“Not Authorized by Law” Means No Legal Permission: Travel Act Bribery via Meeting-Coordination Calls, and Waiver of Omitted Bribery Element by Agreed Instruction

1. Introduction

In United States v. Lester Crowder, the Seventh Circuit affirmed five Travel Act convictions arising from a bribery-facilitation scheme connected to proposed strip-club licensing and permitting in Harvey, Illinois. The government’s case centered on recordings made by a confidential informant (Dennis DeZutter), who paid Crowder (a former city building inspector) $13,000 after Crowder promised to “streamline” city processes and repeatedly indicated money would go “upstairs,” referencing city leadership.

Three appellate issues framed the decision:

• Sufficiency: whether evidence proved Travel Act elements and the Illinois bribery predicate, including the “not authorized by law” requirement.
• Jury instructions: whether omitting “not authorized by law” required reversal.
• Vagueness: whether Illinois’s bribery statute is unconstitutional for lack of notice/standards.

2. Summary of the Opinion

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited

A. Standards for reviewing sufficiency

• United States v. Sorensen, 134 F.4th 493, 497 (7th Cir. 2025) and United States v. Peterson, 823 F.3d 1113, 1120 (7th Cir. 2016): The court reiterated de novo review of acquittal denials, operationalized as classic sufficiency review—viewing evidence in the light most favorable to the government and asking whether any rational juror could convict beyond a reasonable doubt. These cases anchored the court’s refusal to reweigh credibility (particularly Crowder’s “I was scamming” testimony).

B. The Travel Act framework and “unlawful activity” predicates

• United States v. Dvorkin, 799 F.3d 867, 876 (7th Cir. 2015): Supplied the canonical three elements of a Travel Act violation (interstate facility use; intent; thereafter performing/attempting the unlawful act).
• United States v. Cui, No. 24-2495, 2026 WL 73014, at *7 (7th Cir. Jan. 9, 2026): Reinforced that “unlawful activity” includes bribery “in violation of the laws of the State.”
• United States v. Muskovsky, 863 F.2d 1319, 1326 (7th Cir. 1988): Used for both the Travel Act’s basic description and the proposition that a telephone is a facility in interstate commerce, and for the “facilitates” understanding of the interstate-facility nexus.

C. “Significant relationship” between interstate facility use and the unlawful activity

• United States v. Raineri, 670 F.2d 702, 717-18 (7th Cir. 1982): Provided the limiting principle: interstate use must relate significantly, not merely incidentally or minimally, to the illegal activity—yet need not be indispensable. The court analogized Crowder’s repeated phone use (to set up pay-and-progress meetings) to Raineri’s bank-account facilitation.
• United States v. Campione, 942 F.2d 429, 434 (7th Cir. 1991): Crucial doctrinal guardrail: the Travel Act does not require proving the defendant completed the state-law offense; the “federal crime” is use of interstate facilities in furtherance of unlawful activity. This supported the court’s response to Crowder’s argument that he did not solicit bribes over the phone.

D. Illinois bribery “not authorized by law” and instructional entitlement

• People v. Arriaga, 416 N.E.2d 418, 422 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981): Used as a contrast case illustrating what “authorized by law” looks like: a colorable legal directive or permission that could entitle a defendant to a jury instruction on the authorization element. The Seventh Circuit relied on Arriaga to frame Crowder’s failure—he identified no legal authorization at all.

E. Credibility and the jury’s right to disbelieve exculpatory testimony

• United States v. Harris, 729 F.2d 441, 449 (7th Cir. 1984): Supported the court’s dismissal of Crowder’s “I intended to scam the informant” narrative; even if offered, the jury may disbelieve it and credit recorded statements and circumstantial evidence.

F. Waiver of jury-instruction issues

• United States v. Leal, 72 F.4th 262, 265-66 (7th Cir. 2023): Provided the rule: affirmative agreement to instructions constitutes waiver, not mere forfeiture.
• United States v. Morgan, 929 F.3d 411, 432 (7th Cir. 2019): Explained waiver’s consequence: generally, no appellate recourse.
• United States v. LeBeau, 949 F.3d 334, 342 (7th Cir. 2020): Reinforced that waiver “extinguish[es]” the right—used to foreclose Crowder’s instructional challenge because counsel omitted the element “by design.”

G. Plain-error framework and constitutional vagueness

• United States v. Schrode, 839 F.3d 545, 554 (7th Cir. 2016): Established plain-error review for arguments not raised below.
• United States v. Page, 123 F.4th 851, 864 (7th Cir. 2024) (en banc) and Greer v. United States, 593 U.S. 503, 508 (2021): Supplied the four-part plain-error test and the discretionary “fairness/integrity/reputation” prong.
• Johnson v. United States, 576 U.S. 591, 595 (2015): Provided the vagueness standard: fair notice and prevention of arbitrary enforcement.
• United States v. Cook, 970 F.3d 866, 873 (7th Cir. 2020): Supplied the as-applied principle: if a statute undoubtedly applies to the defendant’s conduct, he generally cannot rely on hypotheticals.
• United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114, 123 (1979): Used to reject the argument that overlap with other provisions renders the charged provision vague; if the charged provision unambiguously covers the conduct, overlap is irrelevant.

3.2 Legal Reasoning

A. “Not authorized by law” as absence of permission (not proof of separate prohibition)

The court treated the “not authorized by law” phrase as a straightforward permission inquiry: bribery liability attaches when there is no legal authority permitting acceptance of the property/personal advantage. Crowder’s proposed gloss—requiring the government to point to a separate statute or rule expressly prohibiting the receipt—was rejected as inconsistent with the “plain language” of 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/33-1(d).

