Precedents Cited
Kelly v. Borough of Carlisle, 622 F.3d 248 (3d Cir. 2010)
The court cited Kelly v. Borough of Carlisle for the standard of appellate review of summary judgment:
de novo review applying Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a). While not central to the PPP merits, it frames
the procedural posture: the Third Circuit independently assessed whether the record supported judgment as a
matter of law in favor of the SBA.
Long Island Care at Home, Ltd. v. Coke, 551 U.S. 158 (2007)
Long Island Care at Home, Ltd. v. Coke supplied the interpretive principle that “the specific governs
the general.” The court used that canon to prioritize the Corporate Group Rule’s specific consequence—noncompliant
loans “will not be eligible for forgiveness”—over more general language in other SBA materials suggesting that
denials may occur “in whole or in part, as appropriate.” This move is the opinion’s key interpretive pivot:
even if general guidance contemplates partial denials in some scenarios, a specific rule can foreclose partial
forgiveness for the category of violations it addresses.
The court invoked United States v. Nixon for the proposition that when the Executive Branch promulgates
binding rules, it is bound by them while they remain in force. Applied here, once the SBA adopted the Corporate
Group Rule, it was obligated to apply it as written; doing so cannot itself be arbitrary or an abuse of discretion.
The citation reinforces that an agency’s adherence to its own valid, operative rule is not a flaw but a virtue.
Leslie v. Att'y Gen. reinforced the “long-settled principle” that an agency’s regulations that affect
the rights and interests of others are controlling upon the agency. The Third Circuit used this alongside
Nixon to validate the SBA’s reliance on its own Corporate Group Rule as the primary basis for denial.
FCC v. Prometheus Radio Project, 592 U.S. 414 (2021)
The court cited FCC v. Prometheus Radio Project for the APA reasonableness benchmark: agency action is
upheld if it falls “within a zone of reasonableness.” This precedent informed the court’s alternative holding:
even if the SBA had discretion to partially forgive, the SBA’s explanation for denying forgiveness entirely was
reasonable given the magnitude of the overage and the borrower’s asserted lack of awareness despite multiple
certifications and applications across the corporate group.
Impact
This decision is likely to shape PPP/agency-forgiveness litigation in at least four ways:
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No equitable “cap-only” forgiveness theory in the Third Circuit.
Borrowers who exceed an SBA-promulgated aggregate cap cannot assume courts will order forgiveness up to what
would have been allowed; categorical ineligibility language can support total denial.
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Regulatory specificity matters.
When SBA (or other agencies) pairs a compliance obligation with an explicit consequence (“will not be eligible”),
courts may treat that as decisive even if other program materials discuss partial remedies elsewhere.
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“As appropriate” preserves agency discretion.
The opinion treats “in whole or in part, as appropriate” as a discretionary administration tool—not a borrower
entitlement—limiting attempts to convert general guidance into mandatory outcomes.
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Compliance systems and recordkeeping are legally salient.
The SBA’s reasoning credited by the court highlights that borrower explanations reflecting weak controls can
justify harsher outcomes under APA review, especially where repeated certifications were made during the
application process.
More broadly, the case reinforces a pandemic-program administration theme: in mass emergency lending with finite
appropriations, agencies may adopt bright-line rules to allocate resources and deter over-application, and courts
may uphold strict consequences where rules clearly warn of them.