No Sua Sponte Rule 32.1 Confrontation Balancing Required Absent an Objection in Supervised-Release Revocations (United States v. Price)

Introduction

In United States v. Price (10th Cir. May 5, 2026), the Tenth Circuit affirmed the revocation of Anthony Steven Price’s supervised release after the district court found—by a preponderance of the evidence—that he (1) committed a new crime (assault and battery with a dangerous weapon) and (2) possessed a dangerous weapon, based largely on a police report and related testimony.

The appeal presented two core issues: (a) whether the evidence was sufficient to support the district court’s factual findings that Price assaulted the victim using an object qualifying as a “dangerous weapon,” and (b) whether the revocation was improperly based on hearsay evidence without the district court conducting the Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.1(b)(2)(C) confrontation “balancing test.”

Summary of the Opinion

The Tenth Circuit affirmed. It held that the district court’s findings were supported by the record—principally the admitted police report and corroborating testimony—and that the district court acted within its factfinding role in discrediting Price and his mother-in-law. The court also rejected Price’s hearsay/confrontation argument under plain-error review because Price did not object to the hearsay evidence or assert confrontation rights at the revocation hearing. Critically, the panel noted that the Tenth Circuit has not held that district courts must sua sponte perform the Rule 32.1(b)(2)(C) balancing test before considering hearsay; therefore, any asserted error was not “plain.”

Analysis

Precedents Cited

• United States v. Disney, 253 F.3d 1211 (10th Cir. 2001)
  The panel relied on Disney for the standard of review: revocation decisions are reviewed for abuse of discretion. This framing is consequential because it narrows appellate intervention to legal error or clearly erroneous factual findings, rather than allowing de novo reweighing of evidence.
• United States v. Battle, 706 F.3d 1313 (10th Cir. 2013)
  Battle supplied the abuse-of-discretion definition: abuse occurs when the district court relies on an incorrect legal conclusion or a clearly erroneous factual finding. The panel used this to structure its analysis: (1) factual sufficiency/clear error and (2) legal error concerning hearsay and confrontation.
• United States v. Cortes-Gomez, 926 F.3d 699 (10th Cir. 2019)
  The court quoted Cortes-Gomez for the “clearly erroneous” benchmark: findings are clearly erroneous only if unsupported by the record or leave the appellate court with a definite and firm conviction of mistake. That standard drove the panel’s conclusion that the police report (plus supporting testimony) provided enough factual support.
• United States v. Rodebaugh, 798 F.3d 1281 (10th Cir. 2015)
  Rodebaugh reinforced that credibility determinations belong to the district court as factfinder. This precedent enabled the panel to uphold the district court’s choice to credit the police report over live defense testimony.
• United States v. Williams, 106 F.4th 1040 (10th Cir. 2024)
  The panel invoked Williams to emphasize the evidentiary flexibility of revocation hearings—courts may consider material (letters, affidavits, etc.) that would be inadmissible in a criminal trial. This precedent undercut Price’s suggestion that hearsay is categorically insufficient at revocation.
• United States v. McGehee, 672 F.3d 860 (10th Cir. 2012)
  McGehee provided the procedural consequence of failing to object: confrontation/hearsay claims not raised below are reviewed only for plain error. This was a key pivot, because it raised Price’s appellate burden.
• United States v. Jones, 818 F.3d 1091 (10th Cir. 2016)
  The court recognized Jones as the governing authority that the Rule 32.1(b)(2)(C) balancing test “governs whether hearsay evidence may be used to revoke supervised release.” But the panel distinguished the situation here: Price did not invoke Rule 32.1 or assert confrontation rights, and the Tenth Circuit has not imposed a duty on district courts to conduct the balancing test sua sponte.
• United States v. Hernandez, 104 F.4th 755 (10th Cir. 2024)
  Hernandez was cited for the definition of “plain” error—an error that is clear or obvious under current law. Because the Tenth Circuit has not clearly required a sua sponte Rule 32.1 balancing test, any alleged error could not be “plain.”
• United States v. Body, 791 F. App'x 807 (11th Cir. 2019)
  The panel addressed Price’s reliance on Body (an unpublished Eleventh Circuit decision) by distinguishing it on preservation grounds: unlike Price, the defendant in Body preserved the confrontation/hearsay issue. This comparison reinforced the centrality of contemporaneous objection in revocation practice.

