Nonmandatory Child-Abuse Reporters Receive § 63.2-1512 Immunity Only for Complaints Made “Pursuant to” § 63.2-1510 (Not to Law Enforcement Alone)

Introduction

In Cupp v. Delta Air Lines, Inc. (Supreme Court of Virginia, Apr. 2, 2026), the Court answered a certified question from the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit arising out of Cupp v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 154 F.4th 178 (4th Cir. 2025). The case stems from an in-flight incident in which a Delta flight attendant suspected that a father, Nicholas W. Cupp, might be trafficking or sexually abusing his 13-year-old daughter. The airline’s personnel relayed the suspicion to law enforcement, who detained and questioned Cupp and the child upon landing, but ultimately found no probable cause to arrest or charge him.

Cupp sued the flight attendant, Delta, and Endeavor Air alleging tort claims (including negligence, intentional infliction of emotional distress, tortious interference with parental rights, and false imprisonment). The defendants asserted statutory immunity under Virginia Code § 63.2-1512, contending that good-faith reporting of suspected child abuse should be immunized even if the report was made to police rather than to social services.

The determinative issue was narrow but consequential: whether a nonmandatory reporter obtains § 63.2-1512 immunity when making a good-faith complaint to law enforcement without contacting a Department of Social Services (“DSS”) employee.

Summary of the Opinion

The Supreme Court of Virginia answered the certified question “no.” The Court held that, for a nonmandatory reporter, § 63.2-1512 immunity attaches only to a “complaint pursuant to § 63.2-1510”. Because § 63.2-1510 authorizes complaints only to (i) the local department of social services, (ii) the State Department of Social Services’ toll-free hotline, or (iii) in a limited exception, a court, a complaint made solely to law enforcement is not “pursuant to” § 63.2-1510 and therefore does not trigger § 63.2-1512 immunity.

The Court rejected policy-based and “absurdity canon” arguments seeking to expand immunity beyond the statute’s textual boundaries, emphasizing that statutory expansion is a legislative, not judicial, function. The Court also clarified that the absence of immunity does not itself impose liability; it simply means potential liability is decided under ordinary tort principles rather than barred at the threshold by immunity.

Analysis

1) Precedents Cited

The Court’s reasoning is anchored in familiar Virginia interpretive methodology: text first, with restrained use of interpretive canons and a strict separation between judicial interpretation and legislative policymaking.

  • Virginia Dep't of Tax'n v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 300 Va. 446, 454 (2022): Cited for the proposition that statutory interpretation presents a pure question of law—especially in the certified-question posture—framing the Court’s task as answering the question “in the first instance.”
  • Newberry Station Homeowners Ass'n v. Bd. of Supervisors, 285 Va. 604, 616 (2013): Used to reinforce the canon that courts assume the General Assembly chose its words carefully and that courts are “bound by those words.”
  • Seguin v. Northrop Grumman Sys. Corp., 277 Va. 244, 248 (2009): Invoked to prohibit courts from adding words that would expand statutory scope, a key move because defendants sought an atextual expansion of immunity to police reports.
  • Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 301 Va. 460, 469 (2022): Cited for the plain-meaning rule: absent ambiguity or absurdity, statutory words receive their ordinary meaning.
  • Daily Press, LLC v. Office of the Exec. Sec'y, 293 Va. 551, 557 (2017): Supports the Court’s separation-of-powers response to public policy pleas—policy choices are for the General Assembly.
  • City of Charlottesville v. Payne, 299 Va. 515, 532 (2021): Cited both for (i) not substituting judicial judgment for legislative judgment and (ii) defining “absurd result” narrowly as an interpretation rendering a statute internally inconsistent or incapable of operation.
  • AAA Disposal Servs. v. Eckert, 267 Va. 442, 445 (2004): Cited for the principle that when statutory text is clear and unambiguous, interpretive canons (including absurdity) do not apply.
  • Holsapple v. Commonwealth, 266 Va. 593, 598 (2003): Cited (via AAA Disposal) for the same limit on resort to canons in the face of unambiguous text.
  • Brown v. Lukhard, 229 Va. 316, 321 (1985): Also cited (via AAA Disposal) reinforcing the constrained role of canons where text is plain.
  • Cupp v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 154 F.4th 178 (4th Cir. 2025): The certification vehicle; the Fourth Circuit indicated Cupp had not plausibly alleged bad faith or malice, but found Virginia immunity law unsettled as to nonmandatory reporters who report to police rather than DSS.

Collectively, these cases supplied the doctrinal scaffolding for the Court’s central move: treating the statutory cross-references in § 63.2-1512 as controlling limits rather than flexible signposts guided by broad child-protection policy.

2) Legal Reasoning

A. The structure of § 63.2-1512 is limiting, not illustrative

The Court begins from the text: § 63.2-1512 grants immunity only in four enumerated circumstances: (1) a “report pursuant to § 63.2-1509,” (2) a “complaint pursuant to § 63.2-1510,” (3) taking a child into custody “pursuant to § 63.2-1517,” or (4) participating in a judicial proceeding resulting from one of those categories. The certified question, by design, concerns only category (2), because it asks about a nonmandatory reporter making a complaint.

