Once a Victim’s Name Is Public, Courts Cannot Gag the Press or Exclude It from Trial for Refusing an Unconstitutional Restraint

Case: LAS VEGAS REVIEW-JOURNAL, INC v. DIST. CT. (CHASING HORSE) (CIVIL)
Citation: 142 Nev., Advance Opinion 31 (Nev. Apr. 23, 2026)
Court: Supreme Court of Nevada

1. Introduction

This original writ proceeding arose mid-trial in a high-profile criminal prosecution of real party in interest Nathan Chasing Horse. Petitioners—the Las Vegas Review-Journal, Inc. and three of its journalists—challenged two actions taken by the Eighth Judicial District Court (Judge Jessica K. Peterson):

  • an oral, enforceable prohibition (backed by a contempt threat) against publishing the identity of an alleged minor sexual-assault victim (“S. Doe”) even though her name had already been disclosed repeatedly in public filings and in open court; and
  • the press’s ejection and exclusion from the courtroom during the alleged victim’s testimony as a consequence of refusing to “agree” to that prohibition.

Petitioners sought emergency relief because the challenged restrictions were not independently appealable and—given the ongoing trial—would cause immediate, irreparable harm to First Amendment rights and the public’s access to criminal proceedings.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Nevada Supreme Court granted mandamus relief, holding that the district court “manifestly abused its discretion” by:

  • imposing an unconstitutional prior restraint (a “gag” on publication of truthful information); and
  • violating the press’s right of access by excluding petitioners from the courtroom to enforce that unconstitutional restraint.

The court emphasized that neither NRS 200.3772 nor Marsy’s Law authorized restraining the press in these circumstances, and that privacy interests were substantially diminished once the alleged victim’s name was already in public records and repeatedly spoken in open court. The court also sharply criticized the district court’s alteration of the written transcript to change the judge’s spoken use of the alleged victim’s real first name.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited

A. Writ jurisdiction and why emergency review was appropriate

  • D.R. Horton, Inc. v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 123 Nev. 468, 475, 168 P.3d 731, 737 (2007): supplies the Nevada standard that mandamus controls a “manifest abuse of discretion” or arbitrary/capricious discretionary act. The court used it to frame the level of error required for writ relief.
  • Johanson v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 124 Nev. 245, 248-49, 182 P.3d 94, 96 (2008): describes prohibition and also supports entertaining writ petitions challenging speech restraints because appellate review is not “plain, speedy, and adequate.”
  • Pan v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 120 Nev. 222, 224, 228, 88 P.3d 840, 841, 844 (2004): reiterates that extraordinary writ relief requires no adequate remedy at law. Here, the fleeting but severe nature of a gag order satisfied that requirement.
  • L.V. Rev.-J. v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 134 Nev. 40, 43, 412 P.3d 23, 26 (2018): central Nevada authority recognizing that even a short-lived gag order is a substantial prior restraint that causes irreparable First Amendment injury.
  • Cap. Cities Media, Inc. v. Toole, 463 U.S. 1303, 1304 (1983): quoted via the 2018 Nevada decision for the proposition that short-lived restraints still inflict irreparable harm.
  • L.V Rev.-J., Inc. v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., No. 92008, 2026 WL 236659 (Nev. Jan. 28, 2026) (Order Granting Petition for Writ of Mandamus): the court’s earlier emergency order in this same dispute, later explained by the published opinion.

B. Prior restraint doctrine and the “heavy presumption” against constitutionality

  • Neb. Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 559 (1976): the U.S. Supreme Court’s canonical statement that prior restraints are the “most serious” First Amendment infringement, with particular force in reporting criminal proceedings. Nevada used this to underscore the exceptional burden the State/court must meet.
  • Talk of the Town Bookstore v. City of Las Vegas, 92 Nev. 466, 470, 553 P.2d 959, 961 (1976): Nevada authority describing the “heavy presumption of unconstitutionality” for prior restraints.
  • Fla. Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 540-41 (1989): supplies two key principles the Nevada court applied: (1) when punishing truthful publication in the name of privacy, the protected interest must be of the “highest order,” and (2) the State must apply restrictions evenhandedly if it claims an extraordinary privacy justification.
  • L.V. Rev.-J. v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 134 Nev. 40, 44-46, 412 P.3d 23, 26-28 (2018), and Johanson v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 124 Nev. 245, 251, 182 P.3d 94, 98 (2008): together provide Nevada’s three-part test for a permissible gag order:
    1. a clear and present danger or serious and imminent threat to a protected competing interest,
    2. narrow tailoring, and
    3. no less restrictive alternatives.
    The court measured the district judge’s restrictions against this framework and found them defective at every step.

