Numerical Handgun Limits and a 90-Day Acquisition Cap Require Second Amendment Historical Review

Case: Mills v. New York City, No. 24-3308-cv
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
Decided: November 10, 2026
Opinion: Judge Reena Raggi, joined by Judges Debra Ann Livingston and Michael H. Park

1. Introduction

Mills v. New York City clarifies the boundary between identifying conduct protected by the Second Amendment and determining whether regulation of that conduct is constitutionally justified. Its central holding is procedural but consequential: courts cannot dismiss challenges to numerical handgun restrictions merely because individuals remain able to possess or carry some firearms. Nor may courts require plaintiffs, at the threshold stage, to establish that the Constitution expressly forbids the challenged regulation.

Applying the framework established in New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass'n, Inc. v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022), the Second Circuit held that three New York City restrictions required historical justification: a one-handgun-at-a-time carry limit, a 90-day interval between handgun acquisitions, and a repealed rule limiting carry-license registration to two handguns. The court did not hold those restrictions unconstitutional. It required the district court to proceed to the historical-tradition inquiry rather than dismiss the claims at the initial textual stage.

The plaintiffs were Charles Mills, a Queens resident holding premises and carry licenses; Craig Sotomayor, a Nassau County resident holding a state carry license and a City special license; and Braden Holliday, a Bronx resident alleging that licensing costs prevented him from obtaining a license. Their claims challenged several distinct features of the City’s handgun regulatory system.

The appeal followed Judge Jed S. Rakoff’s dismissal of the entire complaint. The principal questions were whether the plaintiffs had adequately alleged standing for each challenged requirement, whether the remaining restrictions implicated protected conduct, and whether existing circuit precedent foreclosed the licensing-fee claims.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Second Circuit affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded in part. Its disposition carefully separated jurisdictional defects, inadequate pleading, and errors in the substantive Second Amendment framework.

Disposition of the challenged requirements
Requirement or claim Appellate disposition Principal reason
Purchase-authorization requirements Dismissal affirmed for lack of standing No sufficiently alleged injury attributable to the rules themselves, rather than website unavailability or licensing costs.
General handgun-registration requirement Dismissal affirmed for lack of standing The complaint alleged no specific, personal injury from that requirement.
Dealer-reporting requirements Jurisdictional dismissal affirmed The opinion’s concluding summary expressly includes these provisions among the claims lacking adequately pleaded standing.
Handgun-disposal requirements Dismissal left undisturbed The plaintiffs abandoned the issue on appeal.
One-handgun-at-a-time carry limit Dismissal vacated; remanded The rule directly restricts bearing arms, conduct covered by the Second Amendment’s text.
One handgun acquisition per 90 days Dismissal vacated; remanded A rule deliberately slowing additional acquisitions meaningfully constrains acquiring and possessing multiple firearms.
Repealed two-handgun carry-license registration cap Dismissal of Mills’s surviving damages claim vacated; remanded The cap restricted which lawfully owned handguns he could carry. Prospective relief remained moot.
Licensing, renewal, and fingerprinting fees Dismissal affirmed The facial challenge was foreclosed by controlling fee precedent; Holliday’s inability-to-pay allegations were conclusory.

The operative distinction is between coverage and constitutional validity. A restriction may regulate conduct covered by the Second Amendment yet remain valid if the government supplies the historical justification required at the second stage of the analysis.

3. Precedents Cited and Their Influence

A. The constitutional foundation and governing framework

District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008)

This is the opinion’s principal source for interpreting the Amendment’s language. It recognizes an individual right, independent of militia service, to possess and carry weapons in case of confrontation. It interprets “keep” as possession, “bear” as carrying for confrontation, and “Arms” as including bearable weapons beyond those available at the Founding.

These interpretations prevent the City from defining protected conduct as merely possessing or carrying the minimum weaponry officials consider sufficient for self-defense. At the same time, the decision’s recognition of presumptively lawful regulations informs the treatment of commercial-sale conditions and licensing requirements. The Second Circuit generally places such presumptions in the historical-justification inquiry rather than using them to eliminate textual coverage.

McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (2010)

This decision establishes that the Second Amendment applies to state and local governments through the Fourteenth Amendment. Its reiteration of the presumptive validity of certain commercial-sale conditions also informs the acquisition analysis. That assurance, however, does not automatically resolve whether a particular purchase restriction substantially interferes with acquiring firearms.

New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass'n, Inc. v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022)

This decision supplies the controlling two-stage framework. First, courts identify whether the Amendment’s plain text covers the regulated conduct. If so, the government must establish consistency with the Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation. Its rejection of means-end scrutiny is central: courts cannot decide textual coverage by balancing a restriction’s severity against the perceived importance of its policy objectives.

Footnote nine is especially important. Its discussion of objective, “shall-issue” licensing systems does not, according to the Second Circuit, require plaintiffs to prove unconstitutional infringement at step one. Its warning about lengthy processing times and exorbitant fees also preserves the possibility of challenges to abusive licensing administration.

United States v. Rahimi, 602 U.S. 680 (2024), and United States v. Hemani, 608 U.S. 772 (2026)

These decisions reinforce the framework’s allocation of responsibility: when government regulates arms-bearing conduct, it must justify the regulation. They also confirm that the right is not unlimited. The question is not whether firearm regulation is categorically permissible, but whether the particular regulation is justified under the governing historical method.

Wolford v. Lopez, 609 U.S. 185 (2026)

This decision provides the opinion’s most immediate clarification of step one. The relevant questions concern whether the law applies to “the people,” concerns “Arms,” and restricts keeping or bearing those arms. An affirmative answer establishes coverage; the regulation’s scope, prevalence, and rationale belong in the historical inquiry.

The Second Circuit also relies on this decision, including Justice Barrett’s concurrence, to distinguish history used to explain constitutional language from history used to justify modern restrictions. The latter inquiry examines how and why historical laws regulated firearms.

Antonyuk v. James, 120 F.4th 941 (2d Cir. 2024)

The opinion expressly states that the three step-one questions articulated in Wolford v. Lopez supplant the circuit’s earlier formulation in this case. Other aspects remain relevant: licensing requirements may enjoy presumptions grounded in historical tradition, and some processing delay does not necessarily establish a constitutional violation. Those propositions do not authorize courts to impose a heightened textual burden on plaintiffs opposing dismissal.

B. Acquisition rights, ancillary conduct, and numerical restrictions

United States v. Vereen, 152 F.4th 89 (2d Cir. 2025)

This decision supplies the “meaningfully constrains” standard for restrictions on conduct ancillary to possessing and carrying firearms. Its interstate-transport restriction did not meaningfully constrain the right where a firearm remained available for acquisition within the purchaser’s home state. By contrast, the City’s 90-day rule deliberately limits the pace at which additional firearms may be acquired.

New York State Firearms Ass'n v. James, 157 F.4th 232 (2d Cir. 2025)

This case limits protection for ancillary activities to what is necessary to realize the textually specified right. It also distinguishes short administrative delays from meaningful constraints and confirms that properly calibrated, nonprohibitive licensing fees remain permissible under circuit precedent. It therefore supports both the survival of the acquisition claim and dismissal of the inadequately pleaded fee challenge.

Gazzola v. Hochul, 88 F.4th 186 (2d Cir. 2023), and Andrews v. State, 50 Tenn. (3 Heisk.) 165 (1871)

The former quotes the latter for the proposition that keeping arms necessarily encompasses purchasing them, obtaining suitable ammunition, and maintaining them in working condition. The Second Circuit nevertheless distinguishes acquisition rights from preferences about convenience, such as having a nearby gun store.

Importantly, Gazzola v. Hochul concerned preliminary injunctive relief against regulations imposed on dealers. Its evidentiary demand cannot simply be transferred to a plaintiff resisting dismissal. The present registration cap also directly restricted carrying already-owned handguns, rather than indirectly affecting acquisition through dealers’ operating costs.

Nguyen v. Bonta, 140 F.4th 1237 (9th Cir. 2025)

This is the closest supporting appellate authority on acquisition limits. It recognizes that “Arms” is plural and treats a one-firearm-per-30-day rule as meaningfully constraining acquisition where delay itself is the rule’s purpose. The Second Circuit adopts that distinction when analyzing the City’s longer acquisition interval.

