2. Background and Procedural History
The relationship and the charged conduct
Benjamin and Simmons resumed a friendship in spring 2021. They spent time together at Simmons’ apartment and during breaks from her work as a toll collector. Their relationship deteriorated after Simmons lent Benjamin a car on the condition that he make its lease payments. According to the trial evidence, he fell behind on payments and had accidents with the vehicle.
Simmons sought the car’s return and discouraged Benjamin from appearing unannounced at her apartment. Benjamin nevertheless continued contacting her and visiting. During August and September 2021, he sent repeated accusatory and insulting messages, demanded to know her whereabouts, and threatened to come to her home despite her requests that he leave her alone.
On October 5, 2021, Benjamin arrived at Simmons’ apartment shortly after she returned from work. She allowed him inside to use the bathroom. He then accused her of lying about being at work, grabbed her, squeezed her neck, and punched her. During the struggle, he took her phone. Knowing that Benjamin was aware she kept a gun in her purse, Simmons reached into the purse to induce him to return the phone. He threw it at her, and she called 911.
Police photographed bruising on Simmons’ neck and face. After leaving, Benjamin returned and demanded entry, prompting another police call. Simmons obtained medical treatment on October 11. At trial, a forensic nurse testified that the photographs and medical records were consistent with strangulation.
Trial, sentencing, and appeal
The Superior Court denied Benjamin’s motion for judgment of acquittal on the stalking charge. It granted his request for a self-defense instruction, over the State’s objection, based on the evidence concerning Simmons’ deliberate movement toward the purse containing the gun. The appellate order recounts these rulings but does not separately analyze them as grounds for reversal.
Principal procedural dates
| Date |
Event |
| October 6, 2021 |
Benjamin was arrested. |
| November 2, 2021 |
The Superior Court accepted the case. |
| March 6, 2023 |
Originally scheduled trial date; trial was subsequently postponed twice at the prosecutor’s request. |
| May 8–10, 2023 |
Trial commenced, and the jury found Benjamin guilty. |
| July 14, 2023 |
Initially scheduled sentencing date; the record did not explain why sentencing did not occur. |
| November 27, 2023 |
The Superior Court denied the State’s habitual-offender motion. |
| February 16, 2024 |
The Superior Court imposed sentence. |
The sentence announced at the hearing comprised one year of Level V incarceration for stalking, four years of Level V incarceration followed by eighteen months of Level III GPS probation for strangulation, and thirty days of Level V incarceration for offensive touching. The written order mistakenly recorded the offensive-touching sentence as thirty months.
On direct appeal, counsel filed a brief and motion to withdraw under Supreme Court Rule 26(c), stating that a careful review disclosed no arguably appealable issues. Benjamin received notice of the procedure and submitted his own arguments concerning speedy trial, speedy sentencing, and confrontation. The State sought affirmance.
4. Analysis: Precedents and Legal Reasoning
A. Independent review under Rule 26(c)
The court relied on PENSON v. OHIO, 488 U.S. 75, 83 (1988), and LEACOCK v. STATE, 690 A.2d 926, 927–28 (Del. 1996), for the safeguards governing a non-merit appeal. These authorities require two distinct inquiries:
- Whether counsel conscientiously examined the record and law for arguable claims.
- Whether the court’s own review establishes that the appeal is so devoid of arguably appealable issues that it can be decided without an adversarial presentation.
These precedents matter because counsel’s assessment cannot substitute for judicial review. Benjamin’s personal submissions still required consideration, and the court independently examined the record. Its identification of the sentencing discrepancy demonstrates that this review can produce corrective relief even when the asserted appellate claims lack merit.
B. Preservation and plain-error review
Supreme Court Rule 8 and PAGE v. STATE, 934 A.2d 891, 896 (Del. 2007), supplied the framework for reviewing issues not raised in the Superior Court. Under WAINWRIGHT v. STATE, 504 A.2d 1096, 1100 (Del. 1986), plain error concerns defects apparent on the record that are fundamental and clearly deprive an accused of a substantial right or demonstrate manifest injustice.
Benjamin had not asserted either speedy-trial or speedy-sentencing rights below. His confrontation claim was also unpreserved, despite an objection to the nurse’s testimony. At trial, he objected that the nurse had not prepared her own report and could not testify as an expert from records or interviews she had not personally created or conducted. He did not identify a Sixth Amendment confrontation violation.
