Nondefective Equipment Placement Is Not a “Physical Defect” Under R.C. 2744.02(B)(4)

1. Introduction

Steigerwald v. Berea, 2026-Ohio-2554 presented a recurring governmental-immunity question: when a patron is injured inside a public facility, does the political-subdivision immunity exception for injuries “due to physical defects” on the grounds of a government-function building apply?

Joan Steigerwald, a regular attendee of a senior swimming class, tripped over the legs of a newly installed bench in the women’s locker room at the Berea Recreation Center and suffered fatal injuries. Her estate sued the City of Berea and the Berea Recreation Center (collectively, “Berea”) for negligence and wrongful death, alleging the hazard arose because Berea chose a bench with extended legs and placed it in a confined space.

The key issue was whether the alleged hazard was a “physical defect” within the meaning of R.C. 2744.02(B)(4), which can strip a political subdivision of immunity for negligence occurring “within or on the grounds of” a building used in connection with a governmental function.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Supreme Court of Ohio reversed the Eighth District and held that placing a structurally sound, functioning bench (with no tangible imperfection) in a locker room—even if arguably hazardous—does not constitute a “physical defect” under R.C. 2744.02(B)(4). Because the estate produced no evidence that the bench was broken, malfunctioning, or physically flawed, the statutory exception did not apply and Berea’s political-subdivision immunity remained intact. The case was remanded for entry of summary judgment for Berea.

3. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

Hoskins v. Cleveland, 2026-Ohio-1225

Hoskins is the opinion’s central driver. There, the estate alleged a “physical defect” based on a lifeguard’s decision not to use an elevated lifeguard chair. The Court rejected the claim because the chair itself was structurally sound; the alleged danger flowed from operational choice, not a tangible imperfection.

Steigerwald extends and operationalizes that rule in a premises setting: when equipment is not broken and functions as designed, the governmental actor’s decision about how or where to use it does not transmute the equipment into a “physical defect” for purposes of R.C. 2744.02(B)(4).

McConnell v. Dudley, 2019-Ohio-4740

Cited for the familiar three-step immunity framework: (1) general immunity under R.C. 2744.02(A)(1), (2) exceptions under R.C. 2744.02(B), and (3) potential reinstatement under defenses in R.C. 2744.03(A). The Court’s analysis effectively ended at step two because it found no applicable exception.

Sharp v. Union Carbide Corp., 38 Ohio St.3d 69 (1988)

Sharp supplied the interpretive method: because “physical defect” is undefined in the statute, the Court applied the term’s “plain, everyday meaning.” That methodology anchored the Court’s move to dictionary definitions and ordinary-meaning construction.

Doe v. Greenville City Schools, 2022-Ohio-4618 and State ex rel. M/I Homes of Cincinnati, L.L.C. v. Clermont Cty. Bd. of Elections, 2025-Ohio-4362

The estate relied on Doe for the idea that an “absence” (there, a missing fire extinguisher) could be treated as a physical defect. The Court rejected that reliance on stare decisis grounds: the relevant discussion in Doe appeared in a lead opinion that “did not command a majority” and therefore established no binding rule. The Court cited State ex rel. M/I Homes of Cincinnati, L.L.C. v. Clermont Cty. Bd. of Elections to reinforce the principle that non-majority lead opinions do not create controlling precedent.

Intermediate appellate definitions referenced

The opinion noted an Eighth District line defining “physical defect” as a perceivable imperfection diminishing worth or utility, drawing from: Doe v. Greenville City Schools, 2022-Ohio-4618 (as quoted), R.K. v. Little Miami Golf Ctr., 2013-Ohio-4939, and Duncan v. Cuyahoga Community College, 2012-Ohio-1949. But the Supreme Court’s controlling move was to articulate its own ordinary-meaning formulation and apply it in light of Hoskins.

Dissent’s competing appellate authorities (not adopted by the majority)

Justice Brunner’s dissent relied on appellate cases suggesting that an otherwise functional object can still create a “physical defect” through layout, setup, or deployment, including: Jones v. Delaware City School Dist. Bd. of Edn., 2013-Ohio-3907, Moss v. Lorain Cty. Bd. of Mental Retardation, 2009-Ohio-6931, and Leasure v. Adena Local School Dist., 2012-Ohio-3071. The majority did not embrace that approach and instead drew a sharper line between “hazardous condition” and “physical defect” as a matter of statutory meaning.