Heller v. District of Columbia, 801 F.3d 264 (D.C. Cir. 2015)

This decision supports the proposition that the right extends to possessing multiple firearms. Its treatment of temporal acquisition and registration limits reinforces the conclusion that retaining access to one or two weapons does not remove a numerical restriction from constitutional scrutiny.

Parker v. District of Columbia, 478 F.3d 370 (D.C. Cir. 2007)

The opinion invokes this case to reject the premise that a regulation implicates the Second Amendment only when it produces total disarmament. Otherwise, government could prohibit firearms while pointing to other defensive weapons as sufficient substitutes.

Beckwith v. Frey, 171 F.4th 560 (1st Cir. 2026)

This decision treated a 72-hour waiting period as regulating conduct likely outside the Amendment’s text when reviewing denial of a preliminary injunction. The Second Circuit notes the differing approach but expressly reserves how it would assess that particular rule. Its holding concerns the City’s deliberate metering of successive acquisitions, not every waiting period.

C. Licensing presumptions, competing approaches, and litigation posture

Maryland Shall Issue, Inc. v. Moore, 116 F.4th 211 (4th Cir. 2024)

The Second Circuit expressly declines to adopt this decision’s placement of an infringement requirement at step one. The Fourth Circuit had treated nondiscretionary licensing systems as presumptively constitutional at that stage and required plaintiffs to demonstrate infringement.

The Second Circuit instead finds that approach inconsistent with the sequence of the analysis: whether a restriction ultimately infringes the Constitution ordinarily cannot be answered before the government’s historical justification is considered. It notes similar objections expressed in Judge Niemeyer’s separate opinion and Judge Richardson’s dissent.

United States v. Berger, 189 F.4th 333 (3d Cir. 2026)

This decision likewise reads the licensing discussion in footnote nine as informing infringement at step one. The Second Circuit identifies that approach but rejects assigning plaintiffs a comparable threshold burden.

Zherka v. Bondi, 140 F.4th 68 (2d Cir. 2025)

This case illustrates the separation between coverage and justification. It treated felons as among “the people” at step one but upheld disarmament of nonviolent felons under historical tradition at step two. A regulation’s presumed lawfulness need not narrow the textual category of protected persons or conduct.

Giambalvo v. Suffolk Cnty., 155 F.4th 163 (2d Cir. 2025), and Frey v. City of New York, 157 F.4th 118 (2d Cir. 2025)

These decisions concern challenges to training and permitting requirements, including plaintiffs’ burdens when seeking preliminary injunctions against presumptively valid regulations. They also show that administrative delay is not automatically unconstitutional. They do not require plaintiffs opposing dismissal to prove that the Amendment’s text forecloses a regulation.

New Hope Family Servs. v. Poole, 966 F.3d 145 (2d Cir. 2020)

This case supplies the procedural distinction underlying that conclusion: a plaintiff seeking immediate injunctive relief must demonstrate a likelihood of success, while a plaintiff opposing dismissal need only satisfy the applicable pleading standard.

D. Temporary burdens and constitutional analogies

Three decisions from other constitutional settings reinforce the rejection of a permanent-deprivation requirement:

  • Federal Election Comm'n v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238 (1986), recognizes that modest restrictions on speech warrant constitutional vigilance.
  • Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn v. Cuomo, 592 U.S. 14 (2020), recognizes that temporary restrictions on worship can deprive individuals of First Amendment freedoms.
  • Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996), establishes that even brief detention constitutes a Fourth Amendment seizure requiring constitutional justification.

These are analogies about constitutional coverage, not substitutes for the Second Amendment’s historical test. They show why the temporary or partial nature of a restriction cannot alone eliminate the need for analysis.

E. Licensing fees

Kwong v. Bloomberg, 723 F.3d 160 (2d Cir. 2013)

This controlling decision upheld the licensing fees challenged again here. It permits fees designed to defray, without exceeding, administrative costs where they impose no more than a marginal restraint on Second Amendment rights. The court holds that the subsequent constitutional framework has not displaced that rule.

Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 (1941)

This First Amendment decision is the source of the administrative-cost principle adopted in Kwong v. Bloomberg. It permits appropriately limited licensing charges associated with administering regulated activity and maintaining public order. It defeats the categorical claim that exercising a fundamental right can never involve a fee.

