Objective Reasonableness of Low-Output Contact Shocks During Booking and Reasonable Deference to Jail Medical Staff

Introduction

In Joshua Aaron Elswick v. Ryan Derrough (Sixth Circuit, Jan. 21, 2026), the court addressed whether a county deputy’s use of a “generated low-output voltage emitter (“GLOVE”)” during jail booking constituted excessive force against a pretrial detainee, and whether the deputy was deliberately indifferent to the detainee’s asserted needs for psychiatric intervention and potable water.

The plaintiff, Joshua Elswick—who had significant mental-health diagnoses and was allegedly intoxicated—was arrested after a domestic dispute. During booking he repeatedly resisted efforts to remove restraints, expressed paranoia that officers were trying to kill him, and fought deputies. Deputy Jailer Ryan Derrough used the GLOVE (a contact-only, single-setting, low-level compliance device) multiple times while deputies attempted to remove restraints and maintain control. Elswick later sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging Fourteenth Amendment due-process violations.

The district court granted summary judgment to Deputy Derrough on qualified-immunity grounds. The Sixth Circuit affirmed.

Summary of the Opinion

  • Excessive force: Applying Kingsley v. Hendrickson, the court held the GLOVE’s use was not “objectively unreasonable” given Elswick’s active resistance, the deputies’ need to remove restraints to book him, the perceived threat level based on prior conduct, and the limited evidence of injury. Qualified immunity applied.
  • Deliberate indifference—psychiatric/medical needs: Even assuming an objectively serious mental-health need, the court found no evidence that Deputy Derrough recklessly disregarded it because he requested nurse evaluations and reasonably deferred to medical staff.
  • Deliberate indifference—potable water: The record showed Elswick had access to drinkable water (a cup in booking and a cell sink/fountain), but refused due to paranoia; therefore, the deputy did not deprive him of potable water.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

Qualified immunity framework and summary judgment posture

  • Burnett v. Griffith — Provided the de novo standard for reviewing qualified-immunity summary-judgment grants. The case anchors the appellate posture: the Sixth Circuit independently assesses whether the record, viewed favorably to the plaintiff, shows a constitutional violation and whether the right was clearly established.
  • Heeter v. Bowers — Restated the controlling qualified-immunity formulation: no liability at summary judgment where, under plaintiff-favorable facts, the conduct did not violate clearly established rights. The opinion also later informs the medical-care discussion by reaffirming detainees’ access to adequate care.
  • Scott v. Harris — Supplied the “video controls” principle: at summary judgment, courts view facts “in the light depicted by the videotape.” This mattered because Elswick argued the silent surveillance video did not show active resistance; the court relied on video plus testimony to resolve that dispute.

Excessive force standard for pretrial detainees

  • Kingsley v. Hendrickson — The central governing authority. The Sixth Circuit applied Kingsley’s objective standard and nonexhaustive factors: need for force, alternative options, resistance, threat and officer perspective, and injury. The court’s conclusion turned on how those factors matched the booking-room realities.
  • Cretacci v. Call — Supported the proposition that officers may use “some force” in response to “active resistance” marked by “a deliberate act of defiance.” The panel used Cretacci to characterize Elswick’s conduct as active resistance rather than mere noncompliance.

Conditions of confinement and deliberate indifference under the Fourteenth Amendment

  • Bell v. Wolfish — Grounded the general rule that pretrial detainees may not be subjected to conditions that “amount to punishment.” This frames the due-process lens for conditions and medical-care claims distinct from Eighth Amendment punishment doctrine.
  • Westmoreland v. Butler County — Articulated that deliberate indifference to conditions posing a substantial risk to a pretrial detainee’s health or safety violates due process. The opinion uses it as the doctrinal gateway for Elswick’s medical-care and water claims.
  • Lawler ex rel. Lawler v. Hardeman County — Noted that deliberate-indifference claims take “many forms,” situating Elswick’s theories (psychiatric intervention and potable water) as recognized categories of detainee-rights litigation.

Medical-care claim elements and the Sixth Circuit’s “recklessness” requirement

  • Helphenstine v. Lewis County — Provided the two-part test: (1) objectively serious medical need, and (2) a deliberate-and-reckless failure to act in the face of an unjustifiably high risk known or so obvious it should be known.
  • Howell v. NaphCare, Inc. — Supplied the definition of “objectively serious” medical need: physician-diagnosed as mandating treatment or so obvious that even a lay person would recognize the need for a doctor’s attention.
  • Brawner v. Scott County — Clarified the culpability threshold as “more than negligence but less than subjective intent.” The panel relied on this “recklessness” framing to conclude that requesting nurse evaluations and deferring to them fell short of constitutional fault.
  • Greene v. Crawford County — Stated the key deference principle: a non-medically trained officer does not act with deliberate indifference when he reasonably defers to medical professionals’ opinions.
  • Mercer v. Athens County — Reinforced that deference to medical staff must be reasonable; the panel cited it to underscore the absence of evidence that the deputy’s reliance on the nurse was unreasonable under the circumstances.

Potable water as a basic condition of confinement

  • Farmer v. Brennan — Provided the broad “humane conditions of confinement” requirement, which includes meeting basic human needs.
  • Dellis v. Corr. Corp. of Am. — Specifically recognized “drink[able] water” as part of humane conditions, supporting the legal viability of Elswick’s theory while also setting up the decisive factual issue: whether water was actually denied.

