Open Meetings Act: Ad Hoc, Volunteer Community Advisory Groups Without Formal Advisory Authority Are Not “Public Bodies”

1. Introduction

In Nicole Solas v. South Kingstown School Committee (R.I. May 29, 2026), the Rhode Island Supreme Court addressed whether the South Kingstown School Committee’s Black, Indigenous, People of Color (BIPOC) Advisory Board (the “Board”) was a “public body” subject to the Open Meetings Act (OMA), G.L. 1956 § 42-46-3.

The Board was created after community concerns about racial inequity, student discipline, and incidents of racism in the district. The School Committee retained a private organization, Nonviolent Schools Rhode Island (NSRI), to facilitate meetings. When plaintiff Nicole Solas sought access to Board meetings, she was told the meetings were not open to the public. She filed an administrative complaint with the Attorney General under § 42-46-8(a), and after the Attorney General concluded the Board was not a public body, she brought an OMA action in Superior Court seeking declaratory relief and invalidation of Board actions.

The central issue was whether this Board—comprised of volunteers, facilitated by a private vendor, meeting with informal membership and structure, and providing suggestions routed through a policy subcommittee—had the kind of “supervision, control, jurisdiction, or advisory power” that makes gatherings “meetings” of a “public body” under the OMA. See §§ 42-46-2(1), 42-46-2(5), 42-46-3.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Court affirmed summary judgment for the School Committee, holding the Board was not a “public body” subject to the OMA. The Court characterized the Board as an “amorphous, ad hoc group” more like the Compensation Review Committee (CRC) in Pontarelli v. Rhode Island Board Council on Elementary and Secondary Education, 151 A.3d 301 (R.I. 2016), than the Emergency Hiring Council (EHC) in Solas v. Emergency Hiring Council of the State, 774 A.2d 820 (R.I. 2001).

Key to the holding was the Board’s lack of formal advisory authority over public policy decisions: it could make suggestions, but it had no power to implement policy, no voting or veto authority, and its recommendations were filtered through a two-stage public process (policy subcommittee and School Committee), both of which held open meetings subject to the OMA.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited

  • Solas v. Emergency Hiring Council of the State, 774 A.2d 820 (R.I. 2001)
    The Court reaffirmed Solas for the proposition that under § 42-46-2(1), “advisory power” can be sufficient to trigger the OMA: “a council’s exercise of advisory power is enough to bring it under the act’s umbrella.” But the Court treated Solas as fact-specific. The EHC in Solas was created by executive order, met regularly, consisted of high-level appointed public officials, and—critically—exercised “significant supervisory and executive veto power” over state hiring, at least functioning in an advisory capacity over state employment decisions.

    In this case, the Court used Solas primarily as a comparator to show what “advisory power” looks like when it is institutionally meaningful: advisory capacity backed by formal authority, embedded in government decision-making, and tied to a body’s defined governmental role.
  • Pontarelli v. Rhode Island Board Council on Elementary and Secondary Education, 151 A.3d 301 (R.I. 2016)
    Pontarelli supplied the controlling analogy. There, the CRC made compensation recommendations that were subject to a further discretionary review process before any public vote. The Court held the CRC was not a public body because it did not have the requisite advisory power in the statutory sense; its role was upstream, and the public had later opportunities to see and object to proposals at open meetings of the ultimate decision-makers.

    The Court applied that same logic here: the Board’s suggestions were reviewed first by a policy subcommittee (which could accept, reject, or send back proposals) and then by the School Committee, in meetings open to the public. Because recommendations were not “blanketly adopted” and the Board could not compel action, the Board resembled the CRC rather than the EHC.
  • Anolik v. Zoning Board of Review of City of Newport, 64 A.3d 1171 (R.I. 2013) and Tanner v. Town Council of Town of East Greenwich, 880 A.2d 784 (R.I. 2005)
    These cases were cited for the standard of review framing OMA challenges as a “mixed question of law and fact,” and for applying de novo review to “application of the law to the facts.”
  • Statutory-interpretation line of cases: LMG Rhode Island Holdings, Inc. v. Office of McKee, 335 A.3d 444 (R.I. 2025), Estrella v. Janney Montgomery Scott LLC, 296 A.3d 97 (R.I. 2023), Westconnaug Recovery Company, LLC v. U.S. Bank National Association as Trustee for ARMT 2007-2, 290 A.3d 364 (R.I. 2023), Sosa v. City of Woonsocket, 297 A.3d 120 (R.I. 2023), Cullen v. Lincoln Town Council, 960 A.2d 246 (R.I. 2008), In re J.T., 252 A.3d 1276 (R.I. 2021)
    These cases supported the Court’s interpretive methodology: give effect to legislative intent, apply plain meaning when text is clear, and align construction with the OMA’s remedial purpose (§ 42-46-1).
  • Summary judgment standards: Citizens Bank, N.A. v. Palermo, 247 A.3d 131 (R.I. 2021), Boudreau v. Automatic Temperature Controls, Inc., 212 A.3d 594 (R.I. 2019), Felkner v. Rhode Island College, 291 A.3d 1001 (R.I. 2023)
    These cases supplied the de novo framework for reviewing summary judgment and the “light most favorable to the nonmoving party” approach.

