Date: Jan 27, 2026

Noise-Immunity for Shooting Ranges Under RSA 159-B:1 and :2 Requires Only Noise-Ordinance Compliance; “Began Operations” When Range Opened to the Public

Introduction

In Martell v. Gold Bess Shooting Club, LLC, 2026 N.H. 1, the Supreme Court of New Hampshire addressed the scope of statutory immunity for shooting ranges facing noise-based nuisance litigation under RSA 159-B:1 and RSA 159-B:2. The plaintiffs—twenty-three neighboring landowners—sued Gold Bess Shooting Club, LLC and Caulder Construction, LLC after an outdoor range opened in late October 2020. The suit initially focused on environmental and safety nuisance theories, and later added noise-related nuisance claims after the Town of Woodstock enacted a noise ordinance in April 2021.

The central issues were: (1) whether RSA 159-B:1 and RSA 159-B:2 require a range to have been “lawfully” established/constructed/operating in all respects to obtain noise immunity, and (2) when a range “began operations” (and, relatedly, whether mere LLC registration could mean the range was “established”). The trial court granted summary judgment to the defendants on the noise-related nuisance claims; the Supreme Court affirmed.

Summary of the Opinion

The court held that RSA 159-B:1 and RSA 159-B:2 condition noise-related immunity solely on compliance with noise control ordinances that existed when the range was established, constructed, or began operations—not on compliance with other legal regimes such as wetlands or terrain alteration statutes. The court further held that Gold Bess’s range “began operations” before Woodstock adopted its noise ordinance, because the range opened to the public and became functional as a shooting range in October 2020. Accordingly, the range was immune from the plaintiffs’ noise-related claims under RSA 159-B:1 and RSA 159-B:2.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

O'Malley-Joyce v. Travelers Home & Marine Ins. Co., 175 N.H. 245 (2022), and Boyle v. City of Portsmouth, 172 N.H. 781 (2020): cited for the summary-judgment framework—no genuine dispute of material fact and entitlement to judgment as a matter of law, with the record viewed favorably to the nonmovant on each cross-motion. These cases supply the procedural posture that allowed the court to decide the immunity issue as a question of law on largely undisputed facts.
Appeal of N.H. Troopers Ass'n, 175 N.H. 167 (2022): cited for core interpretive rules—plain meaning, reading statutory terms in context, construing the statute as written, and not adding language the legislature did not include. This case underpins the court’s refusal to graft an “overall lawfulness” requirement onto RSA 159-B:1 and :2.
State v. Desmarais, 81 N.H. 199 (1924), and Ocasio v. Fed. Express Corp., 162 N.H. 436 (2011): cited for the principle that the same word can carry different meanings in different statutory contexts, supporting the opinion’s broader move: RSA 159-B:1 and RSA 159-B:2 can be interpreted differently from RSA 159-B:4 even though they are within the same chapter.
Hardy v. Chester Arms, LLC, 176 N.H. 421 (2024), 2024 N.H. 5: cited for the rule that unambiguous statutes are applied as written, without resort to legislative history. This helped the court end the inquiry once it found RSA 159-B:1 and :2 textually clear.
Monadnock Rod and Gun Club v. Town of Peterborough, 177 N.H. 70 (2024), 2024 N.H. 61, and Residents Defending Their Homes v. Lone Pine Hunter's Club, 155 N.H. 486 (2007): these decisions frame RSA chapter 159-B as “primarily” protecting existing ranges from noise liability, but they are used more sharply here to distinguish the narrower noise-immunity provisions (RSA 159-B:1 and :2) from the broader “vesting” provision (RSA 159-B:4).
- Residents Defending Their Homes construed “in operation” in RSA 159-B:4 to mean “lawful operation,” preventing RSA 159-B:4 from being used to legalize a previously illegal land use through retroactive insulation from zoning enforcement.
- Monadnock Rod and Gun Club reinforced that RSA 159-B:4 does not protect a range that was already noncompliant with the relevant ordinance before it changed (there, failure to obtain town approval before reorienting/rebuilding outdoor facilities).
In Martell, those cases do not expand RSA 159-B:1 and :2; instead, they justify why those provisions should not be treated like RSA 159-B:4.
Town of Salem v. Wickson, 146 N.H. 328 (2001): cited for the general principle of vested rights in land-use law—vesting typically requires lawful use. The court uses this to explain why the “lawfulness” overlay made sense for RSA 159-B:4 (a vesting-like provision), but does not transfer to RSA 159-B:1 and :2 (immunity provisions).
Appeal of Laconia Patrolman Assoc., 164 N.H. 552 (2013): cited for the admonition against adding words to a statute. This supports the court’s key move: the words “in compliance with any … noise control ordinances” cannot be rewritten to mean “in compliance with all applicable laws.”
Appeal of Port City Air Leasing, Inc., 177 N.H. 149 (2024), 2024 N.H. 71: cited for using common usage/dictionary definitions when a statute does not define a term—here, “begin” and “operation”—to determine when a range “began operations.”
Sara Realty v. Country Pond Fish & Game Club, 158 N.H. 578 (2009): used as the closest functional analogue for RSA 159-B:2: where no noise regulation predated a continuously operating range, RSA 159-B:2 independently barred a nuisance action. The court relies on Sara Realty to confirm that the statutory immunity operates as a direct bar once the temporal and ordinance-compliance conditions are met.

