NRS 52.325 Is Not the Exclusive Method to Authenticate Medical Records Produced in Discovery; Incompleteness Goes to Weight, and Medical Liens Are Admissible to Show Bias

1. Introduction

Case: GUTIERREZ-ZACATENCO v. HERRERA, 142 Nev., Advance Opinion 52 (Nev. Aug. 13, 2026).
Parties: Angel Gutierrez-Zacatenco (defendant below; appellant) and Rosa Herrera (plaintiff below; respondent).
Posture: Consolidated appeals from a final judgment in a personal injury action and post-judgment orders denying a new trial, awarding attorney fees and costs, and denying NRCP 60(b) relief.

Liability for a 2019 rear-end collision was admitted; the only trial issues were causation and damages. A central defense theme was that Herrera’s symptoms and treatment were attributable, in whole or part, to a similar 2017 accident. Herrera produced 2017 medical records in discovery, which the defense experts relied upon. The district court nevertheless excluded those records, chiefly on “authentication” grounds tied to NRS 52.325 and later also on NRCP 16.1 pretrial disclosure grounds, and further excluded evidence that treating providers were on medical liens by applying the collateral source rule.

The Nevada Supreme Court addressed three interlocking questions: (1) whether NRS 52.325 is the exclusive method for authenticating medical records when the records were produced by an opposing party in discovery; (2) whether the defense’s NRCP 16.1 pretrial disclosure deficiency warranted exclusion; and (3) whether the collateral source rule bars evidence of medical liens offered to show provider bias.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Court held that NRS 52.325 applies to subpoena-produced medical records and is not the exclusive means of authenticating medical records. When records are produced by an opposing party in discovery, authentication may be satisfied under NRS 52.015 by sufficient support for a finding that the evidence is what the proponent claims.

The Court further held that the records’ incompleteness (missing pages from the final 2017 visit) did not defeat authentication; it was a matter for the jury in assessing weight, not admissibility. The Court also held that although the defendant failed to specifically list the 2017 records in pretrial disclosures as required by NRCP 16.1(a)(3)(A)(iii), the violation was harmless under NRCP 37(c)(1) because Herrera had long been on notice that the defense would rely on those records.

Finally, the Court held the district court misapplied the collateral source rule and, under controlling law, medical liens are not collateral-source payments and may be admissible to show bias. Because the evidentiary errors affected substantial rights and a different verdict might reasonably have been reached, the Court ordered a new trial, vacated the fee-and-cost award, and found the NRCP 60(b) appeal moot.

3. Analysis

3.1. Precedents Cited

A. Standard of review; authentication basics

  • Davis v. Beling, 128 Nev. 301, 311, 278 P.3d 501, 508 (2012): Used for the proposition that evidentiary rulings are generally abuse-of-discretion, but legal interpretations of the evidence code are reviewed de novo. This framing mattered because the district court’s exclusion hinged on a legal reading of NRS 52.325 versus NRS 52.015.
  • Talley v. State, 141 Nev., Adv. Op. 61, 580 P.3d 101, 108 (2025): Cited to emphasize authentication as a “condition precedent” and “foundational” to admissibility; evidence cannot be relevant if it is not what it purports to be. The Court used Talley to anchor the inquiry in NRS 52.015’s threshold test.

B. Relationship between NRS 52.325 and general authentication; distinguishing a Nevada medical-records case

  • Sanders v. Sears-Page, 131 Nev. 500, 514-16, 354 P.3d 201, 211-12 (Ct. App. 2015): Herrera relied on it to argue NRS 52.325 governs medical-record authentication. The Supreme Court distinguished it: Sears-Page rejected a record delivered anonymously and “authenticated” by an unaffiliated doctor with no personal knowledge. The Court treated Sears-Page as confirming that NRS 52.015 and NRS 52.025-.105 provide nonexclusive methods, not that NRS 52.325 is mandatory in all circumstances.

C. Federal persuasive authority on what “authentication” requires (and what it does not)

  • Rodriguez v. State, 128 Nev. 155, 160 n.4, 273 P.3d 845, 848 n.4 (2012): The Court invoked this to justify reliance on federal Rule 901(a) cases as persuasive for interpreting NRS 52.015.
  • Orr v. Bank of Am., NT & SA, 285 F.3d 764, 776 (9th Cir. 2002): Cited for the distinction that authenticity concerns “genuineness,” not ultimate admissibility; this supported the Court’s insistence that disputes about completeness/implications do not necessarily negate authenticity.
  • Maljack Prods., Inc. v. GoodTimes Home Video Corp., 81 F.3d 881, 889 n.12 (9th Cir. 1996): Used to illustrate that letterhead, production by the opposing party, and lack of a genuine-genuineness dispute can be enough for a prima facie showing.
  • United States v. Tank, 200 F.3d 627, 630 (9th Cir. 2000): Provided the “reasonable juror could find” standard for prima facie authentication.
  • United States v. Martinez-Lantigua, 857 F.3d 453, 457 (1st Cir. 2017) (quoting United States v. Alicea-Cardoza, 132 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 1997)); and United States v. Vayner, 769 F.3d 125, 130 (2d Cir. 2014): Cited to reject a categorical rule that anything produced in discovery is “automatically authentic” and to emphasize that authentication is context-specific.
  • United States v. Ceballos, 789 F.3d 607, 618 (5th Cir. 2015) (quoting United States v. Jiminez Lopez, 873 F.2d 769, 772 (5th Cir. 1989), and United States v. Isiwele, 635 F.3d 196, 200 (5th Cir. 2011)): Cited to reinforce that courts do not require “conclusive proof” of authenticity and that flaws go to “weight” rather than admissibility.
  • Threadgill v. Armstrong World Indus., Inc., 928 F.2d 1366, 1376 (3d Cir. 1991), and United States v. Soulard, 730 F.2d 1292, 1298 (9th Cir. 1984): Used for the specific proposition that disputes about “content and completeness” are weight questions for the jury once minimal foundations are laid.

