Noncompliance with Drug Screening Warrants Denial of a Post-Adjudicatory Improvement Period and Supports Termination Under West Virginia’s “No Reasonable Likelihood” Standard

1. Introduction

Case: In re J.M., No. 25-6 (Kanawha County CC-20-2024-JA-91) (W. Va. Jan. 29, 2026) (memorandum decision).
Parties: Petitioner Mother T.M. (appellant); West Virginia Department of Human Services (“DHS”); the child J.M.; and the guardian ad litem.

The case arose after law enforcement and DHS encountered a home described as in “deplorable condition,” with extensive animal waste and trash, and suspected heroin or fentanyl and drug paraphernalia allegedly “scattered throughout” and accessible to the child. The circuit court ordered services early in the case (including random drug screens) and conditioned visitation on passing three consecutive drug screens.

The central issues on appeal were whether the circuit court (1) erred in denying the mother’s motion for a post-adjudicatory improvement period and (2) erred in terminating her parental rights rather than employing a less restrictive disposition.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia affirmed the December 11, 2024, dispositional order terminating the mother’s parental rights. The Court held that:

  • The circuit court did not abuse its discretion in denying a post-adjudicatory improvement period because the mother failed to demonstrate she was “likely to fully participate,” particularly given extensive noncompliance with drug screening.
  • Termination was supported by findings that there was “no reasonable likelihood” the mother could substantially correct conditions of abuse/neglect in the near future due to failure to follow through with the case plan (notably, drug screening), and that termination was in the child’s best interests.

3. Analysis

3.1. Precedents Cited

In re Cecil T., 228 W. Va. 89, 717 S.E.2d 873 (2011)

The Court used In re Cecil T. in two distinct ways:

  • Standard of review: The Court reiterated Syl. Pt. 1, In re Cecil T., applying clear-error review to factual findings and de novo review to legal conclusions. This framed the appeal as one requiring deference to the circuit court’s fact-bound determinations about the mother’s participation and credibility.
  • Termination principle: The Court relied on Syl. Pt. 4, in part, In re Cecil T., for the proposition that “[c]ourts are not required to exhaust every speculative possibility of parental improvement . . . where it appears that the welfare of the child will be seriously threatened.” This authority supported affirmance even though the mother argued for a less restrictive alternative.

In re Tonjia M., 212 W. Va. 443, 573 S.E.2d 354 (2002)

The Court cited In re Tonjia M. for the principle that circuit courts have discretion to deny an improvement period “when no improvement is likely.” This case underpinned the Court’s conclusion that partial compliance (e.g., parenting/adult life skills participation) does not compel granting an improvement period where core risk drivers—here, drug exposure concerns and drug screening noncompliance—remain unaddressed.

In re R.J.M., 164 W. Va. 496, 266 S.E.2d 114 (1980)

In re R.J.M. appeared through the quotation embedded in Syl. Pt. 4 of In re Cecil T.. Its influence is doctrinal: it supplies longstanding support for prioritizing child welfare over uncertain parental rehabilitation where the record indicates continued threat or stagnation.

3.2. Legal Reasoning

(a) Denial of Post-Adjudicatory Improvement Period: “Likely to Fully Participate”

The Court applied W. Va. Code § 49-4-610(2)(B), which requires a parent seeking a post-adjudicatory improvement period to demonstrate they are “likely to fully participate.”

Although the mother participated in parenting and adult life skills (even if by phone), the Court treated drug screening as a decisive measure of participation and risk reduction because the initiating harm involved suspected fentanyl/heroin in the home and readily accessible to the child. The Court emphasized:

  • She “failed to attend all but one of her drug screens” initially and later missed “almost fifty drug screens.”
  • She admitted she had “no valid excuse” for failing to participate.
  • Many submitted screens were reportedly “out of range” and deemed not valid by the laboratory; while an expert noted such results could be “health related,” uncertainty did not overcome the broader pattern of missed and invalid tests.

The Court’s reasoning effectively links improvement-period eligibility to demonstrated accountability in the components most connected to the abuse/neglect allegations. Participation in some services did not satisfy the statutory requirement when the mother did not reliably engage in drug testing—an intervention directly responsive to the alleged danger.

(b) Termination: “No Reasonable Likelihood” + Best Interests

For termination, the Court focused on the statutory “no reasonable likelihood” standard in W. Va. Code § 49-4-604(d)(3): a no-reasonable-likelihood finding is supported when a parent has “not responded to or followed through with a reasonable family case plan or other rehabilitative efforts . . . designed to reduce or prevent the abuse or neglect of the child.”

The Court held the mother’s extended refusal to participate in drug testing, combined with her denial of a drug problem, constituted failure to follow through with a reasonable case plan. Importantly, the Court treated drug screening not as a technicality but as a core compliance indicator in a case involving suspected opioids in the home.

The Court also endorsed the circuit court’s best-interests finding, noting evidence that the child was “completely terrified to see” the mother and displayed behavioral issues (including “having accidents on himself”), and that DHS efforts to place the child in therapy were unsuccessful. The combination of (1) persistent noncompliance and (2) evidence of child trauma and fear supported termination under W. Va. Code § 49-4-604(c)(6).

3.3. Impact

While a memorandum decision is primarily case-specific, In re J.M. provides a clear, practice-relevant signal in West Virginia abuse and neglect litigation:

  • Drug-screen compliance can be dispositive when the underlying allegations involve drug exposure in the home. Courts may treat missed or invalid screens as strong evidence that a parent is not “likely to fully participate” in an improvement period.
  • Partial compliance is not full compliance. Engagement in parenting classes does not necessarily counterbalance sustained refusal to complete drug screens when substance risk is central.
  • Invalid or unverified testing outcomes do not automatically create reasonable doubt. Even where an expert testifies that abnormal results could be “health related,” the overall pattern of missed tests, invalid tests, and non-acknowledgment of substance concerns may still support denial of an improvement period and termination.
  • “Less restrictive alternatives” arguments face a high bar when statutory findings are met and the child’s welfare is implicated; courts are not required to explore “speculative” improvement possibilities when the record shows persistent noncompliance and child harm.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Adjudication vs. disposition: Adjudication answers whether abuse/neglect occurred; disposition determines the remedy (services, custody change, termination, etc.).
  • Post-adjudicatory improvement period: A court-supervised window after adjudication during which a parent must comply with services to correct conditions. It is not automatic; the parent must show they are “likely to fully participate.”
  • “No reasonable likelihood” to correct: A legal finding that, in the near future, the parent probably will not fix the problems that made the home unsafe—often shown by failure to follow a case plan.
  • Clear error vs. de novo review: Appellate courts rarely disturb factual findings unless clearly mistaken (clear error), but they independently review legal questions (de novo).
  • “Less restrictive dispositional alternative”: Options short of termination (e.g., guardianship, temporary custody). These are not required when the statutory grounds for termination are established and termination is in the child’s best interests.

5. Conclusion

In re J.M. reinforces a pragmatic rule in West Virginia abuse and neglect proceedings: when substance exposure is central to the case, a parent’s sustained failure to complete reliable drug screening strongly supports (1) denial of a post-adjudicatory improvement period for lack of demonstrated “full participation” and (2) termination based on failure to follow through with a reasonable case plan and the child’s best interests. Grounded in W. Va. Code §§ 49-4-610 and 49-4-604 and guided by In re Cecil T., In re Tonjia M., and In re R.J.M., the decision underscores that child safety and timely permanency may outweigh speculative prospects of parental improvement where noncompliance persists.