Date: Jul 4, 2026

No Separate 21 U.S.C. § 851(b) Hearing Required When the Defendant Is Advised and Admits the Prior Conviction at the Plea Proceeding (Anders Affirmance)

1. Introduction

United States v. Naajeh Torres (3d Cir. July 1, 2026) is a non-precedential Anders disposition affirming (1) Torres’s federal drug-trafficking convictions and sentence under 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) and (2) the revocation of his supervised release and the consecutive revocation sentence. Torres committed the new drug offenses while on supervised release for a prior federal drug conviction.

The appeal arrived in the posture typical of an Anders case: appointed counsel concluded there were no nonfrivolous issues and moved to withdraw under Anders v. California. Torres did not file a pro se merits brief, but his pro se notice of appeal asserted that the “career offender” sentence was excessive.

The key issues addressed were: (a) whether counsel’s Anders submission satisfied Third Circuit requirements, (b) whether the guilty pleas were knowing and voluntary, (c) whether the drug and revocation sentences were procedurally and substantively reasonable, (d) whether Torres’s U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1 career-offender designation was challengeable in light of circuit precedent, and (e) whether the district court committed error regarding 21 U.S.C. § 851(b) procedures after the Government filed an enhancement information.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Third Circuit granted counsel’s motion to withdraw and affirmed across the board. It held that:

Counsel’s Anders brief was adequate, triggering the court’s limited review focused on the issues counsel identified.
The district court had jurisdiction over both the new federal drug case and the supervised-release revocation.
Torres’s guilty plea complied with constitutional requirements and Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11.
The 180-month drug sentence (a downward variance from the 262–327 month career-offender range) was procedurally and substantively reasonable.
Any challenge to the career-offender designation based on overbreadth of a state drug statute was foreclosed by United States v. Lewis.
On the unpreserved § 851(b) argument, the court found no error where Torres was advised of the § 851 information at the plea hearing and admitted the prior conviction; in any event, he could not show prejudice under plain-error review.
The revocation admission and waiver of a formal hearing complied with Rule 32.1(b), and the consecutive 18-month revocation sentence was reasonable.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited

(a) Anders screening and Third Circuit practice

Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967): The constitutional framework permitting appointed counsel to withdraw only after demonstrating a conscientious review and identifying potential issues, enabling the appellate court to independently confirm frivolousness. This decision supplies the foundational standard applied throughout the opinion.
United States v. Youla, 241 F.3d 296 (3d Cir. 2001): The operational Third Circuit test: (1) adequacy of counsel’s Anders brief and (2) independent review for nonfrivolous issues. Youla also provides the key procedural consequence: when the Anders brief is adequate, the court “confine[s]” its scrutiny to the portions of the record identified by counsel.
McCoy v. Ct. of Appeals of Wis., Dist. 1, 486 U.S. 429 (1988): Quoted for the definition of “frivolous”—lacking any basis in law or fact—supporting the court’s conclusion that none of the identified issues cleared that low threshold.
Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75 (1988): Cited for the appellate court’s duty to conduct plenary review in Anders settings to ensure no nonfrivolous issues exist.
United States v. Langley, 52 F.4th 564 (3d Cir. 2022) and United States v. Marvin, 211 F.3d 778 (3d Cir. 2000): These cases refine what “adequate” Anders lawyering looks like—thorough record review, identification of arguable issues, and explanation of frivolousness. The panel used them to validate counsel’s submission and move to merits screening.

(b) Plea validity

Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969): Establishes the constitutional requirement that a guilty plea be knowing, voluntary, and intelligent, with an adequate record. The panel used Boykin to frame the Rule 11 colloquy review and concluded the plea was constitutionally sound.