The distinction is important: an objection to an expert’s foundation does not automatically preserve a constitutional objection. The trial court must receive the relevant legal ground. Accordingly, the Supreme Court reviewed the confrontation claim for plain error rather than treating it as a preserved constitutional challenge.
C. Speedy trial: balancing, not a mechanical deadline
The governing precedents
BARKER v. WINGO, 407 U.S. 514 (1972), supplied the four-factor constitutional test: length of delay, reasons for delay, assertion of the right, and prejudice. The factors are interrelated, and none is independently conclusive. JOHNSON v. STATE, 305 A.2d 622, 623 (Del. 1973), established Delaware’s adoption of that test.
MIDDLEBROOK v. STATE, 802 A.2d 268, 273 (Del. 2002), clarified when the right attaches: arrest or indictment, whichever occurs first. It also supplied the initial screening principle that further balancing is unnecessary unless the delay is presumptively prejudicial. Cooper v. State, 2011 WL 6039613, at *7 (Del. Dec. 5, 2011), explained that Delaware generally considers the remaining factors when the interval exceeds one year.
“Presumptively prejudicial” is a threshold for analysis, not a finding that the defendant has established actual prejudice or a constitutional violation. Benjamin’s approximately nineteen-month delay crossed that threshold, requiring examination of the remaining factors.
Reasons for the delay
The court attributed portions of the delay to pandemic-related conditions and portions to the State. Administrative Order No. 22 modified the Speedy Trial Guidelines after the judicial emergency ended. Certain provisions, including the requirement that all covered criminal cases reach a determination of guilt or innocence within one year of indictment, did not apply to Superior Court cases pending between March 16, 2020, and December 31, 2021.
Benjamin’s case fell within that category because the Superior Court accepted it on November 2, 2021. The administrative framework directed the court to prioritize those cases consistently with justice and management of the pandemic-generated caseload. The prosecutor also obtained two postponements because of other scheduled trials.
The court did not treat the administrative modification as suspending the constitutional right. It continued to apply the constitutional balancing test. It also observed that Benjamin was adjudicated guilty within one year of indictment, even though the corresponding guideline did not apply.
This distinction between starting dates is consequential: the constitutional period ran from arrest, whereas the cited administrative benchmark ran from indictment. Compliance with an indictment-based guideline therefore did not eliminate the need to consider the longer arrest-to-trial interval.
Assertion and prejudice
Benjamin never asserted the speedy-trial right in the Superior Court. The court weighed that omission in the State’s favor. It also found that he had identified no prejudice and had not shown that the delay impaired his defense.
Those conclusions, considered with the other factors, defeated the claim. The order does not hold that failing to demand a speedy trial automatically forfeits the constitutional right, nor that prejudice is invariably indispensable. It applies the established, contextual balancing process to this record.
D. Speedy sentencing: assuming the right without defining its constitutional source
The role of the sentencing precedents
In HARRIS v. STATE, 956 A.2d 1273, 1275 (Del. 2008), the court found support for assuming a constitutional right to speedy sentencing and applying the four-factor balancing framework. That decision quoted PEREZ v. SULLIVAN, 793 F.2d 249, 254 (10th Cir. 1986), for the significance of the defendant’s changed status after conviction: the person is no longer an accused presumed innocent, but someone found guilty and awaiting sentence.
These authorities prevent an unqualified transfer of pretrial assumptions into the post-verdict setting. The same general factors may be considered, but the defendant’s altered legal position matters. Crucially, Benjamin’s order assumes rather than definitively establishes a constitutional right to speedy sentencing. It should not be read as announcing that the Sixth Amendment trial guarantee necessarily continues unchanged after conviction.
The delay and the sixty-day guideline
The interval between the May 10, 2023 verdict and February 16, 2024 sentencing was less than one year, but substantially exceeded the sixty-day guideline for cases in which a presentence investigation had been ordered. The Superior Court initially scheduled sentencing for July 14 and directed that it coincide with a violation-of-probation hearing in another case. The record did not explain why sentencing failed to occur then.
The State later sought habitual-offender treatment. The parties litigated that request from late August through November 2023, and the Superior Court denied it on November 27. Sentencing followed in February.
