No “Default Dismissal” Under Rule 12(b)(6): Unopposed Motions Still Require Merits Review in the Fourth Circuit

Case: Janet Guzman v. Acuarius Night Club LLC (4th Cir. Feb. 13, 2026) (published) — Vacated and remanded.

1. Introduction

Nine professional female models sued Acuarius Night Club LLC, a Greenville, South Carolina nightclub, alleging the club misappropriated images from the models’ social media and used them in promotional flyers and advertising for club events (e.g., “Ladies Night,” “Traffic Light Party,” “Latin Saturdays”) without notice, consent, or compensation. The complaint asserted two federal false-association/false-endorsement counts under the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1), plus seven state-law counts. Supplemental jurisdiction over the state claims was invoked under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a).

The procedural posture drove the appeal: Acuarius moved to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Plaintiffs did not file a timely response under the District of South Carolina’s local motion practice rule (D.S.C. Local Rule 7.06). The district court, sua sponte, entered a text order “granting as unopposed” the motion to dismiss—dismissing the federal counts and most state counts with prejudice, and dismissing the remaining misappropriation claim (Count III) without prejudice after declining supplemental jurisdiction.

The central issue on appeal was whether a district court may grant a Rule 12(b)(6) motion solely because it is unopposed—i.e., treat nonresponse as a procedural default warranting dismissal.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Fourth Circuit vacated and remanded. It held that a plaintiff’s failure to oppose a Rule 12(b)(6) motion is not, by itself, a legally sufficient basis to dismiss for failure to state a claim. Rule 12(b)(6) authorizes dismissal only when the complaint, on its face and accepting factual allegations as true, fails to state a plausible claim. The Rule does not provide “default” dismissal relief for nonresponse.

The panel found the record showed the district court dismissed because the motion was “unopposed,” not because the court performed the required plausibility analysis. Accordingly, the judgment was vacated and the case remanded for further proceedings.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited

Core Fourth Circuit requirement: courts must assess legal sufficiency even if unopposed

  • Stevenson v. City of Seat Pleasant, 743 F.3d 411, 416 n.3 (4th Cir. 2014)
    The opinion treats Stevenson as the governing statement: even if a plaintiff does not challenge a motion to dismiss, “the district court nevertheless ha[d] an obligation to review the motions to ensure that dismissal [was] proper.” Guzman operationalizes this obligation as a matter of Rule 12(b)(6)’s text: dismissal must be justified by failure to state a claim, not by the absence of opposition.
  • Goudy v. Navy Fed. Credit Union Found., No. 23-1721, 2024 WL 2206508, at *1 (4th Cir. May 16, 2024)
    Cited as consistent Fourth Circuit practice: a district court “cannot treat a nonresponse [to a motion to dismiss] as a per se procedural default.” The panel uses Goudy to underscore that nonresponse does not itself satisfy Rule 12(b)(6)’s standard.

Plausibility framework: what the court must do on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion

  • Francis v. Giacomelli, 588 F.3d 186, 192 (4th Cir. 2009)
    Used for the proposition that Rule 12(b)(6) tests “solely the legal sufficiency” of the complaint, assuming pleaded facts are true.
  • Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) and Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)
    These supply the required inquiry: whether the complaint pleads enough factual matter to state a claim “plausible on its face.” Guzman emphasizes that this is the exclusive basis for a Rule 12(b)(6) ruling—no alternative “default” basis exists in the Rule.

Authorities rejecting “dismissal as sanction” through unopposed Rule 12(b)(6) motions

  • Stackhouse v. Mazurkiewicz, 951 F.2d 29, 30 (3d Cir. 1991)
    Quoted for the idea that granting dismissal solely because the motion is unopposed converts the dismissal into a “sanction,” not a merits-based determination that the complaint fails to state a claim.
  • Pomerleau v. W. Springfield Pub. Sch., 362 F.3d 143, 145 (1st Cir. 2004)
    The defendant urged the First Circuit’s approach permitting dismissal as unopposed where a local rule “expressly requires” a response and “the result does not clearly offend equity.” The Fourth Circuit distinguished Pomerleau because “the District of South Carolina has no such local rule.” The panel did not adopt Pomerleau as a general principle and instead anchored its holding in the text of Rule 12(b)(6).

How unopposed filings may be treated—without collapsing into default

  • Pueschel v. United States, 369 F.3d 345, 354 (4th Cir. 2004)
    Cited for the limited proposition that a court may treat the asserted grounds in an unopposed motion as “uncontroverted.” Guzman makes clear that “uncontroverted” is not the same as “automatically granted”: the court must still determine whether, as a matter of law on the complaint’s face, the Rule 12(b)(6) standard is met.

Analogy to summary judgment: even unopposed, the movant must be entitled to judgment as a matter of law

  • Robinson v. Wix Filtration Corp., 599 F.3d 403, 409 n.8 (4th Cir. 2010) (quoting Custer v. Pan Am. Life Ins. Co., 12 F.3d 410, 416 (4th Cir. 1993))
    The court analogizes: just as summary judgment cannot be granted by default, a motion to dismiss cannot be granted by default. The duty is judicial, not adversarial: the court must verify entitlement under the governing legal standard.

