OPERS May Require Notarized Consent Form Before Processing R.C. 145.40 Direct Rollover Refunds

Case: State ex rel. Haydocy v. Ohio Pub. Emps. Retirement Sys., Slip Opinion No. 2026-Ohio-1928 (Ohio May 28, 2026).
Court: Supreme Court of Ohio (per curiam).
Posture: Appeal as of right from dismissal (Civ.R. 12(B)(6)) of a mandamus action.

I. Introduction

This decision addresses when a public retirement system may insist on additional documentation before processing a member’s request to remove accumulated contributions—specifically, a request to roll over OPERS-held funds into an eligible deferred-compensation plan. Cory A. Haydocy (a former State of Ohio employee) sought a writ of mandamus compelling the Ohio Public Employees Retirement System (“OPERS”) to process his refund/rollover request despite his refusal to submit a notarized member-consent form that OPERS requires for refunds exceeding $10,000.

The central issues were (1) whether Haydocy pleaded a clear legal right to compel processing without the notarized form and (2) whether OPERS had a clear legal duty to do so under R.C. 145.40 and related administrative rules—particularly Adm.Code 145-2-67(A), which allows rollovers only “at the time and in the manner prescribed by the board.”

II. Summary of the Opinion

The Supreme Court of Ohio affirmed the Tenth District’s dismissal of the mandamus complaint. Accepting Haydocy’s factual allegations as true (as required on a Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion), the Court held that he still failed to allege facts establishing either (1) a clear legal right to have OPERS process a rollover request without the notarized consent form or (2) a clear legal duty requiring OPERS to process it.

The Court emphasized the Public Employees Retirement Board’s statutory rulemaking authority and its trustee obligation to safeguard funds. It concluded that OPERS’s notarization requirement fits within the board’s authority to prescribe the “time and manner” of rollover distributions under Adm.Code 145-2-67(A). The Court also denied Haydocy’s motion to supplement the record under S.Ct.Prac.R. 15.08.

III. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

• State ex rel. Hanson v. Guernsey Cty. Bd. of Commrs., 1992-Ohio-73: Provided the Civ.R. 12(B)(6) framework—motions to dismiss test the complaint’s sufficiency; allegations are taken as true; dismissal only when no set of facts could entitle relief. The Court applied this standard to Haydocy’s mandamus pleading.
• State ex rel. Sands v. Coulson, 2021-Ohio-671: Confirmed de novo review of a Civ.R. 12(B)(6) dismissal. This set the appellate lens for reviewing the Tenth District’s decision.
• State ex. rel. Husted v. Brunner, 2009-Ohio-4805: Supplied the three mandamus elements (clear legal right, clear legal duty, no adequate remedy). The Court’s holding turned on the first two elements.
• State ex rel. Tarrier v. Pub. Emps. Retirement Bd., 2021-Ohio-649: Reinforced the board’s trustee role and duty to “safeguard and prudently invest” entrusted funds—supporting the reasonableness of identity-verification measures like notarization when transferring large sums.
• State ex rel. Davis v. Pub. Emps. Retirement Bd., 119 Ohio App. 181 (10th Dist. 1963): Haydocy’s primary comparator. The Court distinguished it: in Davis, the board relied on a policy requiring employer certification where the statute’s definitions already resolved the employee-status dispute, and there was “no showing” certification was required by rule/statute. Here, by contrast, the board’s authority to prescribe “time and manner” of rollovers was expressly grounded in Adm.Code 145-2-67(A), and no statute/rule defined “application” to bar the notarized-consent condition.
• State ex rel. Martens v. Findlay, 2025-Ohio-5589: Used to reject supplementation of the appellate record—materials not filed below generally are not part of the “record on appeal.”
• State ex rel. Gaylor, Inc. v. Goodenow, 2010-Ohio-1844 (quoting Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969)): Supported the mootness rationale for denying Haydocy’s pending motions after dismissal (no “live” controversy; no legally cognizable interest).
• State ex rel. Citizens for Open, Responsive & Accountable Govt. v. Register, 2007-Ohio-5542: Cited for the principle that trial/appellate courts have broad discretion over discovery.
• Ditech Fin., L.L.C. v. Global Capital Partners, 2018-Ohio-1998 (quoting Midland Steel Prods. Co. v. Internatl. Union, United Auto., Aerospace & Agricultural Implement Workers of Am., Local 486, 61 Ohio St.3d 121 (1991)): Used to reject the claim that denial of discovery necessarily amounts to a due process violation because “there is no general constitutional right to discovery.”
• State ex rel. Miller v. Reed, 1999-Ohio-315: Supported the Tenth District’s refusal to address constitutional arguments raised for the first time in objections to the magistrate’s decision.
• Mitchell v. Lawson Milk Co., 40 Ohio St.3d 190 (1988): Reinforced that only “reasonable inferences” are drawn for the nonmovant; the Court used this to label Haydocy’s “collusion” and “revenue” allegations as speculative.

