Oral Pronouncement Controls on Revocation: Unpronounced “Standard” Supervised-Release Conditions Must Be Stricken; Firearm Condition May Be Reformed to the Mandatory Core

Introduction

United States v. Gonzales (5th Cir. Feb. 13, 2026) concerns the recurring sentencing problem of a mismatch between what the district court says at sentencing and what later appears in the written judgment—specifically, supervised-release conditions added in writing but not imposed in open court.

Jaylen Anthony Gonzales pleaded guilty to one count of transportation of an undocumented alien and initially received probation. After alleged probation violations, the district court revoked probation and imposed 31 days’ imprisonment followed by 12 months of supervised release. At the revocation hearing, the court orally required reporting to a probation officer and participation in inpatient and outpatient drug treatment, and it granted the probation officer’s request to impose mental-health treatment and medication-compliance conditions. The written judgment, however, also included four “mandatory” and fifteen “standard” conditions.

The central issue on appeal was whether the written judgment impermissibly broadened the sentence by adding discretionary supervised-release conditions that were not orally pronounced (or validly incorporated by reference).

Summary of the Opinion

The Fifth Circuit held that a conflict existed because the district court did not orally pronounce (or expressly adopt by reference) the “standard” supervised-release conditions later included in the written judgment. Applying the rule that the oral pronouncement controls over a conflicting written judgment, the court vacated the sentence in part and remanded with instructions:

  • to remove unpronounced standard Conditions 3 through 9 and 11 through 15; and
  • to amend Condition 10 (weapons restriction) by striking language extending beyond the mandatory firearms/ammunition/destructive-device prohibition, leaving only what can operate as a mandatory condition.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

1) Standard of review when the error first appears in the written judgment

  • United States v. Martinez, 987 F.3d 432 (5th Cir. 2021): The court reiterated that conditions are reviewed for abuse of discretion when the defendant had no opportunity to object below. Gonzales uses this as the entry point for review because the alleged error surfaced only once the written judgment issued.
  • United States v. Baez-Adriano, 74 F.4th 292 (5th Cir. 2023): Supplies the key procedural premise—when the discrepancy “appears for the first time in the written judgment,” the defendant lacked an opportunity to object, supporting abuse-of-discretion review rather than forfeiture-based plain-error review.

2) The constitutional “pronouncement” rule and what counts as pronouncement

  • United States v. Diggles, 957 F.3d 551 (5th Cir. 2020) (en banc): This is the backbone authority. It distinguishes:
    • mandatory conditions (need not be orally pronounced because required by statute), and
    • discretionary conditions (must be orally pronounced because the defendant has a right to be present when sentenced).

    Diggles also recognizes two lawful ways to satisfy pronouncement for discretionary conditions: (i) express adoption of a document listing conditions (e.g., the PSR) that the defendant reviewed and could object to; or (ii) express adoption of “court-wide or judge-specific standing orders” listing the conditions. In Gonzales, the district court did neither.

  • United States v. Martinez, 47 F. 4th 365 (5th Cir. 2022): Tightens Diggles by emphasizing that the “mere existence” of a standing order or document is insufficient; the district court must explicitly adopt the list. Gonzales applies this to reject any suggestion that the AO 245B template or standing orders can silently supply conditions.

3) Oral pronouncement controls over a conflicting written judgment

  • United States v. Pelayo-Zamarripa, 81 F.4th 456 (5th Cir. 2023) (citing United States v. Mireles, 471 F.3d 551 (5th Cir. 2006)): Reaffirms the controlling principle: where there is an “actual conflict,” the oral pronouncement governs.
  • United States v. Mireles, 471 F.3d 551 (5th Cir. 2006): Provides the operational test: a conflict exists if the written judgment “broadens the restrictions or requirements” beyond what was orally imposed. Gonzales uses this test to hold that unpronounced standard Conditions 3–15 (as listed) broadened the supervised-release regime.

4) Application in revocation proceedings (and treatment of unpublished decisions)

  • United States v. Fraga, No. 23-40248, 2024 WL 111388 (5th Cir. Jan. 10, 2024) (unpublished): The panel treats Fraga as persuasive authority for two points: (i) Diggles pronouncement rules apply equally to sentences imposed on revocation; and (ii) a weapons condition can be narrowed to its mandatory core by striking “dangerous weapon” language beyond the firearms/ammunition/destructive-device prohibition.
  • Ballard v. Burton, 444 F.3d 391 (5th Cir. 2006): Cited for the general proposition that unpublished opinions “may be persuasive authority,” even though they are “not precedent” under 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.
  • United States v. Goins, No. 24-20187, 2025 WL 48408 (5th Cir. Jan. 8, 2025) (unpublished): Reinforces Fraga’s approach to the same “dangerous weapon” language in an identical condition, supporting consistent remedial tailoring.

