Okla. Stat. tit. 21, § 645 Is Not Categorically a “Crime of Violence” Under the Guidelines Because It Reaches Assaults on Unborn Victims

Case: United States v. Hill (10th Cir. Jan. 23, 2026) (Order and Judgment)
Issue Areas: Fourth Amendment (warrants; omissions); Federal Sentencing Guidelines (crime of violence; categorical approach)

1. Introduction

Pauline Ronniesha Hill, a felon, was convicted by a jury of possessing a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) after police executed a search warrant at her residence and found a 9mm pistol. On appeal, Hill challenged both (1) her conviction—arguing the warrant affidavit omitted material alibi-related facts and that her post-search confession was “fruit of the poisonous tree”—and (2) her sentence—arguing the district court erroneously treated her Oklahoma convictions for assault and battery with a dangerous weapon under Okla. Stat. tit. 21, § 645 as “crimes of violence” under the Guidelines.

The case therefore presented two distinct questions: whether alleged omissions in a warrant affidavit were “material” enough to void the warrant, and whether § 645 qualifies categorically as a “crime of violence” for Guidelines purposes given Oklahoma law’s treatment of offenses involving unborn victims.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Tenth Circuit affirmed Hill’s conviction, holding that the allegedly omitted alibi-corroboration facts were not “material” because including them would not have vitiated probable cause. The affidavit already disclosed the essence of Hill’s alibi, and probable cause does not require resolving evidentiary conflicts.

But the court reversed and remanded for resentencing, holding that Okla. Stat. tit. 21, § 645 “criminalizes the assault and battery of an unborn person with a dangerous weapon,” and therefore is not categorically a “crime of violence” under the Guidelines in light of United States v. Adams. The district court’s Guidelines calculation—built on a base offense level of 20 under U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a)(4)(A)—was therefore erroneous.

3. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

• United States v. Gonzales, 399 F.3d 1225 (10th Cir. 2005): Provided the review framework—clear error for factual findings and de novo review for legal questions—anchoring how the panel evaluated the suppression ruling and probable-cause determination.
• United States v. Garcia-Zambrano, 530 F.3d 1249 (10th Cir. 2008): Supplied the governing test for omissions in warrant affidavits: suppression is warranted only if the affiant knowingly/recklessly omitted material information and a “corrected” affidavit would not support probable cause.
• Puller v. Baca, 781 F.3d 1190 (10th Cir. 2015): Defined “material” as information whose inclusion “would vitiate probable cause.” This was decisive because Hill’s additional alibi details were treated as potentially helpful but not probable-cause destroying.
• Hinkle v. Beckham Cnty. Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs, 962 F.3d 1204 (10th Cir. 2020) (quoting Kaley v. United States, 571 U.S. 320 (2014)): Emphasized that probable cause “is not a high bar,” requires only a “fair probability,” and does not demand fine-grained resolution of competing evidence or consideration of all exculpatory material. The panel used this line to reject Hill’s theory that more corroboration of her alibi had to be presented to the warrant-issuing judge.
• United States v. Adams, 40 F.4th 1162 (10th Cir. 2022): The pivotal sentencing precedent invoked by Hill. Adams reasoned (as characterized in Hill) that where a state offense covers conduct against unborn victims, it may fall outside the Guidelines’ “crime of violence” definition under the categorical approach. The panel applied that logic to Oklahoma’s § 645.
• United States v. Taylor, 843 F.3d 1215 (10th Cir. 2016): The district court treated Taylor as controlling authority that § 645 is categorically a crime of violence. Hill clarifies that, given the unborn-victim scope the panel recognized, reliance on Taylor led to a misclassification for Guidelines purposes.
• United States v. Singer, No. 23-6120 (Jan. 23, 2026): A companion decision addressing the same legal question. Hill incorporates Singer’s analysis and holds, on that basis, that counting § 645 as a crime of violence was error.

B. Legal Reasoning

1) Suppression: omissions, materiality, and probable cause

Hill’s suppression theory depended on the two-step omissions doctrine described in United States v. Garcia-Zambrano: the defense must show (i) a knowing/reckless omission, and (ii) that adding the omitted information would defeat probable cause. The panel’s decision turned on the second element—materiality.

