No Reasonable Expectation of Privacy in Unsecured Secret Recordings Placed in Shared Spaces; No Categorical Time-Limit Requirement for Hard-Drive Warrants

Introduction

In United States v. Kenneth Mininger (11th Cir. Aug. 18, 2026), the Eleventh Circuit addressed two recurring Fourth Amendment questions at the intersection of privacy expectations and digital searches. First, it considered whether an overnight guest can claim a reasonable expectation of privacy in SD cards containing voyeuristic recordings when the guest secretly places cameras in shared rooms of the host’s home, leaves the cards unsecured (no passwords), and uses them to invade the host family’s privacy. Second, it considered whether a warrant to search physical electronic storage devices must be limited by time period or file category when probable cause initially focuses on specific victims and dates.

The parties were the United States (appellee) and Kenneth Michael Mininger (appellant), who was convicted after officers viewed SD-card footage (obtained without a warrant but with the homeowner’s written consent) and then obtained warrants for Mininger’s residence and devices, ultimately uncovering extensive child sexual abuse material.

Summary of the Opinion

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed Mininger’s convictions. On the SD cards, the court held that Mininger failed to establish an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in the contents of the SD cards because he left them in shared areas, readily accessible to others, unsecured, and used them for illicit voyeuristic recordings. Because there was no “search” of a protected privacy interest, the Fourth Amendment did not bar officers from viewing the SD-card contents.

On overbreadth, the court rejected Mininger’s argument that the warrants for his physical devices had to include “available, appropriate limits” (such as time limits or forensic constraints tailored to specific victims/dates). The court held that Eleventh Circuit precedent does not impose a categorical requirement to time-limit warrants for physical electronic storage devices, particularly where evidence may be hidden through encryption or file obfuscation.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

• United States v. Ewing, 140 F.4th 1339 (11th Cir. 2025)
  Role: Provided the standard of review for suppression rulings: clear error for facts, de novo for application of law. This framing mattered because the Eleventh Circuit effectively revisited the privacy question independently, even though the district court had found a privacy expectation but denied suppression on consent grounds.
• United States v. Cohen, 38 F.4th 1364 (11th Cir. 2022)
  Role: Allowed affirmance “on any ground supported by the record.” The panel used this to affirm on a different rationale than the district court: lack of a reasonable expectation of privacy, rather than third-party consent.
• United States v. King, 509 F.3d 1338 (11th Cir. 2007)
  Role: Supplied the burden framework (defendant must show a Fourth Amendment “search” by establishing a subjective expectation and an objectively reasonable one) and the analogy that data made readily accessible to third parties resembles items left in unsecured common areas. The panel leaned heavily on King to treat the unsecured SD cards in shared rooms as outside the zone of socially recognized privacy.
• United States v. Sarda-Villa, 760 F.2d 1232 (11th Cir. 1985)
  Role: Reinforced that reasonable-expectation analysis turns on the “totality of the circumstances.” The panel used this to aggregate multiple facts—shared location, lack of password, easy discoverability, and illicit purpose—rather than relying on any single factor.
• United States v. Miravalles, 280 F.3d 1328 (11th Cir. 2002)
  Role: Provided the rhetorical and doctrinal punch that certain asserted privacy expectations are “not only unreasonable, but foolhardy.” The court used this language to characterize the risk Mininger assumed by leaving incriminating, accessible storage in common areas.
• United States v. Hall, 47 F.3d 1091 (11th Cir. 1995)
  Role: Supported the broader principle that failing to take steps to restrict public access undermines an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy.
• United States v. Epps, 613 F.3d 1093 (11th Cir. 2010)
  Role: Recognized warrantless searches as permissible where the “container itself and the circumstances” indicate contraband. The panel analogized the secretly placed cameras (in a child’s bedroom and shared bathroom) and their SD cards to a container whose context signals illicit content, strengthening the conclusion that society would not recognize a privacy right in such recordings.
• Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91 (1990)
  Role: Mininger invoked Olson for the proposition that overnight guests can have a “legitimate expectation of privacy” in a host’s home. The panel distinguished Olson by grounding guest privacy in social norms and reciprocity—norms that do not extend to covert, nonconsensual surveillance of the host’s family.
• United States v. Rackley, 742 F.2d 1266 (11th Cir. 1984)
  Role: Helped the court draw a line between a guest’s privacy in “his own quarters” and diminished privacy in shared areas like bathrooms, supporting the conclusion that leaving unsecured items in shared spaces weakens any claim to privacy.
• United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400 (2012); United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705 (1984); United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109 (1984)
  Role: These cases supplied the doctrinal map of what constitutes a Fourth Amendment “search”: trespass-based intrusion (Jones) and infringement of a reasonable expectation of privacy (Karo quoting Jacobsen). Mininger proceeded under the expectation-of-privacy branch; the panel used these authorities to frame the threshold question: was there a protected privacy interest at all?
• United States v. Wuagneux, 683 F.2d 1343 (11th Cir. 1982) (quoting Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971))
  Role: Established the anti-“general rummaging” principle and the requirement that warrants be as specific as circumstances permit. The panel acknowledged this constraint but concluded it was satisfied by a warrant limited to evidence of “Child Pornography and Sexual Exploitation.”
• United States v. McCall, 84 F.4th 1317 (11th Cir. 2023)
  Role: Noted that time limits can be a useful narrowing tool for warrants directed to cloud accounts. Mininger relied on this general idea; the panel treated it as context-specific rather than a universal mandate.
• United States v. Blake, 868 F.3d 960 (11th Cir. 2017)
  Role: Provided the decisive distinction between cloud-account searches and hard-drive/device searches. The panel emphasized Blake’s point that hard drives permit concealment via “obscure folders, misnamed files, encrypted data,” making ex ante precision (like limiting by file type or date) less feasible.
• United States v. Strauss, 678 F.2d 886 (11th Cir. 1982)
  Role: Reinforced that warrant particularity is ultimately a “reasonableness” inquiry. The panel used this to uphold the warrant’s subject-matter limitation without requiring additional technical or temporal constraints.