(c) Sentencing reasonableness review

United States v. Tomko, 562 F.3d 558 (3d Cir. 2009) (en banc): Supplies the Third Circuit’s procedural/substantive reasonableness framework and the “no reasonable sentencing court” substantive test. Tomko is the anchor for affirming both the drug sentence and the revocation sentence.
Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338 (2007): Cited for the presumption of reasonableness of within-Guidelines sentences. The panel, relying on Rita and additional authority, treated the below-Guidelines sentence as “presumptively reasonable” against Torres’s claim it was too high.
United States v. Liddell, 543 F.3d 877 (7th Cir. 2008): Quoted for the proposition that it “follows” from Rita that a below-Guidelines sentence is also presumptively reasonable when challenged by a defendant as excessive. While not binding in the Third Circuit, it is used here to reinforce the panel’s conclusion that Torres’s substantial downward variance undermines any substantive-reasonableness claim.

(d) Career-offender predicate “controlled substance offense” disputes

United States v. Lewis, 58 F.4th 764 (3d Cir. 2023): This is the dispositive precedent on Torres’s intended career-offender argument. Lewis holds that for U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(b), it is irrelevant that a state drug law defines the controlled substance more broadly than federal law. The panel applied Lewis to deem Torres’s overbreadth argument “foreclosed,” eliminating a major potential appellate issue.

(e) § 851(b) procedure, plain-error review, and the “chance to affirm or deny”

United States v. Dorsey, 105 F.4th 526 (3d Cir. 2024) and United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725 (1993): Dorsey is cited for applying Olano’s four-part plain-error test to unpreserved claims. The panel used this framework to address Torres’s new appellate claim that the district court failed to provide a § 851(b) hearing.
United States v. Guyton, 144 F.4th 449 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 146 S. Ct. 900 (2025): Guyton serves as the contrasting example—there, the district court “disregard[ed] [the] straightforward command” of § 851(b) by not giving the defendant the opportunity to affirm or deny the alleged prior conviction. Here, by contrast, the panel emphasized that Torres was advised at the plea hearing and admitted the conviction, satisfying the core § 851(b) concern.

3.2 Legal Reasoning

(a) The Anders framework controlled the scope and depth of review

The panel first validated counsel’s Anders submission under United States v. Langley and United States v. Marvin: counsel identified plausible categories of issues (jurisdiction, plea validity, sentencing reasonableness) and explained why each lacked merit. Under United States v. Youla, that adequacy determination permitted the court to limit its detailed record review to the areas counsel flagged, while still fulfilling the independent-review obligation described in Penson v. Ohio.

(b) Plea validity: a Rule 11 and Boykin compliance check

The court’s plea analysis tracked standard Rule 11 and Boykin requirements: competency, understanding of charges and penalties, awareness of trial rights being waived, and a factual basis. Finding the colloquy complete and the admissions clear, the panel found no arguable challenge to the plea’s validity.

(c) Drug sentence: procedural reasonableness, then substantive reasonableness

Procedurally, the district court (1) calculated the Guidelines range, (2) considered the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors, and (3) explained the variance. Substantively, the panel applied United States v. Tomko and concluded the 180-month sentence—well below the career-offender range—fell comfortably within the realm of reasonable sentencing outcomes. The panel additionally invoked Rita v. United States and United States v. Liddell to reinforce the proposition that a below-range sentence is particularly difficult to attack as “too high.”

(d) Career-offender status: Lewis foreclosed the overbreadth theory

Torres’s principal substantive complaint was effectively about the career-offender enhancement: he argued that his prior state drug conviction was not a qualifying controlled substance offense because the state statute allegedly criminalized more conduct than federal law. The panel treated this as squarely controlled by United States v. Lewis, which rejects that mismatch argument for § 4B1.2(b) purposes in this circuit. That foreclosed any nonfrivolous appellate claim on this point.

(e) § 851(b): advice-and-admission at the plea hearing sufficed; no separate hearing required

The opinion’s most rule-like clarification concerns how § 851(b) can be satisfied in practice. Torres argued (for the first time on appeal) that the district court should have held a distinct § 851(b) hearing after conviction and before sentencing. Applying Olano plain-error review (as framed by United States v. Dorsey), the panel held there was no error because:

§ 851(b) requires that the court inquire whether the defendant affirms or denies the conviction alleged in the information and warn that challenges not made before sentencing are waived.
The district court advised Torres of the § 851 information at the change-of-plea hearing, and Torres admitted the prior conviction.
The panel stated: “Nothing in § 851 requires a court to hold a separate, unrequested hearing.”