Legal Reasoning

1) Sufficiency of Evidence and Deference to Factfinding

The panel treated the appeal primarily as a challenge to factual findings. Applying the abuse of discretion and clear error standards, it concluded the findings were supported by the admitted police report describing the injuries (including a “deep gash” requiring emergency care) and the account that Price struck the victim with an object described by witnesses as a “small novelty baseball bat” (with some uncertainty whether it could have been “brass knuckles”). The court emphasized that the record need only show a preponderance of evidence for revocation and that the district court had discretion to credit one set of accounts over another.

The court also highlighted that credibility calls are for the district court, not the appellate court, and it refused to second-guess the district court’s determination that Price and his mother-in-law were not credible, particularly in the face of injury evidence described in the police report.

2) Hearsay and Confrontation at Revocation; Preservation and Plain Error

The panel rejected the notion that “hearsay alone” cannot support revocation, noting revocation hearings are not criminal trials and may consider evidence that would be inadmissible at trial. The more precise question is not categorical admissibility, but whether the supervisee’s limited confrontation right under Rule 32.1(b)(2)(C) requires exclusion of particular hearsay absent sufficient justification.

On that question, the court’s reasoning turned on procedure:

• Rule 32.1(b)(2)(C) gives the defendant an opportunity to question adverse witnesses unless the “interest of justice” does not require the witness to appear.
• The advisory committee notes contemplate a balancing test: the defendant’s confrontation interest versus the government’s good cause for not producing the witness.
• However, Price did not object to the hearsay nature of the police report/testimony and did not assert a right to cross-examine the declarants, so the claim was reviewed for plain error.
• Because Tenth Circuit law has not clearly imposed a requirement that the district court must conduct the Rule 32.1 balancing test sua sponte, any failure to do so could not be “plain.”

Practically, Price reinforces that the Rule 32.1 confrontation/balancing framework is typically triggered by a defendant’s timely request to question adverse witnesses (or a contemporaneous objection to hearsay), and that appellate relief is unlikely when the defendant remains silent at the hearing.

Impact

Although the decision is styled as an “Order and Judgment” and expressly “not binding precedent” (except for law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel), it has persuasive significance in at least three ways:

1. Preservation is decisive in revocation confrontation disputes. Defendants who do not object to hearsay or request confrontation will likely face plain-error review and near-certain affirmance absent extraordinary facts.
2. No clearly established duty to perform Rule 32.1 balancing sua sponte. The panel’s statement that the Tenth Circuit has “never held” such a requirement is a strong signal to district courts and litigants: the burden is on the defense to raise the issue.
3. Police reports can be pivotal evidence at revocation. When admitted without objection and paired with testimony (even if partly derivative), police reports may provide sufficient factual support under the preponderance standard—especially when the district court disbelieves contrary defense testimony.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Supervised release revocation: A post-incarceration supervision term can be revoked if the judge finds, by a preponderance of evidence, that conditions were violated, potentially resulting in additional imprisonment.
• Preponderance of the evidence: “More likely than not,” a lower standard than “beyond a reasonable doubt.”
• Abuse of discretion / clearly erroneous: Highly deferential appellate review; appellate courts generally uphold findings if there is record support and no obvious mistake.
• Hearsay: An out-of-court statement offered for its truth. In revocation hearings, hearsay may be considered more freely than at trial, subject to limited confrontation protections.
• Rule 32.1(b)(2)(C) balancing test: When the defendant asserts a right to question adverse witnesses, the court weighs the defendant’s confrontation interest against the government’s reasons for not producing the witness.
• Plain error: A demanding appellate standard applied when the party failed to object below; the error must be clear under existing law and affect substantial rights.

Conclusion

United States v. Price affirms revocation findings grounded in a police report and related testimony under deferential review and underscores the procedural reality of revocation litigation: a defendant who does not timely object to hearsay or invoke Rule 32.1 confrontation rights will likely be limited to plain-error review on appeal. The decision’s most notable doctrinal signal is that, under current Tenth Circuit law, a district court’s failure to conduct the Rule 32.1(b)(2)(C) balancing test sua sponte is not “plain” error—placing the onus on defense counsel to preserve confrontation issues during the revocation hearing itself.