Noncompliance and Continued Domestic Violence Justify Denial of an Improvement Period and Termination Without Less Restrictive Alternatives

1. Introduction

In In re A.B. and S.B. (W. Va. Aug. 25, 2026) (memorandum decision), Petitioner Mother G.B. appealed the Circuit Court of Kanawha County’s September 8, 2025, dispositional order terminating her parental rights to A.B. (age two at petition filing) and S.B. (age five at petition filing). The West Virginia Department of Human Services (“DHS”) alleged neglect (failure to provide necessities and support) and parental substance abuse, against a backdrop of prior terminations/relinquishments and domestic violence.

The central appellate issues were whether the circuit court erred by (1) denying a post-adjudicatory or post-dispositional improvement period, (2) terminating parental rights on allegedly insufficient evidence, and (3) failing to employ a less restrictive alternative to termination.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia affirmed. The Court held that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in denying an improvement period because the mother failed to prove—by clear and convincing evidence—that she was likely to fully participate, particularly given poor service compliance, continued domestic violence (including an alleged stabbing despite a protective order), and her failure to appear at the continued dispositional hearing after an explicit warning.

The Court further held that termination was supported by clear and convincing evidence and constituted a permissible disposition without intervening less restrictive alternatives because the circuit court found (and the record supported) “no reasonable likelihood” that the conditions of abuse/neglect could be substantially corrected in the near future and that termination was necessary for the children’s welfare.

3. Analysis

3.1. Precedents Cited

  • Syl. Pt. 1, In re K.S., -- W. Va. --, 930 S.E.2d 400 (2026)
    Role in the decision: Provided the controlling standards of review in abuse and neglect appeals: substantive rulings for abuse of discretion, factual findings for clear error, and legal issues de novo. The Court used this framework to defer to the circuit court’s factfinding about the mother’s service noncompliance and its discretionary decision to deny an improvement period.
  • In re Tonjia M., 212 W. Va. 443, 448, 573 S.E.2d 354, 359 (2002)
    Role in the decision: Reinforced that a circuit court may refuse to grant an improvement period “when no improvement is likely.” The Court applied this principle to uphold the denial, emphasizing the mother’s demonstrated pattern of noncompliance and domestic violence.
  • In re K.V., 251 W. Va. 418, 427, 914 S.E.2d 517, 526 (2025)
    Role in the decision: Confirmed that termination of parental rights requires proof by clear and convincing evidence. The Court cited it while rejecting the mother’s claim that DHS failed to meet its burden.
  • State v. Guthrie, 194 W. Va. 657, 669 n.9, 461 S.E.2d 163, 175 n.9 (1995)
    Role in the decision: Supported appellate restraint: appellate courts do not reweigh evidence or reassess witness credibility. The Court relied on this principle when declining to second-guess the circuit court’s evaluation of the CPS worker’s testimony.
  • Syl. Pt. 5, in part, In re Kristin Y., 227 W. Va. 558, 712 S.E.2d 55 (2011) (quoting Syl. Pt. 2, In re R.J.M., 164 W. Va. 496, 266 S.E.2d 114 (1980))
    Role in the decision: Supplied the key dispositional rule: termination may be employed without less restrictive alternatives when there is no reasonable likelihood the conditions can be substantially corrected and termination is necessary for the children’s welfare. The Court used this syllabus point to reject the mother’s “least restrictive alternative” argument.

3.2. Legal Reasoning

(a) Denial of improvement period under W. Va. Code § 49-4-610
The Court treated the improvement-period request as a statutory entitlement only upon a specific evidentiary showing. Under W. Va. Code § 49-4-610(2)(B) & (3)(B), the parent must demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that she is likely to fully participate. The circuit court found the mother did not meet that burden, pointing to:

  • poor compliance (frequent cancellation/rescheduling and eventual cessation of services);
  • lack of insight into why services were required and why removal occurred;
  • problematic visitation (ending visits early);
  • a continuing domestic violence pattern, including an alleged stabbing after a protective order; and
  • failure to appear at the continued dispositional hearing despite an explicit warning that rights could be terminated.

