No Compassionate Release for an “Unusually Long Sentence” Absent a Relevant Change in Law Creating a Gross Sentencing Disparity (U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(b)(6))

Introduction

In United States v. Darryl King (11th Cir. Feb. 20, 2026) (unpublished, per curiam), the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the Northern District of Florida’s denial of a pro se motion for compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). King—serving a 262-month federal sentence imposed in 2013 after pleading guilty to drug-trafficking conspiracy and firearm offenses, including felon-in-possession under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) and a consecutive mandatory sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(i)—argued that changes in law should qualify him for a sentence reduction.

The key issues on appeal were (1) the proper standard of review (abuse of discretion) for denying § 3582(c)(1)(A) relief, and (2) whether King identified an “extraordinary and compelling” reason—specifically an “unusually long sentence” under U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(b)(6)—by showing a relevant change in law that created a “gross disparity” between his sentence and what he would likely receive today.

Summary of the Opinion

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed because King failed to satisfy the “change in law” component of the “unusually long sentence” theory in U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(b)(6). Although he had served more than 10 years (meeting the first prong), he did not identify any relevant legal change that would produce a gross disparity if sentenced at the time of his motion.

The panel rejected four asserted “changes”:

  • The First Step Act’s replacement of “felony drug offense” with “serious drug felony” in parts of the Controlled Substances Act did not alter Armed Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”) or career-offender definitions used at King’s sentencing.
  • ACCA does not require that the defendant have served more than a year and a day on the predicate convictions; relevant statutory criteria were unchanged.
  • King’s predicates were not “mere possession” offenses; they involved selling, trafficking, or possessing with intent to sell/distribute, which qualify under ACCA’s “serious drug offense” definition.
  • The district court did not plainly err by not sua sponte evaluating Second Amendment cases (New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass'n, Inc. v. Bruen; United States v. Rahimi) or the Third Circuit’s as-applied decision (Range v. Att'y Gen. United States), none of which controlled the Eleventh Circuit or addressed King’s sentencing enhancements.

Having found no “extraordinary and compelling” reason, the panel held it need not address 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) or policy-statement alignment.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

1) Standard of review and the abuse-of-discretion framework

United States v. Harris, 989 F.3d 908 (11th Cir. 2021) supplied the governing appellate standard: denials of § 3582(c)(1)(A) motions are reviewed for abuse of discretion, and reversal is inappropriate merely because the appellate court might have decided differently. The King panel relied on Harris to define abuse of discretion as using the wrong legal standard, improper procedures, clearly erroneous factfinding, or a clear error of judgment—then concluded none occurred.

2) No inherent authority to modify sentences

United States v. Puentes, 803 F.3d 597 (11th Cir. 2015) grounded the threshold principle that federal courts lack inherent authority to modify a sentence and can do so only when authorized by statute or rule. That framing matters in compassionate-release litigation because it narrows the inquiry to the statutory elements of § 3582(c)(1)(A) and applicable Commission policy statements, rather than equitable reconsideration of the original sentence.

3) Treatment of pro se filings and issues raised late

The panel cited Tannenbaum v. United States, 148 F.3d 1262 (11th Cir. 1998) for liberal construction of pro se filings, but paired it with United States v. Levy, 379 F.3d 1241 (11th Cir. 2004) to decline issues first raised in a reply brief (here, an argument about a probation violation under ACCA). Together, these cases illustrate a recurring boundary: courts will read pro se papers generously, but they will not relax preservation rules to the point of sandbagging.

4) Plain-error review for unpreserved appellate arguments

Because King first argued on appeal that the district court should have sua sponte considered certain Second Amendment authorities, the panel applied plain-error review via United States v. Innocent, 977 F.3d 1077 (11th Cir. 2020) and the four-part plain-error formulation in United States v. Pena, 684 F.3d 1137 (11th Cir. 2012). This mattered because, even if the argument had some conceptual appeal, plain-error review is highly deferential and requires a “plain” (clear/obvious) legal mistake.