F. Standing, pleading, facial challenges, and appellate review

  • Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992), supplies injury, traceability, and redressability as the constitutional minimum for standing. Clapper v. Amnesty Int'l USA, 568 U.S. 398 (2013), and Coalition for Competitive Elec., Dynergy Inc. v. Zibelman, 906 F.3d 41 (2d Cir. 2018), reinforce those requirements.
  • TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 594 U.S. 413 (2021), requires standing for each claim and each requested remedy. A plaintiff injured by one licensing feature cannot automatically challenge the entire system.
  • United States v. Hays, 515 U.S. 737 (1995), establishes that generalized grievances do not supply standing, supporting dismissal of the general registration challenge.
  • Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009), require plausible factual pleading. They explain both why the revived claims could proceed and why Holliday’s unsupported inability-to-pay assertion failed.
  • City of Los Angeles v. Patel, 576 U.S. 409 (2015), quoting United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987), identifies the demanding nature of facial challenges. National Shooting Sports Found., Inc. v. James, 144 F.4th 98 (2d Cir. 2025), applies that burden at the pleading stage. Surviving step one does not establish invalidity in every application.
  • Mosaic Health, Inc. v. Sanofi-Aventis U.S., LLC, 156 F.4th 68 (2d Cir. 2025), and Bugliotti v. Rep. of Argentina, 67 F.4th 102 (2d Cir. 2023), establish de novo review of the respective dismissal grounds. Melendez v. City of New York, 16 F.4th 992 (2d Cir. 2021), supplies the favorable treatment of plaintiffs’ factual allegations and reasonable inferences.
  • United States v. Prawl, 149 F.4th 176 (2d Cir. 2025), supports treating the unpursued handgun-disposal challenge as abandoned on appeal.

4. Legal Reasoning

A. Standing must connect a particular injury to a particular rule

The plaintiffs’ overall interest in possessing handguns did not establish standing to challenge every component of the City’s system. The court examined what caused each alleged impediment.

For purchase authorizations, the rules provided that the NYPD would issue an authorization form to qualified licensees upon request. Neither licensed plaintiff alleged that the rule itself prevented a purchase. Mills instead alleged temporary website unavailability. The court attributed any resulting delay to an administrative failure, not the challenged authorization requirement. Holliday’s alleged obstacle was the cost of obtaining a license, not the purchase-authorization process.

The general registration claim failed for a different reason: it lacked allegations identifying a concrete injury to any plaintiff. Importantly, that conclusion does not conflict with revival of the two-handgun registration-cap claim. Requiring registration and limiting the number of registrable handguns are distinct rules with different alleged consequences.

The concluding disposition also expressly affirms dismissal of the dealer-reporting claims for lack of standing, although the opinion does not separately develop their injury analysis in the same detail. These jurisdictional rulings do not establish that the requirements are constitutionally valid; they establish that these plaintiffs did not adequately present those questions.

B. Step one asks what is regulated; step two asks whether regulation is justified

The opinion’s organizing distinction is straightforward:

  1. Step one: Does the challenged law restrict conduct covered by the constitutional text?
  2. Step two: Has the government justified that restriction through the Nation’s historical regulatory tradition?

Here, the City did not dispute that the plaintiffs were among “the people” or that handguns were covered “Arms.” The remaining threshold issue concerned keeping and bearing those arms.

History can inform both stages, but for different purposes. At step one, historical evidence helps explain the language’s meaning. At step two, historical regulations establish whether the government may impose the modern restriction. The opinion does not permit the second inquiry to be collapsed into the first.

C. Direct restrictions and ancillary burdens receive different threshold treatment

When a law directly restricts possession or carrying, textual coverage does not depend on how severe the restriction appears. A numerical carry restriction regulates bearing arms even if carrying one handgun remains lawful.

Ancillary activities require a closer connection. Buying firearms, obtaining ammunition, and maintaining weapons enable possession and carrying, but not every regulation affecting those activities implicates the constitutional text. Under circuit precedent, the challenged rule must meaningfully constrain realization of the protected right.

This distinction limits the holding. The court does not treat every regulation connected to guns as constitutionally suspect. It does, however, reject a burden-severity threshold for laws directly governing possession or carrying.