Legal Reasoning

1) No objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in the SD cards

The court treated the SD-card issue as a threshold Fourth Amendment question: before asking whether an exception (like consent) justified the officers’ conduct, Mininger had to show that the officers’ viewing of the SD-card contents infringed an expectation of privacy that society recognizes as reasonable.

Applying the “totality of the circumstances” approach, the court highlighted three reinforcing facts:

1. Shared location and loss of control: The SD cards were left in cameras placed in shared spaces (a child’s bedroom and a shared bathroom), making them readily discoverable and accessible without entering Mininger’s private sleeping area.
2. Failure to secure access: The cards were not password-protected. The ease of access made the contents functionally “readily accessible to third parties,” akin to items left in unsecured common areas under United States v. King.
3. Illicit, privacy-invasive use: The placement and purpose—covertly recording a minor undressing—placed the asserted privacy interest outside the social norms that typically support Fourth Amendment protection. The court’s reliance on United States v. Epps underscored that context can signal contraband/illicit content such that society is not prepared to recognize a privacy right in it.

Importantly, the court did not deny that overnight guests can have privacy interests in a host’s home (Minnesota v. Olson), but it narrowed Olson to its normative foundation: guest privacy is grounded in customary, reciprocal respect within the host-guest relationship. Secret voyeuristic recording was treated as a fundamental breach of that premise, rendering any claimed expectation of privacy objectively unreasonable—especially where the recording media is left unsecured in common areas.

The practical effect of this holding is that the court affirmed without needing to rely on the district court’s consent rationale, using United States v. Cohen to uphold the denial of suppression on an alternative ground supported by the record.

2) No categorical requirement that device-search warrants include time/category limits

Mininger argued that because the initial SD-card videos were tied to specific people and periods (e.g., recordings from 2018–2020), warrants for his devices should have been constrained by time range, victim identifiers, or forensic filters. The Eleventh Circuit rejected this as inconsistent with its precedent and with the realities of physical-device forensics.

