Notice-Based Pronouncement of Standard Conditions of Supervised Release Satisfies Due Process in United States v. Long

Introduction

The Eleventh Circuit’s decision in United States v. Avery Itez Long (No. 22-13714, decided Nov. 22, 2024) addressed a recurring sentencing issue: whether a district court must orally recite each of the standard conditions of supervised release at the sentencing hearing or whether a simple reference to “standard conditions” and inclusion of those conditions in the written judgment is sufficient to satisfy due process and the requirements of 18 U.S.C. § 3583. Avery Long pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm (18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)) and received a sentence of 85 months’ imprisonment followed by three years of supervised release. On appeal, Long argued that the district court plainly erred by failing to pronounce each standard condition of supervised release on the record and thus deprived him of the opportunity to object.

Key Issues:

  • What due process requirements govern the oral pronouncement of discretionary (standard) conditions of supervised release?
  • What standard of review applies when a defendant fails to object at sentencing to conditions that were referenced but not individually recited?
  • Did the district court’s reference to “some standard conditions” and inclusion of those conditions in the written judgment satisfy the notice-and-objection requirement?

Summary of the Judgment

The Eleventh Circuit, in a per curiam opinion, affirmed Long’s sentence. Citing the court’s recent decision in United States v. Rodriguez (75 F.4th 1231 (11th Cir. 2023)), the panel reiterated that any discretionary conditions of supervised release must be pronounced orally at sentencing—but not necessarily by reciting each condition verbatim. A district court may satisfy its obligation by referencing a written list of conditions (for example, the standard conditions set forth in U.S.S.G. § 5D1.3). Here, the district court expressly informed Long that he would be subject to “mandatory,” “special,” and “some standard conditions” which would appear in the written judgment. Because that reference gave Long notice and an opportunity to object, the Eleventh Circuit held that any error was not “plain” under the four-part plain-error test and therefore affirmed the imposition of all 13 standard conditions in the written judgment.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

  • United States v. Rodriguez (75 F.4th 1231, 1246–49 (11th Cir. 2023)): Established that a district court must orally pronounce any discretionary conditions of supervised release but may do so by referencing a written list of conditions (e.g., a standing administrative order or the PSI’s recommendation).
  • United States v. Zinn (321 F.3d 1084, 1087 (11th Cir. 2003)): Confirmed that unobjected-to sentencing errors are reviewed under the plain‐error standard.
  • United States v. Hamilton (66 F.4th 1267, 1274–75 (11th Cir. 2023)): Held that a sentencing explanation challenge is reviewed de novo, but clarified that the acknowledgment of § 3553(a) factors suffices for reasons stated.
  • United States v. Hayden (No. 19-14780, 2024 WL 4377360 (11th Cir. Oct. 3, 2024)): Applied Rodriguez and Zinn to hold that referencing “standard conditions” orally at sentencing gave notice, so the defendant’s failure to object triggered plain-error review.

Legal Reasoning

The court’s reasoning unfolded in these steps:

  1. Statutory and Guidelines Framework. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d) requires the court to impose certain mandatory conditions of supervised release and authorizes additional discretionary conditions. The Sentencing Guidelines enumerate 13 “standard conditions” in U.S.S.G. § 5D1.3(b).
  2. Due Process Pronouncement Requirement. Under Rodriguez, any discretionary condition must be pronounced orally to afford the defendant notice and an opportunity to object. However, the court need not recite each condition word-for-word if it directs the defendant to a written list at sentencing.
  3. Standard of Review. Because Long did not object at sentencing to the conditions, the Eleventh Circuit applied the four-part plain-error test (error, plainness, prejudice to substantial rights, and effect on fairness/integrity of proceedings), rather than de novo review.
  4. Notice and Opportunity to Object. The district court expressly informed Long that “some standard conditions” of supervised release would be imposed and detailed in the written judgment. This satisfied Rodriguez’s notice requirement, unlike in Rodriguez itself where no reference was ever made.
  5. No Plain Error. Long failed to demonstrate a reasonable probability that he would have secured a more favorable outcome if each condition had been recited. There was no prejudice to his substantial rights, and therefore no plain error requiring reversal.

Impact

This decision clarifies and reinforces sentencing practice in the following ways:

  • Courtrooms may avoid lengthy recitations of boilerplate standard conditions by referencing a single written list (for example, the guidelines or a standing administrative order), so long as the defendant is explicitly notified at sentencing.
  • Defense counsel must listen for any reference to standard conditions and timely object if they wish to preserve a challenge to specific conditions.
  • Appellate courts will apply plain-error review to unobjected-to conditions when the sentencing transcript shows that the defendant had notice and an opportunity to object.
  • The ruling promotes judicial efficiency without sacrificing the defendant’s due process right to be heard on the conditions of supervised release.

Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Mandatory vs. Discretionary Conditions. Mandatory conditions are required by statute (e.g., no new crimes, drug testing). Discretionary conditions are those the court may impose at its discretion, including the 13 “standard conditions” in the Guidelines.
  • Plain-Error Review. When a defendant does not object at trial or sentencing, an appellate court will only reverse if there was an obvious error that affected substantial rights and seriously undermined the fairness or integrity of the proceedings.
  • Due Process Notice Requirement. A defendant must know what conditions will apply and have an opportunity to challenge them. Oral pronouncement—either by listing conditions or by referencing a written source—satisfies this requirement.
  • Section 3553(a) Factors. These are the statutory factors (e.g., seriousness of the offense, deterrence, protection of the public) that guide sentencing decisions and inform the overall sentence, including supervised release.

Conclusion

United States v. Long confirms that a district court need not recite each standard condition of supervised release verbatim at sentencing. It may instead notify the defendant that standard conditions will apply, point to a written list, and include the conditions in the written judgment. That procedure satisfies due process and the requirements of § 3583(d) so long as the defendant has notice and an opportunity to object. Going forward, this ruling will streamline sentencing hearings while preserving defendants’ rights to challenge any condition they find objectionable.