Operative Thieves Are Not “Fences” Under U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(4); Leadership Enhancement Applies When Defendant Directs a Five-Participant Car-Theft Ring

1. Introduction

In United States v. Jamarus Deontae Hoskins (11th Cir. July 23, 2026) (unpublished), the Eleventh Circuit reviewed a 97-month sentence imposed after a jury convicted Jamarus “Juke” Hoskins of (1) conspiracy to transport, possess, and sell stolen motor vehicles in interstate commerce (18 U.S.C. § 371) and (2) three substantive counts of selling or possessing stolen motor vehicles (18 U.S.C. § 2313).

The appeal centered on two Sentencing Guidelines adjustments: (i) a two-level enhancement for “receiving stolen property” under U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(4), and (ii) a four-level organizer/leader enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(a). The record described a multi-state car-theft scheme in which vehicles were stolen from dealerships, VINs were altered, fraudulent titles were produced, and vehicles were resold—often at Hoskins’s direction.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The court reversed the application of U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(4), holding it does not apply where the defendant is an operative “thief” who directs the thefts and downstream resale, rather than a “fence” who merely receives and resells property stolen by others. The panel affirmed the U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(a) leadership enhancement, finding sufficient evidence that Hoskins exercised decision-making authority and control over at least five participants. The sentence was vacated and remanded for resentencing without the § 2B1.1(b)(4) enhancement.

3. Analysis

3.1. Precedents Cited

  • United States v. Kluge, 147 F.4th 1291 (11th Cir. 2025) (quoting United States v. Dupree, 57 F.4th 1269 (11th Cir. 2023) (en banc)):
    Cited for the standard that Guidelines interpretation/application is reviewed de novo. This framed the court’s approach to whether § 2B1.1(b)(4) and § 3B1.1(a) were correctly applied to the established facts.
  • United States v. Bergman, 852 F.3d 1046 (11th Cir. 2017), and United States v. Valois, 915 F.3d 717 (11th Cir. 2019):
    Cited for the “clear error” standard governing sentencing factfinding and the deference owed when a district court chooses among permissible views of the evidence.
  • United States v. Perez, 943 F.3d 1329 (11th Cir. 2019):
    Used to emphasize that the government’s concession that § 2B1.1(b)(4) was inapplicable did not bind the court; the panel still had an independent duty to apply the law.
  • United States v. Bradley, 644 F.3d 1213 (11th Cir. 2011) (citing United States v. Saunders, 318 F.3d 1257 (11th Cir. 2003)):
    This was the controlling substantive authority on § 2B1.1(b)(4). The panel relied on Bradley’s rule that § 2B1.1(b)(4) applies to “fences” (those who sell goods stolen by others), not to “actual thieves.” The Hoskins panel treated Hoskins’s role as analogous to the operative defendant in Bradley, making the enhancement improper.
  • United States v. Martinez, 584 F.3d 1022 (11th Cir. 2009):
    Central to the leadership analysis: it distinguishes mere “orchestration” of aspects of a conspiracy from “control, influence, and decision-making authority” over participants and transactions—supporting affirmance of the § 3B1.1(a) enhancement where the defendant created and managed the criminal dealings.
  • United States v. Glover, 179 F.3d 1300 (11th Cir. 1999):
    Cited for the limitation that § 3B1.1 enhancements cannot rest solely on managing conspiracy “assets.” The panel used this to explain that Hoskins’s enhancement was justified by directing people (runners, trailers, title facilitator), not merely by handling money or property.
  • United States v. Mullings, 166 F.4th 939 (11th Cir. 2026):
    Mentioned in a footnote to note ongoing issues about guideline commentary’s role, but the court declined to address them because neither party disputed the commentary’s validity here. Practically, the panel proceeded under the commentary’s multi-factor organizer/leader test.

3.2. Legal Reasoning

A. Why § 2B1.1(b)(4) Was Improper

Section 2B1.1(b)(4) increases the offense level if “the offense involved receiving stolen property” and the defendant was “in the business of receiving and selling stolen property.” The Eleventh Circuit treated the enhancement as targeting a particular economic role: a professional “fence” who traffics in goods stolen by others.

