Ohio Charter-Amendment Petitions: Council May Reject Combined Part-Petitions Seeking Different Elections

1. Introduction

This decision addresses whether supporters of a municipal charter amendment may combine signatures from part-petitions that propose identical amendment language but request submission at different elections. The Supreme Court of Ohio held that Avon Lake City Council did not abuse its discretion or clearly disregard applicable law when it declined to submit such an amendment to voters.

The proposed amendment would have changed Avon Lake’s law director from an appointed officer to an elected officer. Its proponents collected signatures on petition sheets identifying either the November 2024 general election or the November 2026 general election. Although the combined signatures exceeded the required threshold, neither group independently contained enough valid signatures.

The majority treated the two groups as requesting materially different governmental actions. Their shared alternative wording—“or at such other election as is provided by law”—did not eliminate that divergence. The decision therefore distinguishes an incorrect election date consistently used throughout a petition from different election dates appearing across separate groups of petition sheets.

2. Background and Procedural History

The parties and proposed amendment

The relators were the City of Avon Lake, Ohio Committee for the Election of the Law Director, William Zimmerman, Melissa Seljan, and Ohio Citizens for Honesty, Integrity, and Openness in Government, Ltd. The respondents included Avon Lake City Council, its clerk Valerie Rosmarin, the city, and the individual councilmembers.

Under Section 37 of the Avon Lake Charter, the mayor appoints the law director with the concurrence of a majority of council. The committee sought to amend that provision to make the office elective.

Two circulation periods and two election dates

The committee began circulating petitions in July 2024. Those sheets asked council to submit the amendment at the November 5, 2024 general election, “or at such other election as is provided by law.” After concluding that it could not collect enough signatures for that election, the committee paused its effort.

Circulation resumed in June 2026. The committee reused sheets identifying the 2024 election and also circulated new sheets identifying the November 3, 2026 election. Both versions contained the same proposed amendment and the same alternative-election clause. Some signatures on the 2024-dated sheets were collected in 2024, while others were collected in 2026.

On August 26, 2026, the committee filed 33 part-petitions containing 769 signatures. The Lorain County Board of Elections verified 678 signatures and reported that 483 valid signatures were required.

The board expressly limited its certification to signature sufficiency and validity. It did not determine whether the petition was otherwise legally sufficient.

Council’s refusal and the original action

On August 31, council considered Ordinance No. 26-81, which would have submitted the amendment at the November 2026 general election. Council rejected it by a vote of six to one, reasoning that the filing effectively comprised two petitions and that neither independently satisfied the signature requirement.

The committee’s chairperson then demanded that the city law director institute mandamus proceedings. Relators contended that the demand was ignored. On September 9, they commenced an expedited election action in the Supreme Court of Ohio, seeking an order requiring enactment and transmission of the ordinance for placement on the November 2026 ballot, together with attorney fees.

3. Summary of the Opinion

The court denied mandamus because relators failed to establish a clear legal right to the requested relief and a corresponding clear duty on respondents’ part.

• The requested governmental action mattered. Identical amendment text did not make the petition sheets equivalent when they requested submission at elections two years apart.
• The alternative-election clause did not cure the difference. Each group still primarily requested a different action from council.
• Neither group had sufficient signatures. The majority did not require council to combine the two groups to reach the threshold.
• Prior incorrect-date cases were distinguishable. Those cases involved one consistently incorrect date, not competing dates across part-petitions.
• Signature verification was not comprehensive approval. Neither forwarding the papers nor verifying their signatures established that they constituted one legally sufficient petition.

The court also denied relators’ motion to strike, their emergency motion for a peremptory writ, and their request for attorney fees. It approved their cash deposit as security for costs.

4. Analysis: Constitutional Framework and Legal Reasoning

A. The constitutional duty is mandatory once its prerequisites are satisfied

Article XVIII, Section 9 of the Ohio Constitution requires a municipality’s legislative authority to submit a proposed charter amendment upon petitions signed by ten percent of the municipality’s electors. Article XVIII, Section 8 supplies the submission procedure.

Under Section 8, the legislative authority must “forthwith” provide by ordinance for submission at the next regular municipal election occurring between 60 and 120 days after passage of the ordinance. If no regular municipal election falls within that period, a special election must be held within the same interval.

