“No Court Shall Have Jurisdiction” Means No Review of § 1182(a)(9)(B)(v) Waiver Decisions—including Eligibility Determinations

I. Introduction

This appeal arises from a familiar immigration problem with unusually hard procedural edges: a family-based immigrant visa beneficiary who accrued more than one year of unlawful presence is inadmissible and typically must depart the United States and wait ten years abroad. Congress provided a potential escape hatch—an inadmissibility waiver under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(v)—but also imposed strict limits on judicial review.

Plaintiff-Appellant Danuta Dec (a Polish national) sought a provisional unlawful presence waiver through USCIS (under the Secretary of Homeland Security’s delegated authority). USCIS denied her application on an eligibility ground tied to its interpretation and policy implementation of 8 U.S.C. § 1154(l) (relief following the death of a “qualifying relative”). Dec then sued in federal district court for declaratory and APA relief; the district court dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that Congress “unequivocally precludes judicial review of all agency decisions as to waivers—including eligibility determinations.”

The opinion also addresses a second, practice-facing issue: the appellant’s opening brief contained non-existent citations and a false quotation, bearing hallmarks of AI hallucination. The court admonished counsel but imposed no further sanction on the record presented.

II. Summary of the Opinion

• No judicial review of waiver decisions: The court held that 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(v) strips jurisdiction over “a decision or action … regarding a waiver,” which the court read to include threshold eligibility determinations, not merely the ultimate discretionary grant/denial.
• Eligibility is discretionary in any event: Even apart from the “no court shall have jurisdiction” clause, the court concluded that waiver eligibility—requiring hardship “established to [the agency’s] satisfaction”—is “inherently discretionary,” thus falling within unreviewability principles (APA § 701(a)(2) and related INA provisions).
• APA presumption rebutted: Because Congress precluded review (and because the determinations are committed to agency discretion), the APA’s presumption of reviewability does not supply jurisdiction.
• AI/accuracy admonishment: The court publicly admonished counsel for submitting non-existent citations and a false quotation, emphasizing duties of accuracy and candor and referencing mechanisms (Westlaw/Lexis citation checks) that make verification “easier now than ever.” It declined further sanctions, crediting counsel’s acceptance of responsibility and finding the errors limited and non-dispositive.

III. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

1) Seventh Circuit and Supreme Court immigration-review framework

• Soni v. Jaddou, 103 F.4th 1271 (7th Cir. 2024): Used for two propositions: (i) general visa/adjustment background; and (ii) critically, the Seventh Circuit’s prior articulation that for this waiver provision, “no review means no review,” including the observation that § 1182(a)(9)(B)(v) “lacks a proviso parallel” to 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D) (which preserves review of legal questions in certain removal contexts). The court leaned on Soni to reinforce the breadth of Congress’s jurisdiction-stripping design.
• Nielsen v. Preap, 586 U.S. 392 (2019): Cited for the institutional point that waiver authority originally vested in the Attorney General has been transferred to the Secretary of Homeland Security.
• Dijamco v. Wolf, 962 F.3d 999 (7th Cir. 2020): Provides the Seventh Circuit’s methodological instruction to scrutinize statutory text when determining whether jurisdiction is barred, and it is invoked to note that the court had not yet “had occasion to consider § 1154(l).” The panel uses Dijamco to justify restraint: even if § 1154(l) could raise nondiscretionary duty questions, the waiver-review bar prevents reaching them here.
• Patel v. Garland, 596 U.S. 328 (2022): Employed for textual interpretation—specifically, that “regarding” has a “broadening effect.” This supports construing “decision … regarding a waiver” to sweep in all waiver-related determinations, including eligibility.