Legal Reasoning

1) Excessive force: the court treats the GLOVE as a proportional compliance tool in response to active resistance

The panel’s analysis is built around Kingsley v. Hendrickson and the concrete booking context. The deputies needed to remove handcuffs and leg shackles to complete booking, but Elswick repeatedly refused to cooperate and physically resisted while officers attempted to safely manage him. The court emphasized what Deputy Derrough knew at the time: Elswick had already been combative during the incident (including swinging at medical workers, destroying equipment, and attempting to bite an officer), and his front-cuffed posture increased the perceived risk because it allowed greater arm movement.

The opinion also credits incremental escalation: Deputy Derrough attempted de-escalation; called for backup and a nurse; used the GLOVE initially as contact guidance over clothing without shocking; and only delivered shocks upon continued defiance and physical resistance. Injury evidence played a limiting role: even accepting Elswick’s complaints of minor burns, he offered no evidence that the burns required medical treatment. On these facts, the panel held Elswick failed to show objective unreasonableness, entitling the deputy to qualified immunity.

Finally, the court rejected Elswick’s effort to reframe the resistance as non-active by invoking Scott v. Harris: where video evidence exists, courts adopt the depiction shown by the recording, here reinforced by testimony.

2) Deliberate indifference (psychiatric/medical): reasonable reliance on a nurse defeats the “recklessness” element

The court assumed—without deciding—that Elswick’s mental-health condition could satisfy the “objectively serious” requirement under Helphenstine v. Lewis County and Howell v. NaphCare, Inc.. The claim failed on the second element: whether Deputy Derrough acted deliberately and recklessly under Brawner v. Scott County.

The decisive fact was process: Deputy Derrough had a nurse evaluate Elswick twice and continued to monitor him. Under Greene v. Crawford County, a non-medical officer generally does not commit deliberate indifference by reasonably deferring to medical professionals. Citing Mercer v. Athens County, the panel found no evidence that the deputy’s deference was unreasonable (for example, ignoring obvious deterioration, refusing to summon care, or overriding medical guidance).

3) Deliberate indifference (potable water): access defeats “denial,” even if the detainee refuses to drink

While Farmer v. Brennan and Dellis v. Corr. Corp. of Am. recognize drinkable water as a basic condition, the panel treated the case as a factual mismatch: Elswick had access to potable water (a cup in booking and a sink/fountain in the cell) but refused due to paranoia that it was poisoned and instead drank from the toilet. The court held the deputy could not be liable for a deprivation where water was available and the detainee declined to use it.

Impact

  • Force using “low-output,” contact-only devices: The opinion signals that the Sixth Circuit will evaluate emerging compliance tools like the GLOVE through conventional Kingsley proportionality factors rather than treating them as categorically excessive. Where officers can show active resistance, incremental escalation, and limited injury, qualified immunity is likely to attach.
  • Video-heavy excessive-force litigation: By relying on Scott v. Harris, the panel underscores that plaintiffs face an uphill battle disputing resistance narratives when surveillance footage exists, even if silent, particularly when corroborated by testimony.
  • Mental-health needs in jail intake: The decision reinforces a practical litigation boundary: even serious mental-health presentations may not yield liability for line staff when they promptly involve medical personnel and do not ignore obvious danger signs. Plaintiffs may need evidence that deference to medical staff was unreasonable (e.g., clear deterioration, refusal to summon care, or disregard of professional direction).
  • Basic-needs claims require denial, not refusal: For water (and by analogy, other basic needs), the opinion suggests that constitutional claims will usually hinge on whether the jail actually withheld access, not on a detainee’s paranoia-driven refusal to use available resources.
  • Practical limitation: The decision is labeled “NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION,” which may limit its precedential weight, but it still reflects how the Sixth Circuit applies established doctrines to modern devices and intake scenarios.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Qualified immunity
A doctrine that shields government officials from damages unless the plaintiff shows (1) a constitutional violation and (2) that the violated right was “clearly established” at the time. Here, the court concluded Elswick failed at the first step (no constitutional violation shown), so the deputy was immune.
“Objectively unreasonable” force (pretrial detainees)
Under Kingsley v. Hendrickson, the question is not the officer’s subjective intent, but whether the force was excessive from the standpoint of a reasonable officer facing the situation. Factors include the need for force, alternatives, resistance, threat level, and injuries.
Deliberate indifference (medical care / conditions)
A constitutional standard requiring more than carelessness. Under Sixth Circuit formulations (including Brawner v. Scott County), the plaintiff must show the official acted recklessly in the face of a high risk to health or safety—not merely that the official made a mistake.
“Objectively serious” medical need
A condition serious enough that it has been diagnosed as requiring treatment, or is so plainly severe that a lay person would recognize the need for medical attention (Howell v. NaphCare, Inc.).
Deference to medical professionals
Non-medical officers generally may rely on nurses or doctors to decide what care is needed, so long as that reliance is reasonable (Greene v. Crawford County).

Conclusion

Elswick v. Derrough applies established Fourteenth Amendment standards to a volatile jail-intake encounter involving a low-output, contact-only compliance device. The Sixth Circuit held that repeated GLOVE shocks were not objectively unreasonable given documented active resistance and limited injury evidence, and it rejected deliberate-indifference theories where the deputy involved medical staff and where potable water was available but refused.

The case’s core takeaway is practical: in the Sixth Circuit, plaintiffs challenging force during booking must overcome the combined force of Kingsley’s context-specific balancing, Scott’s video lens, and qualified immunity—while medical-care and basic-needs claims often turn on whether officials actually denied access or instead reasonably involved and relied upon healthcare staff.