Objective Reasonableness Limits FTCA Battery Liability for TSA Groin Pat-Downs Under North Carolina Law

Case: Erin Osmon v. United States (4th Cir. Feb. 23, 2026) (unpublished, per curiam)
Posture: Appeal from a defense judgment after bench trial on an FTCA civil battery claim arising from a TSA pat-down at Asheville Regional Airport

1. Introduction

This case addresses the line between a required airport security screening and tort liability for civil battery under the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”), applying North Carolina law. Erin Osmon alleged that a July 2019 TSA groin-area pat-down constituted a sexual assault and therefore a civil battery. The United States denied wrongdoing and defended the pat-down as protocol-compliant and objectively reasonable.

The core issues on appeal were: (i) whether the district court misstated or misapplied North Carolina battery law—particularly the intent component; (ii) whether the district court’s factfinding (including credibility determinations based on testimony and CCTV footage) was clearly erroneous; and (iii) whether certain trial evidence—especially testimony from a TSA witness whom Osmon characterized as a “surprise witness”—was improperly admitted.

Although the opinion is unpublished and “not binding precedent,” it is practically instructive for how FTCA battery claims against TSA screeners can succeed or fail at trial and on appeal when the contested conduct is a protocol-driven pat-down captured on video.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment for the United States. It held that the district court: (a) did not commit reversible legal error in its articulation or application of North Carolina battery principles; (b) did not clearly err in finding the pat-down “objectively reasonable and proper,” especially where the court credited the TSA officer’s testimony and video evidence over Osmon’s account; and (c) did not abuse its discretion in admitting challenged testimony, particularly in a bench trial context where the judge can appropriately weigh probative value and disregard improper inferences.

The appellate court emphasized the deference owed to trial-level credibility findings and factfinding after a bench trial and concluded the record supported the district court’s view that no intentional, objectively offensive touching occurred. The panel also approved the district court’s observation that any incidental, brief touching of thigh or pelvic area during a required groin pat-down would not constitute battery under North Carolina law.

3. Analysis

3.1. Precedents Cited and Their Role

FTCA framework and sovereign immunity

  • FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471 (1994): Cited for the baseline proposition that the federal government is generally immune from suit, and that the FTCA is a limited waiver. This anchors the opinion’s threshold framing: Osmon’s claim proceeds only because Congress waived immunity for certain torts by federal employees.
  • Osmon v. United States, 66 F.4th 144 (4th Cir. 2023): The earlier appellate decision in the same litigation reinstated jurisdiction, holding “the FTCA permits people who allege they were assaulted by TSA screeners to sue the federal government.” The 2026 opinion builds on that gateway holding but makes clear that permission to sue is not close to proof on the merits—trial evidence and state-law elements still govern.

Standards of appellate review after bench trial

  • Va. Elec. & Power Co. v. Bransen Energy, Inc., 850 F.3d 645 (4th Cir. 2017): Establishes the “mixed standard” (de novo for legal conclusions; clear error for factual findings) that controls the appeal.
  • Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Cohen, 423 F.3d 413 (4th Cir. 2005): Reinforces that an appellate court may not reverse factfinding just because it would have decided differently—an important constraint given Osmon’s challenges to credibility assessments.
  • HSBC Bank USA v. F&M Bank N. Va., 246 F.3d 335 (4th Cir. 2001): Supplies the classic “definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed” definition of clear error.
  • Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564 (1985): The Supreme Court’s instruction that where “two permissible views of the evidence” exist, the factfinder’s choice is not clearly erroneous. This is the fulcrum for affirming the district court’s preference for the TSA officer’s testimony, supported by video.
  • U.S. Fire Ins. Co. v. Allied Towing Corp., 966 F.2d 820 (4th Cir. 1992): Highlights that credibility-based determinations receive the “highest degree” of appellate deference, directly undercutting Osmon’s attempt to re-litigate witness believability on appeal.

Evidentiary rulings and bench-trial insulation from prejudice

  • Mountain Valley Pipeline, LLC v. W. Pocahontas Props. Ltd. P'ship, 918 F.3d 353 (4th Cir. 2019): Provides the abuse-of-discretion standard and “arbitrary and irrational” threshold for reversal of evidentiary rulings.
  • Schultz v. Butcher, 24 F.3d 626 (4th Cir. 1994): Cited to explain why the district court could hear certain contested testimony in a bench trial and properly weigh it—judges can filter out improper inferences more reliably than juries.

North Carolina civil battery elements and intent

  • Hawkins v. Hawkins, 400 S.E.2d 472 (N.C. Ct. App. 1992): Supplies the North Carolina elements: “intent, harmful or offensive contact, causation, and lack of privilege.” The opinion uses this to frame what Osmon had to prove by a preponderance of the evidence.
  • Andrews v. Peters, 330 S.E.2d 638 (N.C. Ct. App. 1985): Clarifies that battery intent need not be hostile; it is intent “to bring about a result” that the law forbids. This matters because TSA pat-downs are purposeful touchings—liability turns on whether the intended touching is harmful/offensive and unprivileged, not on animus.

Taken together, the cited precedents do less to announce a novel doctrine than to lock in a highly deferential appellate posture: once a district court (as factfinder) deems a TSA pat-down protocol-compliant and “objectively reasonable,” the path to reversal is steep absent legal misstatement or unmistakable factual error.

3.2. Legal Reasoning

(a) The court’s operative merits framing: “objectively harmful or offensive” contact

The district court found Osmon failed to prove battery because Robinson did not “intentionally touch [Osmon] in an objectively offensive manner without her consent,” and the Fourth Circuit treated that as dispositive under North Carolina law. On appeal, Osmon argued the district court effectively required “intent to offend.” The Fourth Circuit rejected that characterization, reading the bench verdict as applying an objective offensiveness inquiry to the contact itself, not requiring proof of a subjective desire to offend.