The court also noted that even assuming error, Torres could not satisfy Olano’s prejudice prong because the prior conviction appeared to qualify as both a serious drug felony and a felony drug offense under 21 U.S.C. § 802(44) and (58), supporting the § 841(b) enhancements referenced in the opinion.

(f) Supervised release revocation: breach of trust and consecutive time

For revocation, the panel confirmed jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3), validated Torres’s knowing admission and waiver under Rule 32.1(b), and affirmed a bottom-of-range sentence under U.S.S.G. § 7B1.4(a). The consecutive structure aligned with the Chapter 7 policy statements emphasizing punishment for breach of trust (and the district court’s stated goals of protection and deterrence).

3.3 Impact

Practical § 851(b) guidance: Although non-precedential, the opinion signals that in the Third Circuit a district court can satisfy § 851(b)’s core requirement by advising the defendant about the filed information and obtaining an admission during the plea proceeding—without convening a separate, standalone § 851(b) hearing absent a request or a genuine dispute. The citation to United States v. Guyton underscores that the critical failure is denying the defendant a chance to affirm or deny, not the absence of a formal “hearing” label.
Reinforcement of Lewis for Guidelines litigation: The decision reiterates that United States v. Lewis controls overbreadth-based challenges to “controlled substance offense” predicates under § 4B1.2(b), limiting avenues for defendants seeking to evade career-offender status via drug-definition mismatches.
Anders practice confirmation: The opinion applies Youla/Langley/Marvin in a textbook manner, reinforcing the message that a properly constructed Anders brief narrows the court’s inquiry and increases the likelihood of summary affirmance.
Sentencing appeals headwind for downward variances: By leaning on Rita and Liddell, the panel signals skepticism toward claims that a below-Guidelines sentence is still “too high,” especially when the district court articulates individualized mitigating reasons (remorse, age of priors, non-violence).

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

Anders brief: A filing by appointed appellate counsel stating that after reviewing the entire record, counsel found no nonfrivolous issues to argue. Counsel must still identify potential issues and explain why each is frivolous; the appellate court then independently checks the record.
Career offender (U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1): A Guidelines status that substantially increases the advisory sentencing range when (among other requirements) the defendant has at least two qualifying prior felony convictions for a “controlled substance offense” (or certain violent crimes). It usually raises both offense level and criminal history category.
§ 851 information and § 851(b) inquiry: If the Government seeks an enhanced drug sentence based on a prior conviction, it must file a written § 851(a) information. Section 851(b) then requires the court to ask the defendant whether he affirms or denies the prior conviction and to warn that challenges not made before sentencing generally cannot be raised later.
Plain-error review (Olano): When a defendant did not raise an issue in the district court, the appellate court typically requires: (1) error, (2) that is plain, (3) that affected substantial rights (usually meaning prejudice), and (4) that seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.
Procedural vs. substantive reasonableness: Procedural reasonableness asks whether the judge followed the correct steps (correct Guidelines calculation, consideration of statutory factors, adequate explanation). Substantive reasonableness asks whether the sentence length is within the range of reasonable outcomes given the facts and the judge’s stated reasons.
Supervised release revocation as “breach of trust”: Revocation sentencing focuses not only on the new misconduct but also on the defendant’s failure to comply with court-ordered conditions—treated as a breach of the court’s trust. Chapter 7 policy statements often support consecutive time to account for that separate wrong.

5. Conclusion

United States v. Naajeh Torres is a non-precedential but instructive Third Circuit decision applying the Anders framework to affirm a drug-trafficking sentence, a career-offender-driven Guidelines calculation (with a substantial downward variance), and a consecutive supervised-release revocation sentence. The opinion’s most notable clarification is its treatment of 21 U.S.C. § 851(b): where the defendant is advised of the § 851 information at the plea hearing and admits the prior conviction, the court viewed § 851(b) as satisfied and stated that no separate, unrequested hearing is required. In addition, the panel reaffirmed that United States v. Lewis forecloses state-statute overbreadth arguments aimed at defeating “controlled substance offense” predicates under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(b).