Oral Pronouncement by Adoption: Discretionary Supervised-Release Conditions May Be Upheld Without an Express On-the-Record Confirmation of Defendant’s Review When the Record Reasonably Shows Notice and Understanding

Case: United States v. Bell (5th Cir. Sept. 17, 2026) (per curiam; not designated for publication)
Context: Revocation sentencing; adoption of supervised-release conditions via a “Judge’s Sentencing Options Worksheet” and appendix

1. Introduction

In United States v. Bell, the Fifth Circuit addressed a recurring post-Diggles issue: when a district court imposes discretionary supervised-release conditions in a written judgment after stating at sentencing that it “adopts” conditions contained in another document, what must happen on the record to satisfy the oral-pronouncement requirement?

The defendant, Marquavia Chancenique Bell, sought to vacate fifteen “standard” supervised-release conditions and a substance-abuse “special” condition included in the written revocation judgment. Her argument was not that the written conditions conflicted with what was said in court, but that the court failed to confirm she had reviewed (or had the opportunity to review) the document it orally adopted—the Probation Department’s “Judge’s Sentencing Options Worksheet” (with an appendix listing recommended conditions)—with her counsel.

The Fifth Circuit affirmed, holding that—even assuming the district court did not expressly verify Bell’s review of the worksheet—there was no abuse of discretion because the record supported a reasonable inference that Bell had notice of, and understood, the conditions being imposed.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The district court revoked Bell’s supervised release and imposed 18 months’ imprisonment followed by one year of supervised release. At sentencing, after the Probation Officer asked whether the court would “adopt the conditions noted in the [Options Worksheet] appendix,” the court responded “yes.” The written judgment then included mandatory conditions, fifteen standard conditions, and a substance-abuse special condition.

On appeal, Bell challenged the discretionary conditions on oral-pronouncement grounds, asserting she lacked a meaningful opportunity to object because the court did not confirm she had reviewed the Options Worksheet with counsel.

The Fifth Circuit declined to decide whether Diggles imposes an “additional duty” to verify counsel’s review of the adopted document in every case. Instead, the court held that even if the pronouncement procedure was imperfect, the district court did not abuse its discretion because the record showed Bell would have understood and anticipated the conditions: they substantially matched prior judgments, were provided in advance, were repeatedly referenced, and were linked to the Southern District of Texas standing order (General Order No. 2017-01) that “outlined every condition imposed.”

3. Analysis

3.1. Precedents Cited (and How They Shaped the Decision)

Core doctrinal backbone: the Fifth Circuit’s post-United States v. Diggles line distinguishing (i) mandatory conditions that need not be pronounced from (ii) discretionary conditions that must be pronounced—either expressly or by reference to an identifiable list—so the defendant can object while present.

A. The pronouncement requirement and “adoption by reference”

  • United States v. Diggles, 957 F.3d 551 (5th Cir. 2020) (en banc): The foundational rule that discretionary supervised-release conditions must be orally pronounced, but may be pronounced by “reference” to a written list (e.g., PSR, standing order, or other document). Bell relies on Diggles for (i) the due-process basis for presence at sentencing and (ii) the permissibility of pronouncement “by reference.”
  • United States v. Grogan, 977 F.3d 348 (5th Cir. 2020): Reinforces that oral pronouncement is required and need not be word-for-word. Bell uses it to rebut the notion that detailed recital is required.
  • United States v. Martinez, 47 F.4th 364 (5th Cir. 2022): Reaffirms that pronouncement can occur by referencing a standing order or other document and frames the notice-to-object function. Bell uses Martinez both as substantive support and as a comparator for when a defendant has an opportunity to object.

B. Mandatory vs. discretionary conditions; § 3583(d)

  • United States v. Gomez, 960 F.3d 173 (5th Cir. 2020): Quoted for the principle that conditions required by statute need not be pronounced (objection would be futile), while discretionary conditions must be.
  • United States v. Quezada-Atayde, 148 F.4th 360 (5th Cir. 2025): Cited for the same mandatory/discretionary distinction and for the proposition that pronouncement is satisfied where the court confirms the defendant received and reviewed the PSR with counsel and orally adopts a list of conditions in a standing order or the PSR.
  • United States v. Fraga, No. 23-40248, 2024 WL 111388 (5th Cir. Jan. 10, 2024) (unpublished): Used to illustrate that statutorily required conditions need not be pronounced in open court (and to explain why Bell did not challenge the statutorily required portion of standard condition ten).