Key move: The Fourth Circuit reframed Osmon’s legal-error argument as a misreading of the bench verdict. It emphasized that the trial court’s bottom line was about the absence of an objectively offensive touching, supported by credited testimony and video.

(b) Credibility, video, and the “two permissible views” rule

The opinion underscores that this case turned on factfinding: what, precisely, the TSA officer did during the “anterior” groin sweep and whether any contact exceeded protocol. The district court discounted Osmon’s credibility in part because of her denial or claimed lack of memory regarding a 2013 social media post critical of TSA. It credited Robinson as “credible” and “persuasive,” and found Osmon’s more serious allegations (touching bare skin/genitals; inappropriate comments; threats to repeat the pat-down) unsupported.

On appeal, the Fourth Circuit invoked Anderson v. City of Bessemer City to hold that where there are two permissible interpretations of the evidence, the trial judge’s selection is not clearly erroneous—especially where video footage and multiple witnesses supported the government’s narrative.

(c) Incidental contact during required screening and the battery threshold

The district court also stated that “any alleged incidental and brief touching of a passenger’s thigh” (and similarly pelvic area) during a required groin pat-down “would not constitute battery under North Carolina law.” The Fourth Circuit did not separately elaborate doctrinally on this point, but its affirmance implicitly accepts a practical threshold: in a security-screening context where touching is expected and privileged to some extent, fleeting incidental contact consistent with protocol is unlikely to be “harmful or offensive” in the legally relevant (objective) sense.

(d) Evidentiary rulings: “surprise” witness and impact testimony

Osmon challenged the admission of testimony from Officer Atchison, arguing inadequate disclosure. The district court found Atchison was “obliquely but sufficiently” identified and noted Osmon had not pursued deposition efforts. The Fourth Circuit affirmed under abuse-of-discretion review, adding that Osmon’s own post-trial briefing conceded Atchison added little.

The Fourth Circuit also rejected Osmon’s challenge to testimony regarding how Robinson was impacted by the allegations, citing Schultz v. Butcher for the bench-trial principle that judges can hear relevant evidence and disregard improper inferences—reducing the risk of prejudice that might warrant reversal in a jury trial.

3.3. Impact on Future Cases

Practical litigation impact for FTCA TSA pat-down claims

  • Video evidence is pivotal: Where CCTV exists, the factfinder’s “careful examination” can decisively corroborate or contradict subjective accounts. Plaintiffs should expect video to dominate credibility and “objective offensiveness” analyses.
  • Objective offensiveness is the battleground: Even intentional touching (inherent in pat-downs) will not establish battery absent proof the touching was objectively harmful/offensive and unprivileged. The opinion signals that protocol-consistent groin screening will often be treated as reasonable and non-tortious.
  • Appellate reversal is unlikely after a defense bench verdict: With clear error review and heightened deference to credibility determinations, plaintiffs who lose on factual findings face long odds on appeal unless they can identify a concrete legal misstatement or unmistakable evidentiary error.
  • Credibility impeachment can be outcome-determinative: The district court relied on Osmon’s handling of the prior TSA-critical social media post to infer bias and reduce weight given to her testimony. Future plaintiffs should anticipate broad credibility probing and prepare consistent explanations for prior statements.

Doctrinal impact (limited by unpublished status)

Because the opinion is unpublished, it does not create binding circuit precedent. Still, it supplies a persuasive template: courts may resolve TSA pat-down battery claims by (i) centering “objective reasonableness” and “objective offensiveness,” (ii) treating incidental contact during mandated screening as insufficient, and (iii) relying heavily on video plus credibility determinations insulated by deferential appellate standards.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • FTCA (Federal Tort Claims Act): A statute that allows people to sue the United States for certain torts committed by federal employees, using the tort law of the state where the conduct happened. Here, North Carolina battery law supplies the elements.
  • Sovereign immunity: The default rule that the government cannot be sued unless it consents. The FTCA is a limited consent.
  • Civil battery (North Carolina): Requires intent, harmful or offensive contact, causation, and lack of privilege. “Intent” means intending the contact/result, not necessarily intending hostility.
  • Objectively offensive contact: The question is whether a reasonable person would regard the contact as offensive in context, not merely whether the plaintiff felt violated (though that reaction may be evidence).
  • Bench trial: Trial to a judge rather than a jury. Under the FTCA, battery claims like this are tried “by the court without a jury.”
  • Clear error (appeal standard for facts): The appellate court will not re-try the case; it reverses factual findings only when firmly convinced a mistake occurred.
  • Abuse of discretion (appeal standard for evidence rulings): The appellate court reverses only if the evidentiary decision was “arbitrary and irrational.”

5. Conclusion

The Fourth Circuit’s decision in Erin Osmon v. United States affirms that, even where the FTCA opens the courthouse doors to claims against TSA screeners, liability for battery under North Carolina law hinges on proof of intentional contact that is objectively harmful or offensive and unprivileged. When a district court—after viewing video and hearing witnesses—finds a TSA groin pat-down protocol-compliant and “objectively reasonable,” the combination of credibility deference and clear-error review makes appellate reversal difficult.

The opinion’s broader significance lies in its pragmatic guidance: TSA pat-down battery cases will often be won or lost on (i) the objective depiction of the contact (especially video), (ii) credibility assessments, and (iii) whether alleged contact exceeds protocol in a way a reasonable factfinder would deem objectively offensive.