Date: Apr 17, 2026

No New Substantive Due Process Privacy Right for Police Evidence-Sharing with Untrained Auxiliary Personnel in Child-Image Investigations

Introduction

Jane Doe 1, et al. v. Steven V. Sloan, et al. (7th Cir. Apr. 14, 2026) arises from a 2019 investigation in Stark County/Toulon, Illinois into a Dropbox folder (“Blue Breeze”) containing sexually explicit images of local underage girls. Deputy Sheriff/Police Chief Gary Bent provided the Dropbox link to Jason Musselman—an auxiliary police officer and the Toulon Police Department’s IT worker—so he could help identify the minors depicted. Musselman did assist with identifications, but later unlawfully retained the images for personal use and distribution, conduct uncovered in a separate 2021 child-pornography investigation that resulted in a 35-year sentence.

The victim-plaintiffs pursued multiple civil theories, including statutory claims against Musselman under 18 U.S.C. § 2255(a) and Illinois tort claims (e.g., intrusion upon seclusion). The appeals concerned only the plaintiffs’ attempt to impose constitutional liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on Sheriff Steven Sloan, Deputy Bent, and municipal entities, alleging that giving Musselman access to the images violated the plaintiffs’ Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process rights.

The key legal issue on appeal was whether the Due Process Clause protects a fundamental liberty interest that prohibits law enforcement, during an investigation, from sharing sexually explicit images of minors with an individual assisting the investigation but allegedly lacking “actual authority” and training—such that the disclosure itself constitutes a substantive due process violation.

Summary of the Opinion

The Seventh Circuit affirmed dismissal of the § 1983 claims. While recognizing the “vile” nature of Musselman’s crimes and criticizing aspects of the investigation’s handling, the court held that plaintiffs failed to allege the violation of a recognized fundamental right protected by substantive due process. Because the asserted liberty interest was not shown to be “deeply rooted in [our] history and tradition” under the Supreme Court’s modern methodology, the court declined to “break new ground” by recognizing a new substantive due process privacy right in this context. The panel emphasized that the Due Process Clause is not a mechanism for courts to craft evidence-sharing protocols, and reiterated that “not every wrong is a constitutional one.”

Analysis

Precedents Cited

Indep. Tr. Corp. v. Stewart Info. Servs. Corp. and Nelson v. City of Chicago:
Cited for the Rule 12(b)(6) posture—courts accept well-pleaded allegations as true and draw reasonable inferences for plaintiffs, while reciting allegations “without vouching for their truth.” These cases frame the procedural lens: even accepting the alleged mishandling and foreseeability concerns, plaintiffs still must plead a viable constitutional right.
Ashcroft v. Iqbal and Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly:
Provide the governing plausibility standard. The opinion uses this framework to stress that conclusory invocations of “privacy” do not suffice; plaintiffs must articulate a specific liberty interest and plausibly connect it to recognized substantive due process protection.
Dobbs v. Jackson Women's Health Org.:
Serves as the opinion’s doctrinal anchor for modern substantive due process analysis. The court relies on Dobbs’s insistence that unenumerated substantive due process rights must be “deeply rooted” and supported by careful historical inquiry. Dobbs also undercuts reliance on older “privacy” formulations that were not grounded in the now-required historical method.
Robbin v. City of Berwyn:
Reinforces the Seventh Circuit’s repeated caution that substantive due process claims are difficult and that the doctrine’s scope is narrow—supporting the panel’s reluctance to expand it to new contexts.
Washington v. Glucksberg:
Supplies the classic test: (1) a “careful description” of the asserted liberty interest and (2) proof it is deeply rooted in the nation’s history and tradition. The court uses Glucksberg to critique both sides’ attempts to define the right and, ultimately, to conclude that none of the proposed formulations identifies a historically grounded fundamental right.
Christensen v. County of Boone, Campos v. Cook County, and Doe v. City of Lafayette:
Cited for the principle that courts must define the right at the appropriate level of specificity and be reluctant to expand substantive due process. The court uses these cases to explain why broad phrasing—e.g., a general “privacy in sexual matters”—fails to “set the boundaries” of the interest at stake.
Doe v. Gray:
Employed as a close Seventh Circuit analog in method (though not facts): a general privacy interest in “medical or sexual information” does not establish a more specific privacy right in a particular investigative context (there, criminal/child welfare investigations). This supports the court’s view that even if “privacy” exists in some sense, it does not automatically constitutionalize the specific disclosure complained of here.
K.C. v. Individual Members of Med. Licensing Bd. of Ind.:
Used as a recent example of Glucksberg-style careful definition of asserted rights, illustrating the court’s insistence on specificity and historical grounding for any claimed substantive due process liberty interest.
Khan v. Gallitano:
Cited for the “deeply rooted” requirement. It underscores that plaintiffs bear the burden to show the claimed right reflects historical tradition rather than policy preference.
York v. Story:
Plaintiffs’ primary “privacy” authority. The court distinguishes it as involving egregious police misconduct: coerced nude photography in a locked room, arguably implicating the Fourth Amendment, followed by circulation without any investigative purpose. By contrast, here the images were shared ostensibly to assist identification in an active investigation, and the officers did not create or coerce the images’ production.
Whalen v. Roe and Wolfe v. Schaefer:
Invoked by plaintiffs to argue a broader informational privacy right. The court treats these cases as too general and factually remote, noting Wolfe’s skepticism that the Supreme Court is eager to recognize or expand such a right, and emphasizing that these decisions predate the Court’s more recent, historically focused substantive due process approach highlighted in Dobbs.
DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep't of Soc. Servs.:
Provides the limiting principle: the Due Process Clause does not turn every tort or governmental mistake into a constitutional violation. This is central to the panel’s bottom line—serious harm and poor judgment are not enough to create § 1983 liability absent a recognized constitutional right.