D. Nevada disclosure/sanctions framework and “harmlessness”

  • Turner v. State, 136 Nev. 545, 553, 473 P.3d 438, 447 (2020): Cited for the purpose of disclosure rules: preventing “trial by ambush.”
  • Pizarro-Ortega v. Cervantes-Lopez, 133 Nev. 261, 265, 396 P.3d 783, 787 (2017): Identified as establishing that NRCP 37(c)(1) supplies the governing framework for NRCP 16.1 failures.
  • Bradley v. Romeo, 102 Nev. 103, 105, 716 P.2d 227, 228 (1986): Used to justify appellate consideration of the controlling-law issue even amid waiver arguments.
  • Ollier v. Sweetwater Union High Sch. Dist., 768 F.3d 843, 862 (9th Cir. 2014): Cited for the merits-over-ambush principle supporting a harmlessness finding.
  • Foster v. Dingwall, 126 Nev. 56, 65, 227 P.3d 1042, 1049 (2010): Cited for abuse-of-discretion review of discovery sanctions.

E. Collateral source rule and medical liens; abuse of discretion by disregarding controlling law

  • Khoury v. Seastrand, 132 Nev. 520, 538-39, 377 P.3d 81, 93-94 (2016): Central controlling authority; expressly holds that evidence of medical liens to prove bias does not invoke the collateral source rule because a lien is a plaintiff-incurred obligation, not independent compensation.
  • Robinson v. G.G.C., Inc., 107 Nev. 135, 143, 808 P.2d 522, 527 (1991): Used to support the general proposition that business associations may be considered in evaluating witness credibility.
  • LVMPD v. Blackjack Bonding, 131 Nev. 80, 89, 343 P.3d 608, 614 (2015): Cited for the principle that disregarding controlling law is an abuse of discretion.

F. Prejudice standard for new trial

  • McClendon v. Collins, 132 Nev. 327, 333, 372 P.3d 492, 495-96 (2016): Provided the test for when evidentiary error warrants a new trial—when it affects substantial rights such that a different result might reasonably have been reached.

3.2. Legal Reasoning

A. NRS 52.325 is limited to subpoena compliance; NRS 52.015 governs other contexts

The Court read NRS 52.325 according to its “plain language,” limiting it to situations where a medical-records custodian responds to a subpoena by delivering authenticated copies to the clerk. Because the defense obtained the 2017 records via a request for production from the plaintiff—not by subpoena to Align Med—NRS 52.325 did not apply. The district court’s error was treating NRS 52.325 as a gatekeeping rule for medical records generally, rather than as a specific statutory pathway for subpoena practice.

B. Prima facie authentication under NRS 52.015 was satisfied on this record

The Court emphasized NRS 52.015’s low but real threshold: enough support for a finding that the records are what the proponent claims. It identified multiple, cumulative indicia:

  • Herrera herself produced the records in discovery in response to “any and all medical records” requests.
  • The documents bore distinctive characteristics (Align Med letterhead; Herrera’s identifying information).
  • The defense obtained a sworn certificate from the custodian attesting to accuracy of the produced copies.
  • Herrera did not dispute that the produced records accurately reflected treatment she received in 2017.

Importantly, the Court rejected a categorical rule that “any record produced by an opposing party in discovery should automatically be deemed authentic,” explaining that authentication remains a fact-specific inquiry. But it concluded that, here, the combined circumstances met the prima facie threshold.

C. Incompleteness is a weight issue for the jury, not an authenticity bar

The district court excluded the records because they were missing three pages from the final 2017 visit reflecting release at MMI, reasoning this defeated the custodian’s “complete” certification. The Supreme Court reframed the issue: even if incompleteness affects probative force, it does not negate that the pages produced are genuine Align Med records for Herrera. Once authenticity is minimally shown, disputes about completeness are for adversarial testing (cross-examination, competing proof) and ultimately the jury’s weight assessment.

The Court’s reasoning also carried a fairness subtext: Herrera produced an incomplete set and then leveraged that incompleteness into exclusion; the opinion signals that such a maneuver should not convert a probative dispute into an admissibility veto when the produced records are otherwise authentic.

