Ohio Identity Fraud Is a CIMT Barring Non-LPR Cancellation; Late Collateral Attacks Do Not Establish “Good Cause” for a Continuance

Case: Alicia Hernandez-Mendez v. Todd Blanche (6th Cir. May 28, 2026) (not recommended for publication)
Posture: Petition for review of a Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision denying cancellation of removal and affirming an Immigration Judge’s denial of a continuance.

1. Introduction

This Sixth Circuit opinion addresses two recurring issues in removal proceedings: (1) when a state identity-related offense constitutes a “crime involving moral turpitude” (“CIMT”) that bars nonpermanent-resident cancellation of removal, and (2) when an Immigration Judge may deny a continuance sought to pursue a belated collateral attack on an underlying criminal conviction.

The petitioner, Alicia Hernandez-Mendez, a Mexican citizen who entered the United States without inspection in 2001 and lived in Ohio, pleaded guilty in 2012 to felony “identity fraud” under Ohio Rev. Code § 2913.49(B) after presenting another person’s identification as her own. When the government charged her as removable for unlawful entry, she conceded removability but sought cancellation of removal based on her long residence. At her merits hearing in 2020—eight years after the state conviction—she requested a continuance to challenge that conviction. The Immigration Judge denied the continuance for lack of good cause and denied cancellation on the ground that the identity-fraud conviction was a CIMT with a potential sentence of at least one year. The BIA affirmed, and the Sixth Circuit denied the petition for review.

2. Summary of the Opinion

• Cancellation of removal: The court held that Ohio identity fraud under Ohio Rev. Code § 2913.49(B)—intentional use of another’s personal identifying information, without consent, with intent to represent it as one’s own—inherently involves deception and therefore qualifies as a CIMT. Because the offense was punishable by up to 12 months, it triggered the statutory CIMT bar to cancellation of removal.
• Continuance: The court held that the Immigration Judge did not abuse discretion in denying a continuance because the petitioner failed to show “good cause,” particularly given the eight-year delay in attempting to challenge the conviction and the lack of an adequate explanation for that delay.

3. Analysis

3.1. Precedents Cited

A. Standards of review and judicial role

• Castillo v. Bondi, 140 F.4th 777, 779 (6th Cir. 2025): Cited for the proposition that when the BIA issues a reasoned opinion, the court reviews the BIA’s reasoning (rather than independently reviewing the Immigration Judge’s decision).
• Seldon v. Garland, 120 F.4th 527, 531 (6th Cir. 2024): Cited for the bifurcated review framework—substantial-evidence review for factual findings and de novo (“fresh eyes”) review for legal conclusions.
• Herrera v. Bondi, 162 F.4th 617, 624–25 (6th Cir. 2025): Used to reject the claim that the BIA must address every subsidiary argument at length; the agency must show it “heard and thought,” not “write an exegesis on every contention.”

B. Cancellation of removal and CIMT framework

• Pereida v. Wilkinson, 592 U.S. 224, 231–32 (2021): Cited for the cancellation-of-removal framework and the relevance of disqualifying convictions. The decision supplies the broader statutory context: the applicant bears the burden to establish eligibility, including the absence of disqualifying convictions.
• Yeremin v. Holder, 738 F.3d 708, 714–17 (6th Cir. 2013): The opinion’s centerpiece for defining CIMTs and for the proposition that crimes involving deception/fraud qualify even if the statute does not use “magic words” like “intent to defraud.” The court relies on Yeremin to treat deception as “inherent” when the offense criminalizes possession/use of identification documents with corrupt/unlawful intent.

C. Illustrative CIMT comparators from multiple circuits

To reinforce that identity- and deception-based offenses commonly qualify as CIMTs, the court cites a cross-circuit set of examples:

• Zaitona v. INS, 9 F.3d 432, 438 (6th Cir. 1993): False statement or concealment in a driver’s license application as a CIMT-type deception.
• Serrato-Soto v. Holder, 570 F.3d 686, 690–91 (6th Cir. 2009): Use of personal information/identification with intent to hide true identity.
• Walker v. U.S. Att'y Gen., 783 F.3d 1226, 1229 (11th Cir. 2015): Uttering a forged instrument.
• De Martinez v. Holder, 770 F.3d 823, 825 (9th Cir. 2014) (per curiam): Using a false Social Security number to obtain employment.
• Tall v. Mukasey, 517 F.3d 1115, 1119 (9th Cir. 2008): Knowing possession for sale of counterfeit trademark goods.
• Rodriguez v. Gonzales, 451 F.3d 60, 63–64 (2d Cir. 2006) (per curiam): False statements in a passport application with intent to procure issuance.
• Montero-Ubri v. INS, 229 F.3d 319, 320–21 (1st Cir. 2000): Use of a fraudulent driver’s license.

These citations do not drive a new doctrinal test; rather, they situate the court’s holding within a consistent national pattern: intentional deception in identification and official-document contexts is paradigmatic moral turpitude.

D. Continuance doctrine

• Suarez-Diaz v. Holder, 771 F.3d 935, 941 (6th Cir. 2014): Cited for the abuse-of-discretion standard applicable to continuance decisions. The court uses it to uphold the Immigration Judge’s refusal to delay proceedings absent “good cause.”