2) Discretion, “satisfaction” language, and mixed questions

• Gulomjonov v. Bondi, 131 F.4th 601 (7th Cir. 2025) and Bouarfa v. Mayorkas, 604 U.S. 6 (2024): Both are cited to support the proposition that when Congress requires a showing “to the satisfaction of” the Executive, it makes the determination discretionary in character. This undercuts Dec’s attempt to relabel eligibility as a purely legal question.
• Wilkinson v. Garland, 601 U.S. 209 (2024): Central to the panel’s treatment of eligibility review. Wilkinson held that cancellation-of-removal hardship eligibility under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(D) can be reviewable as a mixed question of law and fact. The Seventh Circuit relied on Wilkinson’s distinction: Congress did not include “satisfaction” language in § 1229b(b)(1)(D), but did retain it in provisions like § 1182, signaling a different reviewability outcome.
• Guerrero-Lasprilla, 589 U.S. 221 (2020): Appears via Wilkinson as part of the Supreme Court’s taxonomy for “mixed questions” and review of certain legal determinations; it functions here mainly as contrast—what can be reviewable in one INA setting does not control this waiver setting.
• Rahman v. Bondi, 131 F.4th 399 (6th Cir. 2025): Cited as aligned authority applying Wilkinson to conclude waiver eligibility is discretionary and unreviewable, unlike cancellation-of-removal eligibility.

3) Textualism and interpretive canons

• United States v. Melvin, 948 F.3d 848 (7th Cir. 2020): Provides the panel’s statutory interpretation roadmap: start with text, read in context, use ordinary meaning, and stop if unambiguous.
• Lackey v. Stinnie, 604 U.S. 192 (2025): Supports the principle that Congress adopts the “cluster of ideas” attached to legal terms of art.
• Childs v. Webster, 168 F.4th 1020 (7th Cir. 2026): Used for the surplusage canon: interpreting § 1182(a)(9)(B)(v) to allow review of legal eligibility issues would make Congress’s decision to include an express legal-questions proviso in § 1252(a)(2)(D) but not here effectively meaningless.
• ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW (2012): Cited for multiple interpretive propositions: applying unambiguous text as written and the surplusage canon.

4) Professional responsibility and AI-citation issues

• Jones v. Kankakee Cnty. Sheriff's Dep't, 164 F.4th 967 (7th Cir. 2026): The court’s recent discussion of AI’s “promise and pitfalls,” used here to frame the broader institutional challenge while emphasizing that lawyers remain responsible for verifying the accuracy of citations and quotations.
• In re Nwaubani, 2026 WL 687194 (4th Cir. Mar. 11, 2026): Cited as an example of other courts confronting AI hallucinations and fabricated citations.
• FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b)(2), (3) and FED. R. APP. P. 38: Referenced to underscore that filings implicitly represent that legal contentions are warranted and factual assertions have support, and that sanctions may follow from violations.
• Standards for Professional Conduct Within the Seventh Federal Judicial Circuit: Quoted for the specific professional pledge not to “misquote, or miscite” authorities to the court.

B. Legal Reasoning

1) Two independent jurisdictional barriers

The court built redundancy into its holding: Dec lost jurisdictionally twice over.

• Barrier One (discretion): Under the APA, judicial review is unavailable where action is “committed to agency discretion by law” (5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2)). The panel reasoned that the waiver eligibility threshold is discretionary because Congress required hardship to be established “to the satisfaction of” the agency in § 1182(a)(9)(B)(v). The “satisfaction” formulation transforms what might look like an adjudicable hardship standard into an executive judgment call, reinforced by Wilkinson v. Garland’s contrast between statutes with and without such language.
• Barrier Two (jurisdiction stripping): Even if eligibility could be characterized as legal or mixed, § 1182(a)(9)(B)(v) independently states: “No court shall have jurisdiction to review a decision or action … regarding a waiver.” The panel read “decision” in ordinary and legal senses to include determinations reached after considering facts and law; and read “regarding” as expansive (per Patel v. Garland). It also used structural inference: Congress explicitly preserved legal-question review elsewhere (§ 1252(a)(2)(D)), but not here, so courts may not graft a similar carve-out onto § 1182(a)(9)(B)(v).

2) Why § 1154(l) could not reopen the courthouse doors

Dec attempted to reframe the dispute as one about USCIS’s purported nondiscretionary duties under § 1154(l) (and thus reviewable), rather than a waiver decision under § 1182. The panel rejected the maneuver functionally: USCIS’s challenged step was still “regarding a waiver,” and its policy-based linkage of § 1154(l) to “extreme hardship” is itself part of waiver adjudication. Because Congress barred review of waiver decisions broadly, the court held it could not reach the merits of how § 1154(l) should be interpreted or applied.

