Date: Jul 31, 2026

No-Contact Order Violations and Unacknowledged Domestic Violence Justify Denial of Improvement Period and Termination of Parental Rights

1. Introduction

In In re B.M.-1 and O.M., the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia affirmed a Jefferson County Circuit Court order terminating Father B.M.-2’s parental rights to two children, B.M.-1 and O.M. The case arose from a December 2024 abuse-and-neglect petition filed by the West Virginia Department of Human Services (“DHS”), alleging (among other things) a pattern of domestic violence, substance abuse in the children’s presence, and emotional harm to the children. Immediately upon filing, the circuit court placed the children with their nonabusing mothers and entered a no-contact order against the father.

The appeal presented three primary issues: (1) whether the father should have received a post-adjudicatory improvement period; (2) whether the circuit court improperly relied on the father’s history of domestic violence and related criminal proceedings; and (3) whether termination was improper because the court allegedly failed to consider less restrictive alternatives.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Court affirmed. It held that the circuit court acted within its discretion in denying a post-adjudicatory improvement period because the father failed to prove—by clear and convincing evidence—that he was likely to fully participate, particularly given his repeated violations of the no-contact order and his failure to acknowledge the harm caused by his violent behavior.

The Court also held that evidence of the father’s extensive domestic-violence history and protective-order violations was directly relevant to parental fitness at disposition, especially where domestic violence was central to the abuse-and-neglect allegations. Finally, the Court reiterated that termination may be ordered without less restrictive alternatives when there is no reasonable likelihood the conditions of abuse or neglect can be substantially corrected in the near future and termination is necessary for the children’s welfare.

3. Analysis

3.1. Precedents Cited

Syl. Pt. 1, In re K.S., -- W. Va. --, 930 S.E.2d 400 (2026)

The Court began by grounding its review in the abuse-and-neglect appellate framework: dispositional rulings are reviewed for abuse of discretion, factual findings for clear error, and legal issues de novo. This standard shaped the outcome because the father’s arguments largely attacked discretionary decisions (improvement period; termination) and credibility/evidence weighting—areas where appellate deference is high.

State v. Guthrie, 194 W. Va. 657, 669 n.9, 461 S.E.2d 163, 175 n.9 (1995)

Guthrie was used for the bedrock proposition that appellate courts do not reweigh evidence or reassess witness credibility. This mattered because the father characterized his rehabilitation as “undisputed” and “documented,” yet the record contained primarily his testimony without supporting documentation, and the circuit court credited contrary indicia of noncompliance (notably, repeated no-contact violations). The Supreme Court declined to substitute its view for the circuit court’s evidentiary judgments.

In re Timber M., 231 W. Va. 44, 55, 743 S.E.2d 352, 363 (2013) (quoting In re Charity H., 215 W. Va. 208, 217, 599 S.E.2d 631, 640 (2004))

These cases provided the Court’s key doctrinal lever: a parent’s failure to acknowledge the underlying problem renders it “untreatable” and turns an improvement period into an “exercise in futility at the child’s expense.” The father did not challenge the circuit court’s finding that he failed to acknowledge how his violent behavior harmed the children. That unchallenged finding strongly supported both denial of an improvement period and termination—because meaningful remediation requires insight and accountability, not merely participation claims.

In re Tonjia M., 212 W. Va. 443, 448, 573 S.E.2d 354, 359 (2002)

The Court relied on In re Tonjia M. for the principle that a circuit court may refuse an improvement period when “no improvement is likely.” Here, the father’s proven disregard for court orders (including contempt for violating no contact), limited service engagement, and lack of acknowledgment of harm made the circuit court’s “no improvement likely” assessment reasonable.

In re Carlita B., 185 W. Va. 613, 631, 408 S.E.2d 365, 383 (1991) (citing Nancy Viola R. v. Randolph W., 177 W. Va. 710, 356 S.E.2d 464 (1987))

These authorities supplied the relevance rule: repeated abuse and violence toward the other parent is relevant to parental fitness. The father argued his past domestic violence and criminal proceedings were “unrelated” to the case; the Court rejected that framing because domestic violence was central to the petition’s allegations and to the children’s harm. Thus, history of domestic violence and protective-order violations was probative of both risk and the father’s capacity to correct conditions.

Syl. Pt. 5, In re Kristin Y., 227 W. Va. 558, 712 S.E.2d 55 (2011) (quoting Syl. Pt. 2, In re R.J.M., 164 W. Va. 496, 266 S.E.2d 114 (1980))

The Court applied this rule to dispose of the “less restrictive alternatives” argument: when there is no reasonable likelihood of substantial correction, termination may be employed without intervening less restrictive alternatives. The precedents functioned as a categorical answer to the father’s claim that the children could be protected through lesser measures.