D. Temporary or partial restrictions are not categorically outside the Amendment

The district court emphasized that the rules did not permanently deprive the plaintiffs of firearms. The Second Circuit rejected that distinction as unsupported by the text.

Founding-era dictionary definitions of “infringe” included hindering, obstructing, and impeding, not merely destroying a right. Contemporary writings likewise expressed concern about incremental encroachments. These sources undermine an interpretation limited to complete or permanent disarmament.

Duration and extent remain relevant, but ordinarily to historical justification. A temporary restriction may be valid; its temporary character simply does not make constitutional scrutiny unnecessary.

E. Plaintiffs need not prove ultimate infringement before the government must justify a restriction

Requiring plaintiffs to show that a regulation is “foreclosed” by the Amendment’s text would effectively demand the ultimate constitutional conclusion at the outset. The court instead requires a plausible allegation of covered conduct and the relevant restriction.

The opinion places the discussion of generally permissible shall-issue licensing in the second-stage inquiry. Even if a regulatory category enjoys a presumption of validity, that does not ordinarily redefine the conduct protected by the text. Nor does a plaintiff’s burden when requesting a preliminary injunction establish the burden applicable when opposing dismissal.

F. The one-handgun carry rule directly restricts bearing arms

The City’s rule permitted carrying only one handgun at a time. Mills alleged that he wished to carry a second handgun as a backup for self-defense. The district court reasoned that one handgun remained sufficient to exercise the protected right.

The appellate court rejected that minimum-sufficiency approach. The text refers to “Arms,” and the governing decisions repeatedly describe a right to possess and carry weapons. Nothing in those interpretations establishes a one-weapon ceiling.

The City’s historical argument—that Founding-era firearms were single-shot weapons—did not resolve textual coverage. The court observed that reloading requirements could even support carrying multiple weapons. Whether historical circumstances justify a modern numerical limit belongs in the historical inquiry. The holding therefore requires review of the limit, not recognition of an unlimited right to carry any quantity of firearms.

G. The 90-day rule deliberately constrains successive acquisitions

The challenged rule is an interval between acquisitions, not simply a processing period before taking possession of an initial purchase. Its purpose, acknowledged by the City, was to slow additional acquisitions.

That purpose distinguishes the rule from delay incidental to background checks, registration, or dealer compliance with safety requirements. Because the rule intentionally meters acquisition of multiple firearms, the court held that it meaningfully constrains the ability to keep and bear arms.

The City’s asserted anti-trafficking objective—deterring straw purchasers from obtaining guns for unlawful transfer—may be important. But the objective cannot replace historical justification. On remand, the relevant questions may include whether historical law imposed comparable acquisition limits and whether those limits addressed analogous risks through analogous means.

The opinion neither fixes a universally permissible waiting period nor holds all acquisition delays unconstitutional.

H. The two-handgun registration cap restricted carrying already-owned firearms

The repealed cap operated together with a state law criminalizing carrying a handgun not registered to the applicable carry license. Consequently, Mills could not choose freely among his lawfully owned handguns: only the two currently registered were available for lawful carry.

The ability to substitute different registered handguns did not eliminate the restriction. At any given time, the cap excluded the remaining weapons. The court therefore treated the rule as directly regulating bearing arms, not merely limiting convenience or satisfying personal preferences.

Repeal removed the basis for prospective relief, and the plaintiffs did not appeal that mootness determination. Mills’s claim for damages arising from past application of the rule remained live. The remand concerns that surviving claim, not reinstatement of a request to enjoin a repealed rule.

I. Existing precedent and pleading deficiencies defeated the fee claims

The challenged charges were a $340 application fee, a $340 renewal fee every three years, and a one-time $88.50 fingerprinting fee.

Holliday’s as-applied claim failed because his assertion that he could not afford the charges lacked supporting facts about his financial circumstances. The court did not decide that a genuinely indigent applicant could never establish an unconstitutional burden; it held that this complaint did not plausibly plead one.

The facial challenge failed under Kwong v. Bloomberg. The plaintiffs did not plausibly allege that the fees exceeded the City’s administrative costs or that the system was being used abusively. Differences between City fees and lower charges elsewhere in New York did not establish excessiveness relative to the City’s costs. The opinion also observed that the challenged charges had remained unchanged despite inflation and that the other plaintiffs had obtained licenses.