D. NRCP 16.1(a)(3)(A)(iii) noncompliance occurred, but exclusion was improper because it was harmless under NRCP 37(c)(1)

The Court drew a careful distinction between two disclosure obligations:

  • NRCP 16.1(a)(1)(A)(ii) (initial disclosures): The Court disagreed with the district court that this rule was violated, reasoning it does not require a party to identify records only obtained through the opposing party’s production.
  • NRCP 16.1(a)(3)(A)(iii) (pretrial disclosures): The Court agreed a violation occurred because the defense used broad catchall descriptions instead of specifically identifying exhibits.

Even so, exclusion is not automatic under NRCP 37(c)(1); the key question is substantial justification or harmlessness. Harmlessness was found because Herrera had long-standing, case-specific notice (motions in limine on the 2017 treatment, deposition questioning of the defense experts on those records, and disclosed expert reliance). The decision thus prioritizes the disclosure rules’ anti-ambush function over formalism when the opponent cannot credibly claim surprise.

E. Medical lien evidence and the collateral source rule

The district court treated any mention of liens as barred by the collateral source rule. The Supreme Court held this directly conflicted with Khoury v. Seastrand, which drew a doctrinal line: collateral source payments are independent compensation that might improperly reduce tort damages; medical liens reflect an obligation incurred by the plaintiff and may reveal provider financial interest. The Court therefore found an abuse of discretion and directed the district court on remand to evaluate medical lien evidence under ordinary relevance/admissibility principles—not collateral source exclusion.

3.3. Impact

A. Authentication practice in Nevada civil litigation

This opinion clarifies that NRS 52.325 is not a universal authentication gateway for medical records. When medical records arrive through party discovery (requests for production, authorizations, or similar exchanges), litigants may authenticate under NRS 52.015 using a flexible, circumstance-driven foundation (e.g., provenance through a party-opponent, document appearance, contextual admissions, custodian certificates).

Practically, this reduces the incentive to force subpoena/custodian testimony solely to satisfy an erroneously perceived “medical-records-only” rule. It also underscores that authenticity is distinct from completeness and persuasive value—encouraging courts to admit evidence when genuineness is sufficiently supported and let adversarial testing address gaps.

B. Disclosure sanctions: exclusion is not reflexive when the opponent had notice

By applying NRCP 37(c)(1)’s harmlessness safety valve, the Court signaled that exhibit exclusion should be reserved for true surprise/prejudice. In future cases, parties arguing for exclusion will need to articulate concrete prejudice (e.g., inability to prepare expert responses or conduct follow-up discovery), not merely point to technical deficiencies.

C. Medical lien evidence and witness bias

The opinion reinforces (and polices) Khoury v. Seastrand: medical lien evidence is not collateral-source evidence and can be relevant to bias. The ruling will likely increase the routine use of lien evidence as a credibility tool—subject to the trial court’s balancing of relevance and potential unfair prejudice under standard evidentiary principles.

D. Remedy consequences

The Court’s reversal for a new trial and vacatur of attorney fees and costs demonstrates that erroneous exclusion of central defense evidence—especially when it constrains expert testimony—can readily satisfy the “different result might reasonably have been reached” test under McClendon v. Collins.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Authentication (NRS 52.015): A preliminary showing that a document is what the proponent says it is (e.g., genuine medical records for a specific patient). It is not a determination that the document is persuasive or complete.
  • NRS 52.325: A streamlined method for custodians to certify records when responding to a subpoena. This case holds it is not the exclusive method of authenticating medical records in other settings.
  • “Prima facie” showing: Enough evidence that a reasonable juror could find authenticity; the proponent need not prove authenticity beyond doubt at the admissibility stage.
  • Weight vs. admissibility: “Admissibility” asks whether the jury may see the evidence at all; “weight” asks how convincing the evidence is. Missing pages often affect weight, not admissibility, once genuineness is sufficiently shown.
  • Collateral source rule: Prevents reducing damages because the plaintiff received independent compensation (like insurance payments). A medical lien is not compensation; it is a debt/claim against any recovery and may show provider financial incentive.
  • Harmless disclosure error (NRCP 37(c)(1)): Even if a party violated disclosure rules, the evidence may still be used if the failure did not prejudice the opponent (no unfair surprise/ambush).

5. Conclusion

GUTIERREZ-ZACATENCO v. HERRERA establishes (and operationalizes) a key evidentiary rule for Nevada practice: NRS 52.325 is not the exclusive means of authenticating medical records, and where records are produced in discovery by an opposing party, authentication may be satisfied under NRS 52.015 through context-specific indicia of genuineness. The Court further clarifies that incompleteness typically goes to weight, not admissibility, that NRCP 16.1 pretrial disclosure violations warrant exclusion only when not harmless under NRCP 37(c)(1), and that medical lien evidence is not barred by the collateral source rule when offered to show bias under Khoury v. Seastrand. Because the district court’s exclusions prevented the defense from presenting a causation and damages theory supported by expert testimony, the Court ordered a new trial and vacated the associated fee-and-cost awards.