Ongoing-Storm Rule: Ordinary Salting During Active Precipitation Is Not “Unusual Circumstances” Triggering a Commercial Landowner’s Mid-Storm Duty

Introduction

In Haydee Gallardo v. Walmart (Supreme Court of New Jersey, July 30, 2026), the Court addressed the reach of New Jersey’s ongoing storm rule, adopted in Pareja v. Princeton International Properties, 246 N.J. 546 (2021). Plaintiff Haydee Gallardo alleged she sustained serious injuries after slipping in Walmart’s Union Township parking lot at about 1:30 p.m. on January 3, 2015, during an active storm of mixed precipitation that began around 11:30 a.m. Walmart’s contractor, Land Pros of New Jersey, LLC, spread salt between 12:35 p.m. and 1:15 p.m., but did not pretreat the lot before precipitation began. At the time of the fall, snow/sleet accumulation was minimal—“about a trace” to one tenth of an inch.

The central issue was narrow and doctrinal: whether salting during the storm, without pretreatment, constituted “unusual circumstances” under the first exception to the ongoing storm rule described in Pareja—an exception that applies when a commercial landowner’s actions increase risk by creating “unusual circumstances” that exacerbate the danger.

Summary of the Opinion

The Court held that spreading salt on a minimal accumulation during an ongoing storm—without pretreatment—does not constitute “unusual circumstances” and therefore does not trigger a mid-storm duty under Pareja’s first exception. The Court concluded Walmart was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. It reversed the Appellate Division and remanded for entry of summary judgment for Walmart.

The Court also emphasized that the “unusual circumstances” requirement is not optional language and instructed that Model Civil Jury Charge 5.20B should be reviewed and aligned with Pareja because it omits that requirement.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

Pareja v. Princeton International Properties

Pareja is the controlling doctrinal source. It adopted the ongoing storm rule: absent unusual circumstances, a commercial landowner’s duty to remove snow and ice hazards arises within a reasonable time after the storm ends, not during it. Critically, Pareja described two “unusual circumstances” exceptions, including the first exception at issue here: liability may arise if a landowner’s actions increase risk “by creating ‘unusual circumstances’ where the defendant’s conduct exacerbates and increases the risk of injury.”

In Gallardo, the Court treated the case as a direct test of what “unusual circumstances” means in practice. It rejected the trial court’s and Appellate Division’s approach that effectively collapsed the standard into “increased risk” alone, holding that such a reading impermissibly “reads out” the unusual-circumstances limitation.

Terry v. Cent. Auto Radiators, Inc.

The Court used Terry v. Cent. Auto Radiators, Inc., 732 A.2d 713 (R.I. 1999)—expressly cited in Pareja—to illustrate the intended narrowness of the first exception. In Terry, the risk increase was not merely an imperfect attempt at snow removal. It arose from an affirmative direction that required the plaintiff to traverse an additional distance over accumulating snow and ice to retrieve her relocated vehicle—an atypical, instruction-driven exposure to hazard. The Court relied on Terry as the paradigm of “unusual” risk-enhancing conduct.

Rhode Island, Connecticut, and Delaware “Unusual Circumstances” Authorities

To rebut the dissent’s claim that requiring “unusual circumstances” is novel or out of step, the Court cited:

  • Berardis v. Louangxay, 969 A.2d 1288 (R.I. 2009), confirming Rhode Island’s use of an “unusual circumstances” test even where the defendant attempted snow/ice remediation during an ongoing storm.
  • Kraus v. Newton, 558 A.2d 240 (Conn. 1989), applying an “unusual circumstances” limitation on mid-storm duty.
  • Laine v. Speedway, LLC, 177 A.3d 1227 (Del. 2018), applying the continuing storm doctrine “in the absence of unusual circumstances” and rejecting the argument that beginning snow operations mid-storm automatically creates a duty.

These citations support the Court’s policy concern: without a meaningful “unusual circumstances” limiter, landowners might rationally avoid any remediation during storms to reduce liability exposure—contrary to public safety.