3) The opinion’s candid “safety valve” note

The court stressed that its holding does not necessarily foreclose all judicial review forever: if Dec were placed in removal proceedings and faced a final removal order, she could seek review in a court of appeals under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D). But absent that posture, and given Congress’s chosen scheme for waiver decisions, district-court APA review is unavailable.

C. Impact

1) Immigration litigation: waiver denials become effectively insulated

The most significant doctrinal consequence is the Seventh Circuit’s emphatic confirmation that § 1182(a)(9)(B)(v) forecloses judicial review not only of the ultimate waiver grant/denial but also of antecedent eligibility determinations—even when the eligibility dispute turns on statutory interpretation (here, interplay with § 1154(l) and USCIS policy).

Practically, this strengthens USCIS’s insulation from district-court challenges to provisional unlawful presence waiver denials, pushing litigants toward alternative procedural postures (if available) and increasing the stakes of agency-level briefing, evidentiary submission, and motion practice (reopen/reconsider).

2) Doctrinal clarification: “satisfaction” language as a reviewability marker

By leveraging Wilkinson v. Garland as a contrast case, the opinion sharpens a statutory drafting lesson: hardship standards may be reviewable in some INA contexts, but when Congress adds “to the satisfaction of” the Executive, courts will treat the determination as discretionary and, in this waiver setting, doubly protected by express jurisdiction-stripping text.

3) Professional responsibility: AI or not, verification duties are non-delegable

The admonishment section signals that the Seventh Circuit views fabricated citations and false quotations—whether caused by AI hallucinations, copying errors, or negligent editing—as a serious threat to judicial administration. The court’s emphasis on the ease of citation checking (submitting entire briefs to Westlaw or LexisNexis) suggests that “I didn’t know” defenses will face skepticism, and that sanctions risk will increase as courts normalize expectations for verification workflows.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

• “Unlawful presence” and the ten-year bar: Under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(i)(II), an individual unlawfully present for more than one year becomes inadmissible for ten years after departure.
• “Waiver of inadmissibility”: A discretionary permission allowing an otherwise inadmissible person to obtain immigration benefits. Here, § 1182(a)(9)(B)(v) authorizes a waiver when refusal of admission would cause “extreme hardship” to a qualifying relative.
• “Qualifying relative” (in this context): The waiver statute’s hardship must be to a “citizen or lawfully resident spouse or parent.” USCIS policy also linked hardship to § 1154(l) (death of a qualifying relative), but the agency concluded Dec’s sister—not her mother—was the qualifying relationship for her visa petition, so the policy did not apply.
• “Subject-matter jurisdiction”: A federal court’s power to hear a type of case. If Congress strips jurisdiction, courts must dismiss regardless of the merits.
• APA “presumption of reviewability” and its limits: The APA generally allows review of final agency action, but not when (i) another statute precludes review (5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(1)), or (ii) the matter is committed to agency discretion (§ 701(a)(2)).
• “Jurisdiction-stripping” language: The clause “No court shall have jurisdiction to review a decision or action … regarding a waiver” is Congress’s direct instruction that courts may not review waiver-related determinations.
• “Surplusage canon”: Courts avoid interpretations that make statutory text redundant. The panel reasoned that importing a legal-questions exception into § 1182(a)(9)(B)(v) would make Congress’s express exception elsewhere (§ 1252(a)(2)(D)) largely pointless.

V. Conclusion

Danuta Dec v. Markwayne Mullin cements a stringent rule in the Seventh Circuit: the combination of discretionary “satisfaction” language and explicit jurisdiction stripping in 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(v) forecloses judicial review of waiver adjudications in full, including threshold eligibility determinations—even when those determinations depend on USCIS’s interpretation or policy use of other statutes like 8 U.S.C. § 1154(l). The decision reinforces that the APA cannot supply jurisdiction where Congress has taken it away.

In a parallel and increasingly salient holding for federal practice, the court publicly admonished counsel for false citations and a fabricated quotation, warning that accuracy and candor obligations are non-negotiable and that technological change (including AI) does not dilute lawyers’ responsibility to verify every cited authority.