No Double Redress: The Fourth Circuit Bars Appeals for Nominal Damages Once Compensatory Damages Are Awarded

1. Introduction

In Jesse Hammons v. University of Maryland Medical System Corporation, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit confronted a relatively rare but increasingly important procedural question: does a plaintiff who has already recovered compensatory damages for an injury retain Article III standing to appeal the dismissal of additional constitutional claims merely to seek nominal damages or retrospective declaratory relief?

The case arises from the cancellation of a gender-affirming hysterectomy at a Catholic-affiliated hospital. Plaintiff-appellant Jesse Hammons, a transgender man, alleged that the cancellation violated the Establishment Clause, the Equal Protection Clause, and § 1557 of the Affordable Care Act (ACA). The district court agreed only on the § 1557 claim and, following the parties’ stipulation, entered a judgment for $874.63 in compensatory damages (actual plus interest). Hammons appealed, seeking to revive his constitutional claims primarily to obtain nominal damages and a backward-looking declaratory judgment.

The Fourth Circuit (Judges Heytens, Quattlebaum, and Rushing) dismissed the appeal, holding that Hammons lacked standing because he failed to identify any non-duplicative remedy that the appellate court could award. In turn, the hospital’s conditional cross-appeal was dismissed as moot.

2. Summary of the Judgment

  • Holding: A plaintiff who has already received compensatory damages for a single underlying injury lacks Article III redressability to appeal the dismissal of additional claims merely to obtain nominal damages or retrospective declaratory relief.
  • Disposition: The Fourth Circuit granted defendants’ motion to dismiss for lack of appellate standing and dismissed both the main appeal and the conditional cross-appeal.
  • Status: Unpublished opinion (non-precedential within the Fourth Circuit), but carries persuasive weight and clarifies the interaction between Uzuegbunam v. Preczewski and single-injury damages principles.

3. Detailed Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited and Their Influence

  1. Virginia House of Delegates v. Bethune-Hill, 587 U.S. 658 (2019) – Reiterates that standing requirements apply at every stage, including on appeal. The court used Bethune-Hill to place the burden squarely on Hammons to demonstrate redressability.
  2. Comite de Apoyo a los Trabajadores Agrícolas v. U.S. Dept. of Labor, 995 F.2d 510 (4th Cir. 1993) – Establishes that a purely retrospective declaratory judgment, without more, does not satisfy the redressability prong. Cited to dispose of Hammons’s declaratory-relief theory.
  3. Uzuegbunam v. Preczewski, 592 U.S. 279 (2021) – The Supreme Court’s landmark on nominal damages. The panel relied on Uzuegbunam for two propositions: (a) nominal damages are actual damages, not “mere symbols,” and (b) they are typically available only when no other compensatory damages have been awarded.
  4. Bender v. City of New York, 78 F.3d 787 (2d Cir. 1996) – Articulates the “one injury, one recovery” rule. Used to hold that nominal and compensatory damages cannot both be recovered for the same injury.
  5. Cummings v. Premier Rehab Keller, PLLC, 596 U.S. 212 (2022) – Holds emotional-distress damages are unavailable under § 1557. The panel referenced Cummings only to note Hammons’s belated attempt to claim emotional-distress damages as an unpreserved argument.
  6. Schneider v. County of San Diego, 285 F.3d 784 (9th Cir. 2002) – Distinguished because it involved two separate injuries (takings and due-process violations), whereas Hammons alleged a single injury.