C. “Public record” and “open court” disclosure defeats privacy-based restraints

  • Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 494-95 (1975): the cornerstone “public record” rule—privacy interests “fade” when the information is already in public court records; a State cannot impose sanctions for accurate publication of such information.
  • Okla. Publ'g Co. v. Dist. Ct., 430 U.S. 308 (1977): vacates an injunction barring publication where press attended proceedings and learned the information in court; open access undercuts later speech restraints.
  • Doe v. City of New York, 15 F.3d 264, 268 (2d Cir. 1994), and McNally v. Pulitzer Publk Co., 532 F.2d 69, 77-78 (8th Cir. 1976): cited for the proposition that constitutionally protected privacy does not extend to matters already of public record.

D. Statutes cannot be read to authorize unconstitutional restraints on the press

  • Foley v. Kennedy, 110 Nev. 1295, 1300, 885 P.2d 583, 586 (1994): Nevada interpretive canon that statutes should be construed consistently with the constitution, supporting the court’s refusal to read NRS 200.3772 or Marsy’s Law as press-gag authority.
  • Smith v. Daily Mail Publ'g Co., 443 U.S. 97, 106 (1979): holds unconstitutional a statute criminalizing publication of a juvenile’s name without court approval, reinforcing that truthful publication is strongly protected.
  • S.O.C., Inc. v. Mirage Casino-Hotel, 117 Nev. 403, 415, 22 P.3d 243, 251 (2001): confirms Article 1, Section 9 of the Nevada Constitution is coextensive with the First Amendment—so federal prior restraint principles apply with equal force in Nevada.

E. Courtroom access: closure/exclusion requires an overriding interest and narrow tailoring

  • Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 580 (1980) (quoting Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 681 (1972)): recognizes a First Amendment right to attend criminal trials; openness is integral to speech and press freedoms.
  • Stephens Media, LLC v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 125 Nev. 849, 859, 221 P.3d 1240, 1247 (2009) (quoting Press-Enter. Co. v. Super. Ct. of Cal., 464 U.S. 501, 510 (1984)): provides Nevada’s closure standard: the presumption of openness may be overcome only by an overriding interest, supported by findings, and closure must be essential and narrowly tailored.
  • Globe Newspaper Co. v. Super. Ct. for Norfolk Cnty., 457 U.S. 596, 607-10 (1982): rejects a categorical closure rule in sex-offense trials during minor-victim testimony; even compelling interests require case-specific narrow tailoring—especially where the minor’s identity is already public.

3.2 Legal Reasoning

A. The district court’s “decorum” request became a coercive, enforceable gag order

Although the written decorum order used ostensibly permissive language (“requested out of respect”), the district court later treated it as mandatory: it demanded the Review-Journal “agree” to the restriction, threatened contempt for publication, and imposed exclusion for refusal. Functionally and legally, that is a prior restraint—an advance prohibition on publication backed by judicial sanction.

B. NRS 200.3772 did not apply on this record—and even if it did, it does not authorize gagging the press

The court read NRS 200.3772 according to its structure: it is an opt-in pseudonym procedure for “court records and media releases,” triggered by the victim filing a form with law enforcement and the agency notifying the prosecutor, after which the court uses the pseudonym in proceedings. The Nevada Supreme Court found “no evidence in the record” that S. Doe invoked this statutory mechanism. Because the statutory predicate steps were absent, the district court’s reliance on the statute was legally misplaced.

Critically, the court went further: even if the statute were implicated, its “plain language” does not restrict the press, and reading it to authorize a press gag would raise serious constitutional problems under the First Amendment and Nevada’s Article 1, Section 9.

C. Marsy’s Law protects victim dignity and privacy but does not create a roving power to restrain publication

Marsy’s Law (Nev. Const. art. 1, § 8A(1)(a)) grants victims the right to be treated with fairness and respect for privacy and dignity and to be free from intimidation, harassment, and abuse. The Nevada Supreme Court treated this as an important value, but not a self-executing authorization to impose prior restraints on the press— particularly where the information at issue has already entered the public domain through court-controlled channels.

D. The “highest order” interest was not present because the identity was already public

The court recognized the genuine privacy interest at stake in shielding an alleged minor victim of sexual offenses. But it held that the “prior disclosure” of S. Doe’s name in publicly filed grand jury transcripts and repeated open-court references “diminishes the interest in protecting her anonymity.” Under Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn and related cases, once truthful information appears in public records or open proceedings, punishing or restraining its publication becomes constitutionally untenable. As a result, the district court could not satisfy the requirement that the restraint protect an interest “of the highest order.”