Treatise support

  • 5B Wright & Miller's Federal Practice & Procedure § 1357 n.23 (4th ed. 2024)
    Cited for the collected view that even absent opposition, courts must conduct the Rule 12(b)(6) inquiry; nonresponse does not itself establish failure to state a claim.

3.2 Legal Reasoning

(a) The holding flows from Rule 12(b)(6)’s text and function

The opinion’s core move is textual and structural: Rule 12(b)(6) authorizes dismissal only on one ground—failure to state a claim. Because the Rule “specifies no other ground,” it cannot be used to impose a procedural default dismissal for silence. Nonresponse may deprive the nonmovant of argument, but it does not transform the complaint into a non-claim. Therefore, the court must still evaluate plausibility on the pleadings.

(b) Contrast with Federal Rules that expressly impose default consequences

The panel strengthens the inference by contrast: when the Federal Rules want default consequences, they say so. It cites several examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(a)(1)(E) (default judgment warning), 8(b)(6) (failure to deny equals admission), 12(h)(1) (waiver of certain defenses), 36(a)(3) (requests for admission deemed admitted), and 38(d) (jury waiver). Rule 12(b)(6) contains no analogous language, so courts may not invent an implicit default mechanism.

(c) Record-based application: the district court dismissed for “unopposed,” not for legal insufficiency

The Fourth Circuit read the district court’s “TEXT ORDER granting as unopposed Defendant's motion to dismiss” as dispositive evidence that the dismissal rested on nonresponse. The later order denying post-judgment relief reiterated that the court granted the motion “as unopposed.” The panel found “nothing in the record” showing the court assessed plausibility.

The defendant argued that “with prejudice” dismissals implied a merits analysis. The panel rejected that inference: even if the district court read the motion, the record still did not show it performed the independent Rule 12(b)(6) analysis.

(d) Preservation: a merits error in the judgment is preserved by a timely appeal

The defendant also argued plaintiffs forfeited the Stevenson point by raising it late in post-judgment motions. The panel rejected this: the error occurred in the entry of judgment itself, and “taking an appeal from that judgment is all that is necessary to preserve the error.” The court noted timeliness under 28 U.S.C. § 2107 and Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4)(A)(vi).

3.3 Impact

Practical effect on district court motion practice in the Fourth Circuit

  • No “automatic grant” of Rule 12(b)(6) motions. District courts must conduct a plausibility review even when a motion is unopposed. The movant must still be entitled to dismissal under Iqbal/Twombly.
  • Nonresponse affects advocacy, not the governing standard. A plaintiff’s silence may leave the motion’s legal arguments unrebutted, but the judge must still determine whether those arguments actually demonstrate failure to state a claim.
  • Clarifies the boundary between merits rulings and sanctions. If a court wants to impose consequences for missed deadlines, it must rely on appropriate sanction mechanisms (and their procedural safeguards), not recharacterize the consequence as a Rule 12(b)(6) merits decision.

Interaction with local rules

The opinion distinguishes Pomerleau v. W. Springfield Pub. Sch. on the ground that D.S.C. Local Rule 7.06 does not “expressly” require a response in a manner that authorizes dismissal by default. While the panel stops short of articulating a full preemption rule (i.e., whether any local rule could authorize default dismissal on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion), its reasoning strongly signals that local practice cannot displace Rule 12(b)(6)’s merits requirement without creating a conflict with the Federal Rules’ allocation of default consequences.

Downstream effects on supplemental jurisdiction dispositions

Because the district court dismissed the federal claims as “unopposed,” it then declined supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state claim under 28 U.S.C. § 1367. Vacatur of the federal-dismissal predicate may resurrect federal jurisdiction and alter whether, and when, a district court can appropriately decline supplemental jurisdiction.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Rule 12(b)(6) (“failure to state a claim”). A pleading test: assuming alleged facts are true, do they plausibly amount to a legal claim? It is not a device for punishing missed deadlines.
  • “Plausible on its face” (Twombly/Iqbal). More than labels or speculation; enough factual content to make liability a reasonable inference.
  • “With prejudice” vs. “without prejudice.” With prejudice usually ends the claim permanently in that court; without prejudice permits refiling. Here, the district court dismissed federal counts with prejudice and the lone remaining state claim without prejudice after declining supplemental jurisdiction.
  • Supplemental jurisdiction (28 U.S.C. § 1367). Federal courts may hear state claims tied to federal claims; if federal claims fall out early, courts often decline the remaining state claims.
  • Post-judgment motions (Rules 59(e), 60(b)). Tools to alter/amend judgments (59(e), time-limited) or seek relief for specified reasons (60(b)). The Fourth Circuit did not need to reach these rulings because it vacated the underlying judgment.
  • “Text order.” A docket entry that functions as an order without a full written opinion. The Fourth Circuit treated the text order’s stated basis (“granting as unopposed”) as the key indicator of error.

5. Conclusion

Janet Guzman v. Acuarius Night Club LLC reinforces a clear Fourth Circuit rule: a Rule 12(b)(6) motion cannot be granted merely because it is unopposed. District courts must independently evaluate whether the complaint fails the plausibility standard under Ashcroft v. Iqbal and Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly. Treating nonresponse as dispositive converts a merits ruling into an improper sanction. The decision therefore safeguards Rule 12(b)(6)’s function as a legal-sufficiency screen—not a default mechanism—and it will shape district court handling of missed opposition deadlines across the circuit.