B. Legal Reasoning

1. Immunity baseline: Berea is a political subdivision (R.C. 2744.01(F)), and operating an indoor recreation center is a governmental function (R.C. 2744.01(C)(2)(u)(ii)), so immunity presumptively applies under R.C. 2744.02(A)(1).
2. Gatekeeping question under R.C. 2744.02(B)(4): The Court treated “physical defect” as a threshold requirement—before negligence disputes matter, the plaintiff must identify a qualifying “physical defect” that caused the injury.
3. Ordinary meaning of “physical defect”: Using dictionary definitions, the Court concluded: “physical” refers to tangible/material things; “defect” means an imperfection impairing function. Therefore, a “physical defect” is a tangible imperfection that impairs function.
4. Application to the bench: The record showed the bench was selected from among many models for locker-room suitability (antimicrobial, movable, compatible with cleaning equipment) and was not broken, unstable, or otherwise physically flawed; it functioned as designed. The estate’s theory targeted placement choice (bench with extended legs in a narrow space), not a tangible imperfection in the bench itself.
5. Hazard ≠ defect: The Court expressly separated “unsafe condition” from “physical defect.” Even if an object presents risk, it may remain defect-free.
6. Location clause does not expand “defect”: The phrase “within or on the grounds of” identifies where the defect must be situated; it does not broaden the meaning of “defect” to include discretionary decisions about placement or use.
7. Consistency with Hoskins: Just as nonuse/misuse of a sound lifeguard chair was not a defect, placement of a sound bench was not a defect.

C. Impact

• Narrowing of R.C. 2744.02(B)(4) to “tangible imperfection” theories: Plaintiffs must marshal evidence of a physical flaw (design defect, damage, deterioration, malfunction, or other tangible imperfection), not merely argue that a government employee made a poor layout or placement decision with an otherwise intact object.
• Stronger immunity at summary judgment: The decision invites early disposition where the record shows the instrumentality functioned as intended and lacked physical damage. Litigation may shift toward product-defect claims against manufacturers (when available) or toward other immunity exceptions (when factually supportable).
• Reduced doctrinal reliance on nonmajority opinions: By rejecting reliance on the lead opinion in Doe v. Greenville City Schools, 2022-Ohio-4618, the Court signals that litigants should tread carefully when invoking fractured decisions for a “rule.”
• Tension with some appellate “layout/setup” cases: The dissent highlights a conflict in approach: whether “physical defect” can arise from negligent deployment of nondefective items within a space. The majority’s rule points toward a more uniform statewide limitation, potentially constraining those appellate theories in future cases.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

• Political-subdivision immunity: A default rule that cities and similar governmental entities are not liable for many civil claims arising from governmental functions, unless a statute clearly creates an exception.
• R.C. 2744.02(B)(4) “physical defect” exception: A narrow carve-out: immunity can be lost for negligence inside/on the grounds of certain public buildings only if the injury was “due to” a “physical defect” on those grounds.
• “Physical defect” (as used by the majority): A tangible, material imperfection—something wrong with the object itself (or its physical condition) that impairs function. A mere hazard created by placement or operational choice is not enough.
• Summary judgment: A pretrial ruling that ends a case when there is no genuine dispute of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Here, once “physical defect” failed, the case ended without trial.

5. Conclusion

Steigerwald v. Berea establishes a clear limiting principle for R.C. 2744.02(B)(4): the statutory phrase “physical defects” does not encompass injuries attributed solely to a political subdivision’s discretionary decision to place or use nondefective, functioning equipment in a particular location. By reinforcing and extending Hoskins v. Cleveland, 2026-Ohio-1225, the Court draws a firm line between tangible imperfections (actionable under the exception) and hazardous conditions created by choices (generally barred by immunity), reshaping how premises-based negligence claims against political subdivisions will be pleaded, proved, and resolved at the summary-judgment stage.