New Jersey Snow/Ice and Sidewalk Duty Lineage

The Court reaffirmed that Pareja aligns with a line of New Jersey cases addressing snow-and-ice duties largely in the sidewalk context, including:

  • Bodine v. Goerke Co., 102 N.J.L. 642 (E. & A. 1926), used in Pareja and referenced here for the proposition that, during an ongoing storm, negligence is not reasonably inferable simply from slushy, storm-created conditions.
  • Cooper v. Reinhardt, 91 N.J.L. 402 (Sup. Ct. 1918), distinguished in Bodine because the hazard persisted hours after snow stopped—illustrating the post-storm duty window.
  • Mirza v. Filmore Corp., 92 N.J. 390 (1983), Stewart v. 104 Wallace St., Inc., 87 N.J. 146 (1981), and Qian v. Toll Bros., Inc., 223 N.J. 124 (2015), cited (as in Pareja) for the “reasonable time after the storm” framework and commercial landowner obligations once the duty attaches.
  • Saco v. Hall, 1 N.J. 377 (1949), and Davis v. Pecorino, 69 N.J. 1 (1975), referenced in Pareja (and discussed here) as examples where the dangerous condition was attributable to the landowner’s affirmative conduct (e.g., malfunctioning water-removal system; vehicular use of sidewalk) rather than merely natural accumulation.

Jury Charges Are Not Binding: Graphnet, Inc. v. Retarus, Inc.

A notable procedural/administrative feature of the opinion is its directive regarding jury instructions. The Court, relying on Graphnet, Inc. v. Retarus, Inc., 250 N.J. 24 (2022) (and its citation to State v. Bryant, 419 N.J. Super. 15 (App. Div. 2011)), reminded that Model Civil Jury Charges “are not binding authority.” Because Model Civil Jury Charge 5.20B omits “unusual circumstances,” the Court asked the Committee to align it with Pareja. This is an important “secondary holding”: it signals that future trials should not treat the model charge as a substitute for the full doctrinal standard.

Legal Reasoning

The Court framed the case as turning on the first element of negligence: duty. It reiterated Pareja’s core justification—remediation during an ongoing storm is “categorically inexpedient and impractical”—and that the ongoing storm rule avoids imposing an “impossible burden.”

From that premise, the Court treated “unusual circumstances” as a gatekeeping requirement: without it, any remedial effort that arguably “increased risk” would create an immediate duty, undermining the very reasons the ongoing storm rule exists. The Court emphasized the perverse incentive such a regime would create—commercial landowners and contractors might delay all efforts until the storm ends to reduce liability risk, increasing hazards for invitees.

Applying the standard to the record (viewed in the light most favorable to Gallardo), the Court found no triable issue that the salting operation here was “unusual.” Minimal accumulation (“trace” to one tenth of an inch) plus a common de-icer applied during the storm did not resemble the atypical directive-driven exposure in Terry or other settings that meaningfully depart from ordinary storm response.

Impact

  • Clarifies the first Pareja exception: “Increase of risk” is not enough; the increase must arise from “unusual circumstances.” This tightens the exception and increases predictability for mid-storm slip-and-fall claims.
  • Encourages mid-storm remediation: By limiting liability for ordinary salting/shoveling that does not create “unusual circumstances,” the decision reduces the incentive to do nothing until precipitation ends.
  • Litigation and motion practice: The decision strengthens commercial defendants’ ability to obtain summary judgment in ongoing-storm cases where the plaintiff’s theory is based on ordinary remediation choices (like salting) rather than atypical risk-creating conduct.
  • Jury instruction reform: The Court’s request to revise Model Civil Jury Charge 5.20B may materially change how trial courts charge ongoing-storm cases and how litigants frame proofs.

Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Ongoing storm rule: A commercial property owner generally does not have to clear snow/ice hazards while precipitation is actively falling; the duty begins within a reasonable time after the storm ends.
  • “Unusual circumstances” (first exception): Not every snow-removal step that arguably makes conditions worse triggers liability mid-storm. The plaintiff must show the landowner’s conduct created an atypical, unusual risk-increasing scenario (the Court used Terry as the illustration).
  • Duty vs. breach: The Court resolved the case at the “duty” stage (a legal question). If there is no duty during the storm under the rule (and no exception applies), the case ends without reaching whether the conduct was careless.
  • Summary judgment standard: Even viewing the evidence in the plaintiff’s favor, the court can dismiss if no reasonable factfinder could find facts satisfying the legal test (here, “unusual circumstances”).
  • Model jury charges: Helpful templates, but they do not override Supreme Court doctrine; if inconsistent, they should be revised.

Conclusion

Haydee Gallardo v. Walmart crystallizes a key limitation on Pareja’s first exception: ordinary snow-remediation measures like salting, undertaken during an ongoing storm in the face of minimal accumulation, do not constitute “unusual circumstances” that reimpose a duty on a commercial landowner mid-storm. The Court’s approach aims to preserve the ongoing storm rule’s policy function—avoiding impractical duties and discouraging “wait it out” behavior—while keeping a narrow pathway for liability in truly atypical, risk-enhancing scenarios. Additionally, the Court’s directive to align Model Civil Jury Charge 5.20B with Pareja signals that doctrinal precision in jury guidance is now an explicit priority in this area of premises liability law.