Date: Mar 15, 2026

Opening Statements Can Supply “Good Cause” to Excuse Rule 404(b) Notice and Admit Other-Acts Text Messages to Prove Knowledge/Intent

I. Introduction

In United States v. Dayton Peterson (Sixth Circuit, Mar. 13, 2026), the court affirmed the convictions and lengthy sentences of Dayton Peterson and John E. Lohden, Jr. arising from two violent, law-enforcement-impersonation kidnapping/robbery schemes and related drug and firearms crimes. Lohden, a longtime confidential informant, orchestrated a 2021 kidnapping of Anthony Bishop and a 2022 kidnapping/robbery of Jose Manuel Avila-Galaviz in which Peterson participated. The Avila incident involved forced entry, fake “search warrant” tactics, theft of firearms, luxury watches, large quantities of narcotics, and cash, followed by kidnapping and interrogation-style demands.

On appeal, defendants raised numerous issues. The opinion’s most broadly instructive evidentiary holding concerns admission of other-acts evidence (text messages about a planned robbery/kidnapping) when the defense’s opening statements made knowledge/intent a central disputed issue, and the government’s pretrial Rule 404(b) notice did not precisely match the specific messages offered at trial.

II. Summary of the Opinion

Rule 404(b) texts admitted: The court upheld admission of texts from a cellphone found in Lohden’s impounded car describing another planned “search with papers” robbery, ruling the district court acted within its discretion in excusing any notice deficiency for “good cause” after defense opening statements, and in admitting the texts for knowledge/intent (not propensity).
Fourth Amendment suppression denied (Lohden): Lohden lacked a legitimate expectation of privacy in the impounded vehicle because he abandoned it and later disclaimed interest through counsel.
Competency affirmed (Lohden): No clear error in finding competency to be sentenced under 18 U.S.C. § 4241; § 4244 (hospitalization in lieu of imprisonment) did not govern the question presented.
Contingent plea offer upheld (Lohden): Withdrawing a plea offer conditioned on both codefendants pleading guilty did not violate due process; there is no constitutional right to a plea bargain.
Joinder upheld (Peterson): Trying Peterson with Lohden despite Lohden’s additional counts tied to the Bishop kidnapping was not plain error because the kidnappings were “logically interrelated.”
Sufficiency and sentence affirmed (Peterson): Evidence supported the verdicts; the below-guidelines sentence was presumed reasonable and the district court considered mitigating factors.

III. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

1. Rule 404(b) notice, “good cause,” and “opening the door”

United States v. Johnson, 79 F.4th 684, 698 (6th Cir. 2023)
Supplied the abuse-of-discretion standard for reviewing admission of other-acts evidence. The panel applied that deferential review to the district court’s decision to admit the texts and to excuse any notice gap.
United States v. France, 611 F. App'x 847, 850 (6th Cir. 2015) (unpublished)
The district court relied on this “opening statement” scenario: when a defendant claims in opening that he was “hoodwinked,” evidence showing he knew what he was doing becomes “obvious[ly]” relevant. The panel treated the case as persuasive support for finding “good cause” to excuse Rule 404(b)(3) notice when the defense’s opening crystallizes knowledge/intent as the live issue.
United States v. Harvey, 653 F.3d 388, 394 (6th Cir. 2011)
Quoted for the general principle that evidence otherwise excluded can become admissible when a defendant “opens the door.” This principle supported the notion that the defense’s trial posture (staked out immediately in opening statements) can change the admissibility calculus mid-trial.
United States v. Fairley, 137 F.4th 503, 517 (6th Cir. 2025)
Provided two key review rules: (i) de novo review of whether evidence fits a permitted non-propensity purpose under Rule 404(b)(2), and (ii) abuse-of-discretion review for Rule 403 balancing. The panel used this framework to uphold admission for knowledge/intent and to reject unfair-prejudice arguments—especially because the court limited prejudice by excluding whether the planned robbery actually occurred.

2. Fourth Amendment: abandonment and expectation of privacy

United States v. Moorehead, 912 F.3d 963, 966 (6th Cir. 2019)
Supplied the standard of review for suppression rulings: clear error for facts, de novo for legal conclusions, viewing evidence favorably to the district court’s decision.
United States v. Rogers, 97 F.4th 1038, 1041 (6th Cir. 2024)
Stated the threshold requirement: the defendant must show a “legitimate expectation of privacy” in the place searched. The panel used this framing to dispose of suppression without reaching broader questions once abandonment was found.
United States v. Oswald, 783 F.2d 663, 669 (6th Cir. 1986)
Cited for the rule that abandonment defeats a Fourth Amendment privacy claim. The court analogized Lohden’s conduct—leaving a wrecked car after a chase, being arrested elsewhere, and letting it sit for months—to classic abandonment.
United States v. Robinson, 390 F.3d 853, 873-74 (6th Cir. 2004)
Used to emphasize the subjective-expectation component: Lohden’s conduct (including counsel’s “No, we don’t want it”) showed the opposite of an intent to maintain privacy in the vehicle.

