Operative Amended Complaint Controls: Conclusory Civil-Rights Pleading and Prior-Exhibit Reliance Fail in Municipal Code-Enforcement Suits
Case: Brian Terry v. Jamila McGee
Court: Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
Date: 2026-05-07 (Not for Publication)
1. Introduction
This appeal arose from a municipal code-enforcement dispute in Vero Beach, Florida. Pro se plaintiffs Brian Terry and Galina Roofener
sued Jamila McGee (a municipal code officer), John S. Turner (the City Attorney), and the City of Vero Beach under
42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983, 1985, and 1986, asserting a mix of constitutional theories and allegations framed as fraud and breach of duty.
The plaintiffs’ core factual theme was that McGee allegedly submitted “false affidavits” and misapplied municipal code provisions to harass them,
while Turner allegedly failed to prevent or correct McGee’s conduct; they also alleged City policies/customs and failures in training/oversight.
The district court dismissed the third amended complaint on two independent grounds:
(1) it was an impermissible shotgun pleading; and (2) it failed to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6).
On appeal, the plaintiffs challenged both the pleading assessment and the denial of further leave to amend, and argued the court should have considered
exhibits they attached to earlier filings.
2. Summary of the Opinion
The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. Although the district court dismissed on both shotgun-pleading and Rule 12(b)(6) grounds,
the court of appeals affirmed because the complaint failed to state a claim.
- Fifth Amendment theories failed because the Fifth Amendment constrains the federal government, not the municipal defendants.
- § 1981 failed for lack of pleaded intentional racial discrimination and lack of an identified impaired contractual relationship.
- § 1983 (Fourteenth Amendment) failed because the complaint offered conclusory assertions of equal protection/due process violations without specific facts, and did not plausibly plead Monell municipal liability.
- § 1985(3) and § 1986 failed because the conspiracy and derivative non-prevention allegations were conclusory and nonspecific.
- Further leave to amend was not required on this record, given the procedural history and continued deficiencies.
- Prior exhibits/filings were not required to be considered because the third amended complaint was the operative pleading and did not attach or explicitly incorporate the documents.
3. Analysis
A. Precedents Cited
1) Standards of review and appellate posture
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Caterpillar Fin. Servs. Corp. v. Venequip Mach. Sales Corp.:
supplied the de novo Rule 12(b)(6) standard and reiterated the “plausibly suggest an entitlement to relief” framework.
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Vibe Micro, Inc. v. Shabanets:
provided the abuse-of-discretion standard for dismissals based on shotgun pleadings.
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Pinnacle Advert. & Mktg. Grp., Inc. v. Pinnacle Advert. & Mktg. Grp., LLC and
L.S. ex rel. Hernandez v. Peterson:
distinguished review standards for denial of leave to amend (abuse of discretion) and futility (de novo),
and articulated the futility inquiry (whether the amended complaint would still fail at the motion-to-dismiss or summary-judgment stage).
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Peer v. Lewis:
framed what constitutes abuse of discretion (incorrect legal standard, improper procedures, or clearly erroneous findings).
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Sapuppo v. Allstate Floridian Ins. Co.:
was dispositive to the appellate burden—when a judgment rests on multiple independent grounds, the appellant must show each ground is wrong.
The panel emphasized that because failure to state a claim supported dismissal, affirmance followed even without resolving the shotgun-pleading issue.
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Cisneros v. Petland, Inc.:
reinforced the court’s ability to affirm on any ground supported by the record.
2) Pleading rules, pro se treatment, and “shotgun pleading” doctrine
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Weiland v. Palm Beach Cnty. Sheriff’s Off.:
anchored the Eleventh Circuit’s taxonomy of shotgun pleadings and explained that such pleadings fail to provide adequate notice.
Weiland was also cited for the separate constitutional point that the Fifth Amendment protects against federal—not state—actors.
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Jacob v. Mentor Worldwide, LLC and Albra v. Advan, Inc.:
together expressed the controlling tension—pro se pleadings are liberally construed, but pro se litigants must still follow procedural rules.
