No New Substantive Due Process “Privacy” Right Against Investigatory Sharing of Child-Exploitation Images Without a Glucksberg/Dobbs Historical Showing

Introduction

Jane Doe 1, et al. v. Steven V. Sloan, et al. (7th Cir. Apr. 14, 2026) arises from a 2019 investigation in Stark County/Toulon, Illinois into a Dropbox folder (“Blue Breeze”) containing sexually explicit images of underage local girls. Sheriff Steven Sloan assigned the investigation to Deputy Gary Bent, who—seeking technical help—provided the Dropbox link to Jason Musselman, an auxiliary Toulon police officer and the department’s IT worker.

Musselman assisted in identifying victims but unlawfully retained the images for personal use, later uncovered during a separate child-pornography investigation that resulted in a 35-year sentence. The plaintiffs pursued multiple civil theories; the appeal concerns only their 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims alleging that Sloan and Bent violated the plaintiffs’ Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process rights by giving Musselman access to the images during the investigation.

The central issue on appeal was whether the Due Process Clause protects a fundamental privacy liberty interest that would make the officers’ investigatory disclosure to Musselman a constitutional violation.

Summary of the Opinion

The Seventh Circuit affirmed dismissal of the § 1983 claims. Even accepting the allegations as true at the pleading stage, the court held that plaintiffs failed to allege the violation of any recognized fundamental substantive due process right. The court declined to “break new ground” by recognizing a new privacy-based liberty interest barring police, during an investigation, from sharing sexually explicit images of minors with an auxiliary officer/IT helper who lacked formal authority or training—because plaintiffs did not provide the required historical and traditional grounding demanded by modern substantive due process doctrine.

The panel emphasized that serious wrongdoing and profound harm do not automatically translate into a constitutional claim; other remedies (statutory and tort) remained available. The judgment dismissing the § 1983 claims was AFFIRMED.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

Pleading and appellate posture

• Indep. Tr. Corp. v. Stewart Info. Servs. Corp., 665 F.3d 930 (7th Cir. 2012) and Nelson v. City of Chicago, 992 F.3d 599 (7th Cir. 2021): The court reiterated the Rule 12(b)(6) lens—well-pleaded allegations are accepted as true and viewed favorably to plaintiffs—while also noting it recounts allegations “without vouching for their truth.”
• Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) and Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007): The panel framed the threshold as plausibility, but the case ultimately turned less on factual plausibility and more on the absence of an underlying constitutional right.

The modern framework for recognizing substantive due process rights

• Dobbs v. Jackson Women's Health Org., 597 U.S. 215 (2022): Dobbs supplied the governing articulation that substantive due process protects only a “select list” of unenumerated fundamental rights that are “deeply rooted” in history and tradition and essential to ordered liberty, and it underscored the necessity of “careful historical analysis” when courts are asked to recognize new liberty interests. The Seventh Circuit treated Dobbs as reinforcing (not relaxing) the methodological demands for new substantive-due-process claims.
• Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997): Glucksberg contributed two key constraints: (1) the requirement of a “careful description” of the asserted liberty interest, and (2) a demanding historical inquiry to confirm the interest is deeply rooted in the Nation’s traditions. The panel used Glucksberg as the doctrinal gatekeeper and concluded plaintiffs did not satisfy it.
• Robbin v. City of Berwyn, 108 F.4th 586 (7th Cir. 2024); Christensen v. County of Boone, 483 F.3d 454 (7th Cir. 2007); and Campos v. Cook County, 932 F.3d 972 (7th Cir. 2019): These Seventh Circuit decisions were cited to stress how difficult it is to plead a viable substantive due process claim and to reiterate the admonition that the doctrine’s scope is “very limited” and should not be expanded casually.

Defining the asserted right with sufficient specificity

• Doe v. City of Lafayette, 377 F.3d 757 (7th Cir. 2004) (en banc): Used for the proposition that defining a liberty interest too broadly fails to set workable boundaries. The court applied this to reject plaintiffs’ broad “privacy of sexual matters” formulations.
• Doe v. Gray, 75 F.4th 710 (7th Cir. 2023): The panel relied on Gray to emphasize that general references to “privacy” in sexual or medical information do not establish a more specific right in particular investigative contexts, especially involving child sexual abuse allegations.
• K.C. v. Individual Members of Med. Licensing Bd. of Ind., 121 F.4th 604 (7th Cir. 2024): Cited as an example of the court’s practice in carefully formulating the asserted right at the proper level of generality.

Authorities plaintiffs relied on—and why the court found them insufficient

• York v. Story, 324 F.2d 450 (9th Cir. 1963): Plaintiffs’ lead authority. The Seventh Circuit distinguished it as involving police coercion and photographing without lawful purpose and subsequent circulation unrelated to an investigation—conduct “quite distinct” from Sloan and Bent sharing the Dropbox link to facilitate identifications in an active investigation. The panel also noted York predates the modern Glucksberg methodology.
• Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977) and Wolfe v. Schaefer, 619 F.3d 782 (7th Cir. 2010): The court treated these as, at most, broad observations about informational privacy in very different settings (prescription-drug recordkeeping; public disclosure of investigative targets), and it highlighted Wolfe’s caution that the Supreme Court has seemed more interested in limiting than expanding any such right. Critically, the panel viewed these cases as not performing the kind of historical analysis that Dobbs now demands for recognizing new substantive due process rights.
• Khan v. Gallitano, 180 F.3d 829 (7th Cir. 1999): Cited for the “deeply rooted” requirement; it reinforced the plaintiffs’ burden that they did not meet.