E. Ineffectiveness and uneven application underscored the lack of narrow tailoring

The court stressed that other individuals were present when the name was spoken and when the victim testified, yet it did not appear that the district court imposed the same restrictions on those persons. That mattered for two reasons:

  • Practical fit: a measure that does not meaningfully prevent dissemination cannot be “essential” or narrowly tailored to protect privacy.
  • Constitutional evenhandedness: quoting Fla. Star v. B.J.F., the court signaled that selective targeting of “the media giant” is incompatible with the extraordinary nature of restraining truthful publication.

F. Excluding the press to enforce an unconstitutional restraint violated the First Amendment right of access

Turning from speech to access, the court applied the openness presumption from Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia and Nevada’s own access jurisprudence in Stephens Media, LLC v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct.. Courtroom exclusion is a form of closure and must be justified by an overriding interest, supported by findings, and narrowly tailored.

Here, exclusion was not used to protect a valid competing interest; it was used to coerce acquiescence to an unconstitutional gag order. Because there was “no overriding interest in enforcing such an order,” and because the identity was already public, the exclusion could not be narrowly tailored to protect anonymity. The court characterized the exclusion as punishment for refusing to submit to an unconstitutional restraint.

G. The opinion’s institutional warning: transcript alteration undermines trust

The court flagged as “disturbing” the district court’s direction that the written transcript be altered to make it appear the judge used the pseudonym rather than the victim’s real first name. Although this point was not the formal basis of the holding, it functions as an important institutional admonition: courts may protect privacy through lawful mechanisms (e.g., sealing/redaction) but may not “fabricat[e] a part of the official court transcript,” which threatens public trust in court records.

3.3 Impact

  • Clarifies limits of victim-privacy measures against the press: Nevada trial courts may encourage respectful reporting, but they cannot convert decorum guidance into contempt-backed prior restraints—particularly after open-court/public-record disclosure.
  • Reinforces the “public record/open court” rule in Nevada: once identifying information is in publicly filed transcripts and repeatedly spoken in open court, privacy justifications for suppressing publication weaken dramatically, often fatally.
  • Constrains closure-by-retaliation: excluding a media entity from proceedings because it will not agree to a gag order is treated as a constitutional access violation, not a discretionary courtroom-management choice.
  • Signals procedural best practices: if a court believes privacy requires limiting dissemination in records, the opinion implicitly points to lawful alternatives: sealing and filing redacted transcripts, making on-the-record findings, and using narrowly tailored mechanisms consistent with Press-Enter. Co. v. Super. Ct. of Cal..
  • Elevates record-integrity expectations: the transcript-admonition is likely to be cited in future disputes over record accuracy, transparency, and remedial options for handling inadvertent disclosure.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Prior restraint: a government order stopping speech before it happens (e.g., “do not publish this name”). Courts treat it as the most disfavored form of speech restriction.
  • Gag order: a type of prior restraint limiting what participants or third parties (sometimes including the press) may say or publish about a case.
  • “Heavy presumption of unconstitutionality”: the default assumption that prior restraints are invalid unless the proponent meets an extraordinary burden.
  • Narrow tailoring / less restrictive alternatives: the court must choose the least speech-restrictive method that can actually protect the interest (e.g., sealing/redaction rather than banning publication).
  • Right of access to criminal trials: the First Amendment protects not just the right to publish but also the right to attend and observe criminal proceedings, subject only to tightly constrained closure rules.
  • Mandamus / prohibition: extraordinary appellate tools used to correct serious judicial errors immediately when normal appeals are inadequate—commonly used for unconstitutional gag orders because time is critical.
  • Public record doctrine: when truthful information is available in public court records or disclosed in open court, the Constitution strongly protects the press’s right to publish it.

5. Conclusion

Advance Opinion 31 establishes a crisp, practical rule for Nevada trial practice: once a victim’s identity has been placed into the public domain through court records and open-court disclosure, a trial court cannot salvage anonymity by imposing a contempt-backed publication ban on the press—and it cannot exclude the press from the courtroom to enforce such a ban. The decision reaffirms Nevada’s strict prior restraint standards, fortifies the First Amendment right of access, and cautions that privacy protection must be pursued through lawful, narrowly tailored procedures rather than ineffective, selective, or record-distorting measures.