B. “Pursuant to § 63.2-1510” incorporates § 63.2-1510’s authorized recipients

The dispositive interpretive step is the Court’s reading of “a complaint pursuant to § 63.2-1510” as requiring compliance with § 63.2-1510’s authorized complaint channels. Section 63.2-1510 states that any person who suspects abuse or neglect may make a complaint to: (i) the local department of social services where the child resides or where the abuse is believed to have occurred, or (ii) the Department’s toll-free child abuse and neglect hotline—plus a narrow exception (not at issue) requiring reporting to a court if a local department employee is suspected of abuse or neglect.

Because the statute does not authorize a nonmandatory reporter to complain to police as a § 63.2-1510 “complaint,” the Court concludes that a police-only complaint is not “pursuant to § 63.2-1510,” and therefore immunity under § 63.2-1512 does not attach.

C. Policy arguments cannot rewrite a clear statute

The defendants argued that child abuse is a serious problem and that immunity is meant to incentivize reporting—therefore immunity should cover good-faith reports to law enforcement. The Court accepted the premises but rejected the conclusion: the General Assembly could have written broader immunity but instead chose a text that enumerates specific categories and incorporates specific reporting pathways. Under Daily Press, LLC v. Office of the Exec. Sec'y and City of Charlottesville v. Payne, courts do not enlarge statutory protections in the name of public policy.

D. The absurdity canon does not apply—and in any event is not satisfied

Relying on AAA Disposal Servs. v. Eckert (and the cases it cites), the Court held that where statutory language is unambiguous, canons like “absurdity” are not triggered. Even if they were, Payne limits “absurdity” to interpretations that make a statute internally inconsistent or incapable of operation. A legislative choice to immunize only certain good-faith reports—those made through prescribed channels—is neither incoherent nor unworkable.

E. The holding is about immunity, not tort liability

The Court carefully limits the reach of its answer: denying immunity does not establish civil liability. It simply means the defendant cannot terminate the case at the threshold by invoking § 63.2-1512; instead, liability (if any) is resolved through ordinary tort adjudication.

3) Impact

  • Clear channeling rule for nonmandatory reporters: To obtain § 63.2-1512 immunity, a nonmandatory reporter must route complaints through § 63.2-1510’s specified pathways (local DSS, DSS hotline, or the limited court exception). Reporting to police alone does not qualify.
  • Reduced early-dismissal leverage for private actors who call police: Employers and individuals (e.g., airlines, schools, businesses) who bypass DSS and contact law enforcement first may face increased exposure to tort litigation—at least past the immunity stage—if their actions allegedly support claims such as false imprisonment, negligence, or emotional distress.
  • Operational incentives and compliance protocols: Organizations may revise internal policies to ensure that suspected child abuse/neglect concerns are communicated to DSS/hotline (or in parallel with police) to preserve statutory immunity where available. The opinion implicitly encourages careful attention to the statutory reporting architecture rather than relying on generalized “good faith” as a standalone shield.
  • Legislative spotlight: If the General Assembly believes good-faith reports to law enforcement should be immunized for nonmandatory reporters, this decision tees up a clean legislative fix (e.g., expanding § 63.2-1510 authorized recipients or amending § 63.2-1512 to include reports to law enforcement).
  • Certified-question significance: Because the ruling answers an unsettled question identified by the Fourth Circuit, it will guide federal and state courts applying Virginia law in future immunity disputes involving nonmandatory reporters.

Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Certified question: A federal appellate court may ask a state supreme court to answer a determinative question of state law when there is no controlling state precedent. The state court answers the legal question; it does not decide the entire case.
  • Mandatory vs. nonmandatory reporters: Virginia law requires certain professionals (listed in § 63.2-1509) to report suspected child abuse/neglect. Others are “nonmandatory” and may report under § 63.2-1510.
  • Immunity under § 63.2-1512: A legal protection that blocks civil or criminal liability connected with specified reports/complaints or related actions—unless the reporter acted in bad faith or with malicious intent. Immunity is not automatic for all reports; it applies only to the statute’s enumerated categories.
  • “Pursuant to” a statute: Meaning “in accordance with” the statute’s requirements. Here, a “complaint pursuant to § 63.2-1510” must be made to the recipients § 63.2-1510 authorizes (local DSS, DSS hotline, or the limited court exception).
  • Plain meaning rule: If the text is clear, courts apply it as written rather than reshaping it to match perceived policy goals.
  • Absurdity canon (narrow in Virginia): A tool sometimes used to avoid interpretations that make a statute internally inconsistent or incapable of operation. It is not a license to rewrite a clear statute to reach a “better” policy outcome.

Conclusion

Cupp v. Delta Air Lines, Inc. establishes a straightforward but significant rule of Virginia law: a nonmandatory reporter does not receive Virginia Code § 63.2-1512 immunity for a good-faith child-abuse complaint made solely to law enforcement without contacting DSS. The Court reached this result through a strict textual approach: § 63.2-1512 immunity for nonmandatory reporters is tied to complaints “pursuant to § 63.2-1510,” and § 63.2-1510 specifies complaints to social services (or, in a narrow exception, to a court)—not to police.

The decision clarifies reporting-immunity boundaries, reinforces Virginia’s text-centered statutory interpretation tradition, and leaves any broader immunity expansion to the General Assembly rather than the courts.