B. Legal Reasoning

The Court began with the mandamus requirement that the relator show a clear legal right and a corresponding clear legal duty. Haydocy anchored his argument in R.C. 145.40(A)(1), which states that “upon application” the board “shall pay” accumulated contributions if (among other things) two months have elapsed since termination and the member has not returned to service.

The Court found that Haydocy’s reading elided the statutory phrase “upon application.” While Haydocy alleged he submitted an application, he cited no statute or rule defining what constitutes a complete “application” or requiring OPERS to process an application that OPERS deems incomplete. In contrast, the Court emphasized the statutory and regulatory framework granting the board administrative and rulemaking latitude:

• R.C. 145.04(A): charges the Public Employees Retirement Board with general administration and “making effective” Chapter 145.
• R.C. 145.11(A): imposes trustee obligations over OPERS funds.
• R.C. 145.09: authorizes adoption of rules for proper administration and management of Chapter 145.
• Adm.Code 145-2-67(A): allows a member to elect a direct rollover only “at the time and in the manner prescribed by the board.”

On those authorities, the Court reasoned that OPERS can require identity-verification and attestation steps—like notarization—before transferring large sums held in trust. The notarized member-consent form (acknowledging the completeness and truth of the information) was treated as consistent with, not contrary to, R.C. 145.40’s “upon application” condition and the board’s express power to set the rollover’s “manner.”

The Court then disposed of procedural and constitutional complaints: it held the correct Civ.R. 12(B)(6) standard was applied; motions (summary judgment, discovery, status conference) were properly denied as moot after dismissal; discovery denials are discretionary and not inherently due-process violations; and constitutional arguments raised only in objections were forfeited under State ex rel. Miller v. Reed.

C. Impact

• For OPERS administration: The decision effectively validates OPERS’s use of notarized consent forms as a condition to processing certain refunds/rollovers, framing the requirement as an implementation detail within the board’s “time and manner” authority rather than an unauthorized hurdle.
• For mandamus practice: Relators challenging agency application requirements must identify a specific statute/rule that clearly forbids the requirement or clearly commands processing without it. Broad reliance on “shall pay” language will not suffice when the statute conditions payment “upon application” and the agency has rule-backed discretion over process.
• For administrative-law disputes over “policies” vs “rules”: The Court’s distinction from State ex rel. Davis v. Pub. Emps. Retirement Bd. signals that an agency practice is more defensible when tethered to an express rule delegating control over procedure (here, Adm.Code 145-2-67(A)) and when no contrary statutory definition forecloses the agency’s approach.
• For appellate records: The opinion underscores a strict view of what constitutes the “record” on appeal and reinforces that supplementation under S.Ct.Prac.R. 15.08 requires necessity to the issues on appeal, not merely completeness.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

• Mandamus: An extraordinary court order compelling a public official/agency to perform a legal duty. It is available only when the relator shows a clear legal right and the respondent a clear legal duty (plus no adequate ordinary remedy).
• Civ.R. 12(B)(6): A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim; courts assume the complaint’s well-pleaded facts are true, then ask whether, even so, the law provides a remedy.
• “Upon application”: Statutory language making the agency’s duty to pay contingent on the member submitting an application that satisfies the agency’s lawful procedural requirements.
• Direct rollover / eligible rollover distribution: A transfer paid directly from one retirement account to another eligible plan (here, from OPERS to ODC), governed by administrative rules that can specify procedural prerequisites.
• “Time and manner prescribed by the board” (Adm.Code 145-2-67(A)): A delegation allowing the board to set procedural conditions—such as forms, timing, and verification steps—before executing a rollover.
• Mootness: Once the main case is dismissed, pending motions generally become irrelevant because there is no longer an active dispute to resolve.
• Record on appeal / supplementation: Appellate review is limited to materials properly in the lower-court record; adding documents later requires compliance with the appellate rules and relevance/necessity to the issues being decided.

V. Conclusion

State ex rel. Haydocy v. Ohio Pub. Emps. Retirement Sys. establishes (and clarifies) that OPERS may condition processing of a direct rollover of accumulated contributions on a notarized member-consent form when that condition fits within the Public Employees Retirement Board’s authority to prescribe the “time and manner” of rollover distributions under Adm.Code 145-2-67(A), and when no statute or rule clearly prohibits the requirement. The decision is a straightforward but consequential reminder: mandamus does not police perceived bureaucratic unfairness unless the relator can point to a clear legal command that the agency has violated.