explicit instruction that § 32 prevails over conflicting constitutional rules.
  • Supermajority vs. ordinary legislation: § 15(D) ordinarily requires two-thirds votes to change the number of judges in a judicial district. The Court holds that, for Orleans Parish courts enumerated in § 32, the Legislature may act by the usual majority vote.
  • Supervisory writ / plenary supervisory authority: A mechanism allowing the Supreme Court to take up and decide matters from lower courts, even before ordinary appeals conclude, when necessary—here, to meet election deadlines.
  • Preliminary injunction (summary proceeding) vs. merits (ordinary proceeding): A preliminary injunction is meant to preserve the status quo pending a full decision. Louisiana procedure generally requires constitutional challenges to be litigated in an ordinary proceeding; deciding constitutionality at a preliminary injunction hearing is improper unless parties agree to submit the merits.
  • Local or special law: A law targeting a locality can be unconstitutional if it is truly “local” and not properly advertised/authorized. But Louisiana jurisprudence treats laws about courts and judicial officers as matters of statewide concern, even when they apply to only one parish.

5. Conclusion

The Supreme Court’s per curiam opinion establishes (and emphatically applies) a clear interpretive rule: for Orleans Parish courts enumerated in La. Const. Art. V, § 32, the Legislature’s power to enact change “by law” operates by ordinary majority vote and, by virtue of the “notwithstanding” clause, displaces conflicting constitutional mechanisms—here, the two-thirds requirement in La. Const. Art. V, § 15(D)—when the change concerns the Orleans Parish civil or criminal district courts.

Alongside that constitutional holding, the Court fortifies two practical guardrails: (1) court-structure statutes remain strongly insulated from “local law” attacks under longstanding precedent, and (2) trial courts should not render final constitutional invalidations in preliminary injunction proceedings. The dissents underline competing values—uniformity with other districts and judicial independence—setting the stage for continued debate, but the majority’s controlling principle is textual primacy for Orleans Parish under § 32.