3.2 Legal Reasoning

The Court’s reasoning proceeds from the OMA’s definitions and purpose. The OMA seeks to ensure “public business be performed in an open and public manner” (§ 42-46-1) and requires that “[e]very meeting of all public bodies shall be open to the public” (§ 42-46-3), unless a statutory exception applies.

The dispute turned on whether the Board fit within the statutory concept of a “public body” (§ 42-46-2(5)) convening a “meeting” (§ 42-46-2(1)). While the plaintiff emphasized that the OMA covers advisory functions and should be broadly construed (language echoed in Solas v. Emergency Hiring Council of the State), the Court stressed that “advisory power” is not satisfied by mere advocacy, discussion, or informal suggestion-making.

Several factual and structural features supported the conclusion that the Board did not exercise the kind of governmental advisory power that triggers the OMA:

  • Informal creation and operation: The Board was facilitated through an NSRI contract; agendas and “rules” were informal and not set by charter or bylaws.
  • Volunteer, fluid membership: Members were community volunteers, not appointed public officials; attendance fluctuated. The Court treated the indeterminate membership as incompatible with the OMA’s quorum concept. See § 42-46-2(6).
  • No voting/veto authority: The Board could not implement policy and could not override the policy subcommittee or School Committee.
  • Intervening, discretionary review by OMA-covered bodies: Suggestions moved through a “dual-step procedure,” and the public had access at both the policy subcommittee and School Committee stages—both public bodies holding open meetings.

The Court also rejected the plaintiff’s contention that reserving seats for Board representatives on the policy subcommittee effectively conferred advisory power. The reserved seats were not fixed appointments; they could be filled by any available Board volunteer, and in any event the relevant deliberative bodies (the policy subcommittee and School Committee) remained subject to open-meeting requirements.

Finally, the Court addressed the anti-evasion argument (that municipalities could outsource deliberations to vendors to avoid transparency). While acknowledging the OMA’s pro-access policy, the Court concluded that this Board did not function as a governmental decision-making or formally empowered advisory body; it functioned as a “sporadic, ad hoc” advocacy/affinity group feeding into a public process.

3.3 Impact

The decision materially clarifies how Rhode Island courts will distinguish:

  • Formally empowered advisory entities (likely OMA-covered under Solas v. Emergency Hiring Council of the State) from
  • Informal, volunteer community working groups that provide input but lack defined governmental authority and whose ideas are subject to independent, public deliberation (not OMA-covered under the Pontarelli analogy).

Practically, municipalities and school committees may continue to use facilitated community groups for listening sessions and proposal development without automatically triggering the OMA—so long as the group does not become a de facto decision-maker with defined membership, quorum-driven meetings, and institutional authority over matters within the statutory phrase “supervision, control, jurisdiction, or advisory power.”

For litigants, the opinion signals that OMA coverage will be highly functional and structural: challengers should focus on demonstrable authority (veto power, required approvals, binding recommendations, mandated consultation) and institutional markers (creation instrument, formal membership/appointments, regular meeting requirements, quorum-capable structure), not merely on the significance of the topic or the fact that policy ideas originate in a group.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • “Public body” (OMA): Not every group associated with government is a public body. The OMA targets governmental bodies (and certain subdivisions) that exercise governmental functions and are funded as described in § 42-46-2(5).
  • “Meeting”: Under § 42-46-2(1), a “meeting” requires a convening of a public body to discuss or act on a matter within its supervision/control/jurisdiction/advisory power. If a group lacks that power, gatherings may not be “meetings” under the Act.
  • “Advisory power”: The key distinction in this opinion is between (a) advisory power that is institutionally integrated into official action (as in Solas v. Emergency Hiring Council of the State) and (b) informal advice or advocacy that can be freely accepted or ignored and is filtered through independent public decision-making (as in Pontarelli and here).
  • Quorum: The OMA contemplates that a body has identifiable membership so one can determine whether enough members are present to conduct business. The Court viewed fluctuating, indeterminate membership as undermining the ability to apply quorum concepts. See § 42-46-2(6).
  • Summary judgment and declaratory relief: The case was resolved without trial because the court found no genuine dispute of material fact and that the defendant was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Declaratory relief asks the court to declare the parties’ legal rights and duties (here, whether the OMA applied).

5. Conclusion

Nicole Solas v. South Kingstown School Committee refines Rhode Island’s OMA jurisprudence by drawing a firm line between open-meetings accountability for formally empowered governmental councils and committees, and informal, volunteer community groups that share experiences and propose ideas without institutional authority to bind, veto, or meaningfully advise as part of the governmental decision itself.

The Court’s synthesis of Solas v. Emergency Hiring Council of the State and Pontarelli v. Rhode Island Board Council on Elementary and Secondary Education indicates that “advisory power” under the OMA is not triggered by the importance of the subject matter alone; it turns on structure, authority, and where the real governmental decision-making occurs—especially whether the public retains meaningful opportunities to observe and object at the stages where policy is actually deliberated and decided.