No Suppression Remedy for Violations of Florida’s Search-Warrant Knock-and-Announce Statute (Receding from State v. Cable)

Precedents Cited

1) State v. Cable, 51 So. 3d 434 (Fla. 2010) (now limited)

Cable previously held that “as a matter of state law” the exclusionary rule applied to knock-and-announce violations, distinguishing the U.S. Supreme Court’s non-exclusion rule in Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586 (2006). In Times, the Court explicitly concludes Cable was “wrongly decided” because it failed to conduct a proper remedial/statutory analysis and effectively inserted a remedy the Legislature did not provide.

2) State v. Times, 383 So. 3d 555 (Fla. 1st DCA 2024) (quashed)

The First District affirmed suppression only because Cable bound it. Importantly, it noted Cable appeared to be a minority rule among states after Hudson, and Judge Nordby’s special concurrence invited reconsideration. The Florida Supreme Court adopts that reconsideration and reverses the remedial premise.

3) Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586 (2006) and Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927 (1995)

The Court recounts federal doctrine to set the landscape: Wilson located knock-and-announce in the Fourth Amendment reasonableness inquiry, while Hudson held the federal exclusionary rule is not required for knock-and-announce violations. Unlike Cable, which treated Hudson as non-dispositive because it addressed constitutional (not statutory) violations, Times treats Hudson as a contextual reference point but resolves the case primarily through Florida remedial/statutory principles (who decides the remedy and where it appears in the statute).

4) Benefield v. State, 160 So. 2d 706 (Fla. 1964) (reinterpreted)

Cable read Benefield as grounding suppression in statutory knock-and-announce violations. Times rejects that “overread,” emphasizing that Benefield involved a warrantless search deemed “unreasonable,” multiple transgressions, and a conclusion that evidence was “the product of an unlawful arrest and a search incident thereto.” The Court highlights that Benefield did not actually analyze section 933.09’s remedial text or show suppression as a common-law feature.

5) Statutory-remedy and separation-of-powers cases: Jenkins v. State, 978 So. 2d 116 (Fla. 2008); QBE Ins. Corp. v. Chalfonte Condo. Apartment Ass’n, 94 So. 3d 541 (Fla. 2012); Dade County. v. Nat’l Bulk Carriers, Inc., 450 So. 2d 213 (Fla. 1984)

These authorities supply the core legal method: remedies for statutory violations are “within the purview of the Legislature” (Jenkins), courts generally do not insert omitted remedies (QBE), and courts cannot “amend or complete” legislative acts to supply relief (Dade County. v. Nat’l Bulk Carriers, Inc.). The Court treats these principles as controlling over the earlier approach in Cable.

6) Additional cited authorities reinforcing the Court’s approach

• Statler v. State, 349 So. 3d 873 (Fla. 2022) — standard of review (de novo) where statutory interpretation and constitutional issues intersect.
• Brooks v. State, 363 So. 3d 181 (Fla. 5th DCA 2023) — example of refusing suppression where a statute provides no such remedy.
• State v. Pruitt, 967 So. 2d 1021 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007) (special concurrence) — argued exclusion should not apply because section 933.09 contains no suppression remedy.
• Tsuji v. Fleet, 366 So. 3d 1020 (Fla. 2023) and Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106 (1940) — caution against inferring statutory meaning from legislative inaction.
• Johnson v. Transp. Agency, 480 U.S. 616 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting) — skepticism toward using current legislative preferences to “measure” past enactment meaning.
• State v. Poole, 297 So. 3d 487 (Fla. 2020) and State v. Manago, 375 So. 3d 190 (Fla. 2023) — framework for receding from precedent; emphasis on reliance interests.
• Atz v. Andrews, 94 So. 329 (Fla. 1922) — rejected as proof that exclusion was the default “background” for the 1923 codification; also distinguished as constitutional and factually different (no warrant; police admitted).
• The dissent’s citations to longstanding DCA practice: Guerrie v. State, 691 So. 2d 1132 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997), Kistner v. State, 379 So. 2d 128 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979), and Moreno v. State, 277 So. 2d 81 (Fla. 3d DCA 1973).
• The dissent’s description of exclusion as judicially created, citing Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. 229 (2011)—used to argue courts may continue applying exclusion even absent statutory text.