The court acknowledges some uncertainty about precisely where the fee analysis fits within the two-stage framework. Because fee precedent predates that framework, and later circuit authority preserves it, the court treats it as supporting dismissal at step one and, alternatively, at step two. The firm holding is that the controlling fee rule survives; the opinion does not make stage allocation entirely categorical.

5. Potential Impact

A. More numerical restrictions will require historical analysis

Within the Second Circuit, governments defending direct possession or carry limits cannot avoid historical review simply by showing that individuals retain access to some firearms. The same applies to acquisition caps that deliberately and meaningfully restrict obtaining additional weapons.

B. Pleading strategy becomes more important

Plaintiffs must identify the particular restriction, their intended conduct, their personal injury, and the relief sought. General objections to a licensing system will not substitute for claim-specific standing. Financial-burden claims require factual support rather than a bare declaration of unaffordability.

Conversely, plaintiffs challenging direct restrictions need not prove the absence of all historical justification merely to survive dismissal at the textual stage.

C. Governments must develop regulation-specific historical defenses

Public-safety objectives and widespread regulatory practice do not alone answer the constitutional question. The government must connect the challenged restriction to an appropriate historical tradition, accounting for both operation and justification. The district court’s earlier suggestion that the claims would “likely fail” does not replace that particularized inquiry.

D. Differences among appellate approaches become more explicit

The opinion identifies a methodological disagreement with placing an infringement requirement at step one, as reflected in Maryland Shall Issue, Inc. v. Moore and United States v. Berger. It also contrasts its acquisition analysis with Beckwith v. Frey, while reserving the constitutionality of that case’s distinct waiting period.

These differences may influence future appellate review, but they should not be overstated as identical disputes over identical regulations.

E. The decision preserves substantial limits on its own reach

  • It does not invalidate the three remanded restrictions.
  • It does not establish an unrestricted entitlement to acquire or carry unlimited firearms.
  • It does not dispense with the demanding requirements of a facial challenge.
  • It does not invalidate ordinary processing delays or cost-based licensing charges categorically.
  • It leaves the merits of the historical defenses for further proceedings.

6. Complex Concepts Simplified

Article III standing
A plaintiff must show a personal, concrete injury caused by the challenged requirement that the requested judicial relief can likely remedy.
Rule 12(b)(1)
A procedure for dismissing claims the court lacks jurisdiction to decide. Here, inadequately alleged standing prevented consideration of several claims.
Rule 12(b)(6)
A procedure for dismissing a complaint that does not plausibly state a legal claim, generally accepting adequately pleaded facts as true.
Textual coverage
The initial question whether the regulated activity falls within the constitutional right—not whether the regulation ultimately violates it.
Historical-tradition review
The government’s obligation to justify a covered firearm restriction by reference to the Nation’s history of relevant regulation.
Ancillary conduct
Activity that enables a right’s exercise, such as acquiring a firearm before possessing or carrying it. Not every incidental inconvenience meaningfully constrains the right.
Shall-issue licensing
A system in which officials must issue a license when an applicant meets objective requirements, rather than deciding whether the applicant has demonstrated a special need.
Facial challenge
A challenge asserting that a rule is invalid across its applications. It is more demanding than establishing that the rule was unconstitutional in one person’s circumstances.
As-applied challenge
A claim that a rule is unconstitutional as applied to the particular plaintiff.
Mootness and retrospective damages
Repeal may eliminate the need to prohibit future enforcement, while a claim for compensation for a past constitutional injury can remain live.
Vacatur and remand
The appellate court sets aside part of the lower court’s decision and returns the affected claims for further proceedings; it does not necessarily decide who ultimately wins.

7. Conclusion

Mills v. New York City establishes that partial and temporary firearm restrictions are not exempt from Second Amendment analysis merely because some avenue for self-defense remains available. Direct numerical carry restrictions, and acquisition rules that meaningfully constrain obtaining multiple firearms, require historical justification once textual coverage is established.

Its significance lies in preserving the sequence of constitutional adjudication: plaintiffs must plausibly identify covered conduct and a relevant restriction; government must then justify that restriction through historical tradition. The opinion revives three challenges without resolving their ultimate merits, while preserving claim-specific standing requirements and controlling precedent permitting properly limited licensing fees.