C. Standard of review: abuse of discretion vs. plain error

  • United States v. Villafana-Mondragon, 170 F.4th 360 (5th Cir. 2026) and United States v. Prado, 53 F.4th 316 (5th Cir. 2022): Provide the “opportunity to object” framework governing whether plain-error or abuse-of-discretion review applies.
  • United States v. Mudd, 685 F.3d 473 (5th Cir. 2012) and United States v. Huor, 852 F.3d 392 (5th Cir. 2017): Cited via Gomez for the same bifurcated standard-of-review rule.
  • United States v. Green, No. 24-30608, 2025 WL 1735720 (5th Cir. June 23, 2025) (unpublished): Illustrates that failure to confirm review of the PSR can lead to abuse-of-discretion review because the defendant lacked a meaningful chance to object.
  • United States v. Martinez-Rivera, No. 24-20031, 2025 WL 985711 (5th Cir. Apr. 2, 2025) (unpublished) and United States v. Mojano-Rodriguez, No. 24-20487, 2025 WL 2556261 (5th Cir. Sept. 5, 2025) (unpublished): Invoked to frame how Rule 32 verification issues intersect (or do not necessarily create) an oral/written “conflict.”

D. “Conflict vs. ambiguity” and record-based inference

  • United States v. Currier, 160 F.4th 656 (5th Cir. 2025) and United States v. Woods, 102 F.4th 760 (5th Cir. 2024): Supply the general abuse-of-discretion “decisive question” in pronouncement disputes—whether the gap between oral and written is a conflict or an ambiguity resolvable by the record. Bell distinguishes these because Bell did not claim an oral/written divergence.
  • United States v. Lezama-Ramriez, 173 F.4th 191 (5th Cir. 2025) and United States v. Esparza- Gonzalez, 268 F.3d 272 (5th Cir. 2001): Key to Bell’s reasoning method. They authorize drawing “reasonable inferences” from documents and party statements to decide whether the defendant had the opportunity to read the materials with counsel and thus understood what was being imposed.

E. The “must verify review with counsel” debate (not resolved)

  • United States v. Richard, No. 21-30179, 2023 WL 4559369 (5th Cir. July 17, 2023) (unpublished), United States v. Chavez, No. 20-50550, 2022 WL 767033 (5th Cir. Mar. 14, 2022) (unpublished), United States v. Griffin, No. 21-50294, 2022 WL 17175592 (5th Cir. Nov. 23, 2022) (unpublished), and United States v. Jackson, No. 20-50922, 2022 WL 738668 (5th Cir. Mar. 11, 2022) (unpublished): These cases are cited to show that Fifth Circuit panels have sometimes described a best practice (or requirement) of ensuring the defendant had an opportunity to review the referenced document with counsel before adoption.
  • United States v. Baez-Adriano, 74 F.4th 292 (5th Cir. 2023): Cited for characterizing explicit confirmation as “well-grounded and legally sound procedure,” while acknowledging that Fifth Circuit decisions often find pronouncement satisfied by mere oral reference to standing-order conditions.
  • United States v. Villafana-Mondragon, 170 F.4th 360 (5th Cir. 2026): Quoted for the precise open question: whether Diggles “imposes an additional duty” to verify that counsel reviewed the referenced document with the defendant. Bell expressly avoids resolving that question.

F. Standing orders as incorporated condition-sets

  • In re Conditions of Prob. & Supervised Release, Gen. Order No. 2017-01 (S.D. Tex. Jan. 6, 2017): While not a judicial precedent, it is crucial to the record-based notice rationale in Bell. The Options Worksheet referenced the standing order, and the court treated that cross-reference as reinforcing that the adopted materials “outlined every condition imposed.”

3.2. Legal Reasoning

  1. Identify what must be pronounced. The court reiterated that discretionary conditions (those not required by 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d)) must be pronounced. Bell’s target conditions—fifteen standard conditions and a substance-abuse special condition—fell into that discretionary bucket.
  2. Frame the dispute as “review/notice,” not oral/written conflict. Bell did not claim the written judgment conflicted with what occurred in court; she argued the court failed to confirm she reviewed the adopted Options Worksheet with counsel. This matters because typical pronouncement cases turn on a conflict/ambiguity comparison between oral and written sentencing; here, the court treated the issue as whether Bell had adequate notice and understanding to permit objection.
  3. Assume arguendo an imperfect pronouncement procedure, then assess whether the record nevertheless supports notice and understanding. The panel explicitly declined to decide whether Diggles requires an on-the-record verification of counsel review for adopted documents beyond the PSR. Instead, it held that even if the court did not satisfy that step, there was no abuse of discretion in imposing the conditions.
  4. Apply the “reasonable inferences from the record” method. Borrowing from United States v. Lezama-Ramriez and United States v. Esparza- Gonzalez, the court inferred Bell’s understanding and notice from:
    • the Options Worksheet being provided to Bell and counsel prior to the hearing;
    • the district court referencing the worksheet multiple times during the hearing;
    • the Probation Officer’s explicit request on the record to “adopt the conditions” in the appendix and the court’s “yes” response;
    • Bell’s silence—no suggestion during sentencing that she had not reviewed the worksheet with counsel;
    • the conditions substantially matching those imposed in Bell’s earlier revocation judgment(s) and overlapping with conditions recommended in the original PSR to which Bell filed no objections;
    • the same judge presiding over both revocation hearings; and
    • the worksheet’s reference to General Order No. 2017-01, which the panel treated as setting out the full condition set.
  5. Conclude no abuse of discretion. With the above indicia, the panel deemed it “difficult to conclude” Bell did not understand or anticipate the conditions, and found a “sufficient” understanding that the imposed conditions were those disclosed in the Options Worksheet.