Legal Reasoning

Step one: identify the right with “careful description.”
The court rejects the plaintiffs’ broad formulations (“privacy of sexual highly personal matters” and “avoid nonconsensual dissemination of access”) as insufficiently specific. It emphasizes that the level of generality matters because it determines whether the court is truly recognizing a historically grounded fundamental right or merely constitutionalizing a desirable policy.
Step two: determine whether that carefully described right is fundamental under history and tradition.
Even accepting a more tailored definition (the district court’s or the parties’ refinements, including the minors’ status and unauthorized retention), the court finds no supporting tradition or precedent establishing a fundamental liberty interest that bars investigative sharing of contraband sexual images with an auxiliary participant.

Critically, the court does not treat “privacy” as a free-floating constitutional principle capable of deciding the case. Instead, following Washington v. Glucksberg as reinforced by Dobbs v. Jackson Women's Health Org., the panel requires historical analysis and declines to supply it on plaintiffs’ behalf—especially where recognizing the asserted right would “break new ground.”
Distinguishing plaintiffs’ authorities.
York v. Story is confined to its extreme facts (coerced photography and internal dissemination without legitimate purpose), and the opinion notes its pre-Glucksberg vintage. Whalen v. Roe and Wolfe v. Schaefer are treated as high-level discussions that do not establish the specific right plaintiffs need in the investigative evidence-sharing context, particularly after Dobbs’s emphasis on historical grounding.
Institutional competence and constitutional modesty.
The panel expressly resists converting due process into judicially crafted “evidence-sharing protocols” for child pornography investigations. That observation functions as both a doctrinal restraint (substantive due process is “very limited”) and a separation-of-powers concern: policy failures may be addressed by statutes, departmental rules, state tort law, and criminal law, not necessarily by expanding constitutional doctrine.
Stopping point: no constitutional violation, so § 1983 fails.
Because the court finds no viable substantive due process right, it affirms dismissal on that basis. Although the district court also addressed qualified immunity, the Seventh Circuit’s affirmance rests on the threshold absence of a recognized constitutional right.

Impact

Post-Dobbs tightening of “informational privacy” claims in the Seventh Circuit.
The decision signals that litigants relying on older “privacy” language (particularly pre-Glucksberg cases) will face a steep burden unless they can supply a concrete, historically grounded tradition supporting the specific asserted right. Broad appeals to dignity or confidentiality, without the Dobbs/Glucksberg historical showing, are unlikely to survive.
Limits on constitutionalizing investigative mishandling.
Even in a highly sympathetic setting involving minors and sexual images, the court draws a hard line between poor investigative judgment (and resulting foreseeable harms) and a Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process violation.
Channeling to alternative remedies.
The opinion implicitly encourages plaintiffs to pursue statutory and state-law routes—here, 18 U.S.C. § 2255(a) and Illinois tort claims—rather than attempting to expand substantive due process. This may shape pleading strategies in future cases involving law enforcement handling of sensitive digital evidence.
Operational consequences for law enforcement (indirect, not mandated).
Although the court declines to constitutionalize protocols, the opinion’s criticism that defendants’ handling “left much to be desired” may still motivate agencies to tighten access control, auditing, and training—because exposure remains under tort law, employment discipline, and public accountability even if § 1983 liability is unavailable on these facts.

Complex Concepts Simplified

42 U.S.C. § 1983: A civil lawsuit tool that allows damages claims against state actors who violate federal constitutional or statutory rights.
Substantive due process: The doctrine (under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause) that protects certain fundamental rights from government interference, even when procedures are fair. Courts treat it as narrow and apply it cautiously.
“Careful description” of the right: The requirement (from Washington v. Glucksberg) that a plaintiff define the alleged right precisely, not in broad aspirational terms, so courts can evaluate whether it is truly fundamental.
“Deeply rooted in history and tradition”: The test (emphasized in Dobbs v. Jackson Women's Health Org. and Glucksberg) that unenumerated rights must be supported by longstanding historical practice and legal tradition.
Rule 12(b)(6) / plausibility: The standard for dismissing a complaint that does not plausibly allege a legal claim (Ashcroft v. Iqbal; Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly).
Qualified immunity: A doctrine that can shield officials from damages unless the violated right was “clearly established.” The district court addressed it, but the Seventh Circuit affirmed based on the absence of a recognized right.
Intrusion upon seclusion: An Illinois tort claim (state law) addressing certain serious privacy invasions. The opinion notes that non-constitutional remedies remain available.

Conclusion

Jane Doe 1 v. Steven V. Sloan reinforces a restrained, post-Dobbs v. Jackson Women's Health Org. approach to substantive due process: plaintiffs must precisely define the asserted liberty interest and demonstrate—through history and tradition—that it is fundamental. The Seventh Circuit refused to recognize a new constitutional privacy right governing police sharing of sexually explicit images of minors with an auxiliary participant during an investigation, even where the recipient later exploited the access criminally. The decision underscores a recurring constitutional boundary—captured by DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep't of Soc. Servs.: grave wrongdoing and real harm do not automatically become a Fourteenth Amendment violation, and many disputes about negligent or ill-advised governmental conduct are left to statutory, administrative, and state tort remedies rather than § 1983.