3.2. Legal Reasoning

A. Why Ohio identity fraud is a CIMT

The court’s reasoning proceeds in a straightforward sequence tied closely to the statutory elements and Sixth Circuit precedent:

• Statutory eligibility rule: For non-LPR cancellation, an applicant must show, among other requirements, no disqualifying conviction, including a CIMT meeting the relevant removability/penalty criteria (citing 8 U.S.C. §§ 1227(a)(2)(A)(i), 1229a(c)(4)(A), 1229b(b)(1)(C)).
• Definition of CIMT in Sixth Circuit law: The court quotes Yeremin v. Holder for CIMT as conduct that is “inherently base, vile, or depraved,” and emphasizes the subsidiary rule that crimes involving deception or fraud “consistently” qualify.
• Elements-based fit: Ohio Rev. Code § 2913.49(B) requires intentional misrepresentation—using another’s identifying information without consent with intent to “represent” it as one’s own. The court treats this as deception “at the heart” of the offense.
• No “magic words” requirement: Even though the Ohio statute does not explicitly say “fraudulent intent,” the court applies Yeremin’s principle that moral turpitude can exist where deception is “inherent,” not merely where the legislature uses the word “fraud.”
• Penalty threshold: The identity-fraud offense is punishable by up to 12 months (Ohio Rev. Code §§ 2913.49(B)(2), 2929.14(A)(5)), satisfying the opinion’s understanding of the “one year in prison or more” criterion it applies via 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A).

The court’s analytic move is to equate “representing another person’s identifying information as one’s own” with inherent deception, then to treat inherent deception as sufficient for CIMT classification under Sixth Circuit precedent. On those premises, ineligibility for cancellation follows.

B. Why there was no “good cause” continuance

On the continuance issue, the court focuses on timing, diligence, and explanation:

• Regulatory standard and deference: Immigration judges “may” grant continuances for “good cause” (8 C.F.R. § 1003.29), reviewed for abuse of discretion.
• Eight-year delay undermines diligence: The petitioner sought a continuance in 2020 to challenge a 2012 conviction, offering no adequate explanation for why she did not pursue that challenge during the intervening eight years.
• Notice of immigration significance: The Immigration Judge had reminded the petitioner and counsel in 2013 about the conviction and its potential to bar relief, further weakening any claim that the late timing was unavoidable.
• Secondary rationales insufficient: The asserted benefits of consolidation with her husband’s case, the fact it was her first continuance request, and a moved-up hearing date did not compel a different outcome—especially given the already-protracted timeline.
• Agency explanation adequate: Citing Herrera v. Bondi, the court holds that the Immigration Judge and BIA provided enough reasoning to show they considered the arguments and exercised judgment, without addressing every contention at length.

3.3. Impact

A. Substantive immigration consequence: identity-misrepresentation offenses remain high-risk for cancellation applicants

The opinion reinforces (and operationalizes) a practical rule for the Sixth Circuit: identity-related crimes that require intentional misrepresentation—especially presenting another person’s identifying information as one’s own—will almost invariably be treated as CIMTs because the deception is inherent in the elements. For non-LPR cancellation applicants with such convictions, the case underscores that:

• Reframing the offense as “not explicitly fraudulent” is unlikely to succeed where the elements necessarily involve misrepresentation.
• Even “low-level” felonies with a 12-month maximum can be outcome-determinative for discretionary relief eligibility.

B. Procedural consequence: late collateral attacks rarely justify delaying removal proceedings

The continuance holding adds to a consistent theme in immigration adjudication: seeking time to undo a conviction can be “good cause” only when pursued diligently and supported by a concrete, timely plan. Here, the court’s emphasis on an eight-year delay—combined with prior notice of immigration consequences—signals that Immigration Judges have broad discretion to deny continuances when the request appears reactive rather than diligent.

C. Precedential weight and practical influence

Although the opinion is “NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION,” it still provides persuasive guidance within the circuit. Practitioners can expect the BIA and Immigration Judges to cite its reasoning—especially its element-focused treatment of Ohio Rev. Code § 2913.49(B) as inherently deceptive—when adjudicating similar offenses and continuance requests.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

• Cancellation of removal (non-LPR): A form of discretionary relief allowing certain nonpermanent residents to avoid removal if they meet statutory requirements (including no disqualifying convictions) and persuade the agency to grant relief.
• Crime involving moral turpitude (CIMT): A long-used immigration category for certain crimes viewed as particularly blameworthy. In practice, offenses involving fraud or intentional deception are commonly classified as CIMTs.
• “Inherent” deception: The idea that even if a statute does not use words like “fraud,” the required elements can necessarily involve deception (e.g., intentionally representing another’s identity as one’s own).
• Continuance: A request to postpone a hearing date. Immigration judges can grant it only for “good cause.”
• Collateral attack on a conviction: An attempt to set aside or invalidate a criminal conviction in another court (often after the conviction is final), typically through post-conviction relief.
• Abuse of discretion: A deferential review standard. A court will uphold the agency’s decision if it falls within a range of reasonable choices, even if another judge might have decided differently.

5. Conclusion

Hernandez-Mendez v. Blanche delivers two clear takeaways in Sixth Circuit immigration practice. First, Ohio’s identity-fraud offense under Ohio Rev. Code § 2913.49(B), which criminalizes intentionally representing another person’s identifying information as one’s own, is treated as inherently deceptive and thus a CIMT that can bar non-LPR cancellation when the penalty threshold is met. Second, Immigration Judges act within their discretion in denying continuances sought to pursue long-delayed post-conviction challenges—particularly when the applicant cannot explain years of inaction and had early notice of the conviction’s immigration significance. Together, the holdings emphasize element-based CIMT classification and diligence-driven “good cause” in immigration continuance practice.