Applying In re Tonjia M., the Court accepted that these facts supported a determination that “no improvement is likely,” making denial a proper exercise of discretion rather than an error.

(b) Termination as a permissible—and not overly harsh—disposition under W. Va. Code § 49-4-604
The Court framed termination around two statutory findings reflected in W. Va. Code § 49-4-604(c)(6): (1) no reasonable likelihood that the conditions of abuse and neglect can be substantially corrected in the near future, and (2) termination is necessary for the child’s welfare.

It then tied those findings to the statutory definition in W. Va. Code § 49-4-604(d), emphasizing that “no reasonable likelihood” exists where the abusing adult demonstrates inadequate capacity to solve the problems and, specifically here, where the parent: willfully refuses or is unwilling to cooperate in case planning (W. Va. Code § 49-4-604(d)(2)) and does not respond to or follow through with reasonable rehabilitative efforts (W. Va. Code § 49-4-604(d)(3)).

The Court also rejected the mother’s attempt to recast the evidence (that “services were working”) because the circuit court credited contrary testimony from the CPS worker; under State v. Guthrie, that credibility and weight-of-evidence assessment is not re-litigated on appeal.

Finally, relying on Syl. Pt. 5, in part, In re Kristin Y. (quoting Syl. Pt. 2, In re R.J.M.), the Court held that once the statutory/precedential prerequisites are met, termination may proceed without “intervening less restrictive alternatives.” The circuit court’s separate welfare findings—highlighting the children’s need for continuity and stability—supported the necessity prong.

3.3. Impact

Although issued as a memorandum decision applying established law, In re A.B. and S.B. reinforces several practical rules likely to influence abuse-and-neglect litigation:

  • Improvement periods are earned, not presumed: a parent’s burden under W. Va. Code § 49-4-610 is substantive; courts may deny improvement periods when the record shows disengagement, lack of insight, and ongoing violent conduct.
  • Conduct during the case matters as much as historical conduct: the decision treats post-petition violence, protective-order violations, and cessation of services as strong indicators that “no improvement is likely.”
  • Nonappearance at a warned dispositional hearing is highly consequential: while not framed as a default judgment, the mother’s absence after an explicit warning was part of the evidentiary mosaic supporting denial of an improvement period and termination.
  • Least restrictive alternatives yield to “no reasonable likelihood” plus welfare: the opinion reiterates that once those findings are made and supported by clear and convincing evidence, termination can be affirmed even where a parent argues for more time or lesser dispositions.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Adjudication / adjudicatory hearing: the phase where the court determines whether the child is abused/neglected. Here, the mother stipulated—i.e., formally agreed—to the petition’s allegations, so the court adjudicated abuse/neglect without a full trial.
  • Disposition / dispositional hearing: the phase where the court decides the remedy (services, placement, termination, etc.) based on the child’s best interests and the statutory options.
  • Improvement period (post-adjudicatory / post-dispositional): a structured window of services and monitoring intended to remedy problems so reunification may become possible. Statute requires the parent to prove they are likely to fully participate.
  • Clear and convincing evidence: a heightened standard of proof—more than “more likely than not,” less than “beyond a reasonable doubt.” It requires strong, persuasive proof.
  • “No reasonable likelihood” of correction: a statutory conclusion that the parent cannot or will not fix the problems in the near future, often shown by unwillingness to engage in case planning and failure to follow through with services.
  • Least restrictive alternative: the idea that a court should use the least drastic disposition consistent with the child’s welfare. Under West Virginia law, however, termination may be used without lesser steps when “no reasonable likelihood” exists and termination is necessary for welfare.

5. Conclusion

In re A.B. and S.B. affirms that a parent seeking an improvement period must make a clear and convincing showing of likely full participation, and that persistent noncompliance, lack of insight, ongoing domestic violence, and disengagement from proceedings can justify denial of that remedy. The decision also reiterates that termination need not await less restrictive alternatives where the circuit court finds, on clear and convincing evidence, both “no reasonable likelihood” of near-term correction and that termination is necessary for the children’s welfare—particularly when stability and continuity are paramount.