Legal Reasoning

1) The Court reframes the dispute as a “remedy” question controlled by statutory text and legislative choice

The opinion emphasizes that the only contested question is not whether section 933.09 was violated (it was), but what remedy follows. Because “the remedy for violations of a Florida statute” belongs to the Legislature (Jenkins), the Court begins with the statutory text.

2) Section 933.09: command without an exclusionary remedy

Section 933.09 authorizes forcible entry only “if after due notice of the officer’s authority and purpose he or she is refused admittance.” The Court reads this as a conduct-regulating rule (when officers may break in), not a remedial directive (what happens in court if they do). The Court underscores: the statute “does not authorize, let alone require, the suppression of evidence.”

3) Section 933.17: a legislative enforcement mechanism that counsels against implying exclusion

The Court points to chapter 933’s enforcement provision, section 933.17 (“Exceeding authority in executing search warrant; penalty”), which criminalizes officers who “willfully exceed[]” authority or act with “unnecessary severity.” The Court treats this as the Legislature’s chosen deterrent/enforcement structure within the same chapter—making it inappropriate for courts to infer an additional suppression remedy not specified.

4) Expressio and comparative statutory practice: when the Legislature wants exclusion, it says so

The Court contrasts section 933.09 with statutes that expressly create evidentiary exclusions, such as section 934.06 (wiretapping exclusion) and section 318.14(4)(b) (certain compelled statements “shall not be used”). This comparison supports the interpretive conclusion that omission of exclusion in section 933.09 was deliberate or at least not judicially correctable.

5) Correcting Cable: Benefield was not a sound statutory-remedy foundation

The Court identifies Cable’s central mistake: presuming (rather than demonstrating) that state law justified exclusion for statutory knock-and-announce violations, based on an expansive reading of Benefield. Once Benefield is read as a warrantless-search/unlawful-arrest case without clear statutory remedial reasoning, Cable’s remedial bridge collapses.

6) Stare decisis and reliance: no reliance interest keeps Cable in place

Applying the recedence framework of State v. Poole, the Court focuses on reliance and finds none: no one plausibly “altered his behavior” in reliance on the availability of suppression as a remedy for knock-and-announce violations (State v. Manago). This clears the path to recede from Cable.

7) The dissent’s competing theory: exclusion as a judicially available remedy regardless of statutory silence

Justice Labarga’s dissent argues (i) Cable did not “supply” a remedy but recognized a longstanding judicial remedy; (ii) Florida statutes/common law may provide protections beyond federal minima; and (iii) section 933.17 is a “penalty,” not a “remedy,” and is practically ineffective. The majority rejects this as inconsistent with separation-of-powers principles and the Court’s remedial restraint in cases like Jenkins.

Impact

1) Suppression practice in Florida

Immediate doctrinal shift: defendants can no longer obtain suppression solely because officers executing a valid search warrant violated section 933.09’s knock-and-announce requirements. Trial courts and district courts must treat Cable as receded-from on this point.

2) Litigation reorientation

• From remedy to reasonableness/other violations: litigants may pivot to arguing independent Fourth Amendment or Florida constitutional violations (e.g., warrant validity, scope, probable cause, execution severity) rather than relying on statutory knock-and-announce alone.
• Fact development still matters: while suppression is off the table for section 933.09 alone, egregious execution facts may support other doctrines (e.g., excessive force claims, civil remedies, administrative discipline, or challenges tied to warrant execution beyond knock-and-announce).

3) Law enforcement incentives and legislative pressure

The decision reallocates deterrence away from exclusion and toward legislative and executive-branch mechanisms (criminal penalties under section 933.17, internal discipline, training, and civil suits). The dissent highlights skepticism about whether section 933.17 is used in practice; the majority treats that skepticism as a policy argument for the Legislature, not a basis for judicial supplementation.

4) Broader separation-of-powers signal

Times reinforces a trend toward textual remedial restraint: courts will be reluctant to attach suppression to statutory violations absent explicit legislative direction—especially when the statutory scheme contains other enforcement provisions and when the Legislature has shown it can draft express exclusion rules in other contexts.