5) “No plain error” absent controlling precedent

The panel’s rejection of King’s Bruen/Rahimi/Range theory leaned on United States v. Lejarde-Rada, 319 F.3d 1288 (11th Cir. 2003), which states that where statutory text does not directly resolve the issue, there can be no plain error without Supreme Court or Eleventh Circuit precedent directly resolving it. This is a key doctrinal move: it converts “open legal question” into “not plain,” foreclosing relief under plain-error review.

6) Second Amendment cases invoked by King

  • New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass'n, Inc. v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1, 142 S. Ct. 2111 (2022): The panel described Bruen as invalidating New York’s “proper cause” requirement for concealed carry and clarifying the test for Second Amendment challenges. The court treated Bruen as irrelevant to ACCA/career-offender enhancements and not a basis the district court had to raise on its own in a § 3582 motion.
  • United States v. Rahimi, 602 U.S. 680, 144 S. Ct. 1889 (2024): The panel noted Rahimi upheld § 922(g)(8) against a facial Second Amendment challenge under Bruen, reinforcing that Bruen does not automatically destabilize federal firearm prohibitions.
  • Range v. Att'y Gen. United States, 124 F.4th 218 (3d Cir. 2024): The panel recognized Range as a Third Circuit as-applied decision regarding § 922(g)(1), but emphasized it is not precedential in the Eleventh Circuit and thus could not make any district-court omission “plain error.”

Legal Reasoning

1) The governing compassionate-release structure

The court reiterated the statutory trilogy for prisoner-initiated compassionate release (after exhaustion): a district court may reduce a sentence only if (1) the § 3553(a) factors favor a reduction, (2) “extraordinary and compelling” reasons warrant it, and (3) the reduction is consistent with applicable Sentencing Commission policy statements. The panel then took a common sequencing approach: because King failed at step (2), the court “need not discuss” steps (1) and (3).

2) The “unusually long sentence” path under U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(b)(6)

King’s motion relied on the policy-statement ground of an “unusually long sentence.” The opinion applied the three elements the guideline requires: (i) at least 10 years served; (ii) a relevant change in law; and (iii) a gross disparity attributable to that change.

The court accepted that King met the time-served prong (nearly 12 years), making the case turn on whether any cited legal developments actually changed the law governing King’s ACCA/career-offender exposure.

3) Why King’s asserted “changes in law” failed

A. First Step Act amendments to the Controlled Substances Act did not alter ACCA or the Guidelines

King argued that the First Step Act changed enhancement terminology from “felony drug offense” to “serious drug felony,” and that the new definition requires serving more than 12 months (21 U.S.C. § 802(58)). The panel’s response drew a boundary between different enhancement regimes:

  • The First Step Act amended portions of the Controlled Substances Act (First Step Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-391, § 401(a), 132 Stat. 5194, 5220 (2018)).
  • ACCA independently defines a “serious drug offense” by the maximum authorized penalty (10 years or more), not time actually served (18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(A)(ii)).
  • The Guidelines independently define “controlled substance offense” by being “punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year” (U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(b)(1)), again not by time served.

Thus, even if the Controlled Substances Act enhancement triggers changed, the legal rules that produced King’s ACCA and career-offender guideline calculations did not.

B. Time served on predicate convictions is not an ACCA requirement

King contended he would not qualify for ACCA today because he did not serve more than a year and a day for any qualifying conviction. The panel rejected this as legally misguided: ACCA’s definitions turn on the nature of the offense and authorized punishment thresholds, not the sentence actually served. It emphasized that the relevant ACCA provisions were unchanged from 2013 to the present.

C. “Mere possession” is not an ACCA serious-drug predicate—but King’s predicates were not mere possession

The panel accepted the general proposition that ACCA’s “serious drug offense” definition does not encompass simple possession; the statute requires manufacturing/distributing or possession with intent. But King could not leverage that because his predicate drug convictions involved selling, trafficking, or possessing with intent to sell—conduct that fits within ACCA’s criteria.

