Date: Feb 27, 2026

“Not Required to Follow the Schedule” Does Not Eliminate Equal Parenting Rights or Defeat Guidelines Child Support

I. Introduction

In the Matter of Lici Deng-Vish and Frank Vish (N.H. Feb. 24, 2026) is a divorce appeal in which the petitioner, Lici Deng-Vish (Wife), challenged the Circuit Court’s order requiring her to pay child support to Frank Vish (Husband). The parties, married in 2004, have two minor children and agreed to a parenting plan providing for equal parenting time, while also acknowledging that their eldest child—because of age and maturity—was “not required” to follow the schedule and would arrange parenting time with his father directly with both parents.

The key appellate issues were (1) whether the trial court misinterpreted the parenting plan by treating it as a shared (50/50) arrangement despite the eldest child’s flexible scheduling provision, and (2) whether the court erred in imputing income to Husband using his 2016 annual earnings divided across twelve months.

II. Summary of the Opinion

The New Hampshire Supreme Court affirmed. It held that the parenting plan’s language stating the eldest child is “not required” to follow the schedule did not extinguish Husband’s right to equal parenting time; it affected only when that time would occur. The Court also upheld the trial court’s income attribution under RSA 458-C:2, IV(a), concluding there was an objective basis for using Husband’s undisputed 2016 annual income and rejecting Wife’s argument that the income should have been divided by six months. Finally, it held Wife did not overcome the rebuttable presumption that guideline child support is correct under RSA 458-C:4, II.

III. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

1. In the Matter of Braunstein & Braunstein, 173 N.H. 38 (2020)

Braunstein supplied the overarching appellate framework: divorce decree components—including child support and parenting rights—are reviewed for an unsustainable exercise of discretion. The Court relied on Braunstein to emphasize deference to trial-level factfinding, credibility determinations, and discretionary judgments, overturning only when the record lacks an objective basis to sustain the decision.

2. In the Matter of Georgakilas & Georgakilas, 157 N.H. 662 (2008)

The Court used Georgakilas to set the standard for construing the parenting plan: interpretation of the decree is reviewed de novo, focusing on the intent of the parties expressed in the plan’s language. Georgakilas thus framed the Court’s inquiry as contract-like interpretation of an agreed parenting plan, distinct from discretionary review of the ultimate support award.

3. In the Matter of Crowe & Crowe, 148 N.H. 218 (2002)

Crowe was invoked for the proposition that in calculating child support, the trial court must determine each parent’s “present income,” and that it is for the trial court to decide what income figures should be used based on the hearing’s facts. This supported the trial court’s latitude in selecting historical earnings as a proxy where a parent is voluntarily underemployed or unemployed.

4. In the Matter of Lynn & Lynn, 158 N.H. 615 (2009)

Lynn reinforced that whether to impute income under the guidelines is discretionary. This precedent undercut any argument that a specific imputation methodology was mandatory, and supported affirmance so long as the chosen approach was rationally supported by the record.

5. DeLucca v. DeLucca, 152 N.H. 100 (2005)

DeLucca anchored the Court’s rejection of Wife’s “six months” theory. Even if a witness’s testimony is uncontroverted, the factfinder is not compelled to accept it. Here, Wife’s claim that Husband “probably” worked six months in 2016 was treated as a credibility/weight question for the trial court, especially against the undisputed fact of Husband’s annual 2016 income figure.

6. In the Matter of Silva & Silva, 171 N.H. 1 (2018)

Silva supplied the appellate test for sustaining discretionary determinations: the record need only provide an objective basis sufficient to sustain the conclusion. The Supreme Court used Silva to affirm the imputation decision because the trial court’s use of a full-year salary figure reasonably reflected Husband’s earning capacity consistent with his education and work experience.

7. Vogel v. Vogel, 137 N.H. 321 (1993)

Vogel was cited alongside RSA 458-C:4, II to reinforce the strength of the guidelines presumption: the party seeking a deviation must overcome the presumption that the guideline amount is correct. The Court used Vogel to support its conclusion that Wife failed to show error warranting reversal or deviation.

B. Legal Reasoning

1. Parenting-plan interpretation: flexibility is not forfeiture

The Court parsed the parenting plan’s two key features: (a) the standard weekly schedule allocating time between the parents, and (b) the eldest child’s special provision stating he is “not required” to follow that schedule and will arrange time with his father directly with both parents. Although the Court agreed with Wife on a limited point—this language reflected an intent not to “compel” the eldest child to adhere to the schedule—it rejected the leap from “not compelled” to “no parenting time.”