Limits of constitutionalizing tortious conduct

• DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189 (1989): Invoked for the principle that the Due Process Clause does not turn every wrong by a state actor into a constitutional violation. The court used DeShaney to situate plaintiffs’ injuries as potentially remediable through statutory/tort claims without creating a new constitutional tort.

Legal Reasoning

1. The court demanded a narrow, fact-sensitive description of the asserted liberty interest. The panel rejected broad formulations about “privacy” in sexual matters because they did not capture the key features of this case: images of minors, already in existence, being shared during an ongoing criminal investigation, to someone assisting the investigation, albeit allegedly without appropriate authority/training.
2. Even with careful wording, the interest was not shown to be “fundamental” under Glucksberg/Dobbs. After noting that further “wordsmithing” would not matter, the court held that none of the plausible right-definitions described a fundamental liberty interest recognized by the Due Process Clause.
3. Plaintiffs’ case law did not supply the required foundation. York was both factually distinct and doctrinally outdated relative to modern methodology; Whalen and Wolfe were contextually remote and insufficiently specific. Collectively, plaintiffs’ authorities did not establish a deeply rooted tradition prohibiting investigatory sharing of contraband images with an auxiliary investigator.
4. The court refused to recognize a new right absent a historical showing. The decisive move was methodological: because plaintiffs offered “no effort” to conduct the historical inquiry Dobbs says is “essential” when courts are asked to recognize a new component of liberty, the panel declined to “break new ground.”
5. Normative concerns did not substitute for constitutional doctrine. The panel acknowledged the “vile” nature of Musselman’s crimes and that defendants’ handling of the files “left much to be desired,” but it characterized evidence-sharing protocols as a policy/administrative matter not properly constitutionalized through substantive due process.

Impact

• Higher bar for “informational privacy” claims framed as substantive due process. The opinion signals that broad references to “privacy” and older privacy rhetoric will not suffice post-Dobbs; plaintiffs must tie the asserted interest to a historically rooted tradition and define the right with precision.
• Investigatory context matters. The court treated the fact that the disclosure occurred “in furtherance of the investigation” as central to distinguishing cases involving gratuitous or prurient dissemination by officials. Future litigants challenging mishandling of sensitive evidence will likely need to plead and prove more than negligent or reckless protocol violations to reach constitutional territory.
• Channeling toward non-constitutional remedies. By emphasizing that “not every wrong is a constitutional one,” the decision will tend to funnel similar claims into statutory causes of action (where available) and state tort law, and into institutional reforms rather than § 1983 substantive due process theories.
• Doctrinal discipline in the Seventh Circuit’s post-Dobbs jurisprudence. The opinion operationalizes Dobbs as a constraint on judicial recognition of new substantive due process rights, especially in emotionally compelling settings, reinforcing judicial reluctance to expand the doctrine.

Complex Concepts Simplified

42 U.S.C. § 1983

A federal statute allowing lawsuits against state/local officials for violating federal constitutional or statutory rights. It is not enough to show serious misconduct; a plaintiff must show the conduct violated an actual federal “right.”

Substantive Due Process

A doctrine recognizing that the Due Process Clause protects certain fundamental liberties beyond fair procedures. Courts treat it as limited and require a strong justification before recognizing new unenumerated rights.

“Careful description” of the asserted right

Courts insist the claimed liberty be defined narrowly and concretely, not as a broad abstraction (like “privacy”). The definition influences whether history and precedent plausibly support the claim.

“Deeply rooted in history and tradition” (Glucksberg/Dobbs)

To be “fundamental,” the asserted right must be shown—through historical inquiry and legal tradition—to be longstanding and essential to ordered liberty, not a newly formulated principle.

Motion to dismiss / plausibility (Twombly/Iqbal)

At the pleading stage, plaintiffs must allege enough facts to make a claim plausible. Here, even assuming the facts, the court held the law does not recognize the asserted constitutional right.

Conclusion

The Seventh Circuit’s decision holds that plaintiffs cannot convert investigatory mishandling of sexually explicit images of minors into a Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process claim without identifying a narrowly defined, historically grounded fundamental liberty interest. Distinguishing York v. Story and finding Whalen v. Roe/Wolfe v. Schaefer too general and remote, the court applied the Glucksberg/Dobbs methodology to refuse recognition of a new constitutional privacy right in this setting. The case underscores a broader theme: even egregious harm does not itself create a constitutional cause of action, and many such disputes will be resolved through statutory, tort, and policy mechanisms rather than substantive due process expansion.