No Duty to Evaluate Unalleged Psychological Pain Theories; Symptom and RFC Findings Stand if Supported by Substantial Evidence

Introduction

In Barry Varnon v. Social Security Administration, Commissioner (11th Cir. Feb. 12, 2026) (per curiam) (not for publication), the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the denial of Disability Insurance Benefits to Barry L. Varnon, who alleged disability beginning December 24, 2020 due primarily to musculoskeletal pain conditions (including spine issues and fibromyalgia) and later emphasized fatigue associated with low testosterone.

The appeal presented two recurring Social Security review issues:

  • Whether the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) inadequately evaluated the claimant’s subjective symptoms by not expressly discussing alleged psychological contributors to pain and alleged medication side effects; and
  • Whether the ALJ’s residual functional capacity (“RFC”) assessment failed to account for limitations attributable to low testosterone and resulting fatigue.

Applying the highly deferential “substantial evidence” standard, the court held the ALJ’s symptom evaluation and RFC findings were adequately supported, even though the ALJ did not explicitly address every piece of evidence or every theory later emphasized on appeal.

Summary of the Opinion

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court and the Commissioner. It held:

  • The ALJ properly applied the Eleventh Circuit pain standard and SSR 16-3p by considering the record as a whole and articulating reasons for finding the claimant’s allegations “not entirely consistent” with the evidence.
  • The ALJ was not required to develop or analyze a standalone psychological impairment theory because Varnon did not allege a disabling psychological condition in his submissions or at the hearing; and, in any event, substantial evidence showed normal mental examinations.
  • The ALJ sufficiently considered alleged medication side effects because the record contained many denials of side effects, supporting the ALJ’s ultimate symptom finding under substantial-evidence review.
  • The ALJ did not ignore low testosterone; the RFC discussion cited testimony and urology records, and the ALJ permissibly found the alleged fatigue was not fully supported by the record.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

1) Finality and posture for judicial review

  • Doughty v. Apfel, 245 F.3d 1274, 1278 (11th Cir. 2001): Cited for the proposition that when the Appeals Council declines review, the ALJ’s decision becomes the Commissioner’s final decision. This framed the scope of review: the appellate court reviews the agency’s final decision, not the district court’s reasoning.

2) Standard of review: deference to supported agency factfinding

  • Raper v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 89 F.4th 1261, 1268–69 (11th Cir. 2024): Provided the governing lens—legal issues de novo, but factual findings affirmed if supported by substantial evidence; also used as an example of affirming an ALJ’s symptom evaluation when the ALJ considered the whole record and explained inconsistencies.
  • Moore v. Barnhart, 405 F.3d 1208, 1211 (11th Cir. 2005): Quoted (via Raper) for the definition of substantial evidence and the prohibition on reweighing evidence or making new credibility determinations on appeal.
  • Buckwalter v. Acting Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 5 F.4th 1315, 1320 (11th Cir. 2021): Reinforced that a decision may be affirmed even if the preponderance of evidence could support a contrary result, so long as substantial evidence supports the ALJ.

3) Subjective symptoms and the pain standard

  • Dyer v. Barnhart, 395 F.3d 1206, 1210–11 (11th Cir. 2005): Supplied two key rules: (i) the Eleventh Circuit’s three-part pain standard applies when disability is asserted through pain testimony; and (ii) there is “no rigid requirement” that an ALJ mention every piece of evidence, so long as the decision shows consideration of the condition “as a whole” and is not a “broad rejection.”
  • Holt v. Sullivan, 921 F.2d 1221, 1223 (11th Cir. 1991): Quoted within Dyer as the source of the three-part pain standard.
  • Malak v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 131 F.4th 1280, 1287 (11th Cir. 2025): Used to restate the requirement that an ALJ who discounts pain testimony must give specific and adequate reasons (or the basis must be obvious), and as an analogy for affirming an ALJ’s side-effects finding when treatment records did not show persistent complaints.

4) Duty to develop/consider theories and the claimant’s burden to allege impairments

  • Ellison v. Barnhart, 355 F.3d 1272, 1276 (11th Cir. 2003): Cited for the principle the panel applied to reject Varnon’s attempt to transform “psychological sources of pain” into an unpresented, standalone disabling impairment. The decision treats the claimant’s failure to allege the impairment as dispositive of the ALJ’s duty to address it.
  • Sullivan v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 794 F. App'x 670, 671 (11th Cir. 2017) (per curiam) (unpublished): Cited alongside Ellison to reinforce the same point (with the caveat, implied by its status, that it is persuasive rather than binding).

5) RFC must account for all impairments (severe and non-severe)

  • Schink v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 935 F.3d 1245, 1268 (11th Cir. 2019): Quoted for the proposition that the ALJ must consider all impairments—severe and non-severe—when assessing RFC. The panel used Schink not to reverse, but to validate that the ALJ did in fact consider low testosterone and fatigue in the RFC discussion.

Legal Reasoning

1) Symptom evaluation: “not entirely consistent” + record-based reasons sufficed

The panel treated Varnon’s “psychological causes of pain” and “medication side effects” arguments as part of the broader question whether the ALJ properly evaluated subjective symptoms under Dyer v. Barnhart and SSR 16-3p.