D. Bruen/Rahimi/Range did not create a relevant change in law for King’s enhancements, and there was no plain error

Even assuming (as King urged) that Second Amendment doctrine might affect felon-in-possession prosecutions, the panel held the district court was not required—especially sua sponte—to treat those cases as a “change in law” producing a gross sentencing disparity for King’s enhancements. Two points did the work:

  • Bruen and Rahimi do not speak to ACCA/career-offender enhancements and did not purport to rewrite them.
  • Range is not binding in the Eleventh Circuit; therefore any failure to apply it could not be “plain error” under Lejarde-Rada.

Impact

Although “NOT FOR PUBLICATION,” the decision is informative in three practical ways for compassionate-release litigation in the Eleventh Circuit:

  1. It tightens the “change in law” inquiry under U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(b)(6) by insisting on regime-specific relevance. Changes to one statutory enhancement scheme (e.g., Controlled Substances Act recidivist provisions) do not automatically translate to other schemes (ACCA, career-offender guidelines) that define terms independently.
  2. It reinforces that failure on “extraordinary and compelling reasons” ends the analysis. District courts (and appellate panels) may decline to address § 3553(a) and policy-statement consistency once the motion fails on the threshold extraordinary-and-compelling requirement.
  3. It signals limited traction for late-raised constitutional theories in § 3582 appeals. When constitutional arguments are first raised on appeal, plain-error review—combined with the requirement of controlling precedent—will often be dispositive, especially where the cited authorities are out-of-circuit or do not directly address the sentencing features at issue.

More broadly, the opinion illustrates a common post–First Step Act pattern: defendants attempt to repackage sentencing or conviction challenges as compassionate-release “changes in law.” King underscores that § 3582(c)(1)(A) is not a general vehicle for collateral review, and that “unusually long sentence” relief is narrowly conditioned on a legally relevant change that creates a concrete disparity.

Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Compassionate release (§ 3582(c)(1)(A)): A limited statute allowing a court to reduce a sentence after exhaustion, but only if the prisoner proves an “extraordinary and compelling” reason (and other requirements are met). It is not the same as an appeal or a habeas petition.
  • “Extraordinary and compelling reasons”: A defined set of reasons identified by the Sentencing Commission’s policy statement (here, U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13). The court treated the guideline’s “unusually long sentence” provision as requiring a real legal change plus a “gross disparity.”
  • “Change in the law” vs. “change in circumstances”: A new statute/case can be a “change in law” only if it actually alters the legal rules that controlled the sentence. A change in some other legal area (or a nonbinding decision) may be interesting, but not “relevant.”
  • ACCA (Armed Career Criminal Act): A federal statute that increases the minimum sentence for certain § 922(g) offenders who have three prior qualifying convictions. Whether a prior qualifies generally depends on offense elements and maximum penalties, not the time actually served.
  • Plain error: A highly deferential appellate standard used when an argument was not properly preserved below. If the law is unsettled or there is no controlling precedent, the error typically is not “plain.”

Conclusion

United States v. Darryl King reinforces a clear rule for “unusually long sentence” compassionate-release requests under U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(b)(6): time served alone is not enough; the movant must identify a relevant change in law that produces a gross sentencing disparity. The Eleventh Circuit held that King’s cited developments—First Step Act terminology changes, arguments about time served, and Second Amendment cases—did not alter the ACCA and guideline rules that drove his sentence, and therefore could not supply an extraordinary and compelling reason.

The decision’s broader significance lies in its disciplined separation of sentencing-modification authority from collateral attack, its insistence on regime-specific statutory interpretation (Controlled Substances Act vs. ACCA vs. Guidelines), and its warning that unpreserved, nonbinding constitutional theories rarely succeed on appeal under plain-error review.