Syl. Pt. 4, in part, In re Cecil T., 228 W. Va. 89, 717 S.E.2d 873 (quoting In re R.J.M., 164 W. Va. at 496, 266 S.E.2d at 114, Syl. Pt. 1, in part)

This line of cases reinforced that courts need not exhaust speculative improvement possibilities when the child’s welfare would be seriously threatened. The father’s chronic domestic violence history, repeated violations of protective/no-contact orders, and minimal corrective efforts made further delay and experimentation inconsistent with child welfare.

3.2. Legal Reasoning

Improvement period (W. Va. Code § 49-4-610(2)(B)): The statutory gateway requires the parent to demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that he is likely to fully participate. The Court emphasized the evidentiary record: the father’s “documented proof” claim was not supported by documentation in the record, and the circuit court had substantial evidence of noncompliance (multiple no-contact violations) and lack of insight (failure to acknowledge harm). Those facts made it rational to conclude he was not likely to “fully participate.”
Termination (W. Va. Code § 49-4-604(c)(6) and § 49-4-604(d)): Termination requires (1) no reasonable likelihood of substantial correction in the near future and (2) necessity for the child’s welfare. The Court endorsed the circuit court’s reliance on: (a) chronic domestic violence; (b) demonstrated disregard for protective and no-contact orders (including a conviction for violating a protective order during the case and contempt for violating the court’s no-contact order); (c) minimal efforts to address deficiencies; and (d) continued failure to acknowledge harm. These facts supported a finding of “inadequate capacity to solve the problems of abuse or neglect on their own or with help.”
Evidence of past domestic violence: The Court rejected the “unrelated” argument by linking the history directly to the petition’s theory of harm and future risk. Past violence and protective-order violations were treated as forward-looking evidence of parental fitness, compliance likelihood, and the child’s safety.
Less restrictive alternatives: Once the statutory “no reasonable likelihood” finding is made, precedent permits termination without lesser alternatives. The Court found the record supported both the unlikelihood of correction and the necessity of termination for welfare, given the “ongoing risk” posed by chronic domestic violence.

3.3. Impact

Although issued as a memorandum decision, the reasoning reinforces several practical rules likely to shape trial-court decision-making:

No-contact/protective-order compliance as a proxy for improvement-period viability: Violations can be treated not merely as misconduct but as strong predictive evidence that a parent will not comply with structured reunification conditions.
Domestic violence history as disposition-relevant fitness evidence: Where domestic violence is part of the abuse-and-neglect narrative, courts may robustly consider past petitions, criminal proceedings, and protective-order violations to assess risk and corrective capacity.
“Insight” requirement in remediation: The decision underscores that services and claimed rehabilitation are insufficient without acknowledgment of harm—an evidentiary factor that can decide both improvement periods and termination.
Appellate deference to circuit-court factfinding: Parents challenging termination face a steep burden where the record supports the circuit court’s credibility and risk assessments.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

Post-adjudicatory improvement period: A court-supervised chance after a parent is adjudicated for abuse/neglect to complete services (e.g., treatment, parenting education) aimed at fixing the problems that brought the case to court. It is not automatic; the parent must prove likely full participation.
Clear and convincing evidence: A higher standard than “more likely than not.” The evidence must produce a firm belief in the court that the claim is highly probable.
Judicial notice: A procedure allowing a court to recognize certain facts or records (often court records such as convictions or prior proceedings) without requiring the parties to re-prove them through testimony.
Adjudication vs. disposition: Adjudication decides whether abuse/neglect occurred. Disposition decides what should happen next (services, custody arrangements, or termination) based on the child’s welfare and the parent’s ability to correct conditions.
No reasonable likelihood to substantially correct: A statutory conclusion that the parent lacks adequate capacity—alone or with help—to fix the abuse/neglect problems soon enough to meet the child’s needs for safety and stability.
Less restrictive alternatives: Options short of termination (e.g., guardianship, continued custody with another parent). West Virginia precedent allows courts to bypass these when correction is not reasonably likely and termination is necessary for welfare.
Aggravated circumstances: Serious case features (here, chronic abuse) that can justify stronger judicial responses and reduce the expectation that the system must attempt reunification-focused measures.
Contempt: A court finding that a person disobeyed a court order (here, repeatedly contacting a child/mother despite a no-contact order), often used as evidence of disregard for legal boundaries and conditions.

5. Conclusion

In re B.M.-1 and O.M. affirms a straightforward but consequential principle in West Virginia abuse-and-neglect practice: when domestic violence is chronic, court orders meant to protect victims are repeatedly violated, and the parent fails to acknowledge the harm inflicted on children, a circuit court may deny a post-adjudicatory improvement period and terminate parental rights without pursuing less restrictive alternatives. The decision also highlights the centrality of compliance and insight—alongside services—in determining whether reunification efforts are realistic or would merely prolong instability at the child’s expense.