5) Remedy: remand versus appellate reformation

  • United States v. Fuentes-Rodriguez, 22 F.4th 504 (5th Cir. 2022): Invokes 28 U.S.C. § 2106 and confirms the appellate court may reform the judgment or remand. It also states a practical preference for remand to reduce “future confusion” given the frequent downstream use of judgments. Gonzales follows that preference, especially because both parties requested remand.

Legal Reasoning

  1. Identify the claimed conflict. The oral pronouncement included only specific treatment/reporting conditions (and mental-health/medication compliance), while the written judgment added numerous “standard” conditions not mentioned at the hearing.
  2. Classify conditions as mandatory vs. discretionary. Under Diggles and 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d), mandatory conditions need not be pronounced; discretionary conditions must be. The “standard” conditions on AO 245B/standing orders are typically discretionary, even if routinely imposed.
  3. Test whether the court “pronounced” the discretionary conditions. Pronouncement can occur via explicit adoption of a PSR or standing order list (Diggles), but the district court must say so (United States v. Martinez, 47 F. 4th 365). Here, the court did not refer to or adopt the PSR, standing orders (including S.D. Tex. standing order No. 2017-01), or any other document.
  4. Apply the conflict rule. Because the written judgment broadened the restrictions beyond what was imposed orally (Mireles; Pelayo-Zamarripa), the oral sentence controlled and the added discretionary conditions could not stand.
  5. Tailor the remedy condition-by-condition. Standard Conditions 3–9 and 11–15 were ordered removed. For Condition 10, the court accepted that part of the condition overlaps with a mandatory prohibition tied to 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) (felons and firearms) and thus can remain if rewritten to eliminate discretionary “dangerous weapon” language, consistent with Fraga and Goins.
  6. Choose remand to amend the judgment. Though the court could reform the judgment itself, it remanded under 28 U.S.C. § 2106 in line with Fuentes-Rodriguez’s preference.

Impact

Although designated unpublished and “not precedent” under 5th Cir. R. 47.5, United States v. Gonzales fits squarely within (and reinforces) the Fifth Circuit’s mature post-Diggles framework and is likely to be cited as persuasive authority in revocation and supervision-condition disputes. Its practical consequences include:

  • Sentencing-court discipline: District courts must either (a) read discretionary conditions into the record, or (b) explicitly adopt a specified list (PSR/standing order) at the hearing. Reliance on AO 245B templates or district standing orders without express adoption remains vulnerable.
  • Revocation parity: The opinion underscores that revocation proceedings are not exempt—supervised-release conditions added after revocation are subject to the same pronouncement requirements.
  • Remedial blueprint: The court signals a predictable remedy: strike unpronounced standard conditions, and narrowly amend hybrid conditions (like weapons restrictions) to preserve any truly mandatory core.
  • Reduction of downstream confusion: By preferring remand for an amended judgment, the court aims to prevent later actors (probation, prosecutors, defense counsel, and other courts) from relying on an inaccurate written judgment.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Oral pronouncement vs. written judgment
The sentence is imposed in open court. If later paperwork adds restrictions not said at sentencing, the spoken sentence usually controls.
Mandatory vs. discretionary conditions
Mandatory conditions are required by statute (e.g., certain baseline requirements under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d)) and need not be read aloud. Discretionary conditions—including many “standard” conditions—must be imposed in the defendant’s presence.
“Adoption by reference”
A judge can satisfy the pronouncement requirement by clearly stating on the record that they adopt a specific document (like the PSR or a standing order) listing the conditions, assuming the defendant had the chance to review and object. Silence is not adoption.
“Conflict”
A conflict exists when the written judgment adds or expands restrictions beyond what was pronounced—i.e., it “broadens the restrictions or requirements” (the Mireles test).
VACATE IN PART and REMAND
The appellate court invalidates only the problematic portion of the sentence and sends the case back to the district court to correct the written judgment.

Conclusion

United States v. Gonzales reaffirms a strict but administrable rule in Fifth Circuit sentencing practice: discretionary supervised-release conditions—even “standard” ones—cannot appear for the first time in the written judgment unless they were orally pronounced or expressly incorporated by adoption of a specific list. Where the written judgment broadens what was said in court, the oral pronouncement controls, the added conditions must be removed, and the judgment must be amended. The decision also illustrates a careful remedial approach: striking unpronounced discretionary terms while narrowing a weapons condition to its mandatory core, and remanding to ensure the corrected judgment reduces future confusion.