The panel acknowledged the general Fourth Amendment prohibition on “general, exploratory rummaging” (United States v. Wuagneux quoting Coolidge v. New Hampshire) and recognized that time limits can help narrow warrants in some contexts (United States v. McCall). But it emphasized, via United States v. Blake, that physical storage devices differ materially from cloud accounts: hard drives allow users to hide evidence through renaming, obscure placement, and encryption—precisely what happened here through VeraCrypt and layered passwords. Because concealed evidence may not be identifiable without broader forensic examination, ex ante limitations are not always “feasible” or constitutionally required.

Applying the Eleventh Circuit’s particularity standard—warrants must be as specific as circumstances permit (United States v. Wuagneux; United States v. Strauss)—the court found the warrant sufficiently limited to “records relating to Child Pornography and Sexual Exploitation,” and therefore not overbroad.

Impact

• Sharper boundary on guest privacy in a host’s home: The decision signals that Olson-style guest privacy does not extend to clandestine surveillance placed in shared spaces, particularly where the guest leaves recording media unsecured and the conduct invades the host’s family’s privacy. Future defendants may find it harder to claim Fourth Amendment protection over digital media deliberately exposed to discovery in common areas.
• Reinforcement of “accessibility” as a digital-privacy limiter: Building on United States v. King, the opinion emphasizes that failing to employ basic security measures (e.g., password protection) and leaving media in shared spaces can defeat objective privacy expectations, even for digital data.
• Device-warrant drafting in the Eleventh Circuit: The ruling supports warrants for physical devices that are limited by subject matter (e.g., “Child Pornography and Sexual Exploitation”) without mandating time restrictions or forensic protocols, especially where encryption/obfuscation is likely. Litigants challenging such warrants will need to show why additional limits were feasible and constitutionally required under the circumstances, rather than relying on broad analogies to cloud-account cases.
• Practical prosecution implications: By upholding broad forensic examination of physical devices in this context, the opinion reduces suppression risk where initial probable cause points to sexual exploitation and subsequent forensic work reveals additional contraband, including encrypted and concealed material.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Reasonable expectation of privacy

A privacy interest protected by the Fourth Amendment exists only if (1) the person actually expected privacy and (2) society would view that expectation as reasonable. Even if someone wants secrecy, the law may treat the expectation as unreasonable when the person exposes the item to others or violates core social norms.

Totality of the circumstances

Courts do not use a single rigid test; they consider all relevant facts together—location, control, security steps (passwords), who could access the item, and the nature/purpose of the conduct.

Overnight guest privacy (Minnesota v. Olson)

Overnight guests often have privacy rights in a host’s home because society recognizes the custom of hosting. But those rights are strongest in the guest’s own quarters and depend on reciprocal respect; they weaken in shared areas and do not extend to clandestine acts that exceed the host’s permission and social norms.

Warrant particularity vs. “general rummaging”

Warrants must describe what police may search for with reasonable specificity. The Constitution aims to prevent open-ended searches for “anything illegal.” But specificity is judged pragmatically—what limits are possible given the type of evidence and how it can be concealed.

Cloud accounts vs. physical devices

Cloud providers can often produce precisely requested data (making narrow requests feasible), while physical devices can contain hidden, misnamed, or encrypted evidence that may require broader forensic review to locate. The Eleventh Circuit treated this difference as central to whether time limits or forensic filters are required.

Conclusion

United States v. Kenneth Mininger establishes two practical rules in the Eleventh Circuit. First, an overnight guest has no objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in the contents of SD cards left unsecured in shared spaces of the host’s home—especially when used for voyeuristic, nonconsensual recordings that invade the host family’s privacy. Second, the court reaffirmed that warrants to search physical electronic storage devices need not be categorically constrained by time limits or similar ex ante forensic restrictions, so long as the warrant is reasonably particular given the investigative circumstances and the realities of hidden/encrypted digital evidence.