The decision does not convert this constitutional obligation into unrestricted political discretion. Rather, it recognizes that the obligation depends on a legally sufficient petition. Council could examine whether the submitted papers actually supported the same requested action before treating their signatures as collectively sufficient.

B. Mandamus required more than urgency and an aggregate signature count

Relators had to prove, by clear and convincing evidence, a clear legal right to relief, a clear legal duty requiring respondents to provide it, and the absence of an adequate ordinary remedy.

The imminent election satisfied the third requirement. The decisive question was whether council’s refusal involved fraud, corruption, abuse of discretion, or clear disregard of applicable law. Because relators alleged neither fraud nor corruption, the court focused on the latter two grounds.

This review standard matters to the holding’s scope. The court upheld council’s refusal under the facts presented; it did not announce that every difference in petition wording invariably invalidates a petition.

C. The request paragraph was legally operative, not merely introductory

Relators characterized the paragraph identifying the election date as a “preamble,” separate from the amendment itself. The majority rejected that characterization as a reason to disregard its contents.

A charter-amendment petition does more than display proposed charter language. It asks the legislative authority to take a particular action. The majority called that request paragraph the petition’s sine qua non: its indispensable component.

Consequently, substantive identity of the proposed amendment did not establish identity of the petitions. One set requested submission in 2024; another requested submission in 2026. In the majority’s view, those were different requests for ordinances, notwithstanding the common amendment text.

D. A shared fallback clause did not override the specified dates

The strongest textual response was that both versions permitted submission “at such other election as is provided by law.” That language could be understood as authorizing whatever election the constitutional timetable required.

The majority nevertheless gave controlling significance to the different primary requests. It held that the fallback clause did not nullify the fact that the two groups principally sought different actions.

This is the opinion’s central interpretive choice. The majority treated the specified election as part of the signatories’ operative request rather than as an administrative preference displaced by applicable law. The dissent took the opposite approach.

E. Filing papers together did not establish their legal unity

Relators invoked R.C. 3501.38(K), arguing that they filed the part-petitions as “one instrument” and that officials had already treated them that way.

The court rejected the asserted significance of the administrative steps taken. Forwarding the papers to the board was part of the constitutional process, not an adjudication of overall sufficiency. Likewise, the board’s verification established which signatures were valid; it did not decide whether signatures supporting different requests could be aggregated.

The distinction is between physical consolidation and legal unity. Delivering papers together does not, by itself, resolve whether they express one petition capable of meeting the applicable signature threshold.

5. Analysis: Precedents Cited

A. Divergent petitions: State ex rel. Carter v. Celebrezze

In State ex rel. Carter v. Celebrezze, 63 Ohio St.2d 326 (1980), proponents submitted constitutional-amendment part-petitions that differed in their treatment of existing constitutional text. One group included the then-existing text of Article XI, Section 13; another omitted it.

The central question was whether the two groups represented one amendment, permitting combined signatures, or different amendments, each requiring independently sufficient support. The court found no constitutional or statutory authorization to disregard the omission and treated the groups as different proposed amendments. Neither had enough signatures on its own.

The Avon Lake majority expressly declined to treat State ex rel. Carter v. Celebrezze as directly controlling because the proposed amendment language here was identical. Nevertheless, its aggregation problem was analogous: signatures could not simply be combined when the papers sought legally different results.

The present decision thus applies comparable reasoning to the petition’s requested legislative action rather than to differences in amendment text. That is its principal development of the divergent-petition doctrine.

B. Incorrect dates: State ex rel. Baur v. Medina Cty. Bd. of Elections

In State ex rel. Baur v. Medina Cty. Bd. of Elections, 2000-Ohio-49, a referendum petition identified the November 1999 election, but its filing timing made the November 2000 election the earliest available election under the applicable statute. Opponents sought prohibition to prevent the referendum from proceeding.

The court denied relief, holding that determining the election date for a valid municipal referendum petition under R.C. 731.29 was a “mechanical, administrative matter.” An incorrect date was therefore not fatal.

That precedent supported relators’ argument that election timing comes from law, not proponents’ choice. The majority distinguished it because the petition consistently identified one incorrect date. It did not address whether signatures could be combined from groups specifying different dates.

The opinion also notes that the statutory interval under R.C. 731.29 changed after that decision from 75 to 90 days. That amendment supplies historical context; the present charter-amendment dispute was governed by the constitutional process.