Applying United States v. Bradley, the panel focused on whether Hoskins was merely downstream from the thefts or instead an operative actor who caused the thefts. The record showed Hoskins:

  • selected the types of high-end vehicles to be stolen,
  • directed co-conspirators where to steal and where to drop off vehicles,
  • paid “runners” and “trailers,”
  • arranged VIN alteration and fraudulent titles, and
  • found buyers and sold the vehicles.

Those facts made Hoskins functionally accountable as a thief (even if he did not personally execute each physical taking), not a fence who only receives stolen goods. His message stating he was “running an organized car ring” reinforced that he operated the theft pipeline rather than merely purchasing and reselling stolen inventory. Under Bradley, that operative posture foreclosed § 2B1.1(b)(4).

B. Why § 3B1.1(a) Was Proper

Section 3B1.1(a) requires (i) an organizer/leader role and (ii) criminal activity involving five or more participants (or activity that is otherwise extensive). The panel upheld both prongs under clear-error review.

Participant numerosity: The court relied on trial and sentencing evidence that Hoskins communicated with and directed multiple co-conspirators. Agent testimony placed at least five other members in the organization; trial testimony identified several runners and others, and the iCloud group message was sent to five other individuals. This supported the district court’s finding of “five or more participants.”

Organizer/leader factors: Using the guideline commentary’s factors (decision-making authority, recruitment, planning, scope, and control), the panel found Hoskins:

  • issued orders about what vehicles to steal and how to do so,
  • controlled compensation (including withholding payment when runners deviated),
  • determined whether a stolen vehicle would be kept/sold or abandoned, and
  • managed end-to-end execution by coordinating theft, concealment (VIN/title fraud), and resale.

Invoking United States v. Martinez, the panel reasoned this was not mere “orchestration” of isolated aspects; it was “creating” and “managing” transactions and exercising authority over people. And consistent with United States v. Glover, the enhancement did not rest solely on asset management; it rested on leadership over participants.

3.3. Impact

Although unpublished, the decision reinforces two practical sentencing boundaries in Eleventh Circuit practice:

  • § 2B1.1(b)(4) remains fence-focused. Where a defendant is the operative driver of a theft enterprise—directing acquisitions and integrating them into a resale pipeline—courts should be cautious about labeling the conduct as “receiving” in the fence sense. Prosecutors and probation officers may need to justify § 2B1.1(b)(4) with evidence that theft and resale roles were meaningfully separated (i.e., the defendant trafficked in goods stolen independently by others).
  • Leadership can be proven by control over personnel and decisions, even if the leader does not personally perform the physical theft. The opinion underscores that directing “runners,” setting targets, controlling payment, and deciding how stolen inventory is handled are classic indicia of organizer/leader status.

The remand also illustrates the real sentencing consequence of guideline characterization: removing § 2B1.1(b)(4) lowered the total offense level and required resentencing, even though the leadership enhancement remained.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • “Fence” vs. “thief” (for § 2B1.1(b)(4)): A “fence” is a professional reseller who generally does not steal items but buys/receives stolen goods from thieves and sells them. A “thief” is an operative participant who steals or causes thefts to occur. Under Bradley, § 2B1.1(b)(4) is aimed at fences, not thieves.
  • “Organizer/leader” (for § 3B1.1(a)): A leader is someone who makes key decisions, plans the operation, recruits or directs others, and exercises authority—e.g., sets targets, gives instructions, controls payouts. The leader need not personally perform every criminal act.
  • “Participant”: A participant is a person criminally responsible for the offense (not necessarily convicted). Section 3B1.1(a) typically requires five or more participants (or “otherwise extensive” activity).
  • Standards of review: Appellate courts review legal interpretations of the Guidelines de novo, but factual findings (e.g., how many participants, who controlled whom) only for “clear error,” a deferential standard.

5. Conclusion

United States v. Jamarus Deontae Hoskins tightens the fit between guideline enhancements and offender role. It reaffirms that U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(4) is reserved for defendants acting as fences—those in the business of receiving and selling goods stolen by others—and not for defendants who operate and direct a theft-and-resale enterprise. At the same time, it confirms that U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(a) properly applies to a defendant who exercises decision-making authority and control over a multi-person criminal organization, even if he delegates the on-the-ground thefts. The net result—vacatur and remand—highlights how role characterization under the Guidelines can materially change sentencing outcomes.