Legal Reasoning

Textual trigger: “in compliance with any … noise control ordinances.”
The court treated the operative language of RSA 159-B:1 and RSA 159-B:2 as decisive: immunity applies if the range owners “are in compliance” with noise control ordinances in existence when the range was “established,” “constructed,” or “began operations.” Because the statute names only noise control ordinances, the court concluded it does not incorporate broader “all-laws” compliance (e.g., wetlands or terrain alteration statutes). Reading in such a requirement would violate the principle that courts may not add language.
Distinguishing RSA 159-B:4 (vesting) from RSA 159-B:1 and :2 (immunity).
The plaintiffs’ argument sought to import Residents Defending Their Homes (which read “in operation” in RSA 159-B:4 as “lawfully in operation”) into RSA 159-B:1 and :2. The court rejected this by emphasizing the different statutory functions: RSA 159-B:4 is a vesting-style limitation on applying later-enacted restrictions to previously operating ranges, and vesting doctrine traditionally requires lawfulness (citing Town of Salem v. Wickson). RSA 159-B:1 and :2, by contrast, are targeted noise-immunity rules with an express, limited condition—noise-ordinance compliance.
No “illegal use made lawful” problem under RSA 159-B:1 and :2.
The court explained why the “lawfulness” gloss was necessary in RSA 159-B:4 cases: otherwise the statute could be used to protect a use that was illegal even under the old ordinance, effectively laundering illegality when a town changes its laws. But RSA 159-B:1 and :2 do not alter legality of the underlying land use; they only bar noise-based civil/criminal actions under specified timing/ordinance conditions. Thus, applying them as written does not “make lawful that which was unlawful” in the way that concerned the court in Residents Defending Their Homes.
“Began operations” occurred when the range opened and functioned as a range.
Because the statute is disjunctive—immunity is anchored to when the range was “established,” “constructed,” or “began operations”—the court avoided the contested “established” question by deciding the easiest path: the range “began operations” before Woodstock’s April 2021 noise ordinance. Using dictionary definitions for “begin” and “operation,” the court held the range began operations when it opened to the public and became functional as a shooting range in October 2020. With no Woodstock noise ordinance in existence at that time, the statutory condition was satisfied, triggering immunity.

Impact

1) Clear narrowing of conditions to noise-ordinance compliance.
The decision clarifies that RSA 159-B:1 and RSA 159-B:2 do not require a range to prove compliance with environmental statutes, permitting regimes, or other regulatory requirements to obtain noise-based immunity. Future plaintiffs attempting to defeat RSA 159-B:1/:2 by pointing to non-noise regulatory violations will likely be confined to pursuing non-noise theories (e.g., environmental enforcement, safety-based nuisance if viable, statutory claims), rather than noise nuisance.

2) Stronger temporal shield for pre-ordinance operations.
Municipalities that adopt new noise ordinances after a range opens will face a higher barrier to noise-based litigation against those ranges. The key inquiry becomes whether any noise control ordinance existed when the range began operations (or was established/constructed), not whether the range complied with unrelated laws.

3) Doctrinal separation within RSA chapter 159-B.
The court’s careful partitioning of RSA 159-B:4 (vesting-like, lawfulness-sensitive) from RSA 159-B:1 and :2 (text-bound immunity) provides a template for interpreting other provisions in RSA chapter 159-B according to function and text, rather than importing requirements across sections based on generalized notions of “lawful operation.”

4) Practical litigation consequence: ordinance timing and proof of operational start date become decisive facts.
Because “began operations” can be satisfied by public opening/functionality, parties will likely focus discovery and motion practice on when the range became operational in fact, and what noise ordinances existed then—rather than litigating collateral regulatory compliance as a means to defeat noise immunity.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Summary judgment: A procedure allowing a court to decide a claim without trial when there is no genuine dispute about important facts and the law clearly favors one side. Here, the relevant facts (opening date; ordinance enactment date; existence of alleged non-noise violations) were not materially disputed for the statutory interpretation question.
Nuisance (noise-related): A civil claim alleging unreasonable interference with the use and enjoyment of land. RSA 159-B:2 specifically bars nuisance actions “on the basis of noise or noise pollution” when its conditions are met.
Immunity statute vs. vesting statute: An immunity statute blocks certain lawsuits (here, noise-based liability) if specified conditions are met. A vesting statute protects an existing land use from later regulatory changes. The court treated RSA 159-B:1 and :2 as immunity provisions and RSA 159-B:4 as vesting-like—leading to different interpretive consequences.
“In compliance with any noise control ordinance … in existence at the time …”: This phrase sets a timing-based benchmark: if there was a noise ordinance when the range started (or was established/constructed), the range must comply with that ordinance to obtain immunity. If there was no ordinance then, the immunity applies without having to comply with later-adopted noise rules for purposes of noise-based nuisance claims.
“Began operations”: The court construed this as the point when the range became functional as a shooting range—here, when it opened to the public—rather than earlier administrative steps like business formation, and without needing to decide the separate term “established.”

Conclusion

Martell v. Gold Bess Shooting Club, LLC establishes a clear interpretive rule for RSA 159-B:1 and RSA 159-B:2: noise-related immunity turns on compliance with applicable noise control ordinances that existed when the range was established, constructed, or began operations—and does not hinge on compliance with other statutory regimes. The court also clarifies that a range “began operations” when it opened and functioned as a range, making the timing of operational commencement a pivotal fact. The decision strengthens the predictability of RSA chapter 159-B’s noise-immunity scheme while keeping “lawfulness” limitations largely cabined to RSA 159-B:4’s vesting context.