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Waldman v. Conway and Bilal v. Geo Care, LLC:
limited the extent of pro se solicitude—there must be at least some factual support for a claim, and courts cannot rewrite deficient pleadings.
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Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, Ashcroft v. Iqbal, and Chaparro v. Carnival Corp.:
supplied the plausibility requirements, rejecting “threadbare recitals” and requiring factual content that reasonably supports liability
(while recognizing plausibility can include a reasonable expectation that discovery may yield proof).
3) Amendment and futility principles
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Woldeab v. Dekalb Cnty. Bd. of Educ. and Silberman v. Miami Dade Transit:
supported the general rule that pro se plaintiffs usually receive at least one chance to amend before dismissal with prejudice,
sometimes with added leniency.
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Foman v. Davis:
provided recognized bases to deny leave to amend, including repeated failure to cure deficiencies and futility.
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Peterson (again):
defined futility by reference to failure at motion-to-dismiss or summary-judgment stages.
4) Use of documents beyond the complaint; operative pleading doctrine
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Johnson v. City of Atlanta and Day v. Taylor:
set the two-part incorporation-by-reference doctrine—documents not attached to the complaint may be considered if central to the claims and undisputed in authenticity.
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Hoefling v. City of Miami:
established that an amended complaint supersedes prior complaints, rendering them “a legal nullity,” which mattered to plaintiffs’ effort to rely on earlier exhibits.
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Bryant:
was cited for the proposition (in context) that the district court did not abuse its discretion by not considering materials from earlier filings rather than the operative complaint.
5) Elements of the civil-rights causes of action invoked
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Jimenez v. Wellstar Health Sys.:
provided the elements of a § 1981 claim and the requirement to identify an impaired contractual relationship.
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Andre v. Clayton Cnty, Ga.:
supplied the elements of a § 1983 claim (deprivation of a federal/constitutional right under color of state law).
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Childree v. UAP/GA Chem., Inc.:
identified the elements of a § 1985(3) conspiracy claim.
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Park v. City of Atlanta:
characterized § 1986 as derivative of § 1985 violations.
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Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. and Khoury v. Miami-Dade Cnty. Sch. Bd.:
controlled municipal-liability pleading—no respondeat superior; instead, the plaintiff must plead an official policy or a pervasive custom/practice equivalent to policy,
and causation linking policy/custom to the constitutional injury.
B. Legal Reasoning
1) The court affirmed based on failure to state a claim
Applying Sapuppo, the court emphasized that plaintiffs needed to defeat both independent dismissal rationales.
It affirmed on the Rule 12(b)(6) ground alone, concluding the third amended complaint did not plausibly plead any federal cause of action.
2) Constitutional mismatch: Fifth Amendment claims against municipal actors
The court disposed of all Fifth Amendment claims at the threshold: under Weiland,
the Fifth Amendment protects against federal action; the City of Vero Beach is not the federal government, and the individual defendants were not federal agents.
This is a recurring pleading error in local-government disputes where litigants conflate federal constitutional provisions with their state-action counterparts.
3) § 1981: no pleaded racial discrimination and no identified contract right
Under Jimenez, plaintiffs had to allege intentional racial discrimination and connect it to an activity covered by § 1981—here, an impaired contractual relationship.
The complaint instead offered conclusory assertions about due process and “false affidavits,” without factual allegations of racial animus or a specific contract provision.
Under Iqbal, such legal conclusions cannot substitute for facts.
4) § 1983 (Fourteenth Amendment): conclusory “due process/equal protection” labels and Monell defects
The panel treated the complaint as primarily reciting constitutional labels—“equal protection” and “due process”—without alleging the “who, what, when, and how”
needed to make the claims plausible under Twombly/Iqbal and Caterpillar.
It further noted that allegations about the City’s “policies, customs and failure in training and oversight” were stated at a high level of generality.
Under Monell and Khoury, municipal liability requires more than asserting that a municipality’s failures “exacerbated” a violation;
the complaint must plausibly identify a policy/custom attributable to a final policymaker (or a pervasive practice equivalent to policy) and plead causation.