What the opinion functionally adds: It endorses a pragmatic, record-based approach—particularly in revocation contexts—where a defendant’s prior exposure to substantially identical conditions and pre-hearing access to an adopted worksheet can cure (or at least defeat) claims that the court needed an explicit, on-the-record confirmation of review with counsel.

3.3. Impact

  • Revocation practice and local “worksheet” adoption. Bell signals that courts may safely adopt probation-prepared revocation worksheets and appendices (especially when linked to a standing order) without enumerating every discretionary condition, so long as the record supports an inference that the defendant had notice and could object.
  • Strategic implications for defense counsel. Because the panel relied heavily on (i) prior similar conditions, (ii) pre-hearing provision of the worksheet, and (iii) the absence of any on-the-record statement that the defendant had not reviewed the materials, future defendants will likely need to create a record at sentencing—e.g., by stating they have not reviewed the referenced document or requesting time to do so—to preserve a stronger challenge.
  • Doctrinal consolidation without resolving the “verification duty” split. The opinion perpetuates an unresolved tension in Fifth Circuit cases: some language suggests courts “must” ensure review with counsel before adopting a document, while other cases treat mere reference as sufficient. Bell sidesteps the question and decides on a harmlessness/record-inference-like rationale under abuse-of-discretion review.
  • Limited precedential force, practical persuasive value. As an unpublished disposition (5th Cir. R. 47.5), Bell is not binding precedent, but it may be persuasive—particularly for district courts seeking to insulate revocation judgments where conditions are repeated from prior terms and clearly contained in pre-sentencing materials.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • “Oral pronouncement requirement”: The sentence a defendant must follow is the one announced in open court. If the written judgment adds new discretionary burdens that were not pronounced, due process concerns arise because the defendant was not present to hear and object to them.
  • “Discretionary” vs. “mandatory” supervised-release conditions: Mandatory conditions are required by statute; the judge has no real choice, so failing to recite them is generally not reversible. Discretionary conditions are optional and tailored; those must be pronounced (directly or by adopting an identifiable written list) so the defendant can object.
  • “Pronouncement by reference/adoption”: A judge need not read every condition aloud. The judge may say, in substance, “I adopt the standard conditions in [a standing order/PSR/other document],” as long as the defendant has a fair chance to know what is being adopted and object.
  • “Opportunity to object” and standard of review: If the defendant had a meaningful chance to object at sentencing but stayed silent, appellate review is usually “plain error” (harder to win). If the defendant had no meaningful chance, review may be “abuse of discretion” (somewhat easier). In Bell, the panel affirmed even under abuse-of-discretion review.
  • Rule 32(i)(1)(A) verification idea (background to the argument): Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32 requires the court to verify the defendant and counsel have read and discussed the PSR. Defendants sometimes argue a similar verification should occur for any adopted list of supervised-release conditions. Bell did not decide that legal requirement definitively; it held the record showed enough notice and understanding regardless.

5. Conclusion

United States v. Bell affirms discretionary supervised-release conditions adopted by reference to a probation “Options Worksheet” and appendix, despite the absence of an express, on-the-record confirmation that the defendant reviewed the adopted document with counsel. Relying on the Fifth Circuit’s post-Diggles framework and the “reasonable inferences” approach of United States v. Lezama-Ramriez, the court treated the decisive question as whether the record shows the defendant understood and had notice of the conditions sufficient to object.

The key takeaway is practical: in revocation proceedings where conditions are repeated from prior judgments, provided in advance in a probation worksheet, referenced during the hearing, and tethered to a standing order, the Fifth Circuit is inclined to uphold the written conditions—at least absent a contemporaneous indication that the defendant did not review or understand what was being adopted.