C. Mootness and administrative timing: State ex rel. Nauth v. Dirham

In State ex rel. Nauth v. Dirham, 2020-Ohio-4208, referendum proponents challenged the rejection of signatures. The board argued that the case was moot because the petition identified the November 2019 election, which was no longer legally available when the petition was filed.

Following State ex rel. Baur v. Medina Cty. Bd. of Elections, the court rejected mootness. The stated election date was “of no legal significance” because the appropriate election was administratively determined under law. If the signature challenge succeeded, the referendum could proceed at the proper election.

Again, the Avon Lake majority distinguished the precedent because it concerned one consistently incorrect date. Neither referendum decision resolved the legal effect of divergent dates across charter-amendment part-petitions.

The majority therefore preserved those holdings while limiting their usefulness in an aggregation dispute. It did not hold that every inaccurate petition date defeats ballot access.

D. Constitutional processing: State ex rel. Maxcy v. Saferin and State ex rel. Turner v. Barhorst

State ex rel. Maxcy v. Saferin, 2018-Ohio-4035, supplied the governing framework: municipal charter amendments proceed under Article XVIII, Sections 8 and 9. Its role was foundational rather than outcome-determinative.

State ex rel. Turner v. Barhorst, 2026-Ohio-3439, involved an order requiring a city clerk to transmit a charter-amendment petition for signature verification after the clerk had rejected it without taking that step.

The majority used that decision to explain why Avon Lake’s transmission of the papers did not concede their validity. Transmission was an initial procedural duty. Compliance with that duty did not prevent later consideration of defects beyond the signatures themselves.

E. Mandamus standards and election review

State ex rel. Strbich v. Montgomery Cty. Bd. of Elections, 2024-Ohio-4933, provided the three mandamus requirements and the clear-and-convincing-evidence burden.

State ex rel. Clark v. Twinsburg, 2022-Ohio-3089, supported the conclusion that an imminent election leaves no adequate ordinary remedy. It also directed attention to whether relators possessed a clear right and respondents owed a clear duty.

State ex rel. Sanduskians for Sandusky v. Sandusky, 2022-Ohio-3362, supplied the election-review standard concerning fraud, corruption, abuse of discretion, or clear disregard of law. Together, these authorities explain why urgency allowed immediate judicial review but did not establish entitlement to the requested writ.

F. Pleadings and briefs: State ex rel. Hanson v. Guernsey Cty. Bd. of Commrs.

State ex rel. Hanson v. Guernsey Cty. Bd. of Commrs., 1992-Ohio-73, established the relevant distinction under Civ.R. 7(A): complaints, answers, and replies are pleadings; a merit brief is not.

Because Civ.R. 12(F) authorizes striking material from pleadings, it did not support relators’ motion to strike references in respondents’ merit brief. Importantly, the court still disregarded the untimely evidence cited in that brief. Denying the motion did not admit the excluded material into the record.

G. Attorney-fee authorities

Billington v. Cotner, 37 Ohio St.2d 17 (1974), recognizes attorney-fee awards in common-law taxpayer actions when the taxpayer’s efforts benefit the public. The court found no basis for recovery here.

Smith v. Kroeger, 138 Ohio St. 508 (1941), concerns common-fund awards when claimants prevail in an equitable action. Relators did not prevail and could not recover on that theory.

Wilborn v. Bank One Corp., 2009-Ohio-306, recognizes a bad-faith exception permitting fees when the prevailing party demonstrates bad faith by the losing party. Relators’ unsuccessful action did not satisfy that basis for recovery.

These authorities supplemented R.C. 733.61, which permits statutory taxpayer attorney fees when judgment is finally ordered in the taxpayer’s favor. The court’s denial of mandamus defeated that statutory predicate.

6. Procedural Rulings and the Partial Dissent

Emergency relief did not excuse procedural noncompliance

Relators filed an emergency motion stressing that absentee ballots were about to be distributed. The court denied it as procedurally improper for three related reasons:

1. R.C. 2731.04 requires a mandamus application by petition, and S.Ct.Prac.R. 12.02(B)(3) requires original-action relief to be requested in the complaint.
2. The complaint already requested a peremptory writ, making the motion essentially a prohibited supplemental brief under S.Ct.Prac.R. 16.08.
3. The attached exhibit was untimely under the expedited-election schedule in S.Ct.Prac.R. 12.08.