The Court’s central interpretive move was to treat the clause as modifying the mechanics of scheduling (how and when time occurs), not the substance of parenting rights (whether a parent has equal parenting time entitlement under the plan). In other words, the plan preserved the father’s equal parenting-time right; it merely acknowledged that the mature child’s participation would be arranged with flexibility.

2. Child support: imputation based on prior consistent earnings and credibility findings

The trial court found both parties “voluntarily underemployed/unemployed” and invoked RSA 458-C:2, IV(a), which permits the court to consider as gross income the difference between current earnings and what a parent has earned. The trial court selected benchmark years: Husband’s 2016 “quality engineer” income as consistent with his education and the bulk of his work experience, and Wife’s 2020 income as the last year she worked “almost full time.”

On appeal, Wife’s principal challenge was methodological: because Husband allegedly worked only six months in 2016, she argued the annual figure should not have been divided by twelve. The Supreme Court treated this as an evidentiary/credibility dispute. The undisputed record established the annual income figure; the “six months” assertion rested on Wife’s estimate (“probably around six months or so”), which the trial court was free to discount under DeLucca v. DeLucca. Once that was so, the imputation choice fell squarely within the discretionary space described in In the Matter of Lynn & Lynn and sustained under In the Matter of Silva & Silva.

3. Guidelines presumption and the proper procedural pathway for parenting-time nonexercise

The Court emphasized the statutory presumption in RSA 458-C:4, II that guideline support is correct. Wife attempted to resist guideline support by pointing to the eldest child’s alleged nonparticipation in the schedule (and, implicitly, the father’s nonexercise of parenting time). The trial court had drawn a procedural line: the parties represented parenting issues were resolved when submitting the agreed plan; any later nonexercise should be addressed via enforcement or a motion to modify parenting time and child support—not via relitigation at the final hearing contrary to the agreed plan.

The Supreme Court’s affirmance effectively ratified that sequencing: agreed plans are enforceable as written, guideline support applies presumptively, and a party seeking adjustment based on changed parenting realities must pursue modification rather than arguing that the agreed plan should be treated as void or as “zero time” for support purposes.

C. Impact

Parenting plans with “mature child” flexibility clauses: The decision signals that language allowing an older child not to be “required” to follow a schedule will generally be construed as providing flexibility, not as eliminating a parent’s baseline parenting-time rights. This reduces the likelihood that a party can recharacterize a shared-time plan as effectively sole custody for support purposes based solely on the child’s autonomy clause.
Child support and shared parenting where a child refuses the schedule: The Court’s approach suggests that deviations from guideline support will not be achieved indirectly through interpretive arguments when the decree establishes shared parenting; instead, parties should build a record and pursue formal modification based on actual parenting-time patterns and statutory deviation factors.
Imputed income disputes: The ruling underscores that appellate courts will defer heavily where imputation is grounded in a reasonable benchmark year consistent with education and experience, and where the challenger’s contrary narrative hinges on contested or weakly supported testimony about the details of past employment.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

Imputed income / attributed income: Income the court assigns to a parent based on earning capacity (what the parent could earn) rather than current earnings, commonly used where a parent is voluntarily unemployed or underemployed. Here, the court used prior salary history as a proxy for earning capacity under RSA 458-C:2, IV(a).
Voluntarily underemployed/unemployed: A finding that a parent is earning less than they reasonably could, by choice rather than unavoidable circumstances, allowing the court to use earning capacity rather than actual earnings for support.
Rebuttable presumption (guidelines child support): A legal starting point that guideline support is correct. The party seeking a different amount must produce sufficient reasons and evidence to justify deviation.
Unsustainable exercise of discretion: A deferential appellate standard: the Supreme Court will uphold the trial court if there is an objective basis in the record for the decision, even if another reasonable decision might also have been possible.
De novo review (interpretation): The appellate court interprets the decree/plan anew, without deference, focusing on the language and expressed intent—used here to interpret the parenting plan’s meaning.

V. Conclusion

In the Matter of Lici Deng-Vish and Frank Vish clarifies two practical points in New Hampshire family law. First, a parenting plan clause allowing an older child not to be “required” to follow a schedule is best read as a timing and autonomy provision, not as an elimination of the other parent’s equal parenting entitlement under an agreed shared plan. Second, where parties are found voluntarily underemployed or unemployed, the trial court retains broad discretion to impute income using a prior benchmark year consistent with a parent’s education and experience, and guideline child support remains presumptively correct absent a properly supported basis for deviation or a modification proceeding.