3.2 Court’s Legal Reasoning

a. Article III Standing on Appeal
The court begins with the uncontroversial premise that a party invoking appellate jurisdiction must demonstrate injury-in-fact, causation, and—crucially—redressability. Because the district court had already awarded actual damages that fully compensated Hammons for the injury caused by the surgery cancellation, the panel asked: “What more can this court give you?”

b. Redressability Analysis
The panel rejected each purported additional remedy:

  • Retrospective Declaratory Relief – Under Comite de Apoyo, such relief is legally insufficient without some further concrete benefit (injunction, damages, etc.). Hammons offered none.
  • Nominal Damages – Citing Uzuegbunam and Bender, the panel held that once compensatory damages are awarded for a single injury, nominal damages are unavailable because they would constitute an impermissible double recovery.
  • Emotional-Distress Damages – Raised for the first time at oral argument, this theory was deemed waived under Fourth Circuit practice (Clay and Heyward), so the panel declined to consider it.

c. Practical Effect of the Stipulation
The parties’ joint stipulation on compensatory damages proved fatal to appellate standing. By agreeing to and accepting payment for the full measure of economic loss, Hammons effectively conceded that the injury had been redressed. The stipulation also signaled that Hammons was not seeking further compensatory categories (e.g., emotional distress, punitive damages) at the trial level, cementing the panel’s conclusion that nothing remained to be remedied.

3.3 Impact of the Decision

  • Clarifies Post-Uzuegbunam Landscape – The opinion limits plaintiffs’ ability to invoke nominal damages opportunistically after having secured compensatory damages, a question that Uzuegbunam itself left open.
  • Signals Strategic Implications – Civil-rights plaintiffs must now consider carefully whether accepting or stipulating to compensatory damages at the district-court level will foreclose the possibility of reviving constitutional claims on appeal.
  • Section 1557 Litigation – While the merits of the ACA claim were not disturbed, the decision suggests that plaintiffs cannot keep Establishment or Equal Protection claims alive solely to obtain symbolic vindication once a § 1557 monetary award covers the same injury.
  • Religious-Affiliated Hospitals – Substantively, the case leaves unanswered broader constitutional questions about the interaction between Catholic health-care directives and transgender patients’ rights, because those issues were never reached on appeal. Future litigants will need a live remedy (e.g., prospective injunction) to secure appellate review.
  • Appellate Practice – Reinforces the Fourth Circuit’s strict approach to waiver and Rule 28(j) letters, warning counsel that new theories first raised at oral argument are unlikely to be entertained.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Standing – The constitutional requirement that a plaintiff show (1) injury-in-fact, (2) causation, and (3) redressability. Without it, courts lack power to act.
  • Redressability – The plaintiff must show the court can likely give effective relief for the injury. If nothing the court can do would improve the plaintiff’s position, redressability fails.
  • Nominal Damages – A token monetary award (often $1) that courts grant when a legal right was violated but the plaintiff cannot prove actual quantifiable loss. After Uzuegbunam, nominal damages alone can satisfy redressability but only until the plaintiff has been compensated by other damages.
  • Declaratory Judgment – A court declaration of the parties’ rights that does not order money or other relief. If purely retrospective, it typically lacks redressability unless coupled with some practical effect.
  • Stipulation – A binding agreement between parties on specific facts or amounts (here, $748.46 in actual damages), preventing later litigation of the agreed items.
  • Conditional Cross-Appeal – A defensive appeal filed by an appellee, triggered only if the main appeal survives. Because the main appeal was dismissed, the cross-appeal evaporated.

5. Conclusion

Hammons v. University of Maryland Medical System underscores a foundational but sometimes overlooked principle: Article III courts exist to redress concrete injuries, not to issue advisory opinions or symbolic vindications once full compensation has been paid. By synthesizing Bethune-Hill, Uzuegbunam, and longstanding single-recovery doctrine, the Fourth Circuit erected a clear barrier to plaintiffs who, after receiving compensatory damages, attempt to resurrect dismissed claims for the sake of nominal damages or declaratory pronouncements.

Although the opinion is unpublished and therefore non-binding, its reasoning is likely to influence district courts and other circuits confronting similar post-Uzuegbunam standing puzzles. For civil-rights litigants and their counsel, the decision serves as a strategic caution: be mindful that accepting compensatory damages may foreclose appellate review of broader constitutional issues unless a distinct, non-redundant form of relief— such as prospective injunctive relief—remains live.