The ruling reinforces that election urgency affects the availability and speed of review, not the obligation to comply with filing rules.

Security for costs was distinct from entitlement to fees

The court approved the unopposed cash deposit under R.C. 733.59, which requires security for costs in the specified taxpayer proceedings. That approval addressed a procedural prerequisite; it did not establish the merits of the taxpayer claim or create an entitlement to attorney fees.

Justice Brunner’s alternative reading

Justice Brunner would have held the date difference immaterial because both groups expressly permitted submission at another election provided by law. She would have ordered council and its members to enact an ordinance submitting the amendment at a special election within the constitutional timeframe.

Her position treated the shared fallback language as sufficient to reconcile the different dates. It also recognized that the available remedy could be a constitutionally timed special election rather than the specific general election requested in the complaint.

She agreed that attorney fees should be denied but would have awarded relators costs. The supplied opinion records her position without a separate explanatory opinion, so further reasoning should not be attributed to her.

7. Potential Impact and Limits

Petition drafting and renewed campaigns

The immediate practical lesson is to maintain consistency across all petition sheets. A campaign resumed after an unsuccessful election cycle risks losing the ability to aggregate signatures if it combines old sheets naming one election with new sheets naming another.

The decision also warns against relying on general fallback language to reconcile inconsistent primary requests. Proponents should examine the complete request presented to signatories, not merely confirm that the proposed amendment text is identical.

Municipal review and election-board certification

The ruling confirms that a favorable signature report does not conclusively establish a petition’s legal sufficiency. Municipal legislative authorities may still evaluate whether the verified signatures support the same operative request.

That authority remains bounded by the constitutional duty and judicial review for abuse of discretion or clear disregard of law. The opinion does not authorize rejection simply because officials oppose an amendment’s substance.

A meaningful but limited extension of precedent

Future cases may invoke this decision when identical proposals contain materially different instructions to the official charged with submitting them. The strongest application will involve divergent requests comparable to elections two years apart, with no independently sufficient group of signatures.

Several limits are important:

• The court did not invalidate signatures merely because they were collected in an earlier year.
• It did not hold that a uniformly incorrect election date necessarily defeats a petition.
• It did not decide whether the amendment itself was substantively permissible.
• It did not resolve a case in which one date-specific group independently met the signature threshold.
• Because petition insufficiency was dispositive, the majority did not need to resolve the appropriate election or remedy had the petition been sufficient.

The underlying interpretive tension

The opinion leaves a significant boundary between legally prescribed election timing and the wording of a signatory’s request. Earlier referendum cases treated the stated date as administratively dispensable. Here, differing dates became material to whether signatures could be combined.

The majority resolved that tension by distinguishing a uniform error from divergent requests. The dissent demonstrates that the common fallback clause supports a competing reading. Future disputes will likely turn on whether a variation changes the petition’s operative demand or merely reflects an administrative detail.

8. Complex Concepts Simplified

Mandamus

A court order compelling an official to perform an established legal duty. Urgency alone does not establish that duty.

Relator

The person or organization seeking an extraordinary writ in an action brought in the State’s name.

Part-petition

An individual petition sheet or component of a larger filing. Signatures can contribute to a collective threshold only if the components legally support the same petition.

Clear and convincing evidence

Proof producing a firm belief in the facts necessary for relief, rather than merely showing that a position is more likely correct than not.

“Forthwith”

Promptly, without unjustified delay. It does not remove the requirement of a sufficient petition or override constitutional election timing.

Sine qua non

An indispensable condition or component. Here, the court used the phrase for the signatories’ request that council act.

Peremptory writ

An immediate, definitive writ commanding performance. Requesting one does not bypass procedural requirements.

Security for costs

A deposit or other assurance covering litigation costs. It is separate from an award reimbursing attorney fees.

9. Conclusion

The decision establishes that identical charter-amendment language does not necessarily permit aggregation of signatures when separate petition groups ask council to submit the amendment at different elections. On these facts, a shared alternative-election clause did not cure the divergence, and neither group independently satisfied the signature requirement.

Its broader significance is the distinction between support for the same proposed amendment and support for the same operative request. Petition proponents must attend to both; signature verification and consolidated filing alone cannot resolve a material inconsistency in what signatories asked government to do.