5) § 1985(3) and § 1986: conspiracy requires facts, and § 1986 falls with § 1985
For § 1985(3), Childree requires a plausible conspiracy, an act in furtherance, and resulting injury.
The complaint alleged, in conclusory fashion, that McGee and Turner “conspired,” filed or defended “false affidavits,” and were enabled by “institutional failures.”
The court found the absence of specific facts fatal.
Because § 1986 is derivative of § 1985 under Park, the failure to plead a plausible § 1985 conspiracy necessarily defeated the § 1986 claim as well.
6) No further leave to amend required on this record
While pro se plaintiffs typically receive at least one opportunity to amend under Woldeab (sometimes with “an extra dose of grace” per Silberman),
the court concluded the district court did not abuse its discretion. The record showed plaintiffs were allowed to amend, yet the operative third amended complaint remained deficient.
Under Foman and the futility principles discussed in Peterson, repeated failure to cure deficiencies and futility justify denial of further amendment.
7) Prior exhibits and filings: the operative complaint rule and incorporation-by-reference limits
The court rejected plaintiffs’ insistence that the district court should have considered documents attached to earlier complaints or other filings.
Under Hoefling, the third amended complaint superseded prior pleadings, making earlier attachments non-operative unless properly re-attached or incorporated.
And under Johnson and Day, even unattached documents are considered only if they are central to the claims and undisputed.
The panel added that the referenced materials largely reflected plaintiffs’ reactions and writings rather than the underlying deprivation itself, undermining “centrality.”
C. Impact
Although unpublished, the decision reinforces several practical rules likely to shape outcomes in municipal code-enforcement civil-rights suits:
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Labeling conduct “fraud” or calling affidavits “false” does not itself plead a constitutional violation—plaintiffs must allege specific facts tying conduct to recognized constitutional elements (due process, equal protection) and to each defendant’s actions.
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Municipal liability remains a pleading bottleneck—broad references to “policies, customs, failure to train” without identifying a plausible policy/custom and causal link will continue to fail under Monell/Khoury.
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Operative pleading discipline matters—litigants cannot rely on earlier exhibits or arguments unless re-pleaded, attached, or clearly incorporated consistent with Hoefling and Johnson.
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Appellate strategy matters—where dismissal rests on multiple independent grounds, Sapuppo makes it essential to defeat each ground.
4. Complex Concepts Simplified
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Shotgun pleading (from Weiland): a complaint so poorly organized (e.g., lumping defendants together, recycling all allegations into each count, mixing irrelevant facts, failing to separate claims) that defendants cannot tell what they’re accused of and why.
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Plausibility (from Twombly and Iqbal): the complaint must provide enough concrete facts to make liability a reasonable inference, not merely a possibility or a set of labels.
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Monell liability (from Monell): a city is not automatically liable for employee misconduct; liability requires a city policy/custom (or equivalent pervasive practice) that caused the constitutional injury.
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Incorporation by reference (from Johnson and Day): courts may consider key documents not attached to the complaint only when the documents are central to the claim and their authenticity is not disputed.
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Operative complaint (from Hoefling): once a complaint is amended, the new version replaces the old; prior allegations and exhibits generally drop out unless included again.
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§ 1986 is derivative (from Park): if the underlying § 1985 conspiracy is not plausibly alleged, the § 1986 failure-to-prevent claim fails automatically.
5. Conclusion
The Eleventh Circuit’s decision affirms a familiar but exacting principle: even for pro se litigants, federal civil-rights claims arising from local code enforcement
must be pleaded with concrete, defendant-specific facts that satisfy Twombly/Iqbal, and municipal claims must satisfy Monell.
The opinion also underscores that the operative amended complaint controls—prior exhibits and filings generally do not carry forward absent proper attachment or incorporation.
In combination, these doctrines function as a gatekeeping framework that screens out generalized allegations of unfairness or “false paperwork”
unless tied to specific constitutional elements, specific actors, and (for municipalities) a plausible policy/custom causal theory.