The Supreme Court did not resolve responsibility for every portion of this interval. Instead, it assumed that the delay was attributable to the State and still rejected the claim because Benjamin had neither asserted a right to earlier sentencing nor identified prejudice.
The important distinction is between an administrative performance standard and a constitutional violation. Exceeding the sixty-day guideline warranted consideration, but did not itself establish constitutional entitlement to relief. The order does not suggest that the guideline is meaningless or authorize routine sentencing delay; it holds that the particular constitutional claim failed under the balancing analysis.
E. Confrontation: treatment records versus testimonial forensic reports
The constitutional starting point
The court cited Chavis v. State, 227 A.3d 1079, 1088 (Del. 2020), which in turn relied on CRAWFORD v. WASHINGTON, 541 U.S. 36, 59 (2004). Together, these authorities supplied the central rule: the prosecution generally cannot introduce an absent witness’s testimonial statements unless that witness is unavailable and the defendant previously had an opportunity to cross-examine the witness.
The decisive classification was therefore whether the material underlying the nurse’s testimony consisted of testimonial statements. It was not enough that the material was created outside court or that someone other than the testifying nurse recorded it.
Why the laboratory-report precedents did not control
Benjamin relied on two decisions involving forensic laboratory evidence:
- Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305: certificates reporting the composition and weight of suspected cocaine were testimonial, requiring an opportunity to confront the analysts.
- Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 564 U.S. 647 (2011): a testimonial blood-alcohol report could not be introduced through a scientist who neither signed its certification nor performed or observed the reported test.
Both decisions restrict the substitution of a testifying witness for an absent analyst responsible for testimonial forensic findings. But the factual premise was missing in Benjamin’s case. The forensic nurse was not transmitting the results of forensic testing performed by an absent analyst. She relied on statements Simmons made while seeking medical care and on treatment records documenting that care.
The court also relied on Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts itself for the proposition that medical reports created for treatment purposes are not testimonial. Thus, the authority Benjamin invoked supplied the distinction that defeated his argument.
The separate evidentiary foundations
The order addressed several related but distinct evidentiary questions:
- Expert disclosure: The State’s Superior Court Criminal Rule 16 response disclosed its intention to call a forensic nurse as an expert on strangulation and whether Simmons’ injuries indicated strangulation. That disclosure supported the trial court’s rejection of the objection made at trial.
- Treatment statements: D.R.E. 803(4) supported admission of Simmons’ statements concerning her symptoms and their cause for medical diagnosis or treatment.
- Regularly maintained records: The State gave notice of its intention to submit the medical records under D.R.E. 803(6), and Benjamin did not object to their admission.
- Authentication: D.R.E. 902(11) provided for self-authentication of qualifying certified records of regularly conducted activity.
Although the order describes certain statements and records as “not hearsay,” Rules 803(4) and 803(6) are more precisely understood as exceptions to the hearsay exclusion. Rule 902(11), by contrast, concerns authentication: establishing that a record is what its proponent claims.
These doctrines should not be conflated. Expert disclosure does not itself satisfy confrontation requirements. Self-authentication does not independently establish a hearsay exception. And business-record status does not, by itself, resolve whether a statement is testimonial. The court’s conclusion rested on the treatment-related character of the underlying information, together with the evidentiary circumstances and the plain-error standard.
The holding’s limits
The order does not authorize experts to introduce any absent person’s conclusions merely by referring to them as medical records. Its reasoning depends on the records’ treatment purpose and the absence of the testimonial forensic testing at issue in the laboratory cases. Records generated primarily as forensic evidence would require a different analysis.
Nor did the court announce an unrestricted rule permitting all expert opinions based on records the expert did not create. It resolved the specific confrontation claim and found no plain error on this record.
F. Correcting the written sentence
The court relied on Puller v. State, 2023 WL 1099179, at *2 (Del. Jan. 27, 2023), and Superior Court Criminal Rule 36. That authority permits correction, at any time, of clerical mistakes in judgments and orders and errors arising from oversight or omission.
The discrepancy was straightforward: the judge orally imposed thirty days for offensive touching, but the written order stated thirty months. The Supreme Court ordered a limited remand to make the written record reflect the sentence actually pronounced.
This was not a direction to reconsider punishment or conduct a plenary resentencing. The distinction matters because the court affirmed the judgment’s substance while requiring accurate documentation of its terms.