Arriaga supplied the key comparator: authorization is something affirmative—e.g., a directive from a government office—that could make acceptance lawful and justify an instruction. Crowder offered no analogous legal permission; thus a rational juror could find the “not authorized” requirement met.

B. Private citizens can be liable under § 33-1(d)

Crowder argued the Illinois bribery statute targets only public officials. The court rejected this as textual overreach: § 33-1 applies to a “person”, and subsection (d) requires knowledge that the benefit is tendered to cause the person to influence an act related to a public officer/employee’s function—without requiring that the “person” be a public official. This holding matters because Crowder was a private citizen at the time of receipt.

C. Travel Act “facility in interstate commerce” nexus satisfied by repeated meeting-coordination

Relying on Raineri and Muskovsky, the court applied the “significant relationship” test: the interstate use must be more than minimal but need not be essential. Crowder’s repeated calls and texts to set up meetings where he accepted or agreed to accept money were treated as ongoing facilitation, not incidental.

Campione did the doctrinal work to defeat Crowder’s “no solicitation over the phone” defense. The Travel Act focuses on use of interstate facilities in furtherance; arranging the cash handoffs and discussions by phone was enough.

D. Mens rea: intent to facilitate bribery may be inferred despite “scam” claim and informant status

The court found no incompatibility between the Travel Act’s intent requirement (intent to promote/facilitate bribery) and Illinois bribery’s knowledge requirement (knowing the property was tendered with intent to influence official action). Crowder’s “I meant to scam DeZutter” theory raised a factual credibility dispute the jury could reject under Harris.

The informant point failed because the statute’s focus is Crowder’s subjective understanding: the government did not need to prove DeZutter truly intended bribery to occur, only that Crowder knew the payments were tendered with that purpose as communicated and contextualized in their recorded dealings.

E. Instructional omission foreclosed by waiver

Even if “not authorized by law” is an element of Illinois bribery incorporated via the Travel Act, the panel did not reach harmlessness or merits: counsel agreed to omit the language “by design” because the parties viewed it as a legal issue for the court, not a jury fact question. Under Leal, Morgan, and LeBeau, that affirmative choice constituted waiver, extinguishing appellate review.

F. Vagueness rejected (no error; statute clear as applied)

Under Johnson and Cook, the court found the statute gave fair notice and did not invite arbitrary enforcement. “Not authorized by law” was not reasonably susceptible to Crowder’s proposed alternative reading (“prohibited by law”), and the “person” language foreclosed his public-official-only interpretation. Batchelder defeated the overlap argument: even if other provisions might apply, the charged provision was clear.

3.3 Impact

• Clarifies the “not authorized by law” burden in Illinois-bribery predicates: Federal prosecutors (and Illinois courts considering the phrase) can treat “not authorized” as absence of legal permission, not an obligation to identify an independent prohibitory rule. Defendants, correspondingly, are pushed toward an affirmative-authorization theory (as in Arriaga) rather than insisting on a separate ban.
• Reinforces Travel Act reach for “logistics” communications: Calls/texts used to coordinate in-person meetings where bribe money is accepted can be “significantly related” facilitation even when the explicit quid pro quo is not spoken on the phone.
• Strengthens waiver doctrine in instruction negotiations: The decision underscores the litigation risk of “strategic” instructional omissions. Where counsel affirmatively agrees to omit language, appellate courts in this circuit will likely treat later challenges as waived—even when the omitted language tracks a statutory element.
• Limits vagueness attacks on state-law predicates in federal prosecutions (as applied): Where statutory text is direct and the conduct fits plainly, plain-error review will be a steep hill, especially given Cook’s as-applied emphasis.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

• The Travel Act (18 U.S.C. § 1952) in plain terms: It is a federal crime to use an interstate “facility” (often a phone) with intent to promote certain unlawful activities (like bribery under state law) and then take steps to carry that plan out.
• “Facility in interstate commerce”: A cell phone counts even if the calls/texts are local, because the telephone system is treated as an interstate facility (as reflected in Muskovsky).
• “Significantly related” vs. “incidental” use: A phone use is “significant” when it meaningfully helps the illegal scheme function (e.g., scheduling payoffs), even if the scheme could theoretically occur without the phone.
• “Not authorized by law”: Think “no lawful permission” to accept the money/benefit. If you can point to a legitimate legal authorization, that may defeat the element; if you cannot, the element is satisfied.
• Waiver vs. forfeiture: Forfeiture is a failure to object; waiver is an intentional choice. Waiver usually ends the issue on appeal.
• Plain error review: When an issue wasn’t raised in the trial court, the appellant must clear multiple hurdles (clear error + effect on rights + serious fairness impact). If the appellate court sees no error at all, the claim ends immediately.
• Vagueness (Due Process): A law is vague if ordinary people cannot tell what it forbids or if it gives law enforcement unbounded discretion. Courts typically assess vagueness as applied to the defendant’s conduct.

5. Conclusion

United States v. Lester Crowder delivers three practical doctrinal messages. First, for Illinois bribery under 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/33-1(d), “not authorized by law” operates as a lack-of-permission element, not a requirement that prosecutors identify a separate prohibitory statute. Second, repeated phone coordination of payoff meetings can satisfy the Travel Act’s interstate-facility nexus even absent explicit telephonic solicitation. Third, defendants who “by design” agree to omit statutory language from jury instructions risk complete appellate foreclosure under waiver doctrine. The decision therefore strengthens federal Travel Act bribery prosecutions built on recorded meeting logistics, while narrowing post-trial avenues to challenge agreed-upon instructional strategy.