The ALJ followed the expected structure:

  1. Recognized that medically determinable impairments could reasonably produce some symptoms; then
  2. Evaluated whether the alleged intensity, persistence, and limiting effects were consistent with the overall evidence.

Critically, the panel emphasized substantial-evidence review. Even if the ALJ did not explicitly discuss certain snippets of older records referencing psychological factors associated with pain or intermittent medication complaints, the decision was affirmed because:

  • Under Dyer v. Barnhart, an ALJ need not reference every piece of evidence if the reasoning demonstrates consideration of the record as a whole; and
  • The record contained substantial countervailing evidence (normal mental exams; frequent denials of side effects) supporting the ALJ’s bottom-line consistency finding.

2) No standalone psychological-impairment analysis required because it was not alleged

The court added an independent rationale: Varnon did not present a disabling psychological condition as part of his claim (in his submissions or at the hearing). Relying on Ellison v. Barnhart (and Sullivan v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec.), the panel held the ALJ had “no duty to consider it.”

Functionally, the opinion draws a line between:

  • The ALJ’s duty to evaluate the symptoms and functional effects of alleged impairments; and
  • A claimant’s attempt on appeal to reframe isolated medical notations into a new impairment theory not previously pursued.

3) RFC and low testosterone: considered, but not credited to the extent alleged

Because low testosterone was found “severe” at step two, Varnon argued the RFC necessarily had to incorporate additional fatigue-related restrictions. The panel rejected that inference by turning to the governing definition of RFC in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545 and the “regular and continuing basis” concept in SSR 96-8P.

The key move was evidentiary rather than categorical: the panel pointed to portions of the RFC discussion where the ALJ:

  • Noted Varnon’s testimony that he was fatigued “all the time,”
  • Cited urology records showing treatment for decreased testosterone, and
  • Concluded the alleged symptom severity was “not entirely supported” by the record.

Under Schink v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., the ALJ had to consider all impairments; the panel found that requirement satisfied because the ALJ expressly addressed the condition and then made a supported finding about its functional impact.

Impact

Although labeled “NOT FOR PUBLICATION” and therefore nonprecedential in the Eleventh Circuit, the decision is practically important in three ways:

  1. Issue-framing discipline in disability cases: Claimants who wish to rely on a psychological impairment (or a psychological component as a disabling theory) should clearly allege it during administrative proceedings. The panel’s reliance on Ellison v. Barnhart underscores that appellate courts may treat late-breaking impairment theories as forfeited or outside the ALJ’s duty to address.
  2. Symptom evaluation survives imperfect discussion: By reiterating Dyer v. Barnhart, the panel signals that omissions in an ALJ’s written discussion (e.g., not mentioning every reference to side effects) will often be harmless where the record contains substantial evidence supporting the ALJ’s overall consistency rationale and the decision is not a “broad rejection.”
  3. “Severe” at step two does not guarantee RFC restrictions: The opinion reflects a common doctrinal point: step-two severity is a threshold finding, while RFC restrictions depend on evidence-supported functional limitations. Even a “severe” impairment like low testosterone may yield no added restrictions if the ALJ permissibly finds the alleged degree of fatigue unsupported.

Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Five-step sequential evaluation (20 C.F.R. § 404.1520): A standardized process where SSA asks (1) are you working at substantial levels, (2) do you have severe impairments, (3) do they meet a listed impairment, (4) can you do past work, and (5) can you do other work in the national economy.
  • RFC (Residual Functional Capacity): The most you can still do in a work setting despite medical impairments—expressed in work-related functional terms (e.g., lifting, standing, sitting, postural limits).
  • The Eleventh Circuit “pain standard” (Holt/Dyer): A test for evaluating disability claims based on pain testimony requiring an underlying medical condition plus either objective confirmation of pain severity or a condition that could reasonably be expected to cause the alleged pain.
  • SSR 16-3p: SSA guidance directing adjudicators to evaluate the intensity and persistence of symptoms using all record evidence, focusing on consistency rather than making a generalized “credibility” judgment about character.
  • Substantial evidence: Not “more likely than not.” It means enough relevant evidence that a reasonable person could agree with the ALJ—even if a different factfinder might have decided differently.
  • “No rigid requirement” to cite every record (Dyer): ALJs must show they considered the claimant’s condition as a whole, but they do not have to discuss each medical note if the reasoning and evidentiary basis are clear.

Conclusion

Barry Varnon v. Social Security Administration, Commissioner illustrates how difficult it is to overturn an ALJ on symptom evaluation and RFC findings under substantial-evidence review. The panel reaffirmed three practical rules: (1) an ALJ’s symptom analysis is upheld if it is record-grounded and not a conclusory rejection, even if not every evidentiary detail is discussed; (2) the ALJ generally has no obligation to evaluate a new impairment theory—such as a standalone psychological condition—when the claimant did not allege it during the administrative process; and (3) even when an impairment is deemed “severe,” RFC restrictions must be tied to supported functional limitations, not merely to the diagnosis itself.