3. Competency to be sentenced and statutory framework

United States v. Dubrule, 822 F.3d 866, 875 (6th Cir. 2016)
Provided the clear-error standard for review where the district court expressly finds a defendant competent. The panel relied on this deference to uphold the trial court’s credibility choice between competing experts.

4. Plea bargaining: contingent offers and due process

United States v. Allen, 954 F.2d 1160, 1165 (6th Cir. 1992)
Provided de novo review for the due-process claim about plea bargaining.
Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 134, 148-49 (2012)
Quoted for the foundational proposition: there is no constitutional right to a plea bargain. That principle undercut Lohden’s claim that he was “forced” to trial because he could not obtain the conditional 25-year deal.
United States v. Usher, 703 F.2d 956, 958 (6th Cir. 1983)
Cited to support the permissibility (at least absent other misconduct) of plea bargaining that conditions leniency on treatment of “some person other than the accused”—here, a joint “both-or-neither” plea offer.

5. Joinder, sufficiency, and sentencing review

United States v. Dedman, 527 F.3d 577, 591 (6th Cir. 2008)
Supplied plain-error review because Peterson did not object to joinder in the district court.
United States v. Johnson, 763 F.2d 773, 777 (6th Cir. 1985)
Stated the preference for joint trials of jointly indicted defendants and supported the panel’s reluctance to find misjoinder.
United States v. Tisdale, 980 F.3d 1089, 1094 (6th Cir. 2020)
Reinforced that “Joint trials are favored,” supporting the panel’s joinder analysis.
United States v. Ross, 703 F.3d 856, 884-85 (6th Cir. 2012)
Used alongside the “logically interrelated” requirement to uphold joinder under Rule 8(b), given similarities between the Bishop and Avila kidnappings.
United States v. Jones, 641 F.3d 706, 710 (6th Cir. 2011)
Provided the sufficiency standard: whether any rational juror could find the elements beyond a reasonable doubt, viewing evidence in the government’s favor.
United States v. Graham, 622 F.3d 445, 449 (6th Cir. 2010)
Supported two recurring sufficiency principles: appellate courts do not reassess witness credibility, and “physical evidence is not a prerequisite” to conviction.
United States v. Smith-Kilpatrick, 942 F.3d 734, 746 (6th Cir. 2019)
Established the presumption of substantive reasonableness for a below-guidelines sentence, a presumption the panel applied to Peterson’s 360-month sentence.
United States v. Pyles, 904 F.3d 422, 426 (6th Cir. 2018)
Cited for the rule that appellate courts will not reweigh mitigating factors the district court considered.

B. Legal Reasoning

1. Rule 404(b): notice excused and other-acts texts admitted for knowledge/intent

The key evidentiary dispute involved texts recovered from a foil-wrapped cellphone found in Lohden’s impounded car. The government’s pretrial notice stated it would introduce “text messages” showing defendants “placed tracking devices,” “conducted surveillance,” and did “extensive research” on targets. At trial, the government sought to introduce a more pointed set of messages describing another planned scheme—“pull up” to a “millionaire,” “search with papers,” and take cash under the guise of “money laundering,” to which Peterson replied, “Shit I’m wit it.”

The Sixth Circuit upheld admission on three linked grounds:

Good cause for notice shortcomings (Rule 404(b)(3)(C)): The district court treated the defense’s opening statements—disavowing knowing participation and portraying naivete/mistake—as “opening the door,” making these texts newly and sharply relevant to rebut claimed lack of knowledge/intent. That trial development supported a finding of “good cause” to excuse any lack of more specific pretrial notice.
Proper non-propensity purpose (Rule 404(b)(2)): The panel agreed the texts tended to prove knowledge and intent—Peterson’s awareness of the plan and Lohden’s lack of “mistake in his authority”—rather than mere propensity.
Rule 403 balance: The district court reduced prejudice by limiting the proof to planning texts and excluding evidence about whether the planned robbery actually occurred; the Sixth Circuit found no abuse of discretion.

Practically, the opinion illustrates how trial strategy can convert a marginal or notice-sensitive 404(b) issue into admissible rebuttal evidence: once the defense affirmatively claims “I didn’t know” in opening, the court may view other-acts proof of planning and method as directly responsive and thus justified even if the notice was general rather than granular.

2. Suppression: abandonment defeats privacy in an impounded vehicle

Lohden attempted to suppress the cellphone evidence on Fourth Amendment grounds. The panel resolved the issue at the threshold: Lohden could not establish a legitimate expectation of privacy in the vehicle. The facts mattered: he left the damaged car after a chase, was arrested elsewhere, the car sat in an FBI lot for six months, and his attorney later affirmatively disclaimed any desire to claim it (“No, we don’t want it.”). Under Sixth Circuit abandonment doctrine, these facts showed no subjective expectation of privacy and made any such expectation objectively unreasonable.

3. Competency: § 4241 governs competency to be sentenced; credibility calls are for the district court

After conviction, Lohden sought a psychiatric evaluation. A Bureau of Prisons psychiatrist concluded he was competent and malingering; a defense-retained psychiatrist disagreed. The district court credited the Bureau expert, informed by the court’s own multi-year observations of Lohden. Applying clear-error review, the Sixth Circuit deferred to that credibility determination.