Applying Puller v. Baca, the court treated omitted facts as material only if they would have “vitiate[d] probable cause.” It then relied on Hinkle v. Beckham Cnty. Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs to explain why the omitted items did not meet that standard: probable cause requires only a “fair probability,” and does not require officers or judges to resolve conflicts between inculpatory circumstantial evidence and exculpatory testimonial evidence at the warrant stage.

Critically, the panel found the affidavit already contained Hill’s central alibi narrative (picked up from a mechanic around 7:15 p.m.; stayed at a hotel; “no way” she could have done the shooting). The additional details Hill demanded—e.g., extra corroboration such as a 6:00 p.m. phone call, statements from mechanic-shop witnesses, and the fact police later found her car at the shop—were treated as cumulative bolstering rather than facts that rendered suspicion “unfounded.” Because the affidavit still established a fair probability based on:

• a white car identified by victims as belonging to “Sweets” (Hill’s nickname),
• video of a similar white two-door sedan with a sunroof following the victims,
• Hill’s ownership of a matching vehicle, and
• cell-phone records placing Hill in the general area at the relevant time,

the warrant stood, and the firearm and post-search confession were not suppressed.

2) Sentencing: categorical “crime of violence” and unborn-victim scope

On sentencing, the panel agreed with Hill that Okla. Stat. tit. 21, § 645 reaches assault and battery with a dangerous weapon against an unborn person, and therefore fails to qualify categorically as a Guidelines “crime of violence” under the reasoning attributed to United States v. Adams. The panel did not reprint the full analysis in Hill; instead it incorporated the reasoning of United States v. Singer, decided the same day, and held the district court’s Guidelines calculation was erroneous “to the extent it increased her sentence” by treating § 645 as a crime of violence.

The practical consequence in Hill was the undoing of the PSR’s base offense level of 20 under U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a)(4)(A) (which depends on a prior felony “crime of violence”), requiring resentencing under a corrected Guidelines range.

C. Impact

• Guidelines litigation in the Tenth Circuit: Hill (together with the incorporated reasoning from United States v. Singer) invites renewed challenges to the use of Okla. Stat. tit. 21, § 645 as a predicate “crime of violence” for Guidelines enhancements, especially in firearms cases applying U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1.
• Pressure on prior circuit assumptions: The district court believed it remained bound by United States v. Taylor. Hill’s holding—recognizing unborn-victim coverage and rejecting categorical treatment—signals a meaningful doctrinal shift (at minimum in persuasive authority given the “Order and Judgment” designation) in how § 645 is analyzed post-United States v. Adams.
• Affidavit-omission claims: The suppression portion reinforces a high materiality threshold. Even robust alibi corroboration may be deemed immaterial where the affidavit already discloses the core exculpatory claim and independent inculpatory facts still support a “fair probability.”

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

• “Fruit of the poisonous tree”: Evidence (including confessions) can be excluded if it was obtained by exploiting an illegal search or seizure. Here, because the warrant was valid, the confession was not treated as tainted fruit.
• Material omission (warrant affidavit): Not every missing fact matters. An omission is “material” only if adding it would eliminate probable cause—i.e., if it would destroy the fair probability that evidence of a crime would be found.
• Probable cause: A relatively low threshold—more than a hunch, less than proof. Courts do not require officers or judges to settle conflicting witness accounts at the warrant stage.
• “Categorical” crime of violence: Under the categorical approach, courts look to the statute’s elements and the least conduct it criminalizes, not the defendant’s actual conduct. If the statute covers some conduct that would not qualify as a “crime of violence,” the statute is not categorically one.
• Why unborn-victim coverage matters: As applied in Hill via United States v. Adams, if a statute criminalizes violence against an “unborn person,” and the Guidelines’ “crime of violence” definition is understood not to encompass that victim category, the statute sweeps too broadly and cannot serve as a categorical predicate.

5. Conclusion

United States v. Hill delivers a split outcome: the conviction stands because the warrant affidavit—despite alleged omissions—contained sufficient inculpatory facts and already disclosed the core alibi, leaving probable cause intact under the Tenth Circuit’s materiality framework. But the sentence falls because, incorporating the reasoning of United States v. Singer and applying the logic of United States v. Adams, the court held that Okla. Stat. tit. 21, § 645 is not categorically a “crime of violence” where it criminalizes assault and battery with a dangerous weapon against an unborn person. The decision thus narrows the availability of § 645 as a Guidelines predicate and underscores the demanding standard for suppression based on omitted affidavit details.