The panel also rejected the statutory reframing attempt: § 4241 addresses competency to proceed (including to be sentenced), while § 4244 concerns hospitalization in lieu of imprisonment. Because the question presented was competency to be sentenced, § 4241 was the correct analytic vehicle.

4. Contingent plea bargains: no due-process right to the conditional deal

The government offered a package plea: both defendants could plead under favorable terms only if both accepted. Peterson declined, so the offer was withdrawn. Lohden argued this “forced” him to trial. The Sixth Circuit rejected the claim because (i) Lohden remained free to plead guilty absent a deal, and (ii) there is no constitutional entitlement to a plea bargain or to a particular sentence. The conditional structure of the offer did not itself create a due-process violation under the authority cited.

5. Joinder, sufficiency, and sentencing

Peterson’s joinder challenge failed under plain-error review and Rule 8(b) principles favoring joint trials. The panel found the Bishop and Avila kidnappings “logically interrelated” because both involved Lohden impersonating law enforcement to kidnap and extort/rob.

On sufficiency, the court applied the usual deference to jury verdicts: it would not revisit witness credibility and noted physical evidence is not required—though it existed here (e.g., Peterson’s fingerprint on a clipboard, surveillance of Peterson moving the drug-filled backpack, and circumstantial timing of a $27,000 cash purchase days after the robbery).

On substantive reasonableness, Peterson’s below-guidelines sentence carried a presumption of reasonableness, and the district court expressly considered youth, childhood adversity, and criminal history; the Sixth Circuit declined to reweigh those factors.

C. Impact

Rule 404(b) practice in the Sixth Circuit: The opinion strengthens the government’s argument that evolving trial posture—especially explicit knowledge/intent claims in opening—can constitute “good cause” to excuse imperfect Rule 404(b)(3) notice and permit targeted rebuttal other-acts evidence. Defense counsel, in turn, must weigh whether broad “I didn’t know” themes in opening risk unlocking otherwise-excludable planning evidence.
Abandonment and impounded vehicles: The decision underscores how post-flight circumstances and later disavowals can be used to show abandonment, narrowing defendants’ ability to challenge later searches tied to impounded property.
Contingent pleas: The court’s due-process analysis gives prosecutors continued room to structure “package” plea offers without creating a constitutional violation simply because one defendant wishes to accept and another refuses.
Joinder: The “logically interrelated” standard remains comparatively forgiving, particularly where similar modus operandi evidence overlaps across counts and defendants.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

Rule 404(b) evidence: Evidence of “other crimes, wrongs, or acts” cannot be used to show a person’s bad character to prove they acted in accordance with it. But it can be used for specific purposes like proving intent, knowledge, plan, or absence of mistake.
Rule 404(b)(3) “reasonable notice” and “good cause”: Prosecutors usually must alert the defense before trial that they intend to use other-acts evidence. A court may excuse a notice failure if there is “good cause,” such as when the relevance of specific other-acts evidence becomes clear only after the defense’s trial presentation (here, opening statements).
“Opening the door”: A party can make an otherwise inadmissible topic fair game by raising it first. If the defense claims “I didn’t know what was happening,” the government may be allowed to respond with evidence showing the defendant did know.
Rule 403 unfair prejudice: Even relevant evidence can be excluded if its unfairly prejudicial effect substantially outweighs its probative value. Here, the district court mitigated prejudice by preventing the trial from turning into a mini-trial about whether the uncharged planned robbery actually happened.
Abandonment (Fourth Amendment): If someone abandons property, they generally lose Fourth Amendment protection in it because they no longer have a reasonable expectation of privacy. Flight from a vehicle and later disclaiming interest can support a finding of abandonment.
Competency statutes: 18 U.S.C. § 4241 vs. § 4244: Section 4241 asks whether the defendant is mentally competent to understand proceedings and assist counsel. Section 4244 concerns whether a convicted defendant should be hospitalized for treatment instead of imprisoned. This case focused on competency to be sentenced, so § 4241 applied.
Plain error: When a defendant fails to object in the trial court, appellate review is much harder to win: the error must be obvious and must affect substantial rights and the fairness of proceedings.

V. Conclusion

The Sixth Circuit’s decision affirms sweeping convictions and sentences stemming from violent, police-impersonation kidnappings and related drug/firearms conduct. Its most notable doctrinal contribution is evidentiary: when the defense’s opening statement squarely asserts ignorance, naivete, or mistake, a district court may find “good cause” to excuse shortcomings in Rule 404(b) pretrial notice and admit other-acts communications as rebuttal proof of knowledge and intent—so long as the evidence is tightly managed under Rule 403. Alongside that holding, the opinion reinforces established principles on abandonment-based loss of Fourth Amendment standing, deference to competency findings, the permissibility of package plea offers absent a right to a bargain, the preference for joint trials, and the high bar